THE EUROPEAN STATE AND MINORITY RELIGIOUS GROUPS: EXPLORING PATTERNS OF ENGAGEMENT AND ACCESS

by

Gerald T. FitzGerald
A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of George Mason University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Political Science

Committee:

_______________________________________ Peter Mandaville, Chair
_______________________________________ Desmond Dinan
_______________________________________ Justin Gest
_______________________________________ Ming Wan, Program Director
_______________________________________ Mark J. Rozell, Dean

Date: ________________________________ Fall Semester 2017
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
The European State and Minority Religious Groups: Exploring Patterns of Engagement and Access

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

by

Gerald T. FitzGerald
Master of Arts
George Mason University, 2010
Bachelor of Science
New York University, 2008

Director: Peter Mandaville
Schar School of Policy and Government

Fall Semester 2017
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my late father Dermot, my mother Valerie, and my son Finn.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures .................................................................................................................. vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations and/or Symbols ............................................................................. viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract ............................................................................................................................ xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The importance of policy consistency ............................................................................. 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A preview of the selected cases ....................................................................................... 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1 Literature review ............................................................................................ 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism / corporatism and insiders / outsiders .............................................................. 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative analyses of Jewish and Muslim communal organizations in Europe ........... 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural accounts: The role of church-state institutions ............................................. 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural accounts: The ‘problem’ of Islamic pluralism ................................................ 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturalist accounts: the ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis ............................................ 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘post-nationalist’ thesis ........................................................................................... 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘neo-corporatism’ hypothesis .................................................................................. 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2 – Negotiating the political order: Cohesion, equality, difference, and the place of religion in politics ................................................................. 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3 Britain ........................................................................................................... 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-Church Institutions in Britain ................................................................................ 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish organizational representation in Britain (1760—present) .................................... 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim organizational representation in Britain (1970—present) ................................... 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Satanic Verses</em> Affair: from ad hoc pluralism to quasi-corporatism ....................... 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From <em>ad hoc pluralism</em> to <em>quasi-corporatism</em>: The formation of the Muslim Council of Britain ........................................................................................................... 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Labour-MCB ‘honeymoon’ .............................................................................. 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Muslim Council of Britain: Fall from grace and shift to <em>co-opted pluralism</em> ........ 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 7/7 attacks: “The rules of the game have changed” .................................................. 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural inconsistency: the securitization of engagement, targeted capacity building, and the ‘liberal foils’ ...................................................................................... 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural inconsistencies: ‘re-balancing’ ..................................................................... 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4  France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-Church Institutions in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish organizational representation in France (1789—present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim organizational representation in France (1905—present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first <em>Affaire du Foulard</em> as a ‘suddenly imposed grievance’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural inconsistencies: precursors to the CFCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural consistency but procedural and legal inconsistencies: The CFCM (2003 to present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-Church Institutions in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish organizational representation in the Netherlands (1795—present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim organizational representation in the Netherlands (1945—present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch ‘New Realism’ and the Fortuyn and Van Gogh murders as ‘suddenly imposed grievances’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempts to form inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian ‘Muslim’ umbrella groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural consistency but procedural and legal inconsistencies: The CMO and CGI (2004 to present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6 Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of relevant causal mechanisms suggested by McAdam et al. (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister Blair’s 12-point anti-terror plan, August 5, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text of the full-page advertisement appearing in <em>The Times</em> (London), August 12, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1: Insiders and outsiders and scope of study</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2: Estimated Muslim populations in selected European states</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3: Measuring corporatism</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4: Insider and outsider groups</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5: Cohesion, equality and difference: five possible models</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6: Multiculturalism Policy Scores 1980-2010</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7: Changing patterns of engagement between the British state and Muslim civil society organizations</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8: British Muslim attitudes towards the Afghan War</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9: Changing patterns of engagement between the French state and Muslim civil society organizations</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Estimated Jewish population of Britain, 1760-2011</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Muslims in Britain, by ethnicity in 2011</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Muslim population of England &amp; Wales (1960-2011)</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>A ‘reactive sequence’ leading from the Satanic Verses Affair to the emergence of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>A ‘reactive sequence’ leading from the September 11th attacks to the pluralization of relations between the British government and British Muslim organizations (quasi-corporatism to co-opted pluralism).</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Anglo-Jewish and British Muslim populations of England &amp; Wales (1760-present)</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>Estimated Jewish population of France, 1789-2010</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>Estimated Muslim population of France, 1989 to 2010</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>Muslims in France, by origin in 1998</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>A ‘reactive sequence’ leading from the first Affaire du Foulard (1989) to the emergence of the CFCM (2003)</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>Estimated Jewish and Muslim populations of France</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>Estimated Jewish population of the Netherlands (1830-1960)</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>Muslims in the Netherlands, by origin in 2007</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14</td>
<td>Estimated Muslim population of the Netherlands (1971-2003)</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15</td>
<td>A ‘reinforcing sequence’ leading from the El-Moumini affair to the emergence of the Contactorgaan Muslim van Overheid (CMO) and Contact Groep Islam (CGI)</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 16</td>
<td>Estimated Jewish and Muslim populations of The Netherlands (1830-2003)</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ........................................................................ AKP
Alliance Israélite Universelle ..................................................................... AIU
Anglo-Jewish Association .......................................................................... AJA
Association des Étudiants Islamiques en France ....................................... AEIF
Association pour l’Organisation des Élections pour le
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman ........................................................ AOE-CFCM
Black and Ethnic Minority ......................................................................... BME
Board of Deputies of British Jews .............................................................. BDBBJ
Bradford Council of Mosques ................................................................... BCM
British Muslim Forum ................................................................................ BMF
British Muslims for Secular Democracy .................................................... BMSD
Center for Information and Documentation on Israel ............................... CIDI
Centraal Joods Overleg ............................................................................. CJO
Christian Democratic Appeal ..................................................................... CDA
Collectif des Musulmans de France .......................................................... CCF
Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France ......................... CCMTTF
Comité Général de Défense Juive ............................................................... CGD
Comité voor Bijzondere Joodse Belangen .................................................. CBJB
Comité voor Israelietische Belangen ........................................................ CIB
Comité voor Joodse Vluchtelingen .............................................................. CJV
Conseil Consultatif des Musulmans de France .......................................... CCMF
Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam en France ............................................... CORIF
Conseil Français du Culte Musulman ........................................................ CFCM
Conseil Réprésentatif des Israélites de France ......................................... CRIF
Conseil Représentatif des Musulmans de France ....................................... CRMF
Contact Groep Islam .................................................................................. CGI
Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid ......................................................... CMO
Coordination Nationale des Musulmans de France .................................... CNMF
Counting Violent Extremism .................................................................... CVE
Department of Communities and Local Government (UK) ....................... DCLG
Ethnic Minority Policy (NL) ...................................................................... EMP
European Court of Human Rights ............................................................. ECHR
European Court of Justice ........................................................................ ECJ
Federatie van Alevitische en Bektashistische verenigingen ........................ HAK-DER
Federatie van Moslim Organisaties in Nederland ....................................... FOMON
Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France ....................................... FNMF
Federation of Netherlands Zionists ............................................................ FNZ
Federation of Student Islamic Societies ..................................................... FOSIS
Fédération Française des Associations Islamiques d’Afrique,
des Comores et des Antilles ..................................................................... FFAIACAC
Fondation pour l’Islam de France ............................................................... FIF
Foreign and Commonwealth Office .......................................................... FCO
Front de Libération Nationale ................................................................. FLN
Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front) .................................... FIS
Front Nationale ......................................................................................... FN
Grande Mosquée de Paris ................................................................. GMP
Haut Conseil à l’Intégration ............................................................. HCI
Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı (Diyanet) ................................................... HDV
Holocaust Memorial Day (UK) ......................................................... HMD
Muslim Organisations in Nederland (Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands) ............................................................................ MON
Inner Cities Religious Council (UK) ...................................................... ICRC
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ................................ ICCPR
Islamic Foundation (UK) ........................................................................ IF
Islamic Society of Britain ......................................................................... ISB
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ........................................................ ISIS
Islamitisch Landelijk Comité (Islamic National Committee) ................... ILC
Islamitische Omroep Stichting (Islamic Broadcasting Foundation) .......... IOS
Islamitische Omroep Stichting (Islamic Broadcasting Foundation) .......... IRN
Islamitische Stichting Nederland (Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands)  ISN
Jamaat-i-Islami ....................................................................................... JI
Joint Distribution Committee ................................................................ JDC
Joodse Coördinatie Commissie .......................................................... JCC
Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) .... KNIL
Landelijke Organisatie voor Schoolinternaten (National Organization for Boarding Schools) ............................................ LOS
Liberaal Joodse Gemeente ...................................................................... LJG
Lijst Pim Fortuyn ..................................................................................... LPF
Mission Interministérielle de Vigilance et de........................................ MIVILUDES
Lutte contre les Dévires Sectaires ......................................................... MG-NN
Milli Görüs Noord-Nederland ............................................................ MG-NN
Milli Görüs Zuid-Nederland ............................................................... MG-ZN
Mission Interministérielle de Lutte contre les Sects ................................. MILS
Mouvement des Citoyens ..................................................................... MDC
Muslim Association of Britain ............................................................. MAB
Muslim Brotherhood .............................................................................. MB
Muslim Council of Britain ..................................................................... MCB
Muslim Student Society (UK) .................................................................. MSS
National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group ........................................ NMWAG
Nederslands Islamitische Federatie (Dutch Islamic Federation—Milli Görüs) NIF
Nederslands-Islamitisch Parlement ..................................................... NIP
Nederslands-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap .......................................... NIK
Nederlandse Moslim Raad (Dutch Muslim Council) .............................. NMR
Nederlandse Zionistenbond ............................................................... NZB
Office National de l’Immigration ........................................................ ONI
Overkoepelende Sjittische Vereniging ............................................... OSV
Parti Socialiste ..................................................................................... PS
Partij van de Arbeid (NL) ............................................................... PvdA
Partij voor de Vrijheid (NL) ............................................................. PVV
Partij voor Nederland ............................................................................ PVN
Portugees-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap ............................................. PIK
Preventing Extremism Together Working Groups .................................. PET
Progressive British Muslims ................................................................... PBM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quilliam Foundation</td>
<td>QF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raad van Moskeeën (Council of Mosques)</td>
<td>RVM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raad voor Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Nederland (Moroccan Mosque Council in the Netherlands)</td>
<td>RMMMN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Middle Way</td>
<td>RMW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement des Musulmans de France</td>
<td>RMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rassemblement pour la République</td>
<td>RPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party–Turkey)</td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Islam en Dialog (Islam and Dialogue Foundation)</td>
<td>SID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland (Islamic Foundation Centre in The Netherlands)</td>
<td>SICN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk</td>
<td>JMW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Platform Israel</td>
<td>SPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stop the War Coalition</td>
<td>SWC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufi Muslim Council</td>
<td>SMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board</td>
<td>MINAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Satanic Verses Affair</td>
<td>SV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie (Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation)</td>
<td>TICF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unie van Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties (Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands)</td>
<td>UMMON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union des Jeunes Musulmans</td>
<td>UJM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union des Organisations Islamiques de France</td>
<td>UOIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Générale des Israélites de France</td>
<td>UGIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Lahore Ahmadiyya Organizations in the Netherlands</td>
<td>ULAMON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Muslim Organizations in the UK and Eire</td>
<td>UMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union pour un Mouvement Populaire</td>
<td>UMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom Action Committee for Islamic Affairs</td>
<td>UKACIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
<td>UKIP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom Islamic Mission</td>
<td>UKIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Declaration of Human Rights</td>
<td>UNDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verwey-Jonker Institute (NL)</td>
<td>VWJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</td>
<td>VVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waardenburg Working Party (NL)</td>
<td>WWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Islamic Mission Netherlands</td>
<td>WIMN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Jewish Congress</td>
<td>WJC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Muslims Advisory Group</td>
<td>YMAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Muslims Organization</td>
<td>YMO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

THE EUROPEAN STATE AND MINORITY RELIGIOUS GROUPS: EXPLORING PATTERNS OF ENGAGEMENT AND ACCESS

Gerald T. FitzGerald, Ph.D.
George Mason University, 2017
Dissertation Director: Dr. Peter Mandaville

This dissertation examines variations in the consistency with which governments apply certain institutions of church-state relations with respect to minority religious communities over time in Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Adopting a comparative historical approach, with a focus on Jewish and Muslim organizations operating on the national level, this research counters recent scholarship that asserts a continent wide convergence in the ‘neo-corporatist’ structuring of relations with European Muslim organizations. The findings point to ethno-religious demographic change as a cross-cutting driver of inconsistencies across the three case studies and also highlight the role of national differences in church-state institutional arrangements in shaping the contours of the relationship between European governments and minority religious groups.
INTRODUCTION

Historically, religious cleavages in European societies have posed substantial challenges to systems of rule. In response, European states have developed a variety of idiosyncratic institutional structures, especially during processes of state formation and nation building, in order to cope with the challenges that religious cleavages have posed to social stability. Because of variations in initial conditions and the long time-horizons of these institutional developments, what remains is what Grace Davie refers to as a “bewildering variety” of models of church-state institutions across Europe.¹ These models and their institutional and cultural legacies continue to provide the frameworks within which the European state manages and balances its relations with majority and minority religious groups in the present day.

Significant economic and post-colonial migrations in the twentieth century, especially those originating in Muslim majority countries, have posed new and substantial challenges to these path dependent church-state models. In the wake of these migrations, and following a period where ‘myths of return’ were ascendant, individual European states have recently embarked on a process of engaging new religious minorities within the framework of church-state models that were developed prior to their migration. As Islam has increasingly become a religion of European-born citizens—and as the visibility of Muslim communities in European societies has become more apparent, the focus of some European states has shifted to a project that involves the

institutionalization of national frameworks of interlocution with national-level Muslim minority organizations. The last two decades have seen a proliferation of such state-led councils established to represent the Muslim faith in ‘state-religion’ relations at the national-level throughout continental Europe.² In the process of developing and engaging with these interlocutors, however, I argue that many European governments have been inconsistent in their application of church-state institutions. The degree and location of this inconsistency varies across cases but has been particularly visible with regard to contemporary engagements between the European state and national-level organizations from Muslim minority communities. Accordingly, the principal research question addressed in this dissertation is: Why are church-state institutions applied inconsistently across time by different governments?

In order to establish the basis for my contention that church-state institutions have been applied inconsistently across time, it is appropriate to consider what their ‘consistent application’ might look like. Here, I suggest that it is useful to incorporate indicators that can be used to measure structural and procedural consistency (or inconsistency) in the application of church-state institutions with regard to engagements with minority religious groups across time. First, I contend that the ‘consistent application’ of church-state institutions involves a uniform approach to the structuring of relations across time between different minority faith groups. I measure this structural aspect of the relationship along a more corporatist/more pluralist dimension.³ Thus, if the historical pattern in a certain country has been to organize engagements with religious minority

³ While I shall engage in an in-depth discussion of ‘corporatism’ and ‘pluralism’ in Chapter 1, here refer to a distinction between systems of interest representation where the state plays a more top-down and concertational role in the formation and activities of interest groups (more corporatist) and systems where the state adopts a more laissez-faire position with forces of market competition playing a greater role (more pluralist).
groups in a more corporatist fashion, structural consistency would involve successive governments retaining that same pattern across different religious minority groups.

Second, I suggest that ‘consistent application’ is reflected in the uniformity of engagement procedures governing relations with faith-based stakeholders across time. I suggest that the degree of procedural (in)-consistency can be measured by determining whether the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ remain consistent across time or whether governments are involved, initially and on an ongoing basis, in engineering a politically desired mix of ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ through the use of discretionary political measures such as certification/decertification and/or ‘targeted capacity building’ in ways that are inconsistent with historical patterns. This is particularly fraught ground in the faith engagement field as such interventions are prone to being perceived as intentionally favoring a particular theological interpretation and can thus violate the secular principle of liberal neutrality. However, historically, this has not prevented European governments from intervening in a variety of ways in order to provide support—whether financial, legal, or otherwise—to favored groups. However, procedural consistency would involve uniformity across time in the mix of stakeholders with which government engages. In short, the ultimate question is whether the government actively intervenes to engineer the mix of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ with which it engages in a manner that is inconsistent with historical patterns?

It is important to note at this point that I am solely concerned with faith-based communal organizations that adopt a ‘participationist’ strategy, whether or not they are treated as ‘insiders’ by government (See Table 1). Conservative religious groups, such

---

4 Per McAdam et al. (2001), certification entails the validation of actors, their performances, and their claims by public authorities, while decertification is the withdrawal of such validation. Targeted capacity building involves the provision of government support—whether by virtue of core funding or other forms—for an organization in order to enhance its ability to mobilize relative to its competitors. McAdam, Doug, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. New York: Cambridge University Press, 121.
as strictly Orthodox Jews or Salafi Muslims, often position themselves as ‘ideological rejectionists’ or ‘outsiders by choice’ by virtue of a position of political quietism, often considered a theological imperative. Moreover, certain demographic groups, especially women and youth, are often under-represented in formal dialogues between religious organizations and the state and can thus in some sense be considered ‘outsiders.’ However, of paramount interest here are instances when ‘participationist’ communal organizations previously certified by the state cross the line from being ‘insiders’ to
‘outsiders’ whether by choice (i.e. protests/boycotts, etc.) or compulsion (i.e. decertification).

Accordingly, if church-state institutions are applied consistently across time, we would expect the contemporary structuring of interest intermediation with Muslim faith organizations to follow the same pattern (whether more corporatist or more pluralist) as the historical structuring of patterns of interest intermediation with Jewish organizations. Moreover, we would expect government interventions in the faith engagement sphere to exhibit similar characteristics between Muslim and Jewish groups across time in terms of the extent of discretionary political interventions through policy mechanisms such as certification, decertification, and targeted capacity building. Finally, we would expect the political contestation over the nature and proper application of church-state institutions to fall within the parameters observed in historical interactions with minority faith groups.

Conversely, the ‘inconsistent application’ of church-state institutions will involve observable inconsistencies in the structuring of relations across time with changing partisanship, political conditions, and ethno-religious demography. For example, we might see shifts from a more corporatist structuring of interest intermediation to a more pluralist structuring (or vice-versa). We might also see experimentations with different mixes of more corporatist or more pluralist forms of interest structuring. We might also observe inconsistencies in the procedures governing relations across time with inconsistent patterns observed in terms of government certification, decertification, and/or the ‘targeted capacity building’ of consultation partners.

The importance of policy consistency

Academic research supports the idea that the faith-based and other ethno-cultural organizations that operate within these church-state institutional frameworks can play an
important role in facilitating the integration of minority communities. Others argue that ethno-cultural organizations can be helpful in the short-term but also can foster societal segmentation. Werbner (1991) suggests a dialectical progression in that,

… [The movement of ethnic associations and their leaders tends], on the one hand, towards greater integration and penetration of mainstream organisations, and the formation of broad-based alliances; on the other hand, alongside this integration a more strident assertiveness of the distinctiveness, separateness and autonomy of ethnic, black, or religious collectivities and their distinctive predicaments.

Foner and Alba (2008) highlight a transatlantic divide where Western Europeans have tended to problematize immigrant religion while it is seen more positively as carrying the potential to facilitate adaption processes in the United States. I argue that the role played by ethno-cultural organizations in integration processes is undermined by the inconsistent application of church-state institutional arrangements over time.

This argument is premised on the work of new institutionalist economists who argue that the inconsistent application of institutional arrangements is detrimental to policy credibility. Underpinning these arguments is the idea that long-term policy objectives in a wide variety of issue areas are often undermined by the short time horizons of political elites whose calculations are premised on the electoral cycles of normal democratic politics. Politicians have few incentives to adopt positions or develop policies whose time horizons of success are longer than the forthcoming electoral cycle and this limits the ability of democratic politicians to credibly commit to more optimal

long-term policies. Indeed, discretionary policymaking is always susceptible to the sub-optimal prioritizing of short-term political gains over long-term solutions.

Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue that this short-termism can be mitigated by agreements on fixed rules that endure over democratic alternations. They argue that fixed rules are preferable because they increase policy credibility while “time inconsistencies” decrease policy credibility. However, given enduring political contestation over the most appropriate interpretations of church-state institutional arrangements, the rationalist objective of ‘fixed rules’ suggested by Kydland and Prescott (1977) may be neither politically desirable nor reasonably practical. That being said, maximizing policy credibility necessitates some degree of consistency within the appropriate boundaries of normal political contestation. Indeed, in instances where church-state institutions provide more discretion to political elites, such as in non-separationist contexts, I would argue that the policy credibility dilemma can in fact be exacerbated. To mitigate precisely these kinds of issues, Majone (1996) proposes the delegation of policy functions to ‘non-majoritarian institutions’ as a means to enhance temporal consistency and policy credibility by taking policy instruments out of the hands of elected politicians with short-term interests. However, it seems highly unlikely that political leaders would be willing to relinquish competency in the area of church-state relations to any ‘non-majoritarian institution.’

---


Others, such as Rothstein and Teorell (2008), have argued that “impartiality in the exercise of public authority” is a fundamental indicator of the quality of government.\textsuperscript{12} Of course, in the faith engagement arena, this principle has been long enshrined in the secular principle of \textit{liberal neutrality}. But \textit{liberal neutrality} has itself been inconsistently applied and, moreover, democratic theorists question whether its consistent application is in fact desirable in light of the potential for \textit{liberal neutrality} to perpetuate structural inequalities (see discussion in Chapter 2). Moreover, inconsistencies in discretionary policies also risk violating the principles of \textit{political equality} and \textit{equality before the law}.\textsuperscript{13} These kinds of violations of basic liberal democratic norms—or perceptions thereof—can be highly corrosive as they undermine the credibility of public authorities and can threaten the very citizenship of minority groups.

Over the course of the past 15 years, for example, Europe has experienced a plethora of restrictive legislation—or legislative proposals—aimed at delimiting the boundaries of acceptable Islamic religious expression in the public sphere. These include a legislative ban in the Netherlands on face-covering clothing in certain public spaces; a ban on ostentatious religious symbols in schools, restrictions on halal slaughter, and a blanket niqab and burka ban in France; a German Supreme Court ruling that bans Muslim prayer in public schools; a ban in Switzerland on the construction of minarets, and other local-level initiatives that appear to restrict the free exercise of freedom of religion. These legislative efforts have been seen by many as an assault on the hitherto unquestioned legitimate exercise of freedom of religion and belief in liberal democracies. To the extent that these initiatives target European Muslims, they serve to further marginalize


communities already stigmatized by securitization discourses. By restricting Islamic religious expression in the public sphere, the European liberal democratic state has been seen by some to be violating liberal democratic norms if not embarking upon a process of institutionalizing discriminatory practices.

A preview of the selected cases

Developments in Britain in recent years mark an inconsistency in the structuring of engagements with a shift away from a long-standing tradition of quasi-corporatism in relations with national-level Jewish communal organizations. In this pattern, the state has consistently engaged over a period of 250 years with a single interlocutor—the Board of Deputies of British Jews (hereafter BDBJ or ‘the Board’)—to which it has also granted representational privileges and some form of statutory recognition. In the early 19th century, the state granted statutory recognition for registering Jewish marriages to the Board, which had been established in 1760, thus granting it an effective monopoly over the representation of Anglo-Jewry. Ultimately, the state played a more activist role in ‘midwifing’ the Muslim Council of Britain in the mid-1990s, with the impetus for its formation attributed to the explicit request of then Home Secretary Michael Howard that


15 Specifically, the Marriage Act (1836) and the Registration Act (1836) provided guidelines by which Jewish marriages were to be recognized by the state. Recognition of this role for the Board of Deputies of British Jews has been long-standing. The British state, however, has adopted a considerably more coercive role in its dealings with the Muslim Council of Britain.
Muslims present a single interlocutor to the state.\textsuperscript{16} My contention is that this request was consistent the pre-existing quasi-corporatist structuring of relations with minority religious organizations as it involved the effective state structuring of a societal interest (i.e. the explicit state request for a \textit{single} interlocutor) as well as an implied exchange of state licensing in return for monopoly representation.\textsuperscript{17}

However, a significant departure from historical precedent occurred in 2006 when then-Communities Secretary, Ruth Kelly (Labour), announced the ‘rebalancing’ of the government’s post-7/7 relationship with Muslim organizations.\textsuperscript{18} In the aftermath, the New Labour government effectively pluralized its relations with British Muslim organizations, which ultimately involved the co-option and/or targeted capacity building of a variety of more liberal and progressive foils to the MCB, which had for various reasons that we shall explore further in Chapter 3 fallen out of favor by that time. In a later development, Kelly’s successor Hazel Blears (Labour) formally decertified the MCB in a move that Geoffrey Alderman, a prominent scholar of Anglo-Jewish history, described this decertification as, “extraordinary… unwarranted Whitehall interference in the internal working of an independent body…[reflecting] the practices of a totalitarian state.”\textsuperscript{19} This marked a significant inconsistency in the application of church-state institutions. New Labour’s active role in the subsequent ‘midwifing’ and ‘targeted capacity building’ of liberal foils to the MCB, most of which were short-lived and lacking in grassroots support, further called into question New Labour’s policy credibility in this area. After 2010, Conservative-led governments effectively returned the Anglican

\textsuperscript{16} The characterization of the MCB as having been “midwifed” comes from Archer, Toby. 2009. “Welcome to the Umma The British State and Its Muslim Citizens Since 9/11.” \textit{Cooperation and Conflict} 44 (3): 335.
\textsuperscript{17} This kind of exchange or bargain between the state and societal interests is central to Philippe Schmitter’s seminal formulation of the concept of corporatism (Schmitter, 1974).
Church to a more central position in its faith engagement policies while winding down its engagements with British Muslim groups in particular, marking yet more time inconsistency with the approach of the preceding New Labour governments.20

The French state’s structural approach to reconciling the presence of Muslim communities with the Republican model has involved the pursuit of a decidedly corporatist path in its structural organization of religious interests consistent with the Napoleonic model and the Law of Separation of 1905. This is illustrated by the nature of governmental involvement in both the creation and the internal organization of the national Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) and regional Conseils Régional du Culte Musulman (CRCMs), which were largely modeled on the Jewish consistories and Protestant federations. It has been noted that then-Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire [UMP], center-right) deliberately modeled the CFCM on the Napoleonic Jewish Consistoire.21 Indeed, parallels have been drawn between the muscular corporatism of Napoleonic interventions that resulted in the formation of the Consistoire in 1808 and Sarkozy’s role in the formation of the CFCM in 2003 as well as between Napoleon’s and Sarkozy’s approaches to state-religion relations more generally.22 While the hard-corporatist character of the CFCM initiative was not inconsistent with Napoleonic precedent, the forcefulness of French governmental intervention in what is technically a private non-profit association was striking in the present-day.23 Moreover, as we shall see, the patterns of engagement leading up to the

---

20 See, for example, Warsi, Sayeeda. 2015. “Muslims Will Speak up for British Values Only When They Know They Will Be Heard.” The Guardian, January 24.
establishment of the CFCM involved significant structural inconsistencies in the approaches adopted by different Interior Ministers as well as procedural inconsistencies including a period of complete disengagement under Jean-Louis Debré (1996-1998).

In 2003, Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy became heavily involved in engineering the mix of ‘insider’ stakeholders involved in the initiative when he negotiated with the leaders of various national-level Muslim federations and mosque umbrellas—as well as with foreign governments—in order to determine quotas of ‘selected’ relative to ‘elected’ members of the CFCM executive, selected the UOIF as the sole ‘Islamist’ voice to the exclusion of all others, demanded the inclusion of at least five women in the CFCM’s first general assembly (despite the fact that women are absent from virtually all other religious bodies in France), requested a “milder” representative of the Tablighi Jama’at in the CFCM’s executive, excluded one prominent Turkish umbrella as a nod to Ankara, and asked that certain protections be extended to African and Turkish minorities within the future body. Moreover, personally intervened to ensure that Dalil Boubakeur, rector of the Grande Mosque de Paris, would serve as the Council’s first president. While considerable state interference is also observable in the shaping of the Jewish consistorial system in the 19th century, Sarkozy’s interventions were more heavy-handed.

Successive Dutch governments have also moved to formalize the relationship between the state and Muslim organizations within the framework of its church-state institutional arrangements starting in the early 2000s. In exploratory discussions with a

---


variety of Muslim mosque umbrellas that began in the summer of 2001, then Minister of Integration, Roger van Boxtel (Democraten 66 [D66], center) and his immediate successors strongly encouraged the formation of a single Muslim interlocutor. However, this demand was not wholly consistent with the Dutch state’s historical template with Jewish organizations where Sephardic and Ashkenazi synagogue umbrellas have enjoyed separate formal recognition as interlocutors on issues related to religious practice for almost 150 years.\textsuperscript{26} However, the Dutch pattern can be seen to consistently follow a pattern of maximizing the breadth of representation in the smallest number of interlocutors possible. In early 2004, with the World Islamic Mission (WIM), a Surinamese Barelwi affiliate of the Contactorgaan Muslims van Overheid (CMO) supra-umbrella, ruling out the possibility of any cooperation with the Ahmadiyya umbrella organization, ULAMON, it became clear that the government’s objective of a single Muslim interlocutor would not be achievable. This resulted in the 2004 decision by then Minister for Integration, Rita Verdonk (VVD, center-right), to extend formal recognition to a second supra-umbrella, the Contact Groep Islam (CGI), which initially included Alevi, Shi’a, and Ahmadiyya umbrella groups who objected to the CMO as Sunni-dominated, conservative, and exclusionary. This arrangement, whereby the state recognized two separate umbrellas, was ultimately reasonably consistent with how the Dutch state has long structured its relations with Jewish organizations since the late 19th century. However, with the effective implosion of the CGI after 2009, the government has nonetheless continued to engage with some of its former constituent umbrellas on their own terms to the dismay of the leadership of the CMO executive.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26} More recently, Dutch governments have also consulted on other issues with the CJO, a more recently formed Jewish umbrella that also includes non-religious groups.

\textsuperscript{27} Personal interview with Rasit Bal of the CMO, May 10, 2017.
The preceding synopses reflect the cases selected for this research. So, why choose Britain, France, and the Netherlands? First, in absolute terms, Great Britain and France are in the top four countries with the largest Muslim populations in Western Europe (See Table 2). Second, all of these countries are mature and stable liberal democracies whose commitment to religious freedom has historically been generally recognized. Third, all three cases are advanced industrialized economies. Fourth, Britain, France, and the Netherlands provide good cases for a comparative study because they vary considerably in terms of how they have structured their relations with Muslim minority communities. As we shall see, the British case forms the centerpiece of the research as it is the only case where an interlocutor has been formally decertified by the state.

Interestingly, in all cases, the state initially sought a single, national-level interlocutor, a demand that had far-reaching consequences. While the provision of a unified interlocutor undoubtedly simplified the consultation process for the state, the demand for unitary representation has undoubtedly raised a barrier to entry by increasing the costs of collective action for individual groups within heterogeneous Muslim communities. Even when this barrier is overcome, the resulting bodies have often been beset by internal tensions, whether the result of traditional mosque structures and personal competition and loyalties, or because of lingering tensions between conflicting ethnic or sectarian groups that the state has incentivized, if not obliged, to cooperate with one another. Finally, as Ferrari (2016) points out, the idea of institutionalized national-

---

28 While Britain, France and the Netherlands are characterized as the cases here, strictly speaking, one might consider the unit of analysis as being “departures from historical institutional frameworks.” Accordingly, the possibility of there being more than one “departure” in each political territory is left open.
Table 2: Estimated Muslim populations in selected European states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Est. Muslim Population 2010</th>
<th>Est. Percentage of Population that is Muslim 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4,704,000</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,119,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2,869,000</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,583,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,021,000</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>914,000</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>638,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>527,000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>475,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>451,000</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>433,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>226,000</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>144,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, January 2010

level representation is alien to the Islamic tradition and may appear unusual to many Muslims. While the expectation of a unified interlocutor is still pertinent in the French case, the British and Dutch governments both effectively abandoned this model in the mid-2000s with interviewees and commentators in both cases observing that, from the perspective of the state, the midwifing of a single interlocutor had put too much power in the hands of a single body.

A hypothesis for why European governments initially demonstrated a preference for establishing a single broad based representative organization as a point of dialogue with their Muslim communities is suggested by the work of James Scott. In Seeing Like a State (1999), Scott suggests that, in order to render the complexities of society “legible,” states devise radically simplified designs for social organization. It’s worth quoting Scott at length here,

> These state simplifications, the basic givens of modern statecraft, were, I began to realize, rather like abridged maps. They did not successfully represent the actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only that slice of it that interested the official observer. They were, moreover, not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade.  

The implications of Scott’s thesis are that European states would prefer to develop a single interlocutor in order to make sense of a sub-section of its society with which it has limited knowledge, ultimately with a view to offering a point of entry into a hard to reach community. Later, Scott notes that,

> The techniques devised to enhance the legibility of a society to its rulers have become vastly more sophisticated, but the political motives driving them have changed little. Appropriation, control, and manipulation (in the nonpejorative sense) remain the most prominent. If we imagine a state that has no reliable means of enumerating and locating its population, gauging its wealth, and mapping its land, resources, and settlements, we are imagining a state whose interventions in that society are necessarily crude. A society that is relatively opaque to the state…will typically be mediated by local trackers who know the society from inside and who are likely to interpose their own particular interests. Without this mediation—and often with it—state action is likely to be inept, greatly overshooting or undershooting its objective.

Indeed, in engaging with faith-based organizations, political leaders have consistently either failed to anticipate or have chosen to ignore the effects of decisions in a variety of

---

policy domains (foreign policy, national security, etc.) on relations with faith-based organizations. Moreover, governments have often failed to anticipate how various approaches to establishing and/or building the capacity of specific organizations can have deleterious effects on the credibility and legitimacy of the organizations themselves. The other side of the coin here is that these approaches to establishing, funding and/or engaging with Muslim organizations have often caused European governments to come under fire domestically, whether from a hardcore secular left flank that primarily objects to any state accommodations for ‘religious’ organizations or a nativist or Christianist right flank that objects to any state accommodations for ‘Muslim’ organizations.

While historically there has undoubtedly been some degree of convergence and consistency in church-state institutional development under direct and indirect Napoleonic rule in continental Europe, I argue that there is no single observable contemporary European-wide trajectory—‘neo-corporatist’ or otherwise—at play.\(^{32}\) Instead, I argue that what we are observing are nationally-bound experimentations in state interventions in the realm of religion, and attendant instability and inconsistencies in relations between the state and Muslim faith-based civil society organizations. Indeed, as critical junctures in church-state institutional development in continental Europe, the French revolution and Napoleonic rule represent something of “a conjuncture with enduring consequences” in the French and Dutch cases.\(^{33}\) Yet, the independent development of the Batavian Republic—and the tenuousness of Napoleon’s control over the rule of his brother Louis Napoleon in the Kingdom of Holland—meant that variations in initial local political conditions soon contributed to divergent trajectories in church-


state institutional development. Considerable historical variations in religious demography between France and the Kingdom of Holland meant that different institutional designs were appropriate in each case. Where post-revolutionary church-state institutional designs in France were largely intended to confront, break, and Gallicize the dominant Catholic Church, the religious demography of the Batavian Republic and Kingdom of Holland provided the context for a less confrontational and, ultimately, more consensual arrangement—one that was institutionally solidified under the so-called ‘Pacification of 1917.’\(^{34}\) Similarly, the weakness of Anglican dominance in Britain, as well as religious diversity, resulted in a series of historical accommodations with Dissenters, Catholics, Jews, and others over time that pre-empted any radical frontal assault on the religious establishment and ultimately produced a more accomodationist tradition vis-à-vis relations with religious minorities.\(^{35}\)

In order to determine the reasons behind these variations in the application of church-state institutions to the structuring of relations with Jewish and Muslim communities, a *structured, focused comparison* approach is adopted here.\(^{36}\) This involves a historical examination of the structural, procedural, and legal patterns of intermediation between the state and minority religious groups in the selected cases. This has involved some archival research including the mining of public records as well as the historical and archival records of pertinent organizations when accessible.\(^{37}\) The purpose here was

---


\(^{37}\) Again, I hesitate to call such organizations “representative” groups as the question of their representativeness remains open.
to establish—through an examination of the historical record—the manner by which each case (country) has historically structured its engagement with minority religious groups, particularly Jewish organizations. Fortunately, there is a rich secondary literature to mine on the history of Jewish communities in Europe. As part of the process of reviewing this literature, as well as the literature on contemporary Muslim communities, a number of ‘critical junctures’—that is, “crucial founding moments of institutional formation that send countries along broadly different developmental paths”—were identified in each case. In addition, a number of ‘reactive’ or ‘reinforcing’ sequences of events were established linking identified critical junctures with subsequent changes in structures of interest intermediation. Research into more recent developments with the relationship between the state and Muslim communal organizations also included a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with leaders and activists from civil society organizations that identify as Muslim (See Appendix 1). One of the primary challenges in the course of this research involved the issue of access. While I was surprised to find that the leaders of civil society organizations were, for the most part, amenable if not keen to being interviewed for this research, personnel on the government side of the equation were not so enthusiastic.

The time horizons for each case analysis were determined by an examination of the historical record of interactions between the state and minority religious organizations and the identification of pertinent critical junctures or breakpoints. Interestingly, in almost every case, it was determined that Muslim and Jewish communal organizations were formed in the aftermath of a crisis, whether the Napoleonic formation of the Jewish Consistoire and Opperkonsistorie in France and the Netherlands in the aftermath of the

---

French revolution in 1789; the CRIF, which was formed from the Jewish resistance in France in 1944 as the Second World War drew to a close; the formation of the MCB in 1997, which in Chapter 3 is traced back to the aftermath of *The Satanic Verses* Affair in 1988; the formation of the CFCM in 2003, which in Chapter 4 is traced back to the first *Affaire du Foulard* (‘Headscarf Affair’) in 1989; or the formation of the CMO, which in Chapter 5 is traced back to a reinforcing sequence that was triggered by the so-called El-Moumni Affair in May 2001.\(^3^9\) The exception here is provided by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, which was voluntarily formed in 1760, but whose dormancy up until the 1830s is indicated by the criticism of Rabbi Aaron Levy Green who famously characterized it at this juncture as the “Board of Congratulation and Condolence.”\(^4^0\) Yet, even if one were to regard the mid-1830s, when it finally sprang into action under the stewardship of Sir Moses Montefiore, as the Board’s formative years, this era was not characterized by any identifiable domestic crisis in Britain but, rather, series of international crises involving human rights abuses of Jewish communities.\(^4^1\)

Because of the time horizons involved, that is, the late 18th century to the present day, this project necessarily involves the adoption of a comparative historical analysis that recognizes the importance of critical historical junctures, such as those referenced

\(^3^9\) The El-Moumni Affair refers to a national debate in the Netherlands that was triggered by a Dutch television interview in May 2001 with Khalil El Moumni, a Moroccan born Salafist imam at the al-Nasr mosque in Rotterdam, who likened homosexuality to a contagious disease. The ‘reinforcing sequence’ referenced here also involves the September 11th attacks as well as the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo Van Gogh in 2004 that further problematized Muslim communities in the Netherlands as a preoccupation of political elites.

\(^4^0\) It was only with the Presidency of Moses Montefiore (1835-1874), the overhauling of the BDBJ’s constitution (1836), and its statutory recognition in the British Marriage Act (1836) that the BDBJ became a going concern. Green unfavorably compared the Board of Deputies with the son of the biblical Shunammite woman who sneezed seven times when he awoke, with the Board, on being awoken, sneezing and promptly falling asleep again. See Jacob, Alex M. 1973. “Aaron Levy Green, 1821—1883.” *Transactions & Miscellanies (Jewish Historical Society of England)* 25: 98.

\(^4^1\) Moses Motefiore’s intervention in the ‘Damascus Affair’ of 1840, when prominent Jews residing in the Ottoman Empire were rounded up with some being tortured and forced to “confess” to the murder of a Capuchin monk and his Muslim servant, undoubtedly helped to cement his reputation as an Anglo-Jewish luminary and the Board’s reputation as a defender of the human rights of Jewish communities worldwide.
above. In the empirical case chapters that follow, this approach also involves the deployment of process tracing methods with the history of interactions between the state and Jewish communal organizations arranged into sequences of pertinent events, while specifying how these events are plausibly linked given the social and political environments faced by groups or individual actors as well as their interests.\(^{42}\) Data for this comparative historical analysis were primarily collected from the rich canon of secondary scholarly sources on the history of Jewish communities in Europe over this time period.

One issue that arises in comparing the relationships between European states and Jewish communal organizations, on the one hand, and Muslim communal organizations, on the other, is the starkly different time horizons involved. There is the danger here of selecting on the dependent variable by virtue of truncating the time series data given the relative infancy of Muslim communal organizations.\(^{43}\) We might, for example, come to the hasty and erroneous conclusion that relations between the state and Jewish organizations are by and large ‘stable’ while relations between the state and Muslim organizations are inherently ‘unstable.’ However, in the French and Dutch case chapters, when one turns up the magnification, we shall see that relations between the state and Jewish communities were thrown into considerable disarray in the aftermath of the French Revolution as well as the early 19th century Napoleonic corporatist interventions designed to simplify, rationalize, and institutionalize the state-religion relationship. These interventions caused significant intra-communal tensions between more reform-minded Jews that were sympathetic to the aims of the French revolution and more orthodox and...


conservative Jews who either felt some degree of loyalty to the *ancien régime* or feared the concessions they would be forced to make as part of the emancipatory bargain.
CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW

Pluralism / corporatism and insiders / outsiders

The use of pluralism and corporatism as a conceptual means of measuring consistency and inconsistency in the structuring of interest intermediation over time necessitates a brief discussion of the development of these concepts in the social science literature but also as a tool of governance. The emergence of corporatist thought in the late nineteenth century has been associated with the demise of the ancien regime and as an intellectual reaction to the emergence of competing liberal-capitalist and Marxist orders.\(^4\) Philosophically, in corporatist thought, the state was held to have a moral basis – drawn either from “God” or historical circumstances – to intervene in economic or social affairs in the name of “social justice” or “national interest.”\(^5\) The idea of a free market was anathema to corporatist theorists as its operation was seen to be devoid of any higher moral authority and thus the results could be expected to be unjust.\(^6\) Likewise, national economic interests could not be expected to be served by the free market as corporatist thought prioritized national aggrandizement and the protection of groups that were economically or socially threatened over liberal notions of efficiency.\(^7\) Moreover, corporatist governance was seen to provide an alternative to Marxist thought in that it


provided a means by which the class struggle might be avoided through the functional organization of society.

In the mid-1970s, ‘corporatism’—as an analytical and conceptual variable—enjoyed a revival in the political science literature. In 1974, Philippe Schmitter’s seminal article, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” re-conceptualized ‘corporatism’ by divesting it of its normatively negative connotation that condemned it by virtue of its association with authoritarianism and fascism in interwar Germany and Italy. Instead, Schmitter re-imagined corporatism in systematic terms as, “…a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state.”  

Specifically, he defines the ‘corporatist’ ideal type as,

… a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.  

Having provided a specific and systematized definition of corporatism, Schmitter then defines pluralism as,

… a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.

By divesting the concept of *corporatism* of its cultural and normative connotations and casting it in purely structural/systemic terms, Schmitter provides a definition that permits the comparison systems of interest representation across diverse contexts. Thus Schmitter emphasizes the difference between a pluralist *ideal type* of polity that focuses on the value of competitive interaction among profligate organized groups having no official ties to the state - and a corporatist *ideal type* that is committed to the use of state power to engender cooperation among state-sanctioned, functionally organized groups that would make possible the creation of “an organically interdependent whole.”

The corporatist-pluralist continuum – as it refers to the state organization of interest groups – has most commonly been applied to interest intermediation between the state and labor interests in the European context. In applying this conceptual framework to measure consistency and inconsistency in interest intermediation between the state and minority religious interest groups, the immediate challenge is to extract what is useful about Schmitter’s conceptual framework and then apply it to how the European state structures its relations with interest groups that identify on the basis of a faith identity.

Schmitter’s conceptualization implies a number of dimensions along which one can measure whether a polity is more corporatist or more pluralist in its patterns of interest intermediation in a given area (See Table 3). Aside from movement between more corporatist and more pluralist forms of societal interest organization, for the purposes of this research, movement of organizations over time from ‘insider’ to ‘outsider’ classifications will be considered indicative of instability and inconsistency. According to

---


Grant (1999), ‘insider groups’ have three key characteristics. First, they have received government recognition—or certification—as legitimate representatives for particular interests or causes. Second, pursuant to certification, they are included in formal and informal consultations on issues of concern to them. Third, it is implied that ‘insider groups’ have agreed to abide by certain “rules of the game,” with a failure to do so triggering the risk of political exclusion—or decertification. Grant sub-divides ‘outsider groups’ into outsiders by necessity and outsiders by choice (See Table 4). The former include groups that would ultimately like to become insider groups but, so far, have failed to gain recognition or have been politically excluded; the latter are ideological protest groups that, for various reasons, wish to maintain distance from government.

Table 3: Measuring corporatism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure / Dimension</th>
<th>More Corporatist</th>
<th>More pluralist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No of interest groups</td>
<td>Limited number</td>
<td>Unspecified number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within a given issue area</td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation</td>
<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Non-Competitive</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Non-hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Functionally differentiated</td>
<td>Non-determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Recognizes or licenses</td>
<td>Does not recognize or license</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Grants a monopoly</td>
<td>Does not grant a monopoly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Schmitter (1974)


Table 4: Insider and outsider groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSIDER GROUPS</th>
<th>OUTSIDER GROUPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY NECESSITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Prisoner groups’</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Rejected or decertified participationists</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BY CHOICE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Participationists</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ideological rejectionists</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Grant (1999)*

**Comparative analyses of Jewish and Muslim communal organizations in Europe**

Given the considerable history of scholarship on European Jewry as well as the voluminous output in recent years on the situation of Muslims in the European context, the dearth of scholarship that compares relationships between European states and Jewish and Muslim minorities or the relative effectiveness of their communal organizations is striking. One reason for this is likely found in the fact that Jews, by virtue of their long-
standing presence, ‘whiteness,’ and upward social mobility, have not been considered to be targets of either British or Dutch multicultural policy frameworks that have traditionally been race-based and directed towards ‘Black and Ethnic Minorities’ (in Britain) or, alternatively, ‘Ethnic Minority Policies’ (in the Netherlands).\footnote{For more on this type of argument, see Brodkin, Karen. 1998. \textit{How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says About Race in America}. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.} In France, on the other hand, the Republican model has traditionally viewed Jews as ‘Frenchmen of the Jewish faith’ while casting a jaundiced eye on any mobilization on ethnic or religious lines.

One notable exception to this lack of comparisons between Jewish and Muslim communal organizations is the work of Charlton and Kaye (1985, 1985a) and Kaye (1987) who compare the activism of the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ) relative to the Union of Muslim Organizations (UMO), the fledgling Muslim umbrella organization of the time, in response to attempts by animal rights groups to ban and/or curb the practice of \textit{shechita} (the Jewish method of butchery) or \textit{dhabh} (the Muslim method of butchery) in Britain in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.\footnote{\textit{Shechita} is the Hebrew term for the Jewish method of killing animals for food with the resultant meat known as \textit{kosher}. Its equivalent in Arabic is \textit{dhabh} with resultant meat being termed \textit{halal}. Between 1955 and 1984, at least six private members’ bills were introduced to Parliament by MPs and peers of various party-political persuasions that were aimed at restricting the practice of religious slaughter. See Charlton, Roger, and Ronald Kaye. 1985. “Defending the Religious Slaughter of Animals: A Study in Ethnic Issue Management.” \textit{Politics} 5 (1): 22–28; Charlton, Roger, and Ronald Kaye. 1985. “The Politics of Religious Slaughter: An Ethno-religious Case Study.” \textit{Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies} 12 (3): 490–503; Kaye, Ronald. 1993. “The Politics of Religious Slaughter of Animals: Strategies for Ethno-religious Political Action.” \textit{Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies} 19 (2): 235–50.} In analyzing lobbying efforts to this end, Charlton and Kaye (1985) argue that, “it is the Jewish community which has consistently been the principal defender of religious slaughter in Westminster and Whitehall… [while] Muslim reactions to these threats to communally significant
beliefs have taken the form of \textit{ad hoc}, local responses rather than nationally-focused activism.\footnote{58}

The authors continue by bemoaning the Muslim community’s “almost complete lack of national political organization” throughout the 1960s. While they note some Muslim community organization successes at the local level in the 1980s, especially with regard to the role of the Bradford Council of Mosques (BCM) in the case of the controversy over Bradford City Council’s decision to provide halal meat in Bradford schools in 1983-84,\footnote{59} Charlton and Kaye characterize the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ) as consistently being the “principal defender” of \textit{shechita}—and by extension \textit{dhabh}—in the face of sustained frontal attacks by animal rights organizations and humane societies, even when proposed legislative efforts specifically targeted \textit{dhabh} and thus might have been seen as tangential to the defense of \textit{shechita}.\footnote{60} Ultimately, the authors imply that the national-level failure of Muslim activism in this issue-area through the 1980s was attributable to the social marginality of British Muslim communities, lack


\footnote{59}A mobilization of Muslim parents in Bradford, spearheaded by the Bradford Council of Mosques, resulted in an estimated ten thousand Muslim children boycotting school on March 6, 1984 in response to a concession by Bradford City Council to meet with animal rights activists who were attempting to overturn the City Council’s agreement to provide halal school meals for Muslim schoolchildren. The attempt to overturn halal meat provision in schools subsequently failed in a council vote. For more, see Lewis, Philip. 1993. “Bradford’s Muslim Communities and the Reproduction and Representation of Islam.” D.Phil Dissertation, Leeds, UK: The University of Leeds, 133-138.

\footnote{60}The introduction of a bill to the House of Lords in 1981 by then vice-president of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Lord Houghton (Labour), was aimed at shutting down a growing export market for \textit{halal} meat slaughtered in the UK. The bill was strenuously opposed by the Board of Deputies (BDBJ) even though kosher meat produced in the UK was almost exclusively for domestic consumption. The BDBJ opposed the bill on the basis that it formed the “thin end of the wedge” and would encourage animal rights groups to embark on further attempts to roll back religious slaughter exceptions. See Board of Deputies, Shechita Committee Report, 16 November 1981.
of communal unity and coherence, deficiencies in organizational resources, and lack of elite access and representation relative to Anglo-Jewry.\textsuperscript{61}

In my view, however, social marginality and deficiencies in organizational resources are not truly independent variables in the sense that a societal group that is socially and economically marginalized will be challenged to muster the resources to organize effectively and construct robust communal institutions. Furthermore, as we shall see in the coming chapters, while there were readily identifiable Jewish elites that were economically well-integrated in Britain, France, and the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, the broader Jewish populations in Europe were most certainly economically marginalized, as evidenced by the policy focus on the ‘regeneration’ of French Jews under Napoleon as well as Louis Napoleon’s concern for the “deplorable state” of Dutch Jewry.\textsuperscript{62} By means of their temporal snapshot, Charlton and Kaye directly compare a politically mature, professionalized, and integrated Jewish communal organization hundreds of years in the making to a fledgling Muslim one and thus their analysis appears somewhat ahistorical.

In addressing how Olsonian collective action might play into the issue of ethno-religious activism in defense of religious slaughter, Charlton and Kaye (1985) argue that,

\textit{To date, ‘free riding’, nationally at least, on this issue by Muslims has not been a serious liability to their cause (Olson, 1971). In future, non-participation by the most numerous communal and religious group involved in this highly controversial area is likely both to prove a liability to defenders of the status quo, and to give further encouragement to its attackers.}\textsuperscript{63}


The authors further imply that a propensity for British Muslim leaders to ‘free-ride’ on the back of the Board of Deputies is illustrated by their employment of Jewish defenses of religious slaughter as well as in the argument made by Khan (1982) that shechita and dhabh are “identical”—a claim vigorously denied by Jewish leaders and activists.64 Oddly, Kaye (1993) notes that, “… a comparison of the approaches of the Jewish and Muslim communities demonstrates the much greater effectiveness of the Jewish community despite [emphasis added] lesser numbers.”65 This appears inconsistent with the logic of Olsonian collective action whereby, even with all other factors being equal, we would in fact expect the incentive for group action to diminish as the group size increases and that, as a significantly larger group, we would likewise expect British Muslims (and French and Dutch Muslims, for that matter) to be less effective in pursuing their common interest than Anglo-Jewry.66

Alderman (2008) argues—contra Charlton and Kaye (1987)—that the relative success of Jewish contributions to the defeat of anti-shechita proposals, “relates to fundamentals of religious freedom, with which parliament is loath, nowadays, to interfere.”67 In other words, in Alderman’s view, the successes of the BDBJ in defending shechita in the face of legislative proposals introduced by British Members of Parliament sympathetic to animal rights groups have rested on the view, as expressed by Viscount Hailsham during a 1962 debate in the House of Lords that “If this House gave this Bill a


Second Reading, the Orthodox Jewish community would believe—and would sincerely believe—that it was an attack on Judaism as such.”

My view is that both Kaye (1987) and Alderman (2009) raise valid points. It is indeed likely that Westminster was loath, at least at that particular moment in time, to interfere in policy arenas that would impinge upon long-standing fundamentals of religious freedom. Yet that does not invalidate Kaye’s characterization of the Board of Deputies as having taken the leadership role on this issue through the 1980s nor the idea that the relative inaction of British Muslim organizations in the defense of ritual slaughter can be explained by relative social marginality, a lack of communal unity and coherence, and a lack of elite access and representation. What is also key, however, is the fact that the Anglo-Jewish communal institutions that rose to the defense of shechita (and by extension dhabh) are robust and politically mature institutions that, at the time of Charlton and Kaye’s work, had been in existence for more than 200 years. The sole Muslim organization referenced in their work, the Union of Muslim Organizations (UMO), had been in existence for less than 20 years and, as we shall see in Chapter 3, had its own internal problems not least of which was its non-rotating and first generation leadership’s lack of political savvy and inability to read the political environment.

A number of other more recent accounts have touched upon the historical similarities between Jewish and Muslim claims making in European liberal democratic contexts. Laurence (2012) notes strong resemblances between contemporary church-state institutional arrangements between European states and Muslim minorities and nineteenth-century corporatist arrangements between the state and attempts to

---

domesticate other minority religions—especially Roman Catholics and Jews—by offering some form of political patronage and thereby bringing them into the system. In this vein, Markell (2003) outlines two prevailing anxieties that underpinned the Prussian state’s demand that European Jewry assimilate as a condition of emancipation. The first was the concern that, because of their tendency to cluster together in separate communities governed by—and devoted to—the Mosaic law, the Jews constituted a distinct ‘state within a state.’ Second, the Jews were perceived as threatening to the state because of the transnational pulls of a diaspora that, “[threatened] national identity by pushing the loyalties of citizens up and out, toward persons and groups outside the state.”

While political emancipation secured recognition for the Jews, Markell notes that,

... it also secured recognition for [the state] by placing Jews into a new relationship with the state; it lifted restrictions on Jewish life, but it also served as a tool through which the state could mold its Jewish population into a shape consistent with the requirements of modern government—by which, that is, it could perform the work of identifying Jews as citizens, and identifying itself as sovereign.

Ultimately, Markell argues, the “mutual recognition” model of emancipation bargains better secured the sovereign identity of the state over the inclusion of Jews as citizens. These historical insights are echoed in the contentious contemporary dynamics of the relationship between the state and its Muslim minority communities—one that is steeped in neo-nationalist discourses of divergent values, questions over ‘dual loyalties,’ and fear of potential ‘fifth columns.’

In examining the contemporary manifestation of the ‘assimilation in return for emancipation’ bargain offered to European Muslims by the state, Laurence points out that,

… the concessions sought by governments in consultations with Muslim leaders today share interesting commonalities with the responses furnished two centuries ago by Jewish notables to the pointed questions (questions gênantes) posed by Napoleon Bonaparte in France and Kaiser Wilhelm I in Prussia as a condition for the public recognition of Judaism. The Jewish notables were polled on their positions on polygamy, divorce, and intermarriage, on their attitudes toward fellow citizens and respect for the law, on rabbinical appointments, community policy, and economic integration.72

These questions, Laurence notes, obliged European Jewry to choose regarding the significant problems between Jewish law and citizenship and forced them to undertake religious and civil reform. In the process, European Jewish leaders of emancipation movements threw in their lot with the state, which caused significant intra-communal tension between Reform and Orthodox strands within Judaism—and engendered subsequent intra- and inter-communal tensions when Zionism became increasingly assertive—and was legitimated by European governments—in the early twentieth century.

While Charlton and Kaye (1985, 1985a) analyzed the respective effectiveness of lobby groups in a particular issue-area in Britain, this examination is analyzing a broader trend of relative stability between the state and Jewish and Muslim civil society organizations that operate at the national level in Europe. Undoubtedly, there have many developments in European Muslim civil and political engagement over the past 30 years, especially as regards an emerging confidence in engaging in mainstream politics in the decades following The Satanic Verses Affair in 1988 and the first of the Affaires du Foulard the following year. Yet, while we occasionally observe increased levels of communal unity usually during moments of external threat and crisis; while claims making by national-level Muslim civil society organizations have tended to become more focused and coherent; while Muslim organizations are on the whole better resourced than

---

they were in the late-1980s; and while we observe some improvement in terms of elite access and representation as measured by representation in legislative bodies and local authorities; I argue that the apparent deficiencies in Muslim organization in Europe relative to European Jewry can be better explained as being a factor of temporal sequencing and thus the relative maturity of the two communities.

Moreover, because of the lack of an explicitly transnational dimension to the politics of religious slaughter, it must be noted that Charlton and Kaye also miss the fact that the political interface between the European state and both Jewish and Muslim groups often involves the state’s problematization of transnational affiliations. These transnational pulls—whether real or imagined—create inherent tensions between religious communities and the preoccupation of political elites with maintaining national unity and/or social cohesion. As we shall see the pulls of transnational political forces, particularly the interventions of the Algerian, Turkish, and Moroccan states, have often pitted the interests of foreign states in monitoring their diasporas through maintaining some modicum of control over Islamic organizations in Europe against the preoccupations of national governments. Of course, European Jews are also subject to the pulls of transnational political forces with domestic communal organizations such as the BDBJ in Britain, CRIF in France, and CIDI in the Netherlands all fulfilling a political function that involves rallying support for Israel. While there are undoubtedly important distinctions between these Jewish and Muslim transnational political imaginaries, Judaism and Islam have become politicized in diaspora in similar ways across the three cases examined here.\footnote{Mandaville, Peter. 2001. \textit{Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma}. London: Routledge, 203 note 32.} That being said, it is important to note that there is, of course, considerable variation within Jewish and Muslim communities, organizations, and individuals as to the extent to which each may or may not subscribe to these respective
imaginaries. In other words, it is also important to recognize the inherent complexities in terms of how individuals imagine (or not) their transnational linkages with co-religionists and not perpetuate any overly reductive conception of diasporic or ummatic solidarity.

What is noteworthy is the fact that tectonic geopolitical shifts in the twentieth century have contributed to undermining the traditional forms of institutionalization of the umma as a dual religious and political project. Key drivers of this de-stabilizing process being the penetration of European imperial power into the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia; attendant processes of elite westernization and the adoption of secular state models in colonized territories; the penetration, weakening, and dismantling of the Ottoman Empire at Sèvres and Lausanne; the abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal; the contraction of European empires, the partition of India, and large-scale postwar and postcolonial migrations. On an ideological level, the idea of the umma as a political and religious project has been subsequently undermined by the emergence, in the postwar and post-colonial era, of cross cutting ideologies in Muslim majority countries such as secular-nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and state-led but nationally-bound Islamicization projects. Moreover, these critical geopolitical events and ideological developments were roughly contemporaneous with the rise of political Zionism, British and French endorsements of a Jewish homeland in Palestine as embodied in the Balfour and Cambon Declarations, the Holocaust, the creation of the state of Israel as a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of Jewish statelessness, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts that have since enveloped it.

In short, as Mandaville (2001) notes, the umma became an increasingly de-territorialized and fragmented imagined community over the course of the twentieth

Moreover, these processes occurred at a historical juncture when the Zionist current within the Jewish diaspora was territorializing Jewish identity within a Westphalian nation-state framework. These critical geopolitical developments continue to exert important path-dependent effects on relations between the European states, which played such an oversized role in engineering them, and domestic Muslim and Jewish organizations particularly in light of heightened suspicions of, and anxieties over, Muslim transnational identification and organization in a post-9/11 world. With this in mind, we might expect to see relatively more tension between the European state and domestic Muslim organizations than Jewish organizations because of the degree to which the Jewish diaspora and Jewish identity has been territorialized and institutionalized in the Westphalian nation-state system vis-à-vis Muslim transnational ties and identity that are deterriorialized, more amorphous, and more geographically diffuse.

While, there is a dearth of scholarship that compares relationships between European states and Jewish and Muslim minorities, there are a number of existing theories from the political science canon that need to be addressed here because of direct or tangential relevance to the topic at hand. These hypotheses can be roughly grouped as follows:

- Hypotheses connecting church-state institutional development with political opportunities and/or policy outputs
- Hypotheses positing a structural clash between the state and the horizontal authority structure of Islam

---

• Hypotheses proposing that Islam will be increasingly accommodated in Europe as international and supranational organizations supersede the authority of the state

• Hypotheses positing a European-wide trajectory toward the ‘neo-corporatist’ organization of relations between states and Muslim minority communities

• The “clash of civilizations” hypothesis that pits a modern secular humanist Judeo-Christian ‘West’ against a backward Islamic ‘East’

In the following section, I will analyze these hypotheses and explain their potential relevance to this research.

**Structural accounts: The role of church-state institutions**

Much of the contemporary scholarship that addresses the relationship between European states and Muslim minorities in particular has centered on how cross-national variations in the formulation of policies that impact Muslim minorities in Europe are determined by the historical development within specific national contexts of church-state institutional arrangements. In short, these accounts argue that church-state institutions themselves—or the political opportunities (or lack thereof) produced by church-state institutional arrangements—determine policy-making in issue-areas where religious values and interests are salient. The implication of this approach for this dissertation is that we would expect how the state engages with minority faith-based civil society organizations to likewise be a function of variations in church-state institutional

---

arrangements—or by attendant political opportunities produced by said arrangements—across the selected cases.

Using Britain, France, and Germany as case studies, Minkenberg (2003) takes a political opportunity structure approach in testing the proposition that patterns of church–state relations have an impact on public policy outputs. Regarding the formulation of policies on abortion, Minkenberg examines whether an institutional separation of church and state leads to identifiable patterns of public policy in issue-areas where religious values and interests are salient. While he maintains on the one hand that, “church–state relations represent an institutional arrangement which provides an ‘opportunity structure’ for religious interests in the political process”\(^\text{77}\), he concludes that,

\[\begin{align*}
\ldots \text{a simple structuring of the field of church–state relations with regard to the existence of an official state church on the one hand, or the relative prevalence of a strict separation of state and church on the other, must give way to more nuanced concepts… [including] other, more economic and political, criteria.}\end{align*}\]

\(^{78}\)

Effectively, Minkenberg finds that church-state regimes can only claim some explanatory power for variations in particular public policies.

In examining contemporary state policies toward the religious accommodation of Muslim minorities in Britain, France, and Germany, Fetzer and Soper (2005) treat the causal approaches suggested by resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structure, and ideology as competing theories with which to analyze variations in the accommodation of the religious needs of Muslim minorities in their selected cases.\(^{79}\) Ultimately, they argue that these approaches fail systematically to consider the church–


state aspects of their frameworks and argue that state-church institutional arrangements can best explain variation in state policies toward Muslim minorities. Fetzer and Soper (2005) conclude that France’s apparent lack of accommodation of the religious needs of its Muslim communities are, “products of France’s long and contentious church-state history: the laws, regulations, and constitutional jurisprudence upholding and expanding laïcité.” In Germany, they argue, “key church–state institutions as public corporation status and the constitutional guarantee of religious instruction in public schools play an important role in determining not only Muslims’ policy aims but also the outcome of their efforts.” On the issue of state funding of Muslim schools in Britain, they note that, … [absent] an institutional arrangement where the state worked with various churches, particularly Anglicans and Roman Catholics on education issues, it is impossible to imagine Muslims being able to make the case that the state similarly ought to work with them on the needs of Muslim pupils.

Thus, Fetzer and Soper conclude that state policies towards Muslim demands for religious accommodation in Britain, France, and Germany follows from each state’s historically based church–state institutions. Ultimately, Fetzer and Soper treat political opportunity as an intervening variable in the sense that they see church-state regimes producing narrower (in the case of France) or wider (in the case of Britain) political opportunity structures for faith-based mobilization.

Incorporating the lessons provided by these works necessarily involves contextualizing Jewish and Muslim mobilizations and state responses in each of the

---

country cases within the framework of the church-state institutional arrangements of each country-case. Accordingly, while I accept that variations in church-state institutional arrangements produces different political opportunities across the cases examined here, where the political opportunity structure provided by church-state institutional arrangements is relatively more open (i.e. in Britain), we actually see the greatest inconsistencies with regard to the structural and procedural aspects of governmental relations with Muslim organizations. Accordingly, the empirical country-case chapters to follow will commence with a descriptive section that outlines the pertinent church-state institutional environments as Jewish social and political mobilizations culminated in emancipation bargains with the state in the 19th century and as Muslim mobilizations seek to achieve access to—and accommodations from—the state in the 20th and 21st centuries.

**Structural accounts: The ‘problem’ of Islamic pluralism**

Another strand of structural argumentation that bears on this dissertation involves arguments that posit a structural incompatibility between Islam and the Western European state. In essence, these arguments hold that the development of Western European states involved a series of bargains made with religious groups that were capable of making credible commitments to the state—facilitated by some degree of vertical or hierarchical authority structure. These bargains varied considerably in character depending on contextual factors with dominant churches and minority religions being either co-opted, emancipated, or suppressed by the state. However, these arguments posit that Islam, because of its horizontal authority structure, inherent pluralism, and/or the lack of a central religious authority, faces a collective action problem because its
horizontal and pluralist structural characteristics hinder the formation of centralized and broad-based Muslim leaderships that can make credible commitments to the state.

Comparing the Catholic party in late-nineteenth-century Belgium with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in the early 1990s, Kalyvas (2000) suggests that structural issues inhibit the ability of Islamist organizations to make credible commitments,

Centralized, autocratic, and hierarchical religious structures allow religious parties, which are typically young and divided, to implement such measures and overcome their commitment problem by credibly signaling future compliance.83

It’s important to note, however, that Kalyvas’ comparison is flawed in the sense that he is effectively using Islamism as a proxy for Islam and then comparing Islam and the Catholic Church where a comparison between Islam and Christianity writ large would have been more appropriate. Warner and Wenner (2006) adapt Kalyvas’ observation to the European context by arguing more generally that,

… the structure of Islam impedes collective action by Muslims. The general lack of broad organizations results primarily from the decentralized institutional structure of the Islamic faith.84

However, Schwedler (2011) points out that these arguments lend support to the somewhat neo-Orientalist idea that there is something exceptional about Islam—i.e. its lack of centralized authority—that undermines the ability of Muslims to undertake collective action and make credible commitments.85

In my view, it is clear that certain sects within Islam (e.g. Shi’ism) and theological orientations (e.g. Sufism) have some degree of vertical or hierarchical

organization, in much the same way that considerable variation can be observed between more horizontal ‘congregational’ and more vertical ‘episcopal’ organizational structures across Christian denominations.\textsuperscript{86} In other words, there is considerable variation in structural orientations (i.e. more vertical or horizontal) within both Islam and Christianity writ large. My view is rather that more pronounced heterogeneity in terms of the sectarian adherence, traditional and reformist orientations, and national origins of European Muslims—rather than the supposed structural characteristics of ‘Islam’ \textit{per se}—remain central to inhibiting the formation of more broad-based and inclusive communal organizations at the national level. This diversity is largely the result of postcolonial bargains and labor needs of European countries in the postwar era and takes different forms in different country contexts contingent upon issues such as colonial history, historical migration patterns, and the national origins of migrant groups. Moreover, I believe there is a case to be made that time inconsistencies in the application of church-state institutions highlight the fact that European governments also suffer from a credible commitment problem.

\textbf{Culturalist accounts: the ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis}

The broader arguments that are underpinned by a notional ‘Islamic exceptionalism’ line of thinking also need to be addressed here. This is most often expressed in terms of a ‘clash of civilizations’—a simplistic binary opposition between a Judeo-Christian secular humanist ‘West’ that is technologically and morally superior to

an unreformed and backward Islamic ‘East’—and the implication that there is a fundamental incompatibility between them. Bernard Lewis was an early promoter of this conceptual clash when he referred to “…a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.” Drawing on Lewis (1990), Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1996) has become the defining expression of this line of argumentation. In short, Huntington’s ‘cultural realist’ account posits that the post–Cold War era will be shaped by conflicts between civilizations that are primarily defined by religion. Huntington’s ‘Islamic’ and ‘Hindu’ civilizations are effectively wholly defined by religion and the presence of diverse and distinct ethnic and cultural groups—such as Arabs, Persians, Javanese, and Bengalis—are considered by Huntington to constitute “sub-civilizations.” While Huntington acknowledges a certain measure of intra-civilization pluralism, he ultimately fails to dispense with the monolithic caricatures of his civilizations. In Huntington’s analysis, certain civilizations are more conflict-prone than others:

…At the micro level, the most violent fault lines are between Islam and its…neighbors. At the macro level, the dominant division is between “the West and the rest,” with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies on one hand, and the West on the other. The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness.


The pertinent argument for this dissertation that we might expect to emerge from this line of thinking would likely posit that the relative success of Jewish communities in pursuing their interests in the European context can be attributed to a natural affinity between Judaism and Christianity—i.e. a supposed shared ‘Judeo-Christian ethic’ or compatibility with secularism that underpins Huntington’s civilizational ‘West.’ However, Anidjar (2003) suggests that we should question the sharp distinction that seems to be drawn between the issues commonly referred to in terms of “Europe and the Jews” and “Islam and the West” and instead reflect upon the central role played by the common construction of the Jew and the Muslim as the ‘enemies’ of ‘Christian’ Europe.\footnote{Anidjar, Gil. 2003. \textit{The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy}. Cultural Memory in the Present. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. See also, Arjana, Sophia Rose. 2015. \textit{Muslims in the Western Imagination}. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, Chapter 4.} Bulliet (2004) also challenges a ‘Judeo-Christian’ formulation that necessarily excludes Islam in noting that,

\begin{quote}
…The unquestioned acceptance of “Judeo-Christian civilization” as a synonym for “Western civilization” makes it clear that history is not destiny. No one with the least knowledge of the past two thousand years of relations between Christians and Jews can possibly miss the irony of linking in a single term two faith communities that decidedly did not get along during most of that period.\footnote{Bulliet, Richard W. 2004. \textit{The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization}. New York: Columbia University Press, 6.}
\end{quote}

Moreover, as Mandaville (2003) notes,

\begin{quote}
… the true nature of the complex relationship between Islam and the West cannot be understood by working with static, stultified categories in which particular innate features are assigned to each side. Instead, an appreciation of this relationship can only accrue through taking account of the great diversity inherent within both traditions and the fact that in an
increasingly globalised and transnational world, no cultural forms—or their concomitant intellectual output—can be understood as a pre-formed given.\textsuperscript{94}

Challenges to the neo-Orientalist thinking of Huntington and Lewis now form part of a broader research program that acknowledges the diversity and complexity of European Muslim experiences and treats Muslim political activism in European contexts seriously.\textsuperscript{95} By shedding the implicit neo-Orientalist notion that we cannot use the same social scientific tools to study Islam because of erroneous exceptionalist suppositions, this scholarship has striven to integrate the insights of a sociology of Islam perspective with social movement theory in examining Muslim politics and Muslim activism as being comparable to other forms of activism driven by similar mobilizational dynamics.

The collaborative work of Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, and Sidney Tarrow in Dynamics of Contention (2001) has proven to be a seminal work in the application of social movement theory to faith-based activism in the sense that it superseded more structural approaches by “taking strategic interaction, consciousness, and historically accumulated culture into account.”\textsuperscript{96} My view is that the relational dynamics that McAdam et al (2001) incorporate in Dynamics of Contention (2001) provide a helpful framework for understanding changes in patterns of engagement between the state and civil society that are, after all, inherently relational. McAdam et al (2001) specify more than a dozen environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms that they consider


central to the dynamics of contention, many of which are useful for the purposes of this examination. Of particular relevance to this issue-area are causal mechanisms suggested by McAdam et al. (2001) such as suddenly imposed grievances, diffusion, attribution of similarity, brokerage, identity shift, and category formation, among others (See Appendix 2 for definitions).

The ‘post-nationalist’ thesis

Post-nationalist theses generally point to the demise or retreat of the state vis-à-vis supranational and transnational organization. In a seminal statement of this thesis as it relates to the accommodation of Islam in Europe, Soysal (1994) argues that the state is, “no longer an autonomous and independent organization closed over a nationally defined population.” Soysal (1994) argues that supranational organizations such as the European Union and the European Court of Justice (ECJ)—as well as international human rights norms institutionalized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)—are becoming the primary instruments by which immigrant populations acquire citizenship rights and have thus rendered national citizenship regimes increasingly irrelevant. The implication is that Islam will be increasingly accommodated in Europe as international and supranational organizations supersede the authority of the state and thus, presumably, the need for Muslim activism focused on the national-level will become increasingly redundant. However, in deriving a hypothesis to empirically test Soysal’s theory in Britain and Germany, Koopmans and Statham (1999) found little support for the post-national thesis,

---


with scant evidence of supranational and transnational organization, claims making that targets supranational actors and institutions, or claims making on the nation-state with reference to “supranational rights, conventions, and discourses.”

My own view is that arguments that are underpinned by the notion of a ‘retreating state’ and the increasing relevance of supranational organization have been overstated. Ultimately, competencies in areas such as immigration, family law, and state-church organization remain firmly, if not even more firmly, within the grip of the state. Furthermore, I would argue that the renewed focus on ‘shared values’ and national citizenship across Europe reflects a liberal-nationalist entrenchment that in fact involves a strengthening of the nation vis-à-vis the supranational. In the aftermath of terror attacks and unrest in ethnic neighborhoods in various European contexts in the early to mid-2000s and again in the mid-2010s, governments have in fact bolstered national sovereignty and immigration regimes as political leaders have become increasingly concerned with the imperatives of social cohesion in light of anxieties over the existence of illiberal ‘parallel societies’ that are considered potentially hostile to ‘Western’ liberal and democratic values. Moreover, I believe that Soysal underestimates the persistence of Euroscepticism in both its ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ varieties in European politics.

101 Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism based on “the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institution such as the EU (Hard); and opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make (Soft).” See Szczerbiak, Aleks, and Paul A. Taggart. 2008. “Introduction: Researching Euroscepticism in European Party Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Research Agenda.” In Opposing Europe?: The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, edited by Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul A. Taggart. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Finally, Soysal’s implicit assumption that a supranational governance regime will be more benevolent than the nation-state in providing citizenship rights to immigrant minorities and accommodating Islam cannot be assumed \textit{a priori}. This point is illustrated by several rulings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), including a ruling in June 2004 which held that policies to regulate religious expression in public institutions were permissible; a July 2014 ruling that upheld the 2010 French blanket ban on face-covering veils in public; and a November 2015 ruling that upheld the non-renewal of a French public employee’s contract, after she refused to remove her veil.\footnote{Pfaff, S., and Anthony J. Gill. 2006. “Will a Million Muslims March?: Muslim Interest Organizations and Political Integration in Europe.” \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 39 (7): 806.} With regard to ritual slaughter, Soysal notes that, “…[certain] collective rights are already included in national legislation… all European Community countries have legislation allowing religious rituals that involve slaughtering animals.”\footnote{Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. \textit{Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe}. Chicago: University of Chicago, 206 note 12.} Yet, there have been renewed legislative moves across European Union member states to ban \textit{shechita} and/or \textit{dhabh} at the national level in Denmark (enacted in 2014), Poland (struck down by the constitutional court in 2014), and the Netherlands (rejected by the Dutch Senate in 2012). While the ECHR has held that \textit{shechita} is to be regarded as a manifestation of the freedom of religious practice under Article 9 of the Convention, the Court also indicated that it will accept limitations on ritual slaughter on the condition that the religious community concerned is not denied the ability to consume ritually slaughtered meat.\footnote{Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France. 2000. European Court of Human Rights.} Once again, the ECHR has given a wide margin to its national signatories and blanket bans on ritual slaughter going forward may not be in contravention of Article 9 as long as the ability remains to import \textit{kosher} and \textit{halal} meat.
The ‘neo-corporatism’ hypothesis

Particularly germane to this research is the recent work of Jonathan Laurence, which makes explicit reference to a Europe-wide neo-corporatist impulse in the formation of Muslim councils between 1990 and 2010. In a series of publications culminating in *The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration* (2012), Laurence argues that Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom have “followed remarkably similar pathways in managing their relations with Islam.” He identifies a common pattern involving an initial phase (1960-90) when, underpinned by a “myth of return,” European governments “outsourced” the management of Islam to foreign embassies that were only too happy to exert control over the religious life of their expatriate diasporas. However, the rise of “Political Islam” and critical confrontations between “Islam” and the “West,” such as *The Satanic Verses* Affair of 1988 in Britain and the French *Affaire du Foulard* in 1989, undermined the ‘myth of return’ by highlighting the fact that European Muslim populations were now part of the political landscape of Western Europe albeit on the margins. According to Laurence, the second phase in the process (1990-2010) involved the formation of Muslim councils that were designed to facilitate and encourage religious practice among European Muslims compatible with the norms of national citizenship. Effectively, the state offered incentives for participation in these councils with the expectation that inclusion would lead to political moderation and, ultimately, social integration.

---

While Laurence (2012) holds that the similarities among the countries he examines are more important than the differences, my view is that Laurence’s characterization of a European-wide trajectory toward the more corporatist organization misses the variability in directionality that one observes over time between more corporatist and more pluralist forms of organization, particularly in the case of Britain. Moreover, there is apparent divergence among the policy issues pursued by the Muslim councils across Laurence’s cases, which suggests to me that national institutional variations still predominate. Laurence holds that, in spite of its exclusive focus on mosque governance and the fact that it was a project driven by the Home Office, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) is the neo-corporatist manifestation in Britain of continental European Muslim councils such as the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM). However, in the period since the publication of The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration (2012), MINAB’s relationship with the Conservative-led coalition government has been severed. As one interviewee noted, MINAB, although still in existence, has become effectively defunct. In effect, Laurence’s valuable thesis may be the victim of selection bias by virtue of truncating time series data.

Silvestri (2010) posits a more nuanced three-fold typology of European Muslim councils predicated upon the role played by the state in their establishment. In so doing, she distinguishes between instances involving a “hard topdown approach” of the state (typically in contexts of little or weak forms of self-organization); instances where the state remained officially behind the scenes but encouraged a “bottom-up initiative” (typically in the context of a strong civil society); and “mixed approaches” where the

110 Personal interview with anonymous interviewee, February 2014.
state openly encouraged the formation of a representative Muslim body and offered some logistical structures. Silvestri (2010) argues that, “... it is important to note their existence and they should be appreciated as “experiments” of governments and of Muslim individuals that are trying to explore the appropriate method to govern religious pluralism.”111

In essence, I see the creation of MINAB as involving a “mixed approach,” given its emergence from a political process of engagement with Muslim communities to tackle extremism after the 7/7 attacks, the role played by the Home Office in its formation112, and its working relationship with the Department of Communities and Local Government.113 Yet, my view is that it's conceptually imprecise to place MINAB in the same categorical “neo-corporatist” box along with other European governmental initiatives that involved a “hard top-down approach,” such as that involved in the formation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) in France, especially given its narrow remit involving devising standards for mosques and training institutions. Ultimately, I share Silvestri’s view that what we are observing now is a variety of experimentations in governance across national contexts—some more corporatist and some more pluralist in character as well as some more focused on the national-level and some with a more localized focus. While the range of appropriate policy alternatives—and thus the scope of possible forms of experimentation—available to government in different national contexts is likely determined to a certain extent by church-state

112 Personal interview with Mustafa Field MBE of MINAB dated 2/21/2014.
institutional arrangements, policy initiatives in terms of how to structure engagements with Muslim minority communities appear to be marked by the kinds of limited policy analysis, bounded rationality, and incrementalism that Charles Lindblom termed, “the science of ‘muddling through’.”

In light of the preceding overview of the literature, we might expect to see a number of interactions and patterns emerging from the case analysis to follow. The literature on church-state relations leads us to expect that the development of church-state institutions will exert effects on structures of intermediation. This might seem self-evident except that it has more recently been called into question by those who see cross-national similarities—in terms of a continent-wide moves to the ‘neo-corporatist’ organization of relations with Muslim communities—as being more important than the differences. While I expect the French case to largely fit neatly this ‘neo-corporatist’ pattern, as previously mentioned, I would not expect the British case to do so. While Laurence asserts that the Dutch case fits the ‘neo-corporatist’ pattern, this research also disputes that characterization.

Moreover, while Jewish communities have been excluded from the dominant paradigms of multicultural research by virtue of their ‘whiteness’ and lack of apparent contemporary material disadvantage, we must not forget that the demographic foundations of the Jewish populations of Western Europe originate in refugee flows, whether from inquisitions or pogroms. If, while recognizing its differences, we nonetheless discard the neo-Orientalist assumption that there is something ‘exceptional’

---

about Islam, then we might expect to see points of convergence and divergence between
the experiences of marginalized Jewish communities in the early periods of settlement
and those of Muslim communities in the postwar era. As previously mentioned, we might
expect to see that state interventions throughout history have resulted in communal
instability involving sectarian and national competition and tensions within and between
more conservative and more reformist orientations. We might also expect to see
similarities in the kinds of narratives that emerged in the era of Jewish emancipation and
those that have emerged in the public discourse on the Muslim presence in Europe.

Moreover, while historical European anxieties about the political pulls of the
Jewish diaspora have, since 1948, been territorialized in the form of the State of Israel,
we might also expect to see similar preoccupations with the transnational pulls of the
\textit{umma}. Whereas contemporary support for Israel in Europe finds institutional expression
through a variety of Jewish communal organizations and is relatively well aligned with
the foreign policy prerogatives of the European state, the concern of Muslim
communities for their co-religionists in various contexts might be expected to less well
aligned in light of both the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the War on Terror and other
conflicts in Kashmir, Algeria, Iraq, and elsewhere. We might expect these tensions to
exert a deleterious effect on relations between the state and Muslim communities simply
by virtue of an effective misalignment with the foreign policy prerogatives of the
European state.
CHAPTER 2 – NEGOTIATING THE POLITICAL ORDER: COHESION, EQUALITY, DIFFERENCE, AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN POLITICS

Communal organizations that purport to represent faith communities do not form and operate in a vacuum but within the framework of institutional environments and political cultures that can either facilitate or constrain their capacity to function, grow, and achieve their objectives and goals. As previously noted, and of particular importance, church-state institutional arrangements offer variations in political opportunities for organizations to mobilize along ethnic, cultural, or religious lines. A substantial literature points to the importance of the context of the integration or incorporation regimes within which such organizations operate. While it is most popular to conceptualize European integration regimes as ranging ideally-typically from ‘multiculturalist’ at one end of a spectrum and ‘assimilationist’ at the other, the conceptual lack of specificity, particularly with regard to the term ‘multiculturalism,’ calls into question the utility of this schema. It’s also important to note at this juncture that European Jewish communities have traditionally been stymied in contexts where ‘blackness’ and ‘whiteness’ are the critical categories of multicultural group identification. The exclusion of Jewish communities from the multicultural schema is perfectly encapsulated in Sander Gilman’s argument that, “the Jews, now seen as the ultimate victims of inhumanity, an inhumanity to be

answered by the multicultural, are now excluded from the multicultural as too successful, too white and too Jewish.”

Of course, the idea that Western Europe is demographically multi-cultural is an uncontroversial reality, but how do we define multiculturalism? The attachment of the suffix ism to a multicultural demographic reality is conceptually problematic as it suggests a distinctive and coherent ideological and/or political position. However, as many scholars have noted, the rubric of ‘multiculturalism’ encapsulates a variety of philosophies, institutional frameworks, and political interventions. Others have noted how the term ‘multiculturalism’ can move in and out of vogue, depending on the degree to which the philosophies, institutional frameworks, and political interventions associated with it carry more or less political baggage at any particular moment in time.

This chapter will proceed by adapting the suggestion of Pnina Werbner for the need to “consider multiculturalism as played out in historical moments of crisis and confrontation.” This adaptation is underpinned by Werbner’s assessment that, “citizenship is not permanently fixed by universalist philosophical principles, whether liberal or socialist, but is changing and dialogical, inventive and responsive to world events, a negotiated political order.” The comparative nature of this research as well as the previously mentioned conceptual issues demands that Werbner’s ‘multiculturalism-

119 I use the hyphenated term ‘multi-cultural’ hereafter in the simple sense that no European state is in fact mono-cultural; all are de facto—if not de jure—multicultural insofar as they host a number of different cultural groups.
in-history’ approach be broadened in scope in order to consider the differing ways by which European states deal with issues of cohesion, equality, and difference—and, ultimately, the place of religion—in liberal democratic contexts.

Accordingly, this chapter seeks to intertwine theoretical and policy developments and their interrelationship with critical socio-political events in Britain, France, and the Netherlands since the late 1980s. The late 1980s is considered an appropriate starting point given the roles of *The Satanic Verses* affair of 1988 and the first *Affaire du Foulard* in 1989 as critical junctures that heightened the visibility and political salience of the presence of Muslim communities in Europe and thus Europe’s multi-cultural reality. In so doing, I will commence with a brief discussion of the most relevant contemporary political theories then I will proceed to discuss the impact of critical events on policy shifts and attendant developments in political theory. The purpose of this approach is to focus on contemporary theoretical developments while providing necessary background of the changing political environment across Europe in order to contextualize the country case chapters that will follow.

For the purpose of classifying integration regimes, Parekh (2000) provides a nuanced and useful conceptual framework that specifies five ideal-typical models for which the liberal democratic state might deal with issues of cohesion, equality and difference, which is worth reproducing here as a means to specify the terminology that I will employ in this chapter (See Table 5). Parekh’s schema is deployed here as a means to move beyond the multiculturalist / assimilationist dichotomy and map the changing policy responses of the European state in face of changes in the political environment over the past three decades or so. These policy responses are not static and world events and subsequent (re)negotiations of political orders have had profound implications for how the state engages with minority faith-based organizations, especially those whose presence is seen to be the product of relatively recent migrations.
### Table 5: Cohesion, equality and difference: five possible models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedural</th>
<th>The state is culturally neutral, and leaves individuals and communities to negotiate with each other as they wish, providing they observe certain basic procedures.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>The state promotes a single national culture and expects all to assimilate to it. People who do not or cannot assimilate are second-class citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>There is a single political culture in the public sphere but substantial diversity in the private lives of individuals and communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plural</td>
<td>There is both unity and diversity in public life; communities and identities overlap and are interdependent, and develop common features.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatist</td>
<td>The state permits and expects each community to remain separate from others, and to organise and regulate its own affairs, and largely confines itself to maintaining order and civility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Parekh, 2000: 42*

While the presence of Islam in postwar Europe—and, especially the increasing assertiveness of Muslim politics since the late-1980s—has undoubtedly heightened the awareness of Europe’s multi-cultural reality by making it more visible and topical, political theorists have long been grappling with the tensions between cohesion, equality, and difference. Starting in the early 1970s, a number of Anglophone theorists refined a doctrine that emphasized the liberal ideal of the neutrality of the democratic state. Of course, this was not a novel idea but one that traced an intellectual lineage back to Locke’s argument that government should not concern itself with the “care of souls.”

In the 1970s, some more contemporary ‘liberal neutralists’ went as far as to assert that state neutrality is itself a necessary condition as a defining feature of the liberal state by

---

123 Notably, Locke’s toleration did not extend to atheists (because they cannot be trusted to keep promises) or Roman Catholics ([because] all those who enter into it do thereby *ipso facto* deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince). Locke, John. 1689. “A Letter Concerning Toleration.”
defining it as one, “which imposes no conception of the good upon its citizens but which allows individuals to pursue their own good in their own way.”

Anglophone philosophical debates in the 1970s centered upon whether the claims that minority groups made on the state were just, assuming that justice is an attribute that the state should aspire to achieve. Those arguing from a liberal perspective insisted that justice demanded that the state maintain ‘neutrality’ or ‘color-blindness’ by treating every individual in precisely the same way. Ontologically, these arguments conceptualized citizens as essentially similar and rational individuals and held that any alternative course of action to ‘liberal neutrality’ would be inherently discriminatory and therefore unjust. Theoretical and philosophical debates over cohesion, equality, and difference through the 1980s and 1990s were concerned primarily with ethnic rather than religious difference. Indeed, Modood (2000) points out that theorists at this juncture tended to, “exhibit very little sympathy for religious groups; religious groups are usually absent in their theorizing and there is usually a presumption in favour of secularism.” This was undoubtedly exacerbated by the ontological individualist approach of liberal neutralists and is manifest in John Rawls’ idea that religious commitments and attachments form part of an individual’s “nonpublic or moral identity.” The theoretical preference of ‘liberal

---


125 See, for example, Rawls’ hypothetical “original position,” in which representatives of the citizenry are divested of all identities or affiliations in order to make rational decisions about the social contract. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Original ed. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.


127 See Rawls, John. 1985. “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14: 242 note 24. Modood (1997) and Parekh (1995) have argued that this distinction between public and private spheres—particularly with regard to education—is ambiguous. Central to these argument is the idea that identities are grounded in specific cultures and moralities and denying immigrants and their children the right to learn about their language, culture, and/or religion contributes to their marginalization. See Modood, Tariq. 1997. “‘Difference’, Cultural Racism and Anti-Racism.” In Debating Cultural Hybridity:
neutralists’ for participants in political dialogue to speak a ‘neutral’ language of the civic sphere mandates, in practical terms, that actors who might choose to prioritize a religious identity tread carefully, recast their arguments in a secular language, and avoid expressing certain ideas that might be central to their belief system. Recognition of this inherent secular bias in the predominant theories of liberal egalitarianism became more salient as discussions of the European multi-cultural reality of the late 1980s increasingly became centered on religious—as opposed to ethnic—difference.

Of course, there is an understandable tendency for theorists of ‘difference,’ while appearing to generalize, to ground their work in specific, proximate, and familiar forms of ‘difference.’ Tariq Modood, whose own work focuses on British Muslim communities, notes that the fact that Native Canadians, the Québecois, and women in Europe and North America—the primary subject groups of leading theorists at this time—did not foreground a particular religious identity likely exacerbated this tendency for some of the leading contemporary theorists of ‘difference’ to not engage with issues where religious difference was central. Modood has gone even further by accusing leading theorists and intellectuals—such as Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor—of manifesting

---


“ignorance-cum-prejudice” in the instances where they ventured to remark on the position of European Muslims.\(^{130}\)

The identity shifts and social fault lines that became increasingly apparent in the aftermath of \textit{The Satanic Verses} Affair in Britain in 1988—and the first \textit{Affaire du Foulard} in France the following year—heightened the political saliency of religious identity (i.e. ‘Muslimness’) over ethnicity (i.e. ‘South Asian’ or ‘Maghrébian’ identities) as a more appropriate and mobilizable identity category.\(^{131}\) As British Asians were demonized in the public sphere during \textit{The Satanic Verses} Affair as ‘barbarians,’ ‘uncivilised,’ ‘fanatics,’ and compared to the Nazis,\(^{132}\) many galvanized around the ‘Muslim’ identity that was now being assigned to them pejoratively in the public sphere. Cesari (2005) describes this in terms of a process whereby a marginalized group reclaims their stigmatized identity and inverts this stigmatization into a positive attribute.\(^{133}\) This identity shift is also supported by Will Herberg’s generational thesis, which in effect argues that the religious consciousness of ethnic or migrant populations is more robust than ethnic affiliation as it provides a more adaptive response during times of dislocation, although the social organization and practice of religion is usually modified in the


process. Similar identity shift processes that involve expressions of anti-Muslim sentiment in the public sphere and the subsequent foregrounding of Muslim identities have been noted in France after the Affaires du Foulard and in the Netherlands after the murder of Theo van Gogh. These mutually constituted identity shifts would have far-reaching implications for political organization and mobilization. Suleiman et al (2012) note that, “[The Satanic Verses Affair] energised pre-existing Muslim community networks and organisations and galvanised them into a political and social activism that has since been progressively reinforced.”

It bears noting here that the increasing visibility of Islam in the European public sphere at this juncture also posed specific problems for the idiosyncratic church-state institutional arrangements, ideological commitments, and political traditions of Britain, France, and the Netherlands—none of which were well positioned to cope with this contemporary European manifestation of what José Casanova terms the deprivatization of religion. A British legal-institutional framework that revolved around the management of racial and ethnic groups under the rubric of race relations was not well equipped to deal with religious claims and difference. In France, the strict secularism of the Republican model was inherently threatened by assertions of Muslim identity in a school

---


system designed to perpetuate Republican values and, in particular, laïcisme. In the Netherlands, the effective disintegration of the Dutch pillared model starting in the 1960s and the development of an ‘Ethnic Minorities Policy’ in the 1980s, effectively ethnicized religion by incorporating it within the arbitrary classifications of the state’s “ethnic minority” schemes. The political implications of these issues will be discussed in respective case chapters, but what is important in our exploration of the intersection of political theory and contemporary multi-cultural Europe is that these developments have triggered heated domestic debates, involved renegotiations of political orders, and set new agendas for political philosophers and policy research.

In the 1990s, a number of theorists of deliberative democracy converged on the idea that democratic justice required that marginalized groups be adequately represented in political decision-making processes. Their arguments challenged ‘liberal neutralists’ by proposing that state institutions are not, in reality, ‘neutral’ or ‘color-blind’ but rather are favorable in certain respects toward dominant majority groups; that it was imperative to recognize the potential for ‘blind justice’ at the individual level to create injustice at group and societal levels; and that justice, equity, and fairness sometimes permitted—if not required—‘color-consciousness’ and differential treatment.

---

140 The position of European Jewry has been notably absent in these debates and theorizing. Kahn-Harris and Gidley (2010) note that because Jews have become associated with ‘whiteness’ and are not considered to be materially disadvantaged they do not fit into dominant paradigms of multicultural research. Kahn-Harris, Keith, and Ben Gidley. 2010. Turbulent Times: The British Jewish Community Today. London; New York: Continuum, 6.
were underpinned by the idea that the “state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others” and that policies formulated in the absence of the participation of disadvantaged groups—especially when their participation is salient to the issue-area—are likely to be incomplete and/or biased. In effect, this insight forms the theoretical underpinning for a position in support of ‘affirmative action’ programs as a means to redress institutionalized discrimination.

It’s necessary to note here that electoral models of democratic participation have a relatively poor track record in realizing adequate representation for marginalized groups. European party political machines operate on organizing principles that prioritize the maintenance of party discipline, responsiveness to lobby groups, and maximizing the potential for electoral success. The attendant logic has incentivized parties to operate on a short-term time horizon driven by electoral cycles and pursue strategies that involve co-opting—rather than truly representing—marginalized groups. Furthermore, marginalized groups often do not command the organizational capacity to achieve self-representation in decision-making processes and, if decision-making processes are competitive and/or majoritarian, more powerful participants and/or groups with numerical superiority can systematically ignore disadvantaged and minority group voices. In addressing the democratic shortcomings posed by the failures of liberal representation, a number of theorists of deliberative democracy have posited that marginalized groups will only have a substantial and durable effect on policy formulation and outcomes when decisions move beyond procedural democracy to involve more


substantive ‘practical discourses’ or the ‘sharing of reasons’ across political lines. However, this raises the question as to the appropriate mechanisms within which these substantive ‘practical discourses’ might take place.

A corporatist approach to the organization of ethno-religious minority groups has long been seen as an appropriate organizational mechanism by which the state can provide elite access and representation to those who have been denied it by democratic deficiencies in electoral models. European sociologists have noted the utility of a corporatist approach as a means to mitigate the failure of other representational bodies, especially political parties, “to perform as agents in the ‘formation of the political will of the people.’” Indeed, the manner by which European states organized their relationships with Judaism in the 18th and 19th centuries was seen to provide a historical institutional template for how the state might coordinate its relationship with other minority religious groups. This is manifested in the historical quasi-corporatist relationship between the British state and the Board of Deputies of British Jews or the more forceful Napoleonic corporatist organization of Judaism through the mechanism of the Consistoire in France and the Opperconsistorie in the Netherlands.

By the late 1990s, the British and French governments were both attempting to encourage or develop appropriate representative bodies to act as the primary agent for British Muslim communities and French Islam respectively, a process that was later replicated in the Netherlands. Yet, it would be fair to say that these developments were

---


148 French Republican ideology does not extend recognition to ethnic or religious communities.
motivated less by liberal ideals of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ than by a desire to normalize relationships with Muslim minority groups by ‘domesticating’ Islam by separating it from sources of foreign funding and influence with a view to stemming radicalization.¹⁴⁹

These political and organizational developments are central to this thesis and we will return to examine them in more detail in respective country-case chapters.

Throughout the 1990s, scholarship that addressed issues of cohesion, diversity, and equality—and respective policy developments—followed distinct paths in different country contexts. Favell (2001) notes that British policy academics working in this issue-area have tended not to engage in discussions of European-wide experiences, or comparative accounts, of race and ethnic relations.¹⁵⁰ Others argue that both British and French government officials, media, and academics have tended to portray each other’s ideological commitments and associated practices in unflattering terms.¹⁵¹ As Weil & Crowley (1994) note,

> In the British literature, a description of the French model as ‘ethnocentric’, leading to the racist Front National and relying on a coercive process of assimilation, is sometimes used to highlight the pluralist, liberal and anti-racist British model. Conversely the same British model, redescribed as communitarian, multiculturalist, mixophobic, and leading to religious fundamentalism, is frequently used in France to highlight the secular, egalitarian French model, with its respect for individual identity and social mobility.¹⁵²


Accordingly, throughout the 1990s, differing European models became conflated with national pride and long-standing cross-channel rivalries with social disturbances and militant activity on both sides of the English Channel providing grist for the respective mills. In the 1990s, for example, French security officials coined the pejorative term “Londonistan” to reflect their view of London as an ‘anything goes’ safe haven for Muslim political radicals.

Kymlicka (2001) notes that, by the end of the 1990s, critics of the plural-multiculturalist school had generally accepted that the difference-blind rules or institutions central to liberal models could produce and/or perpetuate disadvantages for particular groups. This, Kymlicka argued, produced two fundamental shifts in the terms of the debate: firstly, whether justice requires common rules for all, or differential rules for diverse groups, should be assessed on a case by case basis. As a result, Kymlicka argued, the burden of proof shifted with there now being an equal burden on defenders of multi-cultural pluralism to show that proposed policy changes would not create injustices and defenders of liberal neutrality to demonstrate that the status quo does not create injustices for minorities.

Parekh (2000) characterized the political debate over cohesion, equality, and difference in Britain as being fought between ‘nationalists’ and ‘liberals’, both of whom prioritize social cohesion over plurality. ‘Nationalists’ advocate an assimilationism that suggests that minorities should conform to national norms. ‘Liberals,’ on the other hand, posit a hypothetical ideologically neutral public space (albeit overwhelmingly secular) and prioritize equality at the expense of difference. However, with minorities now advancing religion as the basis for public recognition, Parekh suggested that

… [the] debate between the nationalist and the liberal models… needs to be increasingly replaced by debates between the liberal and the pluralist
models, with a view to creating a synthesis of their best features – Britain is both a community of citizens and a community of communities.\textsuperscript{153}

Thus, in Parekh’s view, the commitment to individual rights that underpins liberalism and the commitment to group rights that underpins pluralism are not mutually exclusive.

Needless to say, the Parekh Report was not well received by either liberals or nationalists.

Equivalent debates in France since the early 1990s and well into the 2000s have tended to be much narrower in scope and, to use the terminology of Laborde (2008), have effectively been fought between ‘official republicans’ and ‘tolerant republicans.’ ‘Official republicanism’ proposes a liberal-nationalist synthesis of sorts by arguing that a universally secular public sphere is not discriminatory and thus citizens of foreign origin are expected to integrate into the national French community. ‘Tolerant Republicans,’ on the other hand, point to the gap between abstract republican ideals and prescriptions and contemporary social realities in France. Yet, as Laborde (2008) notes, official and tolerant republicans both endorse a version of “status quo neutrality” in that they adopt

\begin{quote}
… a theoretical position which takes the existing distribution of burdens and benefits in society for granted or, more precisely, which fails to provide an impartial baseline from which current claims about inequalities or unjust treatment can be normatively assessed. Neither official nor tolerant republicans are sufficiently critical of existing church–state arrangements, and their potentially dominating effect.\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

Laborde suggests a ‘critical republican’ alternative that, although formulated within the context of contemporary French debates, is general enough to be relevant elsewhere.

Contrary to ‘liberal neutralists’ who seek to exclude religious convictions from public reason, Laborde’s ‘critical republicans’ do not object to the introduction of religious arguments in broad public debate but hold that it is unacceptable for constitutions to be

theologically inspired, or for public officials to justify public decisions by reference to religious views and suggests that, in both cases, appeals should be made to ‘common grounds.’

If the events of the late-1980s and 1990s were decisive for a more assertive Muslim social and political mobilization in European domestic realms, a series of critical events unfolded in the 2000s, which had a cumulative effect in producing new discourses about the perceived failures of European integration regimes and instability of Muslim communities. Key events include the September 11th attacks, the Madrid train bombings of 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh later that year, and the July 7th 2005 attacks on London (7/7). Other events of the decade that were not related to Islamic extremism, such as the controversy surrounding the banning of the hijab in French classrooms and the 2005 Jyllands-Posten cartoon controversy, highlighted the cultural differences between the conservative religious views of some European Muslims, on the one hand, and increasingly secular Western publics. However, unfortunately, conservative Muslim religious views and practices were often erroneously conflated in the public sphere with extremism, a pattern that continues to recur.\footnote{Most recently, this conflation between conservative religious practices and extremism was apparent in the so-called ‘Trojan Horse’ affair. See Arthur, James. 2015. “Extremism and Neo-Liberal Education Policy: A Contextual Critique of the Trojan Horse Affair in Birmingham Schools.” \textit{British Journal of Educational Studies} 63 (3): 311–28.}

Some commentators interpreted these wide-ranging events as an across-the-board failure on the part of all European integration regimes to satisfactorily integrate their Muslim minorities.\footnote{See, for example, Leiken, Robert. 2005. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, August.} Others pointed to the purported failure on the part of Muslims to integrate themselves into European societies.\footnote{For a concise summation of these discourses, see Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf, eds. 2010. \textit{The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices}. London; New York: Routledge.} Effectively, these critical events and the discourses they produced fomented ‘moral panics’ often predicated on neo-Orientalist
assumptions about perceived incompatibilities between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ or ‘Islam’ and liberal democracy. These public ‘moral panics’ were often generated, perpetuated, and amplified by distorted and over-simplified narratives that ignored or glossed over the complex and varied contexts of these events and applied pressure on political elites to find ‘solutions’ to perceived ‘problems.’

Much of the academic literary output of the early 2000s framed and/or critiqued this new context of the “crisis of multiculturalism.” In public discourse, however, crude and simplistic narratives suggested that ‘failures of (Muslim) integration’ had become a law and order issue (often citing the violent urban protests in Bradford, Oldham, and Burnley in the summer of 2001 and in the Paris banlieues in 2005); that ‘failures of (Muslim) integration’ had become a security issue (often citing that many of the 9/11 attackers had lived as legal immigrants in Europe countries or pointing to the ‘homegrown’ London bombings in 2005); and that ‘failures of (Muslim) integration’ were part-and-parcel of a broader ‘culture war’ or ‘clash of civilizations’ (often citing the Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2005 or the Swiss minaret referendum in 2009).

The ‘law and order’ discourse failed to consider that these episodes of violent urban unrest were better explained by factors other than religious difference such as structural problems created by industrial decline, social segregation in housing and education, far-right political agitation, local policing and the misrepresentation of crime data related to racial attacks, media amplification of local racist fears, and weak communal leaderships—all of which disproportionally affected Muslim populations.¹⁶⁴ The ‘security’ discourses and policy responses undoubtedly contributed to the problematic construction of entire European Muslim communities as ‘suspect communities’ or even ‘fifth columns’ further stigmatizing and marginalizing European Muslims.¹⁶⁵ The ‘culture war’ discourses were embedded in a simplistic ‘clash of civilizations’ rubric where passionate defenses of religious views in the public sphere by European Muslim communities were erroneously seen as supporting evidence for the incompatibility of ‘Islam’ with Western ‘liberal democracy’ and/or ‘modernity.’¹⁶⁶

In light of growing evidence of discriminatory societal outcomes in areas such as employment, housing, education, social work, policing, and immigration policy¹⁶⁷, the basis of the French Republican theory of integration, premised on liberal neutrality and


holding that citizens of every origin would become ‘equal’ by the second generation, was becoming increasingly incoherent in practice. Meanwhile, the British and Dutch models were being undermined by a widespread perception of the ‘failure of multiculturalism.’ Critics claimed that multiculturalism had fostered, if not encouraged, separateness with communities operating “on the basis of a series of parallel lives.” 168

This sense of the instability of European Muslim communities was compounded by a perception that there was something exceptional in the development of intergenerational tensions between young Muslims living in cosmopolitan urbanities and older generations. Most often, intergenerational tensions within European Muslim communities have been characterized in the literature as crystallizing over competing understandings and practices of Islam with younger generations rejecting the ‘cultural’ Islam of older generations and searching for a more relevant, ‘authentic’, personalized, or ‘Westernized’ interpretation of Islam. 169 However, as Suleiman et al (2012) note, “Intergenerational conflict in Muslim families needs to be seen in the wider context of the breakdown of inter-generational links that has been identified as one of the chief problems affecting young people in wider British society today.” 170 As Lloyd (2008) notes, globalization, technological change, and changing social norms have had a crucial impact on intergenerational dynamics across-the-board by

…increasing the differences in outlook, values, identity and cultural resources of different cohorts. In particular, the characteristics of younger cohorts shaped by globalisation may result in larger differences between

---

170 Suleiman, Yasir, University of Cambridge Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies (University of Cambridge), University of Exeter, and University of Westminster, eds. 2012. Contextualising Islam in Britain II. Cambridge: University of Cambridge in association with The Universities of Exeter and Westminster, 93.
young and older generations, so that different cohorts find themselves lacking the shared experiences that enable understanding, empathy and shared identity.\textsuperscript{171}

Others have noted that concerns over specific age cohorts mark many periods of social, economic, and political transition.\textsuperscript{172}

This tendency for the third generation progeny of immigrants to gravitate toward a religious identity reflects a pattern that originally theorized by Herberg (1955) in the context of the more robust religious identifications of the third generations of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish immigrants to the United States.\textsuperscript{173} Endelman (2002) notes a similar pattern among Anglo-Jewish youth in Britain in the 1930s and 40s who became detached from the cultural accretions of their parents’ religion and were drawn to radical and/or collectivist political movements that combined Jewish identity with nationalism, such as Bundism, Communism, and Zionism, in the 1930s and 1940s. Endelman (2002) suggests that the Communist Party of Great Britain attracted:

\ldots young men and women who wanted to build a better world but were disillusioned with the increasingly moderate Labour Party… It was also attractive because it was more than a political organization. It offered a meaningful, all-enveloping way of life. “To be a Communist,” the East End–born Marxist historian Raphael Samuel (1934–96) recalled, “was to have a complete social identity, one which transcended the limits of class, gender and nationality.” For some, Communism functioned like a religion, offering answers to ultimate questions, replacing a faith lost or never possessed, providing strength and solace.\textsuperscript{174}

Thus, these intergenerational dynamics should not be seen as part of an exceptional European Muslim pathology—one that problematizes younger generations of British

Muslims\textsuperscript{175}—but rather as a specific manifestation of the perennial identity crises of youth and the generational dynamics of migrant religious identification in the context of dislocation in an era of intense globalization.

The political and media discourses surrounding the ‘failure of multiculturalism’ took different forms in different national contexts but, again, were premised upon the erroneous idea that multiculturalism is a singular, fixed ideology or doctrine. This ubiquitous public discourse, driven by the events of the 2000s, soon began to pervade the political discourse. In Britain, the publication of the Cantle Report in 2001 and its discussion of “parallel lives,” heralded a shift to a more nationalist inflection in political discourse centered on “social cohesion.” A similar shift occurred in the Netherlands following the publication of Paul Scheffer’s seminal 2000 article \textit{Het multiculturele drama} (The multicultural disaster), which predicted the collapse of “the house of cards of the multicultural society.”\textsuperscript{176} In France, which has never considered itself to be a multiculturalist society, a parallel public discourse was marked by considerable hand-wringing over ‘balkanization’ and \textit{communautarisme} and was manifested in the Stasi Commission’s effort to shore-up \textit{laïcité} and improve integration.

In Britain, the Cantle Report and the Denham Report, that were generated in 2001 following the ‘northern disturbances’ said little about the ‘riots’ themselves but heralded a shift toward a discourse of ‘social cohesion.’ The report noted that, “many communities operate on the basis of a sense of parallel lives,” a phrase that entered the British political imaginary and was echoed in the view of Trevor Phillips, then Chairman of the


75
Commission for Racial Equality, that Britain was “sleepwalking to segregation.” One of the problems identified by Cantle (2001) was the lack of a “uniting national vision.” The “Denham Report” argued for the need for “a widespread and open debate about identity, shared values, and common citizenship.” However, it is important to note that both Cantle (2001) and Denham (2001) emphasized that they were not advocating a return to a perceived “dominant or monoculturalist view of nationality” into which all must assimilate.

Contemporaneously, the French government published a series of reports in response to the challenges to laïcité posed by the wearing of Islamic headscarves in classrooms. The Debré and Stasi Commission reports in 2003 are littered with references to valeurs communes, valeurs fondatrices, and valeurs républicaines. The Stasi Report characterized laïcité as, “a foundational value of the Republican pact,” with the school constituting “the first site of learning of Republican values.” This focus on values stood in stark contrast with a report published by the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration a mere one year previously, which stated that ‘In a Republican democracy, the state is not in the business of imposing values, rather, citizens are free to choose their own values.’ The political outcome of the Stasi Commission culminated in the presentation of 26 proposals many of which were targeted at improving integration. Yet, to the dismay of many members of the Commission, only the recommendation to ban, ‘the wearing of signs or

---

clothes through which pupils ostensibly express a religious allegiance’ was acted upon
and, to make matters worse, the rationale behind the prohibition was widely
misunderstood.182

In the Netherlands, in an immensely influential article published in the newspaper
NRC Handelsblad in 2000, sociologist Paul Scheffer chastised Dutch political elites for
ignoring “the multicultural disaster” that was, in Scheffer’s view, unfolding before them.
While Scheffer’s article was part of a strand of ‘new realist’ thinking harshly critical of
Dutch integration policies, his article was the first outspoken criticism from the political
left. He warned that politicians were ignoring the emergence of a separate “ethnic
underclass” consisting of people who feel no attachment to Dutch culture and society and
who are unwilling and unable to integrate. Scheffer’s recommendations were imbued
with a nationalist subtext, invoking the affirmation of Dutch culture, language, and
history as an important remedy for the perceived problems of multicultural society.
Following the El-Moumni Affair of 2001 and the murders of Pym Fortuyn in 2002 and
Theo van Gogh in 2004, anti-Islam and anti-immigrant sentiments have run high and a
consistent segment of the Dutch electorate now supports politicians, such as the PVV’s
Geert Wilders, who make the valorization of Dutch identity and culture—and stricter
policies regarding (Muslim) immigration and integration—central to their platform.

After the September 11th attacks, and in the context of the ongoing and pervasive
discourse over the ‘failure of multiculturalism,’ European public discourse converged
over the need to (re)define and/or (re)valorize national values. This discursive
convergence crossed over into policy realms with citizenship being redefined and
revalued with a view to managing immigrant diversity going forward. While the re-

evaluation of citizenship in the context of diversity has been widely discussed, there is an ongoing debate over the character and direction of changes.\textsuperscript{183} Yet, it is noteworthy that, in recent years, nine European countries have introduced civic integration courses, citizenship tests and/or ‘citizenship trajectories’ as instruments in their new immigrant integration policies.\textsuperscript{184}

Accordingly, the solutions proffered by European political elites to the perceived failure of multiculturalism have all involved the reinvigoration of a common social identity as a means to strengthen national identification. Mouritsen (2008) suggests that this “instrumental liberal neo-nationalism” is premised on the idea that “… some homogeneity, and its maintenance through education, assimilation and immigration control, is necessary.”\textsuperscript{185} All three of the country cases here have seen policy convergence over the institutionalization of citizenship and language tests, and civic integration programs. In July 2003, the Gaullist Raffarin government in France launched Contrats d’accueil et de l’intégration (“Contracts for Reception and Integration”), which mandated one day of civics instruction, followed by up to 500 hours of French language instruction. The UK introduced a relatively gentle citizenship test in 2005 with civic integration becoming a requirement for permanent residency in 2007, and a language test introduced for spousal visas in 2015. The Dutch integration program is currently the strictest in all of

Europe. Renowned in the 1980s for its pluralist-multicultural model, the Netherlands has made the most significant departure towards a more nationalist-assimilationist position.\textsuperscript{186}

In the context of a dominant discourse about the ‘failure of multiculturalism,’ politicians beat a discursive retreat from the \textit{terminology} of ‘multiculturalism’ and effectively substituted a terminology of “community cohesion” for the “m-word.”\textsuperscript{187}

However, evidence points to the fact that this discursive retreat from multiculturalism has not always been matched by policy retreat. On a policy level, there is empirical evidence of a general pattern of the persistence of multiculturalist policies across Europe (See Table 6). Again, the Netherlands remains a high profile exception with the Multiculturalism Policy Index demonstrating a clear ‘rise and fall.’

Contemporaneous with these political developments, theorists of deliberative democracy challenged the appropriateness and applicability of ‘strong’ or ‘mosaic’ theories of multiculturalism—that is, those that view human groups and cultures as clearly delineated and identifiable entities that coexist, while maintaining firm boundaries, and consider the worthiness of cultural preservation as a good in itself.\textsuperscript{188}

\begin{table}
\caption{Multiculturalism Policy Scores 1980-2010}
\label{tab:multiculturalismScores}
\end{table}


\textsuperscript{187} Steven Vertovec was informed by a speechwriter for then British Home Secretary, David Blunkett, that “the minister will never use ‘the M-word’ again.” See Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf, eds. 2010. \textit{The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices}. London; New York: Routledge, 14.

\textsuperscript{188} Benhabib (2002: 8) defines ‘mosaic’ multiculturalism as “the view that human groups and cultures are clearly delineated and identifiable entities that coexist, while maintaining firm boundaries, as would pieces of a mosaic.” The idea of a cultural ‘mosaic’ was coined by John Murray Gibbon in his book \textit{Canadian Mosaic} (1938). The term is now ordinarily associated with Canadian philosophers such as Will Kymlicka as well as the institutional frameworks and political interventions associated with Canadian politics since the 1960s and 1970s.
Note: Countries could receive a total score of 8, for each of the following eight policies: (1) constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat, or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities; (2) the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula; (3) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; (4) exemptions from dress codes; (5) allowing of dual citizenship; (6) the funding of ethnic group organizations or activities; (7) the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; and (8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups. Source: Multiculturalism Policy Index, www.queensu.ca/mcp

While agreeing that a commitment to democratic egalitarianism may sometimes require the accommodation of cultural difference, Benhabib (2002) criticizes a tendency to regard cultural preservation as a good in itself. She argued that our reasoning about accommodating cultural minorities should be driven by democratic egalitarianism rather than the promotion of cultural integrity. According to Benhabib,

*It matters a great deal whether we defend culturalist demands because we want to preserve minority cultures within the liberal-democratic state or because we want to expand, the circle of democratic inclusion. Unlike the multiculturalist, the democratic theorist accepts that the political*
Benhabib argues that ‘strong’ or ‘mosaic’ multiculturalists make the epistemic mistake of understanding cultures in terms of “clearly delineable wholes” that are effectively coterminous with societal groups. Instead, Benhabib contends that cultures only look like delineable wholes to those outside them or to those of their members who make it their project to recast them. However, Benhabib argues, to most participants cultures are “polyvocal, multilayered, decentered and fractured systems of action and signification.” Ultimately, Benhabib suggests that we should focus more on what the political leaders of such groups demand in the public sphere than on how we might best define them.

The European discourse surrounding “social cohesion” became considerably more urgent—particularly in Britain, but also across Europe—in the aftermath of the July 7th, 2005, attacks on London. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the Blair government convened seven “Preventing Extremism Together” (PET) working groups charged with examining how the government and Muslim communities might proceed together in tackling domestic extremism. Approximately one-third of the sixty-four or so recommendations ultimately made by the working groups were intended to be enacted by the government, with the remainder to be implemented by the Muslim community with government assistance if and when necessary. However, the implementation of these recommendations was highly selective with key recommendations being ignored because

---

they were politically inconvenient. Ultimately, the process was widely seen as rushed and flawed, with some viewing the PET experiment as more of a PR exercise than a good faith engagement effort.

This culminated in an elite-led political discourse—one that involved an overlapping left-right consensus—about the need to promote ‘shared national values,’ although defining these values and the specific content of national identity has proven difficult. This marked an effective shift toward a more nationalist discourse that has deployed ‘citizenship’ as a policy response to the perceived ‘crisis of multiculturalism.’ In the face of social disturbances and terrorist attacks, these critiques cast ‘multiculturalism’ writ large as threatening to the long-term political unity and social cohesion necessary to sustain a healthy democracy.

The election of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in Britain in 2010 marked a critical shift from a New Labour’s multi-faith paradigm to a Christian heritage focus accompanied by a renewed emphasis of inter-faith forums with the Church of England deployed as a buffer institution of sorts. Launched in late 2011, the ‘Near Neighbours’ program has provided small packets of funding for interfaith work, administered by the Anglican Church Urban Fund with applications requiring the approval of the vicar of the parish in which the proposed project is to be located. The program has been cast as a way to connect interfaith initiatives to Cameron’s ‘Christian heritage’ and ‘localism’ policy imperatives, while fostering better governance within

Muslim communities and moving away from the securitization inherent to New Labour’s PREVENT program.195

Within the space of several months as 2010 turned to 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron, the then French President Nikolas Sarkozy, and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte all declared multiculturalism a failure in separate public addresses.196 Prime Minister Cameron spoke of a failed British multicultural project as if it were a short-lived social experiment. President Sarkozy effectively misrepresented France’s liberal-nationalist integration regime in praising Cameron’s speech and declaring that, “… we have been too concerned about the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough about the identity of the country that was receiving him.”197 Finally, in June 2011, the then Dutch Interior Minister Piet Hein Donner, stated that,

… the government shares the social dissatisfaction over the multicultural society model and plans to shift priority to the values of the Dutch people. In the new integration system, the values of the Dutch society play a central role. With this change, the government steps away from the model of a multicultural society.198

Donner’s statement reflected that the ‘new realist’ discourse in the Netherlands had captured the public imagination. This was manifested in the electoral success of populist Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV – “Freedom Party”), which had run on a nationalist-assimilationist platform in parliamentary elections in 2010 and emerged as a prominent player in the subsequent formation of a minority government.

196 Over the same time period, other serving and former conservative political leaders including German Chancellor Angela Merkel (October 2010), Spanish ex-Premier José María Aznar (February 2011), and former Australian Prime Minister John Howard (October 2010), jumped on the bandwagon of declaring multiculturalism a failure.
198 Of course, the MCP index demonstrates that the Netherlands had already stepped away from multiculturalism policies in the 2000s (See Table 5).
Notably, all three leaders were political conservatives and all faced political challenges from parties on their right flank, namely from UK Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain, the Front Nationale (FN) in France, and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands. It must be noted that the general trend indicates that support for right-wing populist parties that run on nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti-multiculturalism platforms has grown substantially across Europe since the 1980s. Recent general elections resulted in UKIP garnering 12.6% support (2015), the Front National with 13.6% support (2012), and the PVV with 10.1% support (2012). There has been a significant upswing in public support for the PVV, which runs on an explicitly Islamophobic platform, with recent polling suggesting that the PVV may soon become the largest party in the Netherlands.199

Yet, it must also be noted that opposition to accommodating religious minorities is not monopolized by those who prioritize a nationalist or Christian identity. Politicians of the secular-left and those who continue to adhere to a secular-modernization thesis more broadly also often oppose making accommodations for religious minorities. Accordingly, there is no clear across-the-board left-right divide when it comes to the accommodation or not of religious minorities. While we can say that parties of the left in Britain and the Netherlands have tended to be more supportive of ‘multicultural’ policies, the same cannot be said for France where there is considerable left-right convergence over antipathy to multiculturalism or communautarisme.

European public anxieties over immigration, cultural diversity, and the perceived failure of multiculturalism have undoubtedly been compounded more recently by the rise of ISIS and its apparent ability (albeit limited) to recruit European Muslims, the al-Qaeda inspired Charlie Hebdo shootings in January 2015, and the subsequent attacks on Paris by

ISIS militants later that year. Since the onset of the Syrian civil war, several thousand Europeans have traveled to Syria to fight with ISIS and other anti-regime groups, while France, the UK, and the Netherlands have all contributed to the air campaign against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria since late 2014.

Meanwhile, policy developments have seen some convergence over legislating or providing political cover for the banning of face-covering veils. In the summer of 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld French legislation passed in 2010 that banned face-covering veils in all public spaces in France paving the way for other European countries to follow suit. In May 2015, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte announced that the Dutch cabinet had approved a proposal to legislate for a partial ban on face-covering veils in schools, hospitals, government buildings, and on public transportation systems. Rutte’s cabinet rejected a general ban and acted to withdraw a previous bill that proposed banning face-covering veils on the street that dated from Rutte’s previous minority government, which was supported by Geert Wilders’ PVV. In January 2016, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that he would back “proper and sensible” rules to ban women from wearing face veils. While opposing a general ban, Cameron endorsed the idea that schools, hospitals and other organizations should be free to choose to ban face-covering veils if they so wished.

This chapter sought to intertwine theoretical and policy developments and their interrelationship with critical socio-political events in Britain, France, and the Netherlands since the late 1980s by adapting the suggestion of Pnina Werbner for the need to “consider multiculturalism as played out in historical moments of crisis and confrontation.” In conclusion, we are seeing a substantial divergence between the leading British democratic theorists who espouse an inclusive, multi-faith, and pluralist...
Britain and a political reality in Britain that is increasingly nationalist in tone with a renewed emphasis on Britain’s Christian heritage since 2010; an official French Republican theory that is becoming increasingly incoherent in the face of assertions of religiosity in the public sphere and the persistence of inequitable social outcomes; and the emergence of a populist politics in the Netherlands premised on ‘new realist’ thought that call into question the notion that ‘tolerance’ is a core Dutch value. One interesting pattern that emerged in the mid-2000s in all cases involved the initiation of consultations with stakeholders or academic experts at times of crisis to address the preoccupations of political leaders who then effectively ignored the recommendations delivered because of political sensitivities or inconvenience.\footnote{Examples include the Blair government’s undermining of the Preventing Extremism Together (PET) working groups in Britain after the 7/7 attacks, Jacques Chirac’s ignoring of the majority of the recommendations of the Stasi Commission in France following the second Affaire du Foulard, or accusations of a ‘multiculturalist bias’ on the part of the Verwey-Jonker Institute (VWJ) as a response to their policy evaluation of the Dutch integration regime conducted for the Dutch parliament in 2003 and 2004.}
CHAPTER 3
BRITAIN

In this chapter, I will examine variations in patterns of engagement between the British state and national-level Jewish organizations and the British state and national-level Muslim organizations. This chapter will first outline the contemporary church-state institutional framework in Britain within which these organizations operate. Then we will proceed by examining the variation in patterns of engagements between the state and Jewish and Muslim organizations. A brief outline of the migration and settlement history of each faith community in Britain will be provided before we move on to examining the histories of government engagement with each faith community.

As we shall see, the state has maintained a remarkably stable relationship with the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ) since its founding in 1760. Since the state’s formal recognition of the BDBJ in 1835 as the competent authority to certify Jewish places of worship for marriage, this pattern has been consistently quasi-corporatist in nature with no instance over 250 years of decertification of the BDBJ by the state, no apparent governmental interference in the inner workings of the BDBJ or any other significant observable discontinuities in engagement. Over this period, the BDBJ has consistently pursued an ‘insider by choice’ strategy and has been a favored and consistent communal partner to the British government at the national level without interruption since the mid-nineteenth century. This is in spite of the fact that Anglo-Jewry has experienced significant communal disunity whether between Sephardim and Ashkenazim Jews in the 18th and 19th centuries, Reform and more Orthodox theological orientations
from the 19th century forward, and/or Zionist and anti-Zionist political orientations over the course of the 20th century. Successive British governments have not found it politically problematic that the BDBJ has never been fully representative of the entire spectrum of Anglo-Jewry—whether through the exclusion of Reform congregations in the 19th century or the non-participation of Haredi Jews in the 20th and 21st centuries. Secular Jews also regularly complain that the BDBJ is “too influenced by religious elements” and does not represent their views.\textsuperscript{202}

The emergence of other significant communal institutions, such as the Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA) in the 19th Century or the Jewish Leadership Council (JLC) in the 21st Century have also been treated as unproblematic and one does not observe the kinds of active government interventions in the structuring of relations with Anglo-Jewish organizations that one observes with British Muslim organizations. Over the course of the last 30 years, engagements between the state and British Muslim civil society organizations, on the other hand, have been marked by instability both in terms of changes over time in how engagement has been structured (i.e. more corporatist versus more pluralist) as well as one instance where an ‘insider’ was formally decertified. The variation over time in the treatment of British Muslim civil society organizations involves broad shifts between patterns of engagement that I characterize as \textit{ad hoc pluralist} (pre-1997) to \textit{quasi-corporatist} (1997-2006) to \textit{co-opted pluralist} (2006-2010) to \textit{diminished & localized pluralist} (2010-present) patterns within the timeframe of this analysis.

From an ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ perspective, *The Satanic Verses Affair* ultimately led to the consolidation of a number of organizations that could be characterized as ‘outsiders by necessity’ prior to the point at which political elites came to understand that their ‘benign neglect’ of British Muslim communities was no longer viable. In 1997, a number of more prominent organizations coalesced under the umbrella of the quasi-corporatist Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which subsequently became a privileged ‘insider by choice.’ However, starting in the early 2000s, the MCB gradually fell out of favor with New Labour. Following a ‘rebalancing’ of relations with Muslim organizations in late 2006, select groups of favored ‘insiders by choice’ were co-opted as interlocutors of the British government. However, a shifting of emphasis from national to local-level engagement since mid-2006 and the deployment of the Anglican Church as a ‘buffer institution’ since 2010 has led to an increasingly narrow spectrum of engagement between the state and British Muslim organizations at the national level. Notably, the MCB was formally *decertified* in 2009 briefly becoming an ‘outsider by necessity’ for a period of about 10 months. So how can we explain the relative instability of relations between the British state and British Muslim organizations relative to the stability of relations between the British state and Anglo-Jewish organizations? Here, we will briefly examine the nature of church-state institutions in Britain before turning to this question.

**State-Church Institutions in Britain**

Patterns of state engagement with minority faith groups in Britain are undoubtedly shaped in significant ways by the presence of an established religion, the Church of England, although, as Minkenberg (2003) argues, this explains only part of the
story. Because Anglican dominance has been contested by Catholicism and various Protestant denominations—and because the Anglican establishment has lacked the political and social power conferred by a pope or a monopolistic priesthood—a radical attack on the institutions of religion never occurred in Britain. Having not suffered outright ‘defeat’ as the Catholic Church in France did, the Anglican Church has learned to adapt over time to changing political conditions. While church-state links in Britain have been progressively diluted over the past 150 years, financial and property connections remain, with the state still exercising powers of command over the church and intervening in the religious sphere.

This has produced a contemporary institutional arrangement that has been variously referred to in the literature as “partial” or “weak” establishment. Today, Anglican establishment manifests itself in four specific areas. First, there is the fact that formal accession to the throne involves the anointing of the monarch by Anglican bishops during the Coronation Service. Second, the Church continues to seat twenty-six Anglican bishops, or ‘Lords Spiritual,’ in the House of Lords. Third, the Church retains a privileged position in education where several

---


thousand Anglican schools remain dependent on state funding. Finally, the Church retains a special responsibility in promoting inter- and multi-faith harmony.207

Minkenberg (2003) and others argue that, by keeping open a space for religion in the public sphere, Anglican establishment provides an ‘opportunity structure’ for the expression of religious interests in the political process.208 Monsma and Soper (2009) note that, paradoxically, Anglican establishment helps the state to better approximate neutrality in some policy areas relative to more strictly secular states by, for instance, expanding choice for Jewish, Christian, and Muslim parents who want a school permeated by a religious educational perspective.209 Yet, while its institutional role has diminished over the long term, it is important not to underestimate the role that the Anglican church continues to play in contemporary British political life, whether through its vocal opposition to economic policies at a time when political opposition has been weak,210 speaking up on behalf of religious minorities,211 or acting as a ‘buffer institution’ of sorts between the state and religious interests.212

The dominant position of British minority faith communities toward Anglican establishment is one of antidisestablishmentarianism. Modood (1994) succinctly explains the rationale for the support of minority faith groups as being the result of, 

...the minimal nature of an Anglican establishment, its proven openness to other denominations and faiths seeking public space, and the fact that its very existence is an ongoing acknowledgement of the public character of religion...  

Successive Chief Rabbis have expressed support for establishment as a means of defending the place of religion in public life. A 2013 report on Muslim political participation and small-n survey data confirms that this view is also prevalent among leading British Muslims. Thus, as Modood (1994) notes, “the real division of opinion is not between a conservative element in the Church of England versus the rest of the country, but between those who think religion has a place in secular public culture and those who think not.” This natural cleavage also forms the basis of the so-called ‘solidarity of the religious’ thesis, which posits that adherents of religious faiths coalesce around the similar issues that they confront in predominantly secular societies.

---

Indeed, the Anglican hierarchy has often spoken out in support of minority religious groups. At a critical juncture, for example, prominent voices within the Anglican establishment voiced support for beleaguered Muslim communities during *The Satanic Verses* affair and called on its publisher to withdraw the book. In fact, there has been a broad alignment of interests between British faith leaders on a number of public policy issues. Interests have coincided in the last 30 years in supporting existing accommodations for *shechita* and *dhabh*, the establishment of minority faith schools, the provision of chaplains to state institutions, the inclusion of a religion question in the census, and defending the wearing of religious dress.

Disestablishment has not been a politically contentious issue since the early twentieth century and, in some sense, Anglican establishment reflects a consensus

---


between British political elites and faith community leaders over its continued political utility. The ability of government to deploy (or not) the Anglican hierarchy as either an active and central—or passive and peripheral—actor as part of a faith engagement agenda continues to provide a degree of institutional flexibility that is less apparent in more separationist contexts such as in France and the Netherlands. Indeed, when initiatives to reform the church-state relationship have come on the parliamentary agenda, the tendency has been to pluralize links, rather than to cut them—a tendency that is not always supported by Muslim and Jewish faith groups.226

With these institutional idiosyncrasies in mind, in the following section, I will outline the genesis of a Jewish community in Britain and its organizational representation since the founding of the Board of Deputies of British Jews in 1760. Then I will provide a more in-depth account of the development of British Muslim organizations since the late 1980s. We shall see that, over time, the relationship between the BDBJ and the state has been relatively consistent in its structuring and politically uncontroversial. This stands in stark contrast with the contemporary relationship between the state and British Muslim organizations that has involved significant government interventions since the mid-1990s.

**Jewish organizational representation in Britain (1760—present)**

While there are some (unverifiable) accounts of Jewish settlement in Britain prior to the 11th Century, the consensus among historians is that it was the Norman Conquest

---

226 For instance, in response to the proposed abolition of the laws of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in July 2008, an MCB briefing argued that, “from a Muslim perspective, it is better for the law to protect at least one religious denomination from blasphemy… than no religion at all.” The Board of Deputies also expressed support for maintaining the status quo. The offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel were ultimately abolished with the passage of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. See “Select Committee on Religious Offenses in England and Wales.” 2003. Session 2002-2003 HL Paper 95-I. London: House of Lords.
of 1066 that first brought Jews from Rouen to London. However, in 1290, Edward I banished the Jews from England, the first general expulsion of Jews from a country in the medieval period. During the so-called “Middle Period” between the expulsion of the Jews in 1290 and their informal readmission in 1656, there were no permanent communities residing in Britain that openly practiced Judaism. The short-lived collapse of the national church—the only institution capable of suppressing dissenters and religious minorities—during the English Civil War (1642-1651) ushered in a political environment conducive to the readmission of Jews to Britain in 1656. In October 1656, after seizing Jamaica from the Spanish, Cromwell declared war on Spain. Since the small number of crypto-Jewish marranos resident in England at the time were formally subjects of the Spanish crown, their goods became subject to seizure. This spurred Antonio Rodrigues Robles, a wealthy London merchant, along with a number of other marranos, to reveal publicly that they were in fact Jewish refugees. That same month, leaders of the colony petitioned Cromwell requesting permission to assemble privately for Jewish worship and to purchase a burial ground. The Council of State approved Robles’s request but, in a classic case of British “muddling through,” failed to act on the larger question of formal readmission. This relatively small Jewish settlement in London operated beneath the radar for the rest of the 17th century.

231 Marranos were Jews who lived or had lived in Spain and Portugal who forcibly or voluntarily converted to Catholicism usually as a result of inquisitorial activity, some of whom continued to practice Judaism in secret.
Most of the leaders of the Sephardic community were Portuguese or Spanish-born merchants and some were shipowners.\textsuperscript{233} Close commercial relations were maintained with Sephardic merchants in other port cities, especially Amsterdam, which was at the height of its prosperity.\textsuperscript{234} Diamond (1970) notes, however, that there was significant disparity between rich and poor within the Sephardim, with a small economic elite paying the expenses of the synagogue (the Ashkenazim were too small in number at this point to establish communal institutions of their own). In the early stages of the resettlement, ethnic, class, linguistic, and theological divisions between Sephardim and Ashkenazim were readily apparent. Referring to the Ashkenazim, Diamond (1973) notes,

\begin{quote}
... Their origin was the ghetto, they spoke amongst themselves Jüdisch-Deutsch, a language or jargon unintelligible to the Sephardim, who mostly spoke to one another in Spanish or Portuguese. Their colour was different, their dress different, their names differently constructed. They had always lived openly as Jews, their orthodoxy was more intense, their knowledge of and devotion to Judaism and the minutiae of religious practice, largely developed in the exclusivity of the ghetto, far greater.\textsuperscript{235}
\end{quote}

Another important dimension on which the two communities differed involved rates of intermarriage, with the Ashkenazim having not intermarried to any significant degree with the broader population. Christians considered the Ashkenazim as distinct from the Sephardim and the Sephardim considered them an embarrassment.\textsuperscript{236}

With the restoration of the monarchy in May 1660, Charles II was saddled with a new House of Commons that has been referred to as \textit{plus royalist que le roi}.\textsuperscript{237} The national Church was re-established and reinforced by a series of Acts of Parliament

designed to purge all dissenting elements and impose an Anglican monopoly on office-holding, worship, and education.\textsuperscript{238} The Conventicle Act of 1664 was of particular concern to the Jewish community as it banned the assembly of more than five people for purposes of religious observance that fell outside the auspices of the Church of England. The law was enacted for primarily political, not religious, reasons in that the primary rationale for repressing non-Anglican religious meetings was because nonconformist gatherings were regarded as potential nests of sedition.\textsuperscript{239}

In response to the implied threat to Jewish religious gatherings, the wardens of the London synagogue petitioned the throne directly. Charles II referred the petition to the Privy Council, which responded favorably by reassuring the wardens that they might,

\[\text{promise themselves the effects of the same favour as formally they had had, so long as they demeane themselves peaceably and quietly with due obedience to his Majesty’s Laws and without scandal to his government.}\textsuperscript{240}\]

This letter effectively constituted a “social contract” between the newly established community and the king, one that formally authorized for the first time the residence of the Jews in England.\textsuperscript{241} This response also forms the basis of what many have interpreted as a long-standing social norm that Jews in Britain had nothing to fear if they “kept a low profile and were law-abiding and peaceable.”\textsuperscript{242}

On November 3, 1760, the Sephardic leadership of Bevis Marks synagogue in London established the London Board of Deputies to prepare a loyal address to King George III upon his ascension to the throne. In so doing, Sephardic leaders were reproached by the leaders of Ashkenazi synagogues for acting independently and an

\textsuperscript{241} Neither the petition nor the reply mentioned a Jewish community, a synagogue, or religious observances. It was only in 1674 that the religious status of the Jews in England was legally secured.
agreement was subsequently reached that the Board of Deputies of British Jews (hereafter ‘the Board’ or BDBJ) would consult Ashkenazi communities on matters of mutual interest going forward. However, it took 50 years before the Ashkenazim were formally integrated with permanent representation on the Board.

Indeed, while the Board has historically insisted upon a role as the sole representative of Jews in Britain, at different points in its history various factions have been deliberately excluded, have refused to participate, or have voluntarily withdrawn from participation. As we shall see, the history of the Board has been punctuated by controversies and disputes between different ‘nations’ (i.e., Sephardim and Ashkenazim) theological strands (i.e. Strictly Orthodox, Central Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform) as well as more politicized factions (e.g., Zionist and anti-Zionist). Ultimately, these battles have been settled by actors working within the confines of the Board’s institutional structure and taking advantage of long-term processes of demographic change, institutional leverage, and/or institutional capture. Remarkably, in spite of these communal cleavages, the Board has endured for over 250 years as a privileged interlocutor—and gatekeeper—mediating between the state and Anglo-Jewry and this role has never been seriously questioned by the state.

From 1760 through the mid-1830s, however, the Board met only sporadically and its role in communal life was negligible. In the early nineteenth century, however, the so-called ‘Cousinhood,’ a kin-based network of well-to-do Anglo-Jewish elites, rose to dominate the Board and other communal institutions and did so through the Second

---

244 I adopt Raphael Langham’s nomenclature here to avoid the use of terms that are inappropriate or can be seen as pejorative. Raphael. 2010. 250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010. London; Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 3-4.
Cemented by its wealth and its multitudinous philanthropic endeavors, the Cousinhood set the internal agenda for Anglo-Jewish life, mediating the interface between Anglo-Jewry with state as well as the broader society. Indeed, as Gartner (2001) notes, “the solidity and stability which the Jewish community and its institutions attained by the middle of the nineteenth century reflected the position of its dominant group.”

Two events in 1836 solidified the quasi-corporatist character of the state’s relationship with the Board. First, Moses Montefiore (1784-1885) took over the Presidency of the Board from his uncle in 1836 and set out to establish it as a standing body to represent Anglo-Jewry and monitor legislation and other policy issues of interest. Second, the enactment of the Marriage and Marriage Registration Acts of 1836 recognized the Board as the competent authority to determine who should be permitted to register Jewish marriages. The licensing and formal recognition of the Board cemented its quasi-corporatist position as a centralized and privileged representative communal institution for Anglo-Jewry and conferred immense power upon its President. The Marriage Registration Act was passed at a time when small circle of more assimilationist British Jews had begun to import a genteel version of Reform Judaism from the continent and Montefiore did not hesitate to wield his new statutory powers to discipline the Reformists by refusing to certify a marriage secretary for the Reform-

246 Bermant (1971) defined the “Cousinhood” as “a compact union of exclusive brethren with blood and money flowing in a small circle which opened up from time to time to admit … anyone else who attained rank or fortune, and then snapped shut again’. See Bermant, Chaim. 1971. The Cousinhood. New York: Macmillan.
oriented West London Synagogue in 1842. With Montefiore continuing to refuse to seat known Reformers as deputies at the Board, the Orthodox-Reform impasse over marriage certification was only addressed when government discomfort over its unintended ‘intervention by proxy’ prompted it to grant a marriage secretary to the West London Synagogue under the Marriage Registration Act of 1856. It wasn’t until 1885, only months after Montefiore’s death, that the West London Synagogue was fully integrated into the Board.

After 1840, when Montefiore intervened successfully in the notorious Damascus blood libel case, the Board became a central node within something not dissimilar to what International Relations scholars Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink would later describe as a Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN) that was regularly activated in support of co-religionists in foreign countries. Here, we also see early exemplars of ‘boomerang effects,’ with leaders of distressed Jewish communities—most often in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, or the Russian Empire—appealing to the Board for assistance; with the Board then exhorting Whitehall to pressure offending regimes through diplomatic representations. Sometimes it was politically expedient for the Foreign Office to become involved (as in the ‘Damascus Affair’) and sometimes it

252 On February 5, 1840, an Italian Capuchin monk residing in Damascus, disappeared together with his Muslim servant. The Capuchins immediately claimed that Jews had murdered both men in order to use their blood for Passover. A number of prominent Jews were rounded up with some being tortured and forced to “confess.” To the consternation of European Jewry, the accusations of ritual murder made in Damascus were initially accepted at face value.
254 Board of Deputies archive references C-11-014-027; C-11-014-028 at the London Metropolitan Archives
was less so (as with pogroms in the then-allied Russian Empire). Often, the Board would become directly involved by dispatching representatives to the country concerned.

The increased activity of the Board occurred as the increasing speed of shipping and decreasing costs of sea passage spurred Jewish immigration from the 1840s onwards.\(^{255}\) By 1850, the total number of Jews in Britain was estimated at 35,000 with between 18,000 and 20,000 residing in London.\(^ {256}\) Between 1850 and 1880, there was a modest expansion in the size of Anglo-Jewry and this period marked a transition from predominantly Dutch and German immigration to immigration from Eastern Europe, driven by a famine in northeastern Russia in 1869 during which Jews were expelled from the border regions.\(^ {257}\)

While the Damascus Affair cemented Montefiore’s reputation, his failure to consult Franco-Jewish community leaders in attempting to secure the release of Edgardo Mortara in 1858 prompted the founding of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (AIU) in 1860.\(^ {258}\) The AIU had an explicitly transnational remit, specifically to create: “a link, a solidarity from country to country embracing in its vast network all that is Jewish.”\(^ {259}\) However, this transnational and diasporic vision was in tension with the nationally-bound emancipationist bargain under negotiation in Britain, which caused some anxiety among Anglo-Jewish leaders who were keen to emphasize their loyalty to the state. Moreover, the centrality of the French Revolution and a *mission civilisatrice* in the AIU’s rhetoric


\(^{258}\) In September 1858, Papal guards abducted Edgardo Mortara, a 6-year-old Jewish boy who had been covertly baptized by his Catholic nursemaid in Bologna, Italy. Jewish communities across Europe were outraged when Pope Pius IX insisted Mortara be raised as a Catholic refused to return him to his family.

was perceived as indicative of a distinctly French mode of political and cultural expansionism.

While Catholic emancipation was achieved by the late 1820s, Jews remained excluded from Crown office holding, from corporations, from sitting in parliament, and from some professions, by virtue of barriers including religious tests, oaths, and declarations. The burgeoning movement for political emancipation revealed divisions within the Cousinhood. With the Sephardim/Askenazim divide less politically salient by this juncture by virtue of the demographic swamping of Sephardim by Ashkenazim, communal cleavages became increasingly centered on confrontations between more Orthodox and more Reform-minded strands. Generally, those among the Cousinhood elite who were more enthusiastic about political emancipation tended to also be more predisposed toward Reformism. Orthodox leaders, such as Moses Montefiore and Chief Rabbi Nathan Marcus Adler (1845-1890), on the other hand, took a more cautious approach toward emancipation because of their prioritization of the preservation of (Orthodox) Jewish traditions over political participation. Alderman (1995) notes that the prospect of admitting Jews to Parliament also threatened the Board’s authority because of a fear that Jewish parliamentarians would become the locus of the expression of dissenting ‘Jewish’ opinions. Ultimately, the majority of the Anglo-Jewish community was unmoved by the cause of political equality. On the one hand, Jewish

Footnotes:
workers did not pay enough tax to qualify to vote, the more affluent, on the other hand, found that maintaining their livelihood or pursuing financial success were not denied to them by the law. Some religious authorities also made a ‘fundamentalist’ argument against emancipation taking the form: “the Jew was not an Englishman and, if he tried to become one, his Jewish identity—and destiny—would be lost.”

Operating independently from the Board of Deputies, efforts to achieve full political emancipation were spearheaded by Isaac L. Goldsmid (1778-1859), a Reform-minded financier and philanthropist. The First Jewish Emancipation Bill of 1830 was defeated on its second reading in the House of Commons and a multitude of similar bills introduced between 1833 and 1857 were passed by the House of Commons but defeated in the House of Lords. The emancipation effort was also stymied at this juncture by intra-communal disunity between Orthodox and Reform orientations, which halted the struggle for most of the 1840s. In parliament, Jewish emancipation became part of a larger struggle between Liberals in the Commons who wanted to further separate Church and State and resented the meddling of the Lords and Tories and High Churchmen in the House of Lords who, having failed to sustain an ‘Anglican’ state wanted to ensure a ‘Christian’ one. The ultimate achievement of emancipation was itself a process that began with the seating of Lionel de Rothschild as an MP for the City of London in 1858.


With the AIU’s operations disrupted by the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Reform-minded British Jews, led by Francis Goldsmid (son of Isaac L.), established the Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA) to ensure the perpetuation of the AIU’s more transnational and diasporic mission. This included combating the persecution of Jewish co-religionists by discriminatory regimes—a role that the Board was not seen to be particularly effective at discharging in the aftermath of the Mortara Affair. Unlike the Board of Deputies, which remained strictly Orthodox Under Montefiore’s leadership, the executive of the AJA was integrated and its founding engendered strong opposition from Montefiore and the BDBJ.\footnote{Jewish Chronicle, August 25, 1871, Pages 8-9; Szajkowski, Zosa. 1957. “Conflicts in the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Founding of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Vienna Allianz and the Hilfsverein.” \textit{Jewish Social Studies} 19 (1/2): 29–50; Lipman, V. D. 1990. \textit{A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858}. New York: Holmes & Meier, 44-45.} After a number of failed attempts, an agreement between the AJA and the BDBJ was reached in December 1877 to, “… constitute a conjoint committee for the purpose of … effecting united action in representations to the British Government concerning the interests of Jews in Foreign parts.”\footnote{Szajkowski, Zosa. 1957. “Conflicts in the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Founding of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Vienna Allianz and the Hilfsverein.” \textit{Jewish Social Studies} 19 (1/2): 29–50.} However, the leadership of the Board remained anxious over the challenge that the AJA posed to its communal dominance.\footnote{Cited in Szajkowski, Zosa. 1957. “Conflicts in the Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Founding of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Vienna Allianz and the Hilfsverein.” \textit{Jewish Social Studies} 19 (1/2): 29–50.}

Domestically, by the late 19th century, the focus of Anglo-Jewish institutions had shifted from emancipation to social issues especially over new Jewish immigration.\footnote{Langham, Raphael. 2010. \textit{250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010}. London; Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell.}

![Figure 1: Estimated Jewish population of Britain, 1760-2011](image.png)

*Figure 1: Estimated Jewish population of Britain, 1760-2011*

*Note: This graph is intended to provide a ‘trendline’ rather than a precise depiction of a religious population with all the usual caveats about the difficulties of these kinds of measurements.*

While Britain was primarily a land of transmigration at this juncture for Jews whose ultimate destination was either the Americas or Palestine, as many as 150,000 settled in Britain, which constituted a demographic revolution for Anglo-Jewry. As Endelman notes,

> Their poverty, occupations, and foreignness drew unwanted attention to them and native-born Jews alike, fueling the fires of xenophobia and antisemitism. By virtue of their numbers, they swamped the established community and gave Anglo-Jewry, once again, a foreign-born, lower class cast, which disappeared only in the mid-twentieth century.

Fearing that its philanthropic institutions would be overwhelmed, the Cousinhood elites warned Eastern European Jews to stay in place and work to improve their material condition.

To a certain extent, the changing politics of Anglo-Jewry in the first half of the 20th century—and the challenges posed to Cousinhood control of communal institutions—reflected the longer-term dynamics of demographic changes within Anglo-Jewry after this mass-immigration. However, it also reflected the changing social order after 1880 as the power and political influence of the established families of the British aristocracy declined as a result of the extension of the franchise and the emergence of large-scale party politics. Both of these processes were to come to a head as the tectonic upheavals of the twentieth century reshaped the landscape of Anglo-Jewry and propelled the Zionist movement from the periphery to the center of communal politics. As the political power of the middle-class expanded, business and professional men,

---

resentful of their exclusion from communal power, found in Zionism a mobilizing structure for challenging the Cousinhood oligarchy. Endelman (2002) notes that,

_They wanted a more representative, assertive communal leadership, one less concerned with keeping a low public profile, which would confront antisemitism vigorously and openly, demand government protection of Jewish interests, and mobilize “the Jewish vote” in parliamentary and local elections._

For their part, the old Cousinhood elites viewed the Zionists as a threat to their own status and feared that British sponsorship of a Jewish homeland would impede social integration by casting doubt on the loyalty of British Jews.

In the latter half of the First World War, with the Ottoman Empire on the verge of collapse, Zionists began to cultivate support at the highest levels of government. They appealed to the preoccupations of the Foreign Office by arguing that a British-sponsored Jewish homeland would help to ensure a cordon sanitaire around the Suez Canal and thus secure Britain’s lifeline to India and also appealed to evangelical, ethical, and humanitarian sentiments. In the meantime, Deputies from provincial synagogues and disaffected Londoners began agitating for democratic reforms that would make the Board more responsive to community concerns. The opening salvo of a revolution in the institutional power structure of Anglo-Jewry came when the Board voted narrowly to censure the Conjoint Foreign Committee in June 1917 after its leadership publicly attacked the Zionist movement. The Foreign Office erroneously came to view the

---

279 Mindful of the fact that it was losing influence over the government, the CFC published a manifesto in *The Times* on May 24, 1917, attacking Zionism for claiming that Jews everywhere constituted “one homeless nationality” and for “stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands,” thus “undermining their hard won position as citizens and nationals of those lands.” The CFC also objected to the idea that “…the Jewish settlements in Palestine shall be recognized as possessing a national character in a political sense …[and] the proposal to invest the Jewish settlers in Palestine with certain special rights in excess of those to be enjoyed by the rest of the population.” See Alexander, David L., and Claude Montefiore. 5/24/1917.
Board’s vote as indicative of the strength of Zionist sentiment in Britain. In the aftermath, Renton (2007) notes that,

... continued opposition [by prominent Anglo-Jewish anti-Zionists] was surpassable so long as their protests could be demonstrated to be the death-throes of a privileged elite that was out of touch with the sentiments of the masses in the UK, but more importantly, in the USA and Russia.

For its part, the Foreign Office’s attitude to the utility of the Zionist movement to the war effort reflected what Gelvin (2014) calls “patrician anti-Semitism” in its readiness to overestimate the power of American and Russian Jews to exert influence at the highest levels of power in their respective countries in favor of the Allied cause.

The debates over the causal mechanisms that led to the British government’s public declaration of support in November 1917 for a “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” in the Balfour Declaration do not need to be rehashed here. The Balfour Declaration can, however, be considered a critical juncture in that it heralded the official sanctioning of an ascendant Zionism in Anglo-Jewish communal politics. However, the eventual Zionist ‘capture’ of the Board would involve a further quarter century of struggle involving repeated attacks on the authority and policies of the Cousinhood over issues such as domestic anti-Semitism, the fate of Jews under

“The Future of the Jews.” The Times; The CFC was reconstituted in 1918 as the ‘Joint Foreign Committee,’ it continued to operate until Selig Brodetsky and the Zionist caucus won control of the BDBJ from the Anglo-Jewish aristocracy in 1943 and disbanded the Joint Foreign Committee primarily because of the AJA’s continuing anti-Zionist stance.


Nazism and attempts to rescue them, the mandate for Palestine and issues related to Jewish immigration, and the protection of Jewish religious observances.\textsuperscript{284}

Zionists expanded their base of support during the 1930s by harnessing communal dissatisfaction with the reserve and restraint of the old elites and associating themselves with more assertive community-based activism in opposition to British fascist movements.\textsuperscript{285} Concurrently, the actively hostile ‘anti-Zionist’ position among the old elite was gradually toned down into a position of ‘non-Zionism,’ (ideological disagreement with Zionism but willingness to co-operate).\textsuperscript{286} However, even the disclosure of the full horrors of the Holocaust in late 1942 did not fully galvanize the support of non-Zionists who continued to object that the state the Zionists wanted “seemed to be based on one religion and one race.”\textsuperscript{287} While non-Zionists made some subsequent attempts to restrict the Board’s Zionist activities, the political base of non-Zionists entered into a phase of demise with Britain’s assumption of the Palestine Mandate in the 1920s. This allowed assimilationist non-Zionist Jews to view support for the Jewish community in Palestine as both a patriotic British duty as well as a Jewish religious duty, creating common ground with Zionists and facilitating cooperation.\textsuperscript{288}

After 1943, upon the election of an avid Zionist, Selig Brodetsky, as its president, the Board adopted an unequivocally pro-Zionist stance. Intra-communal conflict aside, by the time of the emergence of the State of Israel in 1948, the Board viewed its close relationship with the Foreign Office as having been, “maintained undiminished by the

efforts of any other body and by any changes in public life.” While various trends in Anglo-Jewish activism—such as a vibrant campaign in support of Soviet Jewry in the 1970s and those advocating dialogue with Palestinians in the 1980s—have highlighted the continuing diversity of opinion among British Jews, the Board has continued to place a premium on presentations of communal unity, with Zionist orthodoxy underpinning the Anglo-Jewish consensus since 1948 and with critics of Israel being effectively excluded from the communal polity.

Indeed, while the great schisms and rifts in Anglo-Jewry have been largely overcome, British Jews find themselves facing more existential challenges such as demographic shrinkage and declining synagogue attendance. Various groups, ranging from the strictly Orthodox to the progressive, as well as individuals, particularly women, the younger generation and the unaffiliated, maintain that current representative structures fail to include them or speak for their interests. Other critics argue that the Board is no longer fit for purpose because of its lack of presence outside London. Ongoing tensions between the Board of Deputies and individual Anglo-Jewish leaders prompted the founding of the Jewish Leadership Council (JLC) in 2004 as a means to coordinate their activities under a single umbrella.

---

Muslim organizational representation in Britain (1970—present)

The present-day Muslim presence in Britain is inextricably linked to Britain’s imperial past, particularly its colonial domination of the South Asian subcontinent. Joining a small contingent of Muslim ‘pioneers,’ the first large-scale migration was precipitated by the labor demands of port towns at the start of the First World War. This immigration ended with a raft of legislative restrictions on immigration in the 1920s reflecting anti-immigrant sentiment that came with demobilization. However, by far the largest migration of Muslims to Britain occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War, primarily in the period between the extension of British nationality to Commonwealth citizens in 1948 and restrictions instituted as a result of renewed anti-immigrant sentiment with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962.

Postwar labor market demands provided the primary ‘pull factor’ by opening up jobs for low-skilled laborers especially in the textile, metallurgical, transportation and hospitality sectors. The primary ‘push factors’ were provided by poor economic conditions in the subcontinent as well as large-scale population displacements caused by both the partitioning of India in the late 1940s and the construction of the Mangla Dam in the Mirpur District of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, a decade later. As a result, kin-
friend chain migrations—often organized around biraderi networks—linked cities such as Bradford, Leicester, and London with villages in Jammu and Kashmir, Faisalabad, Sylhet, and Gujarat. In response to widespread opposition to immigration, primarily from conservative political groups, the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 marked the end of the postwar period of unregulated labor migration. However, the early 1970s also saw an influx of about 27,000 East African Asians, including many

---


Muslims, who were expelled from Uganda in 1972. Aside from South Asians, contemporary British Muslim communities also comprise Turks, Turkish Cypriots, Somalis, Nigerians, Malayans, Iranians, and Arabs of various nationalities as well as a small but growing number of converts. However, more than 60 percent of Britain’s present-day Muslim population originates from the subcontinent.

Organizational life among Muslim communities in Britain continued to be underdeveloped through the 1950s and early 1960s, although the Jamaat-i-Islami inspired UK Islamic Mission (UKIM) and some student societies, such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) influenced Muslim Student Society (MSS) and the more broad based Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) were all established in Britain during the early 1960s. In an ethnographic account of Mirpuri Pakistanis in Bradford in the 1970s, Khan (1977) notes that,

… the Pakistani population in Britain, both at the national and local levels, is fragmented with no ‘grass-roots’ organizations. The leaders known to British authorities are frequently of the urban middle-class whose values and life-style differ markedly from the majority of their countrymen.

Khan notes that the ‘first generation’ was generally disinterested in political activities.

Khan’s observations echo those of Katznelson (1973) who observed that West Indians in Nottingham were represented by ‘cultural brokers’ who, being middle class and educated,

---

305 Founded by Abul A’la Mawdudi in Pakistan in 1941, the Jamaat-i-Islami is an Islamic revivalist party that advocates an Islamic state and that operates throughout the Indian subcontinent and in Britain.
were not representative of the broader community and whose main role was to reassure the British of the political quiescence of their supposed constituency.

During the 1970s, however, British Muslim organizational life proliferated as groups formed seeking to represent an increasing diversity of ethnic, sectarian, and political constituencies. A number of notable organizations were founded at this juncture including the Union of Muslim Organizations (UMO), which was established with Saudi support in 1970 as a mosque umbrella and pioneered efforts to lobby the British government for the accommodation of the religious needs of Muslims. Also launched in 1970, Impact International was a monthly English-language magazine that focused on international political developments much in the vein of Time or Newsweek but through a decidedly Islamist lens. In 1973, the Islamic Foundation (IF) was established in Leicester, initially with Saudi financing, and was primarily engaged in the production and distribution of Islamic literature at this juncture. These three organizations all shared a genealogical connection to—and ideological affinity with— Jamaat-i-Islami.

---


312 As Mandaville (2009) notes, “… [while] the function and religious flavours of the [Islamic] Foundation have evolved considerably since that time—and the rigidity of its ideological connection to the mother movement dissipated somewhat—the Islamic Foundation continues to be formally chaired by its founder,
National-level consultations between government and British Muslim organizations were practically non-existent prior to *The Satanic Verses* Affair, following a pattern of *ad hoc pluralism*. While the UMO, under the leadership of Dr. Syed Aziz Pasha, was the most prominent organization at this juncture, governments' posture toward British Muslim communities and their nascent institutions was one of ‘benign neglect.’

In April 1979, Dr. Pasha penned a one-page letter to the leaders of the three main

---


political parties, which has been noted as being the first formal record of a ‘Muslim lobby’ in a British general election. While the UMO was undoubtedly a trailblazer in campaigning for accommodations for the religious beliefs and practices of Muslims in British workplaces, its larger platform betrayed a distinct problem of message framing in its lack of focus, failure to read the political environment, and naiveté about the workings of British government. The lack of internal democratic procedures was also a problem for the UMO with Dr. Pasha serving uninterrupted as its leader from 1970 until his death in 2011. Indeed, during this time, Dr. Pasha failed to adapt his first generation message framing to the changing political environment in Britain, much to the chagrin of younder generations of British Muslim leaders.

**The Satanic Verses Affair: from ad hoc pluralism to quasi-corporatism**

Much ink has been spilled on the various dimensions of The Satanic Verses Affair (hereafter SV) as well as its ramifications as a “key definitional moment” that upended the existing theoretical nomenclature and policy frameworks that had been constructed

---


315 The letter requested the position of each party on the application of Muslim Family Law through parliamentary legislation; declaring Eid-ul-Adha and Eid-ul-Fitr as official holidays; extending the law of blasphemy to protect non-Christian religions; the establishment of single-sex schools at secondary school level; the provision of halal food to Muslim children in schools; provisions for Islamic education in state schools; the provision of extended lunch breaks on Fridays to facilitate congregational prayers in Mosques; and permitting circumcision of male Muslim children under the National Health Act. See Sherif, Jamil, Anas Altikriti, and Ismail Patel. 2015. “Muslim Electoral Participation in British General Elections: An Historical Perspective and Case Study.” In Muslims and Political Participation in Britain, edited by Timothy Peace. London: Routledge.

around issues of diversity in Britain.\textsuperscript{317} However, to substantiate the characterization of SV as a ‘critical juncture’ in the political science sense of the term requires specifying its precise role in generating a “distinct legacy” in the structuring of the relationship between the state and British Muslim communities.\textsuperscript{318} It is well established that the publication of Rushdie’s book triggered a series of ‘protest cycles’ and media over-reporting defined SV as a “sudden national panic” that demanded reactions from politicians and other stakeholders.\textsuperscript{319} I argue that these cycles of contention ultimately provided new incentives for the emergence of a more formal relationship between the state and British Muslim communal organizations.

While Qureshi and Khan (1989) note that SV heralded, “…the first time the Muslims became aware of how important it was to wield political influence”—an assertion supported by a surge in organized political activity in its wake—it also incentivized British political elites to engage with Muslim communities.\textsuperscript{320} Coming at a time when the Thatcher government’s relationship with the Anglican establishment was at a nadir, SV generated new understandings within government for the need to overcome its antipathy to overt religiosity, come to terms with the presence of religious minorities in British urban centers, and repair its relationship with faith-based organizations across the spectrum. This realization only came to fruition under John Major’s Conservative 


\textsuperscript{318} Collier (2002) defines a “critical juncture” as, “…a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies.” See Collier, Ruth Berins. \textit{Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America}. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002, 29.


Table 7: Changing patterns of engagement between the British state and Muslim civil society organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIMEFRAME</th>
<th>ENGAGEMENT PATTERN</th>
<th>PRIMARY INTERLOCUTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-1997</td>
<td>ad hoc pluralist</td>
<td>Union of Muslim Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2005</td>
<td>quasi corporatist</td>
<td>Muslim Council of Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>co-opted pluralist</td>
<td>British Muslim Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Khoei Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sufi Muslim Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quilliam Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>British Muslims for Secular Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Radical Middle Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-present</td>
<td>diminished localized pluralist</td>
<td>Effective disengagement with national-level organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Organizations are designated ‘primary interlocutors’ of the government of the day based upon Lexis Nexis searches of newspaper reporting and searches of the British Muslim media outlets Impact International, Muslim News, and Q-News since 1985 to determine which Muslim organizations were represented in high-profile meetings with Prime Ministers, Home Secretaries, Foreign Office Ministers, and Communities & Local Government Ministers.

government with the creation of new institutions, such as the 1991 founding of the Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC), a joint project between the state and various faith groups aimed at finding solutions to inner-city problems. It also led to Michael Howard’s role in “midwifing” the MCB and its later certification as a privileged ‘insider’ upon New Labour’s electoral victory in 1997—a shift from an ad hoc pluralist structuring of relations to a quasi-corporatist one (See Table 7).  

Although SV galvanized British Muslim political organization in unprecedented ways, the mobilization was hindered by substantial organizational deficits. This is illustrated by the ineffective repertoires of contention adopted by the organizations that responded to the publication, the persistence of factional and ethnic disunity, the uneven geographic distribution of mobilizations and, ultimately, the failure of the campaign to socially appropriate other societal sectors, especially the traditional Left. Geaves (2005) points out that, “…the existing leadership, skilled in local ethnic micro-politics, was not able to express the feelings of the Muslim community to the wider British society.” For their part, British politicians and media demonstrated a woeful inability to comprehend the expressions of charismatic passion that emerged as a result of SV, which compounded the sense of grievance. The excoriating backlash that followed Khomenei’s fatwa in February 1989—and the failure of British Muslims to unequivocally disassociate from it—left British Muslim communities badly beaten up.

The adoption of ill-conceived ‘repertoires of contention’—such as book burnings in Bolton and Bradford and the burning of effigies of Salman Rushdie dangling from a noose or portrayed as the devil at later protests—reflected mobilization strategies directly imported from the Indian sub-continent, highlighted the role of first generation migrants in the protests, and exacerbated the boundary between the protestors and the wider society. Indicative of growing impatience among British Muslims with the failure of the UKACIA’s traditional lobbying efforts to produce results and the apathy, incomprehension, and subsequent vociferous condemnation, on the part of the British

---

government, media, and wider society, the book burnings marked the point at which the BCM and the UKACIA started to lose control of the debate.\footnote{Lewis, Philip. 1993. “Bradford’s Muslim Communities and the Reproduction and Representation of Islam.” D.Phil Dissertation, Leeds, UK: The University of Leeds, 146.}

Communal factionalism and disunity was indicated by the fact that a number of British Muslim organizations either declined to participate in—or were not represented by—the UKACIA. These included the primarily Barelwi Council of Imams and Mosques (COIM), the Iranian-affiliated Muslim Institute, East London Bangladeshis and, of course, the many secular or ‘culturalist’ Muslims who were also enraged by the publication of Rushdie’s book.\footnote{For an account of the “muted” and “fragmented” response from London’s Bangladeshi community, see Samad, Yunas. 1996. “The Politics of Islamic Identity among Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in Britain.” In Culture, Identity and Politics: Ethnic Minorities in Britain, edited by Terence Osman Ranger. Research in Ethnic Relations Series. Aldershot: Avebury.} The non-participation of the COIM mosque umbrella reflected ongoing sectarian rivalries between more traditional Barelwis and JI, Deobandi, and Islamist visions of Islam in Britain.\footnote{Archer, Toby. 2009. “Welcome to the Umma The British State and Its Muslim Citizens Since 9/11.” Cooperation and Conflict 44 (3): 329–47.} The non-participation of the Muslim Institute, on the other hand, was more indicative of its Iranian sympathies relative to the perception of the UKACIA as a Saudi-axis organization in an era of intense Saudi-Iranian geopolitical competition.\footnote{In January 1992, Kalim Siddiqui of the Muslim Institute founded the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (MPGB) as an organizational vehicle in an (unsuccessful) attempt to institutionalize unity at the national-level. Under the direction, the MPGB chose an ‘outsider by choice’ strategy, involving a decision to remain separate from the mainstream political system and generate revenues internally rather than from local or national government. Ultimately, however, the MPGB attracted more (negative) media attention than support from within British Muslim communities and it faded from view after Siddiqui’s death in 1996. See Malik, Kenan. 2010. From Fatwa to Jihad: The Rushdie Affair and Its Legacy. London: Atlantic.}

Aside from its inability to broker sufficient cross-community support, the failure of the UKACIA’s campaign stemmed from its inability to garner support from the traditional Left or the official institutions of race equality, which found little common
ground with the charismatic, conservative, and particularist aspects of its campaign.\textsuperscript{344} In diagnosing its problems, a UKACIA newsletter published in July 1989 noted that the ‘Muslim community’ in Britain was,

\begin{quote}
\ldots not a homogenous, community... not yet a united community... an inexperienced community ... (with) a lot to learn. Compared, to other communities it has as yet no effective clout in the seats of power, in the media or in economic circles... (However, for the first time) people whose work was localised or limited to members of their own particular school of thought have now got to know, meet-and appreciate others… Muslims as a result of this campaign are beginning to learn more about the political ... and legal processes of the country ... it is heartening to note the support... from some MPs, leading members of the Church, the Jewish and other religious communities...\textsuperscript{345}
\end{quote}

Accordingly, the UKACIA understood its failure as being attributable to communal disunity and a lack of access to political power.

Into the 1990s, with its legal options exhausted, the UKACIA lobbied for the extension of blasphemy laws to defend other faith traditions. When this avenue also proved fruitless, the UKACIA expanded its remit to address other issues of concern to British Muslims, such as campaigning for the inclusion of a census question on religious affiliation and for the provision of religious accommodations for Muslim students in British secondary schools.\textsuperscript{346} These efforts culminated in the pamphlet “Election 97 and the British Muslims” (1997), which outlined a set of ‘community needs’ in the run up to the May 1997 general elections and has been interpreted as an attempt by the UKACIA to


position itself as capable of delivering the ‘Muslim electorate’ to British politicians.\textsuperscript{347} Into the 1990s, international conflicts such as the first Gulf War, the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and conflict in Chechnya, reinforced a sense among British Muslims of the \textit{umma} as a “worldwide community of victims” and opened political opportunities for more radical ‘outsider by choice’ groups such as \textit{Hizb ut-Tahrir}.\textsuperscript{348} Ultimately, it became increasingly clear through the 1990s that the lack of national-level unity among more mainstream British Muslim organizations was not only hindering communal access to resources and representation but had also become an administrative inconvenience from the point of view of the political establishment.\textsuperscript{349}

\textbf{From ad hoc pluralism to quasi-corporatism: The formation of the Muslim Council of Britain}

In \textit{Seeing like a State} (1999), James Scott suggests that states devise radically simplified designs for social organization in order to rationalize complex aspects of society and render them ‘legible.’ This administrative impulse for ‘legibility’ and

---

\textsuperscript{347} Issues of concern addressed by the pamphlet included the lack of Muslim political representation; support for voluntary-aided status for Muslim faith schools; support for protections against religious discrimination, vilification and incitement to religious hatred; socio-economic deprivation and its impact on the young; the detrimental social effects of the newly-minted National Lottery; and various international and humanitarian concerns. See Sherif, Jamil, Anas Altikriti, and Ismail Patel. 2015. “Muslim Electoral Participation in British General Elections: An Historical Perspective and Case Study.” In \textit{Muslims and Political Participation in Britain}, edited by Timothy Peace. London: Routledge, 39; Vidino, Lorenzo. 2010. \textit{The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West}. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, Chapter 5.


simplification was demonstrated in a critical meeting between Conservative Home Secretary Michael Howard and Muslim leaders in March 1994. Frustrated with competition and infighting, Howard demanded that British Muslim leaders form a single body. This request for a single interlocutor implied state recognition in return for privileged, if not monopoly, representation—a hallmark of more corporatist patterns of interest intermediation albeit relatively consistent with the model provided by the Board of Deputies. While Birt (2005) emphasizes Michael Howard’s desire for a “credible representative body” as the driving force behind his desire for a single interlocutor, others have argued, per Katznelson (1973), that the establishment’s primary interest was co-option, “on the basis of their effectiveness in containing dissent and serving strategic

![Diagram](image)

*Figure 4: A ‘reactive sequence’ leading from the Satanic Verses Affair to the emergence of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)*

*Source: Author generated diagram*

---

350 Personal interview, conducted in June 2014, with an anonymous source who was present at the March 1994 meeting with Michael Howard.
interests, often as much linked to foreign policy as domestic affairs.” Of course, these potential rationales are not mutually exclusive, and it is likely that both were, to some extent, at play.

Michael Howard’s request for a single interlocutor spurred an immediate response. In April 1994, under the direction of the UKAICA leadership, representatives from about 50 community bodies joined forces to form the National Interim Committee on Muslim Unity (NICMU) with a view to establishing a broad-based mosque umbrella. In May 1996, NICMU was formally dissolved in preparation for the inaugural meeting of the ‘Muslim Council of Britain’ (MCB) in London in November 1997. The establishment of the MCB heralded a significant advance for Muslim politics in Britain being by far the broadest based organization representing the largest number of Muslims. As one relatively unsympathetic interviewee noted, “…the government at the time was happy to have a relatively sensible partner from the Muslim community.”

While the MCB claimed 250 national, regional, and local affiliated organizations upon its launch, and counted a small number of Shi’a and Sufi groups among its affiliated

---

354 Personal interview with Dr. Usama Hasan of the Quilliam Foundation, February 19, 2014.
membership, both the UMO and the MPGB declined to affiliate. Reflecting these concerns, Iqbal Sacranie, in his keynote address at the inauguration of the MCB, emphasized that the new organization, “does not claim to be the sole representative of Muslims in Britain.” The MCB did, however, purposely exclude some groups that it considered extremist, such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and *Al Muhajiroun*, as well as some that it considered as religiously heterodox, such as the *Ahmadiyya*. In an apparent attempt to reassure both government and potential affiliates that the new organization would not duplicate the organizational deficiencies of the UKACIA and UMO, its founding documents self-consciously asserted that:

\[
... no single organisation may dominate the MCB. It is not personality driven - the secretary-general cannot be re-appointed for a second consecutive term.\]

It’s also important to note, however, that in making the strategic decision to rely on its affiliates, the MCB effectively put distance between itself and the constituencies that it purported to represent, which Akhtar (2013) suggests has made it “remote and inaccessible to ordinary Muslims, who in turn, [have] little influence within [it].”

---

355 Dr. Syed Aziz Pasha, argued that the MCB was a redundancy as it duplicated the role of the UMO. While Sacranie initially claimed that he felt strongly that the UMO could adequately represent Muslim affairs, he appears to have ultimately concluded that the UMO was not adequately inclusive or responsive. The MPGB suggested that the MCB would act as a government mouthpiece given its role in “midwifing” the organization. Yousif al-Khoei of the prominent Iraqi Shia Al-Khoei Foundation (AKF) emphasizes that the Foundation has never been invited to become a member of the MCB. Personal interview with Yousif al-Khoei, June 6, 2014; See also Radcliffe, Liat. 2004. “A Muslim Lobby at Whitehall? Examining the Role of the Muslim Minority in British Foreign Policy Making.” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 15 (3): 370; Al-Rashid, Mahmud. 2004. “A Man for All Seasons.” *Emel*, June.


357 In April 2016, the MCB clarified that it is, “not in a position to represent or be represented by the Ahmadi community,” because it requires that affiliates, “…declare that Messenger Muhammad peace be upon him is the final prophet.” Muslim Council of Britain. 2016. “Position Statement: The Muslim Council of Britain and Ahmadis.” April 6. http://www.mcb.org.uk/position-statement-the-muslim-council-of-britain-and-ahmadis/.


The New Labour-MCB ‘honeymoon’

While it had been ‘midwifed’ by John Major’s Conservative government, the MCB was enthusiastically received by New Labour with Home Secretary Jack Straw a prominent public supporter. The MCB and its office bearers regularly attended receptions at the Home Office and FCO, even representing the latter as part of delegations to Muslim-majority countries. High-level politicians aligned themselves with the MCB during this ‘honeymoon’ period and, in May 1999, Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke at an MCB reception, using the occasion to justify military intervention in Kosovo in front of a sympathetic audience. The cozy relationship between the MCB and New Labour between 1997 and 2001 should thus be seen in the context of historical patterns of the state incentivization of the quasi-corporatist organization of ethnic and religious groups. This has historically been effectuated through the granting of a monopoly—or near monopoly—to a centralized communal organization in order to ‘facilitate consultation’ if not to ensure political quiescence. The state’s relationship with the MCB, however, differed from its relationship with the BDBJ in that it was


362 The argument that the New Labour-MCB relationship was characterized by instrumentalism is supported by the fact that Blair made Kosovo central to his speech—as the government was attempting to muster support for military intervention—while making no reference to long-standing community concerns over Israel/Palestine or Kashmir. See Adil, Abdul. 1999. “First Serving Prime Minister Meets British Muslims.” The Muslim News, May 28; and Bulley, Dan. 2011. Ethics as Foreign Policy: Britain, the EU and the Other. London: Routledge, 42; Versi, Ahmed. 1998. “Cabinet Minister Accepts Muslim Lunch Invitation.” The Muslim News, December 25.

envisioned that the former would be managed within the framework of the British multicultural model of integration, whereas Anglo-Jewry has been effectively excluded from this model by virtue of being “…too successful, too white and too Jewish.”

Concertational dynamics that further illustrate the quasi-corporatist character of the relationship between government and the MCB include the Home Office’s intervention in March 2000 to enhance MCB representation on a consular delegation for British Hujjaj. Others have noted the FCOs granting of unprecedented control to the MCB over the content of a ‘Festival of Islamic Cultures’ with one former FCO official subsequently characterizing the MCB as, “a one-stop-shop for guidance on the British Muslim community.” Moreover, attempts by Communities Secretary Hazel Blears to engineer change within the leadership of the MCB in the late 2000s illustrate a sense of ‘ownership’ of the organization. There is also evidence to support the idea that New Labour instrumentalized the MCB as a crude proxy for ‘British Muslim opinion’ and as a guarantor of the political quiescence of the ‘Muslim community.’

---


expectations would later create an untenable dilemma for the MCB when Britain became involved in the Global War on Terror.\textsuperscript{369}

The emergence of the MCB—and its proximity to New Labour—precipitated voluminous critiques of the organization from various parties (including from within New Labour itself). Initially, however, the most trenchant critiques of the MCB were to be found in the influential British Muslim publication, \textit{Q-News}. Echoing earlier characterizations of the UKACIA as “suit-and-tie Islam,” \textit{Q-News} famously tagged the MCB’s leadership as “lassi Islamists” invoking the pejorative sobriquet “champagne socialists” and implying that their political behavior and upper middle class lifestyles were incompatible with their supposed religious convictions. Masood (2005) suggests that its antipathy reflected the fact that \textit{Q-News’} staff were almost invariably committed Sufis—as opposed to the MCB whose more influential affiliates are rooted in groups that are broadly anti-Sufi.\textsuperscript{371} Notably, \textit{Q-News} editor Fuad Nahdi, recognizing the collective action dilemma posed by the government expectation of a single interlocutor, complained that, “…[in Britain] we have 56 nationalities of Muslims, who speak over 100 languages… Why does the government expect to have one Muslim body?”\textsuperscript{372} However, these critiques of the MCB’s representative deficiencies would only permeate government as New Labour’s relationship with the MCB became increasingly contentious.


Yet, there can be little doubt that, as a national-level interlocutor, the MCB won some significant concessions from government that more localized efforts would not likely have achieved. For example, the MCB played a pivotal role in winning the inclusion of questions on religious affiliation in the 2001 census of England and Wales. Other MCB lobbying efforts resulted in state funding for Muslim faith schools, legislation to protect Muslims from employment discrimination, and legislation that criminalized incitement to hate on the grounds of religion. Yet, marking a harbinger of controversies to come, the inauguration of Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) in January 2001 saw the MCB declining to attend because of its exclusion of, “…the ongoing genocide and violation of Human Rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere…[and because it] includes the controversial question of alleged Armenian genocide as well as the so-called gay genocide.” While the MCB boycott raised serious questions over how to define—as well as who should define—instances of genocide, the boycott itself as well as MCB Secretary General Yusuf Bhailok’s dismissive reference to the “gay genocide” reflected a political tone-deafness and a depth of religious conservatism in message framing that was unlikely to find widespread support in the public sphere.

---


The Muslim Council of Britain: Fall from grace and shift to *co-opted pluralism*

A series of international political events in the early 2000s—that included the 9/11 attacks and culminated in the 7/7 attacks on London’s transportation system—posed serious dilemmas for the relationship between New Labour and the MCB. The September 11th attacks were preceded by violent urban disturbances in northern Britain in the summer of 2001. In the aftermath, official reports cited the apparent instability of British Muslim communities as one of the major barriers to ‘community cohesion,’ a lack of which was singled out as a major contributing factor.\(^{376}\) This idea of a breakdown in ‘social cohesion’ was further entrenched by the events of 9/11. In effect, the 9/11 attacks precipitated a reactive sequence that led to the abandonment of the quasi-corporatist arrangement between the state and the MCB and the restructuring of patterns of engagement in a manner inconsistent with historical church-state institutional templates that I characterize as co-opted pluralism.\(^{377}\) The attacks are a meaningful ‘breakpoint’ for this sequence as they could not have been anticipated in the same manner as the subsequent 7/7 attacks, which had in fact been predicted as a potential response to British involvement in the War on Terror.\(^{378}\) I argue that the 9/11 attacks constitute a ‘conjuncture with enduring consequences’ insofar as they precipitated the fusing of two relatively independent sequences—the sequential development of patterns of engagement between the state and Muslim communities in post-SV Britain and the sequential escalation of conflict between Al-Qaeda and the United States through the 1990s. By committing Britain to the Global War on Terror, the Blair government fused these two

---


sequences under the aegis of the PREVENT strand of its counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, with enduring consequences for the structuring of relations between the state and British Muslim communities.

On September 12, 2001, PM Blair concluded his statement on the September 11th attacks by noting that he was, “… pleased to see the very strong statement of condemnation from the British Muslim Council [sic], echoing that of the American Muslim Council.” However, the Blair government was immediately faced with the dilemma of how to ‘sell’ British participation in military attacks against Afghanistan—attacks that many British Muslims perceived as punishing Afghan co-religionists that had already suffered considerably under Taliban rule. The MCB’s dilemma, on the other hand, involved balancing how to maintain its privileged access to government while representing the interests of affiliates that were strongly opposed to attacking Afghanistan (See Table 8). These tensions were readily apparent on September 27, 2001, when a select group of British Muslim leaders were summoned to Downing Street. Alastair Campbell, a senior aide to Blair, advised Muslim leaders during the meeting that they had “…a selling job to do.” MCB insiders noted the presumption

380 Personal interview with Dr. Anas al-Tikriti, February 18, 2014.
that British Muslim leaders would obediently come ‘on message.’\textsuperscript{383} However, the MCB was simultaneously coming under pressure from its affiliates—as well as its own council of ulema—to oppose the war.\textsuperscript{384} On October 9th, 2001—in a move that infuriated Blair—the MCB publicly declared its opposition to the war.\textsuperscript{385} The MCB was under considerable internal strain at this juncture and competing internal and external pressures had resulted in a break in communication with the government.\textsuperscript{386} With the New Labour-MCB relationship in crisis, Blair was forced to turn to the relatively diminutive Iraqi Shia Al-Khoei Foundation, for a mosque platform to press home the government’s position that the ‘War on Terror’ was not a war on Islam.\textsuperscript{387}

The Blair government’s actions in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks transmitted two key messages. First, it signaled its intense disapproval of expressions of Muslim

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
Poll & Favorable \% & Unfavorable \% & Others (incl. d/k) \\
\hline
Eastern Eye MORI Nov 2001 & 20 & 64 & 16 \\
BBC ICM Nov 2001 & 14 & 80 & 6 \\
Guardian ICM June 2002 & 19 & 66 & 15 \\
BBC ICM Dec 2002 & 12 & 76 & 12 \\
BBC ICM June 2009 & 18 & 72 & 10 \\
EMBES 2010 & 8 & 63 & 29 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{British Muslim attitudes towards the Afghan War}
\end{table}


transnational sympathies and a concomitant expectation of national loyalty. This marked the genesis of a larger political project—ramped up after the July 7th 2005 attacks—to reinvigorate ‘British’ national identity. Second, it revealed an unrealistic belief in the MCB’s ability to ‘deliver’ British Muslims in support of the War on Terror. This betrayed a lack of understanding of the degree of the collective action problems that British Muslim communities faced in terms of their demographic size as well as their sectarian and ethnic fragmentation, not to mention the MCB’s lack of reach outside London. Blair’s turn to the Al-Khoei Foundation foreshadowed a pattern that emerged among New Labour’s leadership that involved identifying alternative interlocutors that would be more pliable or cooperative when the MCB or other stakeholders were disagreeable, with little regard to the obvious inconsistencies in such a policy path. Simultaneously, the government and media started to highlight questions over the representativeness of the MCB. There was certainly a valid critique to be made that women, youth, and certain sectarian groups were under-represented (e.g. Shi’a and Barelwi) or not represented at all (e.g. Ahmadiyya) under the MCB umbrella. Yet, many came to see the backlash against the MCB as an attempt to undermine British Muslim opposition to Blair’s interventionist foreign policy. While its expulsion from favor was temporary, Blair nonetheless telegraphed to the MCB that a price would be extracted for public disagreement with the government over issues related to foreign policy and/or national security.

---

The next crucial point of tension between New Labour and the MCB emerged over government support for the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The MCB, and British Muslims more generally, had long expressed concern about the deleterious effects on the Iraqi population of the U.N. sanctions regime. In the run-up to the attacks, Secretary General of the MCB, Iqbal Sacranie, warned that British foreign policy was in danger of being perceived as, “an indiscriminate war on Islam what President Bush has slipped into calling a ‘crusade.’” Ultimately, however, the MCB’s response to the invasion was limited to critical press statements. It was an MCB national affiliate, the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), which adopted a more agitational ‘outsider’ approach when it agreed to join forces with the Stop the War Coalition (SWC).

Founded in 1997 and reflecting an ethnically Arab constituency with its roots in anti-colonial Islam, one can identify a more ‘political’ and a more ‘pietistic’ faction within the MAB, with the ‘political’ faction ascendant at the height of the antiwar movement in the early 2000s and the ‘pietistic’ faction ascendant after the 7/7 attacks on London. As a Muslim Brotherhood ‘legacy organization,’ the MAB has been at the forefront of activist Muslim politics in Britain against western foreign policy in the Middle East when the ‘political’ faction has been ascendant. This ‘political’ faction became increasingly active in domestic electoral politics in the early 2000s and was a


392 Baldwin, Tom. 2002. “Blair Faces the Wrath of Britain’s Muslims over Iraq.” The Times, September 19,

393 While the MAB is often characterized as the organizational manifestation of the Muslim Brotherhood tendency in the United Kingdom, its proximity to the Brotherhood has fluctuated in strength over time depending on the leadership of the moment. Personal interview with Mustafa Field M.B.E. of MINAB, February 21, 2014.
driving force behind the MCB boycott of HMD.\textsuperscript{394} Importantly, however, the ‘political’ faction has also at times acted in a ‘firewall’ capacity, the most notable example being when MAB leaders ejected radical preacher Abu Hamza from the Finsbury Park mosque in 2003.

MCB insiders have suggested that the MAB’s participation in SWC can be explained by the fact that it had greater resources in terms of funding and staff as well as a more direct interest in the anti-war movement.\textsuperscript{395} In this instance, its umbrella structure allowed the MCB the flexibility to maintain its ‘insider’ status—lobbying the government behind the scenes to change its Iraq policy—while the MAB adopted an ‘outsider’ approach, affording the MCB some distance from the more agitational politics of the MAB.\textsuperscript{396} SWC was significant in that it involved an unprecedented instance of ‘brokerage’ between British Muslim activists and the traditional Left.\textsuperscript{397} As Birt (2005) notes,

\begin{quote}
Whereas during the Rushdie affair British Muslims had marched alone, in 2003 they had helped to create a national movement of popular protest that ironically eclipsed the particularities of their own ‘ummatic’
\end{quote}


discourses in favour of the general anti-war sentiment of middle England.\textsuperscript{398}

The SWC was also notable in that it highlighted the emergence of a new generation of British Muslim leaders that possessed the political pragmatism and acumen to broker cross-cutting alliances; whose vision of British Muslim activism transcended ethnic or religious difference; and who embraced traditional British forms of protest. The MAB’s high profile involvement in SWC led to a perception within government that Britain’s Muslim communities were “strongly joined,” organized, and could have an impact and that, “…the network had become too powerful and had demonstrated an ability to cross lines and join forces with other ‘threats,’” especially on New Labour’s left flank.\textsuperscript{399} The emergence of an anti-war ‘protest vote’ became clear in May 2003 when many of Labour’s losses in local elections occurred in wards with large Muslim populations.\textsuperscript{400}

It was against the context of the opening of political opportunities on the left that the RESPECT coalition was founded in 2004, with support from the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and key figures from the anti-war coalition.\textsuperscript{401} Its emergence in the run up to the 2005 general elections caused alarm within the ranks of New Labour who feared a defection of voters to RESPECT given that anti-war sentiments were running high.\textsuperscript{402} Indeed, the election marked the first time since 1951 that a party to the left of Labour won a seat in Westminster with former Labour MP George Galloway winning a seat for RESPECT in Tower Hamlets in East London and Salma Yaqoob coming a close second


\textsuperscript{399} Personal interview with Dr. Anas al-Tikriti, February 18, 2014.


\textsuperscript{401} ‘RESPECT’ stands for Respect, Equality, Socialism, Peace, Environmentalism, Community and Trade Unionism.

in Birmingham Sparkbrook—both areas with large Muslim communities. However, RESPECT’s electoral appeal was limited outside of South Asian Muslim communities and its appeal as a ‘protest vote’ party diminished as the antiwar movement ran out of steam. RESPECT eventually succumbed to internal tensions, when maverick George Galloway came into conflict with both the SWP and Salma Yaqoob.

The 7/7 attacks: “The rules of the game have changed”

What I’m trying to do here is, and this will be followed up with the action in the next few weeks as I think you will see, is to send a clear signal out that the rules of the game have changed.

- Prime Minister Tony Blair, August 5th, 2005

The attacks on London’s transportation system on July 7th, 2005, solidified a number of changes in how the state engages with British Muslim organizations. The government’s relationship with the MCB had caused, “deep divisions” within New Labour and 7/7 attacks shifted the argument in favor of those who believed that, in privileging the MCB, New Labour had granted it too much power. This debate culminated in the leadership decision in late 2006 to ‘rebalance’ or pluralize New Labour’s relationship with British Muslim organizations—a marked departure from

---


In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Prime Minister Blair announced that he was convening seven working groups—including more than 100 academics, policymakers, religious leaders, and community activists—under the title of ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ (PET), to recommend appropriate strategies for tackling violent extremism. The PET working groups were given a budget of just £5 million and a mere six weeks to complete this mammoth undertaking, which led participants to later publicly question whether it was “a tokenistic exercise” that “smacked… a little bit of presentationalism.” Baronness Falkner noted that, “… it seemed to me rather that it was going to be a very hurried, ‘let’s-do-something’ sort of response rather than anything substantive.”

On August 5th, 2005, Blair pre-empted the PET working groups findings by announcing a 12-point plan for dealing with the threat of terrorism in Britain. Rather than reflecting the outcome of an evidence-based policy process, Blair’s plan seemed designed to appeal to populist sentiment (See Appendix 3). It came as a surprise to Home Office officials and it effectively shattered a cross-party political consensus that had existed.

---

407 Former Home Secretary Charles Clarke noted that the MCB relationship caused, “…deep divisions [within New Labour] as to whether or not we should be giving them the status … as being the representative body of the British Muslim community.” Cited in Jones, Stephen H., Therese O’Toole, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Tariq Modood, and Nasar Meer. 2015. “A ‘System of Self-Appointed Leaders’? Examining Modes of Muslim Representation in Governance in Britain: A ‘System of Self-Appointed Leaders’?” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 17 (2): 211.

408 The seven working groups were the Engaging With Young People Working Group, the Education Working Group, the Engaging with Muslim Women Working Group, the Supporting regional and local initiatives and community actions Working Group, the Imams training and accreditation and the role of mosques as a resource for the whole community Working Group, the Community Security—including addressing Islamophobia, increasing confidence in policing and tackling extremism Working Group, and the Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation Working Group. See “‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Working Groups.” 2005. London: Home Office.


Prominent Labour politicians, academics, and journalists came to understand the move as indicative of Blair’s susceptibility to short-termism and media pressure. Indeed, a 2006 report by the Financial Times found that only three of Blair’s 12 pledges had been fulfilled one year later.

The PET report, published in October 2005, outlined the key issues identified by its working groups and offered more than 60 actionable recommendations to be undertaken by government and/or Muslim community groups and organizations. Going beyond its official Home Office remit, the task force report stressed a consensus over the need for a public inquiry into the attacks, which it was felt would be “instrumental in understanding and learning from what has happened.” The report also stressed that, 

\[\text{British foreign policy -- especially in the Middle East -- cannot be left unconsidered as a factor in the motivations of criminal radical extremists. We believe it is a key contributory factor.}\]

However, in an apparent attempt to deflect criticism from his Iraq policy, Blair insisted that there was no causal link between British foreign policy and domestic radicalization, even though two of the 7/7 bombers had explicitly cited British foreign policy as a motivating factor. Moreover, polling from June 2006 indicated a measure of stability of opinion among British Muslims with 50 percent of those surveyed agreeing with the

---

statement that, “[the] British invasion of Iraq was the principal reason for the London bomb attacks.” While leaked internal government documents had already acknowledged

![Diagram of critical juncture: September 11th attacks, 2001 to 'Global War on Terror' in Afghanistan, 2001 and Iraq, 2003, leading to 7/7 Attacks on London, 2005, and 'New Labour's 'rebalancing' with British Muslim organizations.]

Figure 5: A ‘reactive sequence’ leading from the September 11th attacks to the pluralization of relations between the British government and British Muslim organizations (quasi-corporatism to co-opted pluralism). Source: Author-generated diagram

a causal link between British foreign policy and radicalization prior to 7/7, several high profile security and intelligence community personnel—including a security advisor to Blair’s successor Gordon Brown and two former heads of MI5—broke ranks and opined on the absurdity of the Blair government’s position. However, in denying the possibility of a causal role for foreign policy in the interim, the Blair government

---

foreclosed the possibility of reaching a shared understanding about the full range of factors that may or may not have contributed to the radicalization of the 7/7 bombers and ruled out any consideration of policy change, which only served to permit the list of grievances against the British government to grow.\textsuperscript{420}

In the end, the Blair government cherry-picked two of the PET working groups’ recommendations it was willing to pursue, both of which involved bolstering theological counter-narratives to al-Qaeda ideology. The first proposed the establishment of “a new national advisory body/council of mosques and imams.”\textsuperscript{421} This resulted in the founding in June 2006 of the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), with a view to identifying best practices in mosque management, providing advice on imam accreditation, and organizing ‘capacity building’ and training programs in partnerships with other British Muslim organizations.\textsuperscript{422} Attempting to be seen to incorporate all major theological currents in a corporatist body, MINAB brought together the British Muslim Forum (BMF), a primarily Barelwi umbrella with a geographic focus in northern England, as well as the aforementioned MCB, Al-Khoei Foundation, and MAB.\textsuperscript{423} However, one interviewee noted the underrepresentation of the Islamic revivalist and anti-imperialist Deobandi movement in MINAB, which is notable given that the vast


\textsuperscript{423} The MAB came late to the process, primarily at the behest of Home Office officials who felt that the organization, although not a mosque umbrella as such, would add value to MINAB by imparting credibility on the new body among vital target audiences because of its on-campus strength, strong links to FOSIS, and a ready-made grassroots constituency. Personal interview with Mustafa Field M.B.E. of MINAB, February 21, 2014. See also Hellyer, H.A. 2011. “Pursuant to Prevent: British Community Counterterrorism Strategy: Past, Present, and Future.” Washington, D.C: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.
majority of seminaries in Britain are in fact Deobandi-run. Moreover, while the authors of the PET report had been keen to point out the absence of any causal relationship between the mismanagement and under-performance of mosques and violent extremism, the fact that MINAB emerged from a political process of engagement with Muslim communities to tackle extremism as well as its receipt of substantial government funding, immediately created doubts about its independence and credibility. Some saw MINAB as a state-driven attempt to depoliticize the major mosque-associations by pushing them back into civil society and others considered it a knee-jerk response to “the moral panic surrounding mosques and hate preachers.” Ultimately, MINAB was undermined from the outset by the fact that the MCB was not invested in its success while its other affiliated organizations did not have the capacity to sustain it.

The second PET proposal that was adopted by New Labour involved hosting a traveling roadshow of international scholars, “with credibility and influence amongst younger Muslims… to disseminate effective intellectual and theological counter-arguments against extremist interpretations of Islam.” This was later realized under the banner of the “Radical Middle Way” (RMW) and was spearheaded by individuals associated with Q-News with organizational ‘buy-in’ from the Young Muslims.

---

424 There were political reasons for the lack of Deobandi representation in MINAB. On the one hand, government saw the Deobandi community as one that it could not engage with. On the other hand, it was not in the interests of MINAB affiliates to fight for their inclusion. Personal interview with British Muslim activist who requested anonymity, February 2014


427 Personal interview with British Muslim activist who requested anonymity, February 2014

Organization (YMO) and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS). While it received most of its funding from government, RMW described itself as “a Muslim grassroots initiative” and “fiercely independent.” RMW was not directly funded through PREVENT, however, which gave its organizers a measure of creative agency and freedom. However, RMW’s credibility was brought into question when leaked memos revealed that the idea had been developed much earlier within the FCO for later presentation as a PET initiative. Bright (2006) characterized this as, “… an old civil service trick during ‘public’ consultations to give the appearance of openness, while the real policy is being developed behind the scenes.” While the ‘Radical Middle Way’ drew large crowds, the clumsy manner in which it was introduced was problematic and critics of RMW pointed to the dangers of using government funding to promote particular theological interpretations—also a clear violation of the secular principle of liberal neutrality.

However, in the aftermath of 7/7 and the failed airliner plot in August 2006, a much more significant issue involved the increasingly securitized lens through which government viewed its engagement with British Muslim organizations. Although it had been in existence since 2003 as an unpublished classified policy document, the Blair

---

government first published a partly declassified version of its counter-terrorism strategy, ‘CONTEST,’ in July 2006. A post-7/7 shift in emphasis to the ‘PREVENT’ component of CONTEST, which was framed as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach—designed to, “Prevent the next generation of potential terrorists from coming into being by combating the ideology which might produce them”—necessitated the participation and support of British Muslim organizations. Given its deteriorating relationship with the MCB, the ongoing debate within New Labour started to shift in favor of those who were critical of the organization. Around the same time, a raft of other British Muslim organizations were emerging and were actively cultivated to challenge the MCB’s near monopoly on representation.

Procedural inconsistency: the securitization of engagement, targeted capacity building, and the ‘liberal foils’

With its geographical concentration in the Midlands and its primarily Barelwi orientation, the British Muslim Forum (BMF) emerged as an alternative to the London-centric, primarily non-Sufi, MCB. Formally launched in March 2005 with more than 200 affiliated mosques, the BMF was led by British Muslims with connections into New Labour who positioned the organization as a more liberal, Barelwi alternative to the MCB. The BMF also asserted itself aggressively on the contested issue about

---

435 The ‘Contest’ strategy has since been updated in early 2009 and was reviewed, updated, and almost fully declassified in 2011. See Bonino, Stefano. 2013. “Prevent-Ing Muslimness in Britain: The Normalisation of Exceptional Measures to Combat Terrorism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 33 (3): 387.

436 Personal interview with Mustafa Field MBE from the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) on February 21, 2014.


Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly and MP Shahid Malik soon boasted about having forged a coalition with the BMF in the cause against extremism (while simultaneously disparaging the MCB).\footnote{Kelly, Ruth. 2007. “Time for a British Version of Islam... Deep Faith and Commitment to Country Can Mix.” New Statesman, April 9; Malik, Shahid. 2007. “Stop Whingeing and Show Leadership.” The Times (London), February 10.} This public spotlighting of the BMF, explicitly at the expense of the MCB, signaled the MCB’s loss of privileged status. Subsequently, the BMF became the largest organizational recipient of the DCLG’s Community Leadership Fund.\footnote{Targeted at national-level organizations, the Community Leadership Fund provided £275,000 to the BMF between 2007 and 2009 for improving mosque governance and capacity building. Kundnani, Arun. 2009. “Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism.” London: Institute of Race Relations, 19-20.} This ‘targeted capacity building’ again prompted warnings from experts about the implications of being seen to promote one particular (i.e. Sufi/Barelwi) theological interpretation of Islam.\footnote{Lambert, Robert. 2008. “Empowering Salafis and Islamists against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study.” PS: Political Science and Politics 41 (1): 31–35.} It’s worth noting that, although it has been somewhat self-insulated from criticism by virtue of its much more low-key and less
ardently political public profile, the BMF has faced the same kinds of criticisms that have plagued the MCB.\textsuperscript{443} It’s important to note that the BMF is even less representative of the full spectrum of British Muslim communities than the MCB in that its trustees consist entirely of \textit{ulama} from the \textit{Barelwi} tradition.

Perhaps the first post-7/7 \textit{de novo} manifestation of a burgeoning liberal-pluralist tendency came in the form of the emergence of Progressive British Muslims (PBM) in November 2005. Founded by Farmida Bi, a specialist in Islamic finance with connections to New Labour, the PBM’s formal launch was held at the House of Commons. Staking out a ‘culturalist’ Muslim space, the PBM aimed to appeal to “integrated, liberal British Muslims” who “…felt unrepresented by the existing faith-based Muslim groups.”\textsuperscript{444} Yet, the PBM supported a role for religious voices and leaders in public debates.\textsuperscript{445} Moreover, PBM also argued that British foreign policy played a causal role in fomenting extremism arguing that, “…[the] establishment can choose to ignore this fact but it should stop telling us that it is not so.”\textsuperscript{446} While PBM had disbanded by 2014, its emergence as one of

\textsuperscript{443} In fact, the BMF’s profile has been at times so low-key that more than one commentator has prematurely announced its demise. See, for example, Brandon, James, and Raffaello Pantucci. 2012. “UK Islamists and the Arab Uprisings.” \textit{Current Trends in Islamist Ideology} 13 (July): 43 footnote 17; Ahmad, Waqar I.U., and Venetia Evergeti. 2010. “The Making and Representation of Muslim Identity in Britain: Conversations with British Muslim ‘elites.’” \textit{Ethnic and Racial Studies} 33 (10): 1709. Critics have questioned the BMF’s undemocratic structure, whether it exaggerates the number of affiliated mosques, and its receipt of government funding and proximity to government. See Ahmad, Waqar I.U., and Venetia Evergeti. 2010. “The Making and Representation of Muslim Identity in Britain: Conversations with British Muslim ‘elites.’” \textit{Ethnic and Racial Studies} 33 (10): 1709; The BMF’s funding was primarily earmarked for organizational and community capacity building, supporting Muslim women and youth, mosque governance and imam training, and supporting local forums against extremism and Islamophobia. See Kundnani, Arun. 2009. “Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism.” London: Institute of Race Relations, 19.


a number of liberal foils to the MCB in the immediate aftermath of 7/7 was indicative of widening political opportunities for British Muslim activism at this juncture.

British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD) was established in June 2006 in reaction to both the Shabina Begum case and its founders’ vehement rejection of the MCB’s education policy position, which they regarded as being “exclusivist and exceptionalist.” BMSD Director, Tehmina Kazi, acknowledges that the BMSD envisions itself as a “liberal foil” to the MCB. Like the PBM, the BMSD expressed concern about a tendency to over-emphasize, “… Muslimness at the expense of Britishness.”

Founders Yasmin Alibhai-Brown and playwright Nasreen Rehman were highly critical of the biraderi system and felt that negative images of British Muslims were being perpetuated by, “… unelected, self-styled Muslim spokesmen who maintain power by overstating the ‘threat’ of Muslim disaffection.” While opposing the establishment of faith schools in Britain, the BMSD also criticized the “racist ways” of French-style secularism. Notably, BMSD representatives expressed serious concerns over strings that were attached to a small tranche of Home Office funding the

---

447 Shabina Begum case involved a young Muslim woman who wanted to wear a more extensive covering than was permitted under her school’s uniform rules. Begum challenged the school’s decision to exclude her in a lawsuit that cited Article 9(1) of the ECHR. The case was ultimately adjudicated at the House of Lords, which found that there had been no Article 9 violation. Interview with Tehmina Kazi, Director, British Muslims for Secular Democracy, February 22, 2014. See also Muslim Council of Britain. 2007. “Towards Greater Understanding – Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools, Information & Guidance for Schools.” London: Muslim Council of Britain.


organization received between 2008 and 2010 under the broader PREVENT program because of concerns over the surveillance components of these programs.451

Also in June 2006, the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC) was founded by businessman Haras Rafiq, with Ruth Kelly and Shadow Attorney General, Dominic Grieve MP, both attending its House of Commons launch.452 Like the BMF, the SMC was heralded as representative of a ‘silent majority’ of ‘moderate Muslims,’ although little proof was offered for this grandiose claim. Indeed, the SMC was second only to the BMF in terms of funding received from the DCLG’s Community Leadership Fund.453 New Labour’s targeted capacity building of ‘Sufi’ groups—as theological and political foils to more Islamist-oriented groups—had emerged from right-leaning think tanks in the U.S. and Kelly’s enthusiastic support for the SMC further reinforced the appearance that government was violating the secular principle of non-intervention in theological issues.454 The SMC was widely viewed with suspicion by British Muslims, with many seeing it as a clumsy attempt by the government to co-opt Sufism for political purposes by creating a stalking horse for a government attack on the MCB.455 Moreover,

451 Interview with Tehmina Kazi, Director, British Muslims for Secular Democracy, February 22, 2014.
commentators noted that the simplistic branding of ‘Sufis’ as a collective represented by the SMC—and government legitimization thereof—was problematic in that it assumed a clearly delineated community of ‘Sufis’ that is inherently peace-loving, apolitical, and ‘moderate.’\footnote{As critics noted, this glossed over the role of Sufi leaders at the forefront of anti-colonial and jihadi struggles in places such as Chechnya and Algeria and ignored the arguments that it has often been the younger generation of parents from Sufi-inclined traditions who have been the most vulnerable to extremism. See Bunting, Madeleine. 2006. “The Venomous Media Voices Who Think No Muslim Is Worth Talking to.” \textit{The Guardian}, August 15.} Notably, criticisms of the inappropriateness of these interventions received support from high profile figures from within the BMF mosque umbrella.\footnote{See Dr. Waqar Azmi OBE, of the BMF quoted in Parker, Amanda, and Murtaza Shibli. 2010. “Beyond Prevent: Achieving Security and Challenging Extremism.” Portcullis House, Westminster, 4.}

\textbf{Structural inconsistencies: ‘re-balancing’}

In August 2006, Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly announced that government would only work with organizations that accepted a set of non-negotiable values: respect for the law, freedom of speech, equality of opportunity, respect for others, and responsibility towards others—an idea that Tariq Modood criticized as not being, “…in the spirit of an open, plural citizenship.”\footnote{See “Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds.” 2007. London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 5; Kelly, Ruth. 2006. “Britain: Our Values, Our Responsibilities.” Speech. October 11; Modood, Tariq. 2007. “Multiculturalism and Nation Building Go Hand in Hand.” \textit{The Guardian}, May 23.} Yet, by the end of 2006, Tony Blair declared that the 7/7 attacks had brought the nature of “multicultural Britain” into sharp relief and spoke of a “duty to integrate” involving conforming to “shared, common unifying British values.”\footnote{Blair, Tony. 2006. “Speech on Multiculturalism and Integration.” 10 Downing Street, December 8.} In so doing, Kelly and Blair conflated the political dissidence and/or religious conservatism of some of MCB’s affiliates with ‘extremism’ and, more broadly, resulted in the pursuit of a policy path that fused Britain’s counter-extremism and security...
imperatives with its social cohesion and integration policy agenda.\textsuperscript{460} One of Ruth Kelly’s two primary rationales for ‘rebalancing,’ was that the MCB was a “false gatekeeper” that represented only a section of the British Muslim community.\textsuperscript{461} If that were the case, however then one would expect a corrective to involve widening the spectrum of the British government’s Muslim civil society interlocutors while continuing to engage with the MCB. Kelly’s second rationale was based on the idea that government should only fund organizations with a system of ‘shared values’ compatible with the vision of cohesive society endorsed by the government, which brings us back to the definitional issues surrounding notions of ‘shared values.’ It is noteworthy that the same terminologies deployed by Kelly and Blair would later be incorporated in the highly problematic definition of ‘extremism’—both violent and non-violent—in PREVENT literature.

Kelly implicitly attributed the rationale for ‘rebalancing’ to the MCB’s non-attendance of Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD) events.\textsuperscript{462} While some seized upon this as a good faith explanation,\textsuperscript{463} one interviewee noted that it provided a convenient pretext for further delegitimizing the MCB.\textsuperscript{464} It has to be noted that representatives of the MCB had not in fact attended HMD since its inaugural event in 2001. There can be little doubt, however, that the MCB’s boycott of HMD constituted a substantial political ‘own

\textsuperscript{460} Bunting, Madeleine. 2006. “Integration and Terrorism Have Nothing to Do with Each Other.” \textit{The Guardian}, December 3.


\textsuperscript{464} Personal interview with Mustafa Field M.B.E. of MINAB on February 21, 2014.
Indeed, over the year preceding Kelly’s speech, there was a coincidence of prominent press coverage that highlighted concerns over the ideological affinities of some of the MCB’s leadership to JI and the Muslim Brotherhood, issues with the MCB’s ‘representativeness,’ and the problematic views held by some individuals within its 500 or so affiliated mosques. These critiques reached a crescendo in mid-2006 as the relationship between New Labour and the MCB continued to deteriorate.

In an alternative causal explanation, Maher and Frampton (2009) draw a link between Kelly’s ‘rebalancing,’ the discovery of a plot to blow up several transatlantic airliners in August 2006, and a subsequent demonstration of British Muslim unity with the publication of an open letter linking New Labour’s foreign policy platform with domestic radicalization. Published as a full-page advertisement in national newspapers, the open letter was signed by three of the four Muslim MPs, three of the five Muslim members of the House of Lords, and 38 Muslim organizations (See Appendix 4). Indeed, Birt (2006) characterized the letter as,

…unprecedented in gathering together most of Britain’s Muslim parliamentarians and lobbying groups…Sufis and Islamists, despite attempts to separate them politically, religiously and morally in recent weeks, have come together in this letter.

Ignoring the fact that the BMF and various Labour MPs and peers had signed the letter, Maher and Frampton (2009) note that, “the MCB, together with other Islamist-oriented organizations and individuals” were calling for urgent changes to British foreign

---

Of course, the letter assumed a causal link between British foreign policy and an escalating threat of violent extremism, a conclusion with which British security services privately agreed. However, this public demonstration of communal unity on this issue rattled the government and drew swift and robust condemnation. According to Maher and Frampton (2009),

*The MCB was felt to have endorsed a narrative of victimhood and grievance that fed into the motivations underpinning Islamist violence, and new questions were therefore raised about its position. As a result, Ruth Kelly sought to reach over the heads of groups like the MCB, creating a new approach which emphasized local, rather than national, organisations.*

In the aftermath, leaders from the MCB, UMO, Al-Khoei Foundation, and others, were called to an emergency meeting with Ruth Kelly and Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott during which officials insisted that British Muslim leaders needed to do more to tackle extremism within their community—a task that British Muslim leaders argue is too great for them to tackle.

What emerges from this analysis is that the fall from favor of the MCB involved a series of conflicts related to British government sensitivities to the prevalent view among British Muslims that British foreign policy needed to be considered as a contributing factor to domestic terrorism, a view shared by security and intelligence officials.

---


Simultaneously, a growing awareness emerged across government over time of the problems of the ‘radical simplification’ that had come with having encouraged the formation of a single representative body for British Muslims. Debates within political circles shifted in favor of those within New Labour who argued that the party leadership had conferred too much power on the MCB. This argument included an emphasis on the representative deficiencies of the MCB as well as its inability to ensure the political quiescence of its constituency. Over time, those who believed that the government was depending too heavily on the MCB found their hand strengthened, which created the political conditions that facilitated Kelly’s ‘rebalancing.’

‘Pluralization’ of the relationship between government and British Muslim organizations would be entirely justifiable, from the standpoint of theories of deliberative democracy, if it had been aimed at a good faith broadening of the scope of engagement to provide a voice to hitherto unrepresented or underrepresented groups. However, evidence demonstrates that, in reality, ‘rebalancing’ involved the effective sidelining of the MCB and, ultimately, the bypassing of national-level organizations. Ultimately, Birt (2009) notes that the post-‘rebalancing’ strategies pursued by the Blair government lent themselves to,”…political divisiveness, asserting an exclusive nationalism, promoting out-of-touch official Muslim partners, and taking a wide-focus approach that [alienated] ordinary Muslims.”

Ultimately, Blair’s foreign policy decisions played a significant role in cementing his removal as Prime Minister. While the Iraq War built up pressure for his resignation, Labour MPs claimed that his failure to call for a ceasefire in the 2006 Israel–Lebanon

---


conflict did more than any other single episode to lead to Blair’s eventual removal. Upon his resignation in June 2007, Blair was succeeded by Chancellor Gordon Brown. Brown’s Communities Secretary, Hazel Blears, continued her predecessor’s unsympathetic stance toward the MCB and Brown’s tenure in office from 2007 to 2010 was broadly marked by continuity rather than change. Brown’s support for a ‘values-based’ approach to British citizenship was well established. One of his first acts as Prime Minister was to publish a Green Paper that called for a national conversation to determine the content of Britain’s ‘shared values,’ to be followed by a “British statement of values” that would establish “…the ideals and principles that bind us together as a nation.” Critics questioned the wisdom of this effort to chase “a will of the wisp called Britishness,” with historian Robert Colls arguing that, “… if the values bind us, why do we need a statement? And if they don’t, in what sense are they our values?” As Colls later noted,

In recent years, the state’s thinking has been free market, multicultural, and transnational—a set of propositions which it sees as in step with the process … now known as ‘globalisation’. Our current predicament is that

---


478 Green Papers differ from White Papers in that they contain alternative policies for discussion with stakeholders and the public invited to comment on their content before a final decision is made. White Papers are more authoritative being seen as a statement of government policy. See Ministry of Justice. 2007. *The Governance of Britain.* London: Stationery Office, 57-60.

not one of these propositions is sympathetic to the principle and practice of national identity... \(^{480}\)

However, subsequent government publications indicate the persistence of this thinking throughout Brown’s tenure. \(^{481}\)

It was in the context of ‘rebalancing,’ with PREVENT providing the funding mechanism to build the capacity of more ‘moderate’ and ‘mainstream’ actors to provide a voice to theological counter-narratives, that the phenomenon of the ‘formers’—or reformed extremists—emerged. The ‘formers’ claimed a unique insight into radicalization—and a specialized knowledge in how to counteract it. Founded in 2008, the Quilliam Foundation (QF) styled itself as a counter-extremism think tank built on the widespread acclaim for *The Islamist* (2007), a book by its Deputy Director, Ed Husain that charted his life as a *Hizb ut-Tahrir* activist as well as his subsequent rehabilitation. \(^{482}\)

As a single-issue think tank, Quilliam does not claim to be representative of British Muslim communities taking the position that, “… representation should not be through self-styled ‘community representative’ organizations but as citizens through Parliament.” \(^{483}\) By targeting an elite audience of policy makers rather than any public constituency, QF can be considered a *special interest group*, in that it concentrates on limited issues and benefits mainly its own members. \(^{484}\) However, QF’s linking of ‘entry-level Islamism’ with violent extremism, its whole-hearted embrace by the political

---


\(^{484}\) Personal interview with Dr. Usama Hasan of the Quilliam Foundation, February 19, 2014; For the distinction between *special interest groups* and *constituency representing organizations*, see Etzioni, A. 1985. “Special Interest Groups Versus Constituency Representation.” *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 8 (1): 171–95.
establishment, and its own susceptibility to the kinds of ‘guilt-by-association’ accusations that it has leveled at other British Muslim organizations has provoked withering criticisms of the organization in the public sphere that QF has struggled to counter.485

QF’s approach to countering extremism is premised on the theory that there is a direct causal link between ‘Islamist ideology’ and extremist violence with “extremist rhetoric” providing the “preamble to terrorism.”486 Those theories that posit a direct link between non-violent religious conservatism or Islamist activism and violent extremism have been labeled ‘conveyor belt’ theories of radicalization and have been promulgated by a variety of think tanks, law enforcement agencies, and leading politicians.487 However, a number of political scientists and government security agencies—in Britain and elsewhere—have criticized these theories as crude and simplistic.488 Instead, counter-terrorism experts cite empirical evidence to support so-called ‘firewall’ models that advocate robust engagement with Islamists and other religiously conservative groups in order to harness the competitive aspects of the relationship between Salafi quietists, MB, and JI-inspired groups and al-Qaeda-inspired groups to counter violent extremism—an approach that found support among British security services, including Charles Farr, the

former Director of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (2007-2015) and currently Chair of the Cabinet Office’s Joint Intelligence Committee.489

While some political leaders might have been keen to promote ‘conveyor-belt’ theories as a means to marginalize non-violent Islamist groups that were seen as posing a political threat, many in the British security services, the civil service, and academia did not align with the underlying theoretical premises.490 Ultimately, however, Quilliam continue to maintain the position that not only Hizb ut-Tahrir but also a wide variety of MB- and JI-legacy groups in Britain are effectively aligned with al-Qaeda in the sense that, while they might differ in tactics, they share fundamental strategic goals.491 Ultimately, in QF’s view, only Barelwi groups hold the potential of being fruitfully engaged by government.492 In adopting the ‘conveyor belt’ theory of radicalization as the basic premise upon which its policy prescriptions are based, Quilliam’s ‘values-based’ approach aligned neatly with a ‘rebalancing’ that involved sidelining more Islamist-oriented or Islamist legacy groups. This has resulted in an engagement policy that views


489 A June 2008 report by the Behavioral Science Unit of MI5 leaked to The Guardian and based on in-depth case studies of “several hundred individuals known to be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist activity” concluded that individuals that have become involved in terrorism in Britain have been mostly religious novices and that, “a well-established religious identity actually protects [emphasis added] against violent radicalisation.” See Travis, Alan. 2008. “MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain.” The Guardian, August 20, sec. UK news; see also Gilligan, Andrew. 2010. “Hizb Ut Tahrir Is Not a Gateway to Terrorism, Claims Whitehall Report.” The Telegraph, July 25.


ever-increasing numbers of Muslim organizations with suspicion and has narrowed engagement to a select few.493

Analysts have roundly criticized the monolithic and sweeping characterization of ‘Islamism’ that Husain presents in *The Islamist*.494 Kundnani (2008) notes that, in order to justify his ‘good Muslim, bad Muslim’ distinction, Ed Husain differentiates between, “…true Islam as ‘spiritual’, ‘moderate’ and ‘traditional’, and a distorted form of Islam as ‘ideology’, ‘extremist’, ‘activist’, ‘literalist’, ‘anti-western’ and ‘political.’”495 However, as Kundnani (2008) notes, ‘traditional’ and ‘spiritual’ Islam are not coterminous, nor are ‘literalist’ interpretations of Islam coterminous with ‘political’ interpretations of Islam. Rather, “…[it is] possible to be both spiritual and political, activist and moderate, non-literal and non-traditional.”496

All of this notwithstanding, Gordon Brown’s New Labour fell enthusiastically on the Quilliam Foundation, coming as it did at a juncture when New Labour was characterizing the MCB as insufficiently vehement in countering extremism. Figures later quoted in parliament indicate that Quilliam received close to £3 million from government over a 3-year period, being the largest single recipient of Home Office Prevent funding—receiving nearly £1.2 million from the Home Office between 2008 and 2011 and an additional £1.5 million in project funding from the FCO over the same period.497 In March 2011, Conservative Minister for State for Immigration, Damian Green acknowledged that,

---

493 This exact argument was made by Baroness Warsi after her resignation as Minister of State for Faith and Communities in 2014. Warsi, Sayeeda. 2015. “Muslims Will Speak up for British Values Only When They Know They Will Be Heard.” *The Guardian*, January 24.
The funding provided to Quilliam has been unique, not only in its scale but in its scope. It has been used not just for projects and programmes but, exceptionally, for significant overheads and running costs.\textsuperscript{498}

Quilliam projects have included running ‘Radicalisation Awareness Programmes’ and ‘cultural competency’ training for educators, local government, and public service employees on how to spot the signs of ‘extremism.’\textsuperscript{499}

Pursuant to the growing influence of the Quilliam Foundation, another notable development under Brown’s tenure was the empowering of two consultative bodies, the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group (NMWAG) and the Young Muslims Advisory Group (YMAG).\textsuperscript{500} Both groups were decidedly corporatist efforts ostensibly designed to enable the government to engage directly with constituencies that were seen as under-represented in existing mosque-based structures. Both were effectively ‘prisoner groups’ in the sense that they were entirely reliant on New Labour for their survival given its role in their creation. Launched in January 2008, the NMWAG convened a group of nineteen women to, “act as ambassadors for Muslim women at grass roots and represent their views and concerns to Government” on issues of civic participation, theological understanding, and the identification of role models as “part of [DCLG’s] work to prevent violent extremism.”\textsuperscript{501}

\textsuperscript{498} Green, Damian. 2011. Quilliam Foundation. HC Deb March 15 2011.
\textsuperscript{500} Blears stated that, “[Quilliam] were certainly instrumental, when I was the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, in my decision to set up the Young Muslims Advisory Group and the Muslim Women’s Advisory Group.” Ed Husain disputes this statement and has claimed that these bodies were entirely Hazel Blears’ idea. See Blears, Hazel. 2011. Quilliam Foundation. HC Deb March 15 2011; O’Toole, Therese, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Tariq Modood, Nasar Meer, and Stephen Jones. 2013. “Taking Part: Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance.” Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship: University of Bristol, 21 note 20.
Again, NMWAG was promoted at the implicit expense of the MCB with Hazel Blears praising it as, “...a refreshing change from many of the established Muslim groups that government historically deals with.”

However, Ahmed (2015) points out that, women from Wahhabi and Salafi organisations who would have had access to and influence over young people that were potentially vulnerable to violent extremist manipulation were not represented on the group...

Moreover, echoing participants in the PET working groups, Shaista Gohir, a founding member of NMWAG, later accused the government of using the group to conduct “a tick-box exercise” to contribute to a short term political agenda. Echoing earlier characterizations of New Labour’s engagement policy with British Muslims as a “merry-go-round,” Gohir noted that:

...the government has always employed a strategy of elevating a Muslim organisation before replacing it with another and NMWAG suffered the same fate too. The government diverted its attention towards the Young Muslims Advisory Group (YMAG).

In a repeat of the ‘astroturfing’ that was observed with the emergence of the Radical Middle Way from the PET process, NMWAG participants implied that its ‘role models roadshow,’ designed to raise the aspirations of British Muslim girls, was in fact formulated by civil servants within the DCLG.

Launched in October 2008, the YMAG brought together twenty-three Muslims aged 17 to 26 who were tasked with “[helping to] find solutions to a range of challenges

---

including tackling discrimination; increasing employment levels; preventing extremism and boosting civic participation.”

The YMAG garnered some media attention when it criticized the Brown government for failing to condemn the killing of more than 500 Palestinians in Gaza as an “act of state terrorism,” which it saw as undermining efforts to reduce homegrown radicalization.

An analysis of the attitudes of British Muslim youths toward government engagement with Muslim organizations conducted by the YMAG found that:

_Surprise was expressed by a number of participants as to why the government had chosen to engage with the Quilliam Foundation and stop engaging with the MCB… A lack of clarity about why certain groups were consulted and some were not led some of the young Muslim participants to express confusion about why certain groups are engaged, leading to a lack of confidence in government._

Aside from a lack of clarity and consistency in New Labour’s engagement policy, the report noted that,

_The UK’s foreign policy was a major factor in damaging trust in young people’s perception of the government. This was particularly the case for the more engaged young Muslim groups._

While Hazel Blears had enthusiastically stated at the launch event for YMAG that, “…ensuring young Muslims have access to constructive, democratic channels for dealing with concerns and frustrations is crucial to our efforts to build strong, resilient communities,” there is no evidence that any of its advice was heeded.

---

Meanwhile, in February 2009, the relationship between the government and the MCB plumbed new depths when MCB Deputy Secretary General Daud Abdullah signed the ‘Istanbul Declaration’—a document that called for resistance to the Israeli assault on Gaza and endorsed a call by Hamas to resist any military forces that might be involved in enforcing an arms blockade of Gaza.\(^{512}\) While Abdullah’s pro-Palestinian sympathies were well known, and certainly not unusual among British Muslims,\(^{513}\) Hazel Blears interpreted his signing of the Declaration as justifying violence and informed the MCB that the government would formally cut ties with the organization unless Abdullah resigned his position.\(^{514}\) In an opinion piece published in The Guardian, prominent Anglo-Jewish historian Geoffrey Alderman argued that Blears’ intervention,

\[
\text{...amounts to a piece of quite unwarranted Whitehall interference in the internal working of an independent body ... The very unfortunate precedent she is trying to set reflects the practices of a totalitarian state...} \quad ^{515}
\]

The optics of being seen to bow to unprecedented government influence in a civil society organization left the MCB in a Catch-22 and likely hardened its resolve.\(^{516}\) However, the MCB’s subsequent decertification was effectively a formality given the extent of

---

\(^{512}\) The ‘Military Wing’ of Hamas (\(izz-\text{z}\)-\(\text{Din}\) \(\text{al}\) Qassem) was proscribed by the British government in March 2001.


\(^{514}\) Blears, Hazel. 2009. “Letter to Dr. Muhammad Abdul Bari,” March 13. Other critics interpreted the Istanbul Declaration as (hypothetically) condoning violence against British troops, because it was purported to justify (undetermined) action against the British military should it participate in an (hypothetical) international peacekeeping force to enforce an arms blockade on Gaza.


\(^{516}\) For example, Dodd (2007) notes that, in relation to its boycott of HMD, “Sources say the MCB would have ended its boycott last year, but was attacked by the then communities secretary, Ruth Kelly, over the boycott, and did not want to be seen to be caving in to government pressure.” Dodd, Vikram. 2007. “Muslim Council Ends Holocaust Memorial Day Boycott.” \textit{The Guardian}, December 3.
deterioration in the relationship between New Labour and the MCB by this juncture.\textsuperscript{517} After approximately 10 months, the MCB was recertified by Blears’ successor, John Denham, who apparently had to “[lobby] hard within Cabinet” for restoring ties.\textsuperscript{518}

Conservative Party leader David Cameron—laying out his party’s stance in advance of the impending 2010 election campaign—noted that a conservative government would not “do formal things” with the MCB unless it distanced itself from Abdullah.\textsuperscript{519} Cameron also made a point of endorsing a Conservative Party report that was highly critical of the MCB and criticized attempts to prioritize engagement with religious over secular leaderships.\textsuperscript{520} The report singled out “ideologues” in the MAB and ISB that “follow Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s doctrines…[and] dominate [the MCB’s] policy making.”\textsuperscript{521} Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian theologian who has generated controversy for his sympathy for Palestinian suicide bombers, is considered an intellectual force in Muslim Brotherhood circles.\textsuperscript{522} Former London mayor, Ken Livingstone, courted controversy—and the condemnation of the Board of Deputies—by meeting with Qaradawi, even though the meeting was considered appropriate, if not helpful, by the British security services and Special Branch.\textsuperscript{523}

\textsuperscript{517} Personal interview with Mustafa Field M.B.E. of MINAB on February 21, 2014.
\textsuperscript{522} Al-Qaradawi’s position is that, as the Palestinians have no aircraft or tanks, he respects their right to resort to suicide bombings, a view that is widespread in Muslim majority countries.
While there are serious concerns over the ability of the MCB’s smaller national affiliates to dominate its internal selection procedures, any notion that its leadership marches in ideological lockstep with Yusuf al-Qaradawi ignores that the MCB’s outlook has been shaped to a much greater extent by the pragmatism of political engagement in a pluralistic society. Indeed, this assertion is a genetic fallacy insofar as it ignores that political praxis can involve dynamic moderating processes such as the contestation of older Islamist ideas akin to a British variant of what some have called Islamist auto-reform or the operation of an inclusion-moderation mechanism. The Conservative’s report ultimately recommended the continuation of New Labour’s ‘values-based’ approach.

The General Election in May 2010 returned David Cameron as Prime Minister leading a Conservative—Liberal Democrat coalition (hereafter the ‘Coalition’). The Coalition’s reconfiguration of relationships with British Muslim organizations reflected a Conservative distaste for the bloc structuring of representation, which it viewed as “divisive state multiculturalism.” However, this reflected continuity insofar as Labour

---


528 For example, the NMWAG, created under the aegis of New Labour’s attempts to reconfigure the mechanisms for the representation of Muslims by redressing gender deficits, self-destructed in anticipation
had already been moving in a more conservative direction including moves away from bloc representation since Ruth Kelly’s tenure at the DCLG. However, the Coalition—or more accurately its Conservative leadership—demonstrated considerable skittishness about being seen to engage or associate with ‘Islamists’ or those whose views could be seen as being in any way unsavory and this caution ultimately resulted in a pattern of ‘engagement’ that involves an ever-narrowing circle of interlocutors. Reflecting Cameron’s pre-election commitment, the MCB was again effectively decertified.

In his so-called “King James Bible Speech” in December 2011 Prime Minister David Cameron, outlined the Coalition’s broader stance on the role of religion in public life. Notably, while repeating the familiar (but erroneous) trope that New Labour didn’t ‘do God,’ Cameron argued that Britons should not be afraid to acknowledge the centrality of Christian values in British society. This marked a significant departure from the more “multifaith” approach of New Labour where the Anglican Church was one of many at the table. Unlike Blair, Cameron was unabashed about the role that faith groups, with the Anglican Church leading the way, would play in his ‘Big Society’—the concept itself being heavily influenced by Anglican theologian, Philip Blond.

One of Cameron’s first appointments saw Conservative Party Co-Chairman Baroness Sayeeda Warsi promoted to the cabinet as a ‘minister without portfolio’—the

---


In July 2007, at the age of 36, Baroness Warsi had become the first Muslim woman to sit on the front bench of a British political party.

532 In spite of whispers of tokenism among her colleagues, Warsi came to wield some power in setting the agenda for the Coalition’s relationship to British Muslim communities in this position as well as in her subsequent appointment to the dual role of Minister for State at the FCO and as Minister for Faith and Communities. However, Warsi found her latitude for action in terms of engagement considerably constrained by a more powerful and more conservative faction within the Conservative Party.

Indeed, divisions soon emerged at the highest level of the coalition over how best to engage with British Muslim organizations. In a speech in Munich in February 2011, David Cameron explicitly disavowed “state multiculturalism” but indicated that the coalition was going to follow the path of New Labour by pursuing decidedly ‘liberal-nationalist’ and ‘values-based’ approaches that involved the development of, “… a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to everyone.”

533 Cameron’s speech echoed similar speeches by then French Prime Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, German Chancellor Merkel, and Dutch Prime Minister Rutte, delivered within roughly the same timeframe.

Cameron effectively ruled out working with non-violent extremists by arguing that adopting a firewall approach was analogous to “…turning to a rightwing fascist party to fight a violent white supremacist movement.” Of course, the implied analogy between

534 President Sarkozy praised Cameron’s speech, declaring that, “We have been too concerned about the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough about the identity of the country that was receiving him.” German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that multiculturalism had “failed utterly” in Germany. Dutch Prime Minister Rutte stated in June 2011 that, “… the government shares the social dissatisfaction over the multicultural society model.” In none of these cases was the goal of multicultural policies outlined – or how exactly its apparent failure could be measured. Failure was simply attributed either to unwillingness on the part of immigrants to integrate, or to wrongheaded policies, or both.

the far right British National Party and, for example, the Muslim Council of Britain, which the Conservative leadership held to be Islamist-dominated, was inherently problematic given that it rested on a genetic fallacy and failed to recognize the diversity of mosque and community groups under the MCB umbrella.

Approximately one month after Cameron’s ‘Munich speech,’ Deputy Prime Minister Nicholas Clegg rejected Cameron’s disavowal of multiculturalism and publicly indicated his disagreement with Cameron’s ruling out engaging with non-violent extremists, noting that,

\[\ldots\text{you don’t win a fight by leaving the ring. You get in and win… }\]
\[\ldots\text{We don’t win people to liberal ideals by giving ourselves a leave of absence from the argument.}\]

He illustrated this ethos in action by referencing his decision to allow Simon Hughes, deputy leader of the Liberal Democrats, to attend the Global Peace and Unity conference in 2010, while Baroness Warsi was forced by the Conservative Party leadership to pull out.\(^537\) Clegg and Warsi, along Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, coalesced as the most vocal proponents on the side of the debate within the coalition that favored a wider and more inclusive approach involving a willingness to engage with more Islamist-oriented actors. However, the side that favored a narrower approach was a much more powerful faction within the Conservative Party, enjoying the support of prominent politicians such as Chancellor George Osborne, Secretary of State for Defense Liam Fox, Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove and, crucially, then Home Secretary, Theresa May.\(^538\)


\(^{537}\) As a result of its occasional hosting of controversial Islamic scholars, the Global Peace and Unity conference had previously triggered debate among New Labour in 2008 when Labour MP Sadiq Khan—then Minister for State for Communities at the DCLG and now Lord Mayor of London—attended the conference reportedly against the express wishes of then Communities Secretary Hazel Blears. See Maher, Shiraz, and Martyn Frampton. 2009. “Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement with Muslim Groups.” London: Policy Exchange, 15.

Yet there were also considerable differences of opinion within the ‘narrower approach’ faction with Michael Gove most strictly adhering to a ‘conveyor belt’ approach favoring a very narrow engagement while then Home Secretary Theresa May apparently less threatened by expressions of (Islamic) religious conservatism.539

In January 2011, Baroness Warsi suggested that Islamophobia had passed “the dinner table test” and cautioned against a tendency to categorize Muslims as either “moderates” or “extremists,” which she contended was fueling intolerance.540 Warsi’s comments were greeted warmly by British Muslim organizations across the spectrum but the party leadership quickly distanced itself from them.541 Allen (2013) indicates that the Coalition provided some opportunities for a rapprochement with the MCB with regard to its robust engagement with the issue of Islamophobia.542 This is indicated by the Coalition’s support of platforms to tackle Islamophobia such as the Cross-Government Working Group on Anti-Muslim Hatred, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia and support for TELL MAMA—an independent NGO that measures and monitors anti-Muslim incidents. While Baroness Warsi was, in many respects, single-handedly driving this agenda, it can also be seen as part-and-parcel of an in-group policing bargain with British Muslim community leaders expected to effectively police

542 Allen, C. 2013. “Passing the Dinner Table Test: Retrospective and Prospective Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia in Britain.” SAGE Open 3 (2).
extremism within Muslim communities while the government policed anti-Muslim extremism.\textsuperscript{543}

Engagement between the Coalition and the MCB would be characterized as “limited at best.”\textsuperscript{544} The transition between New Labour and the Coalition was marked by certain continuities in terms of how it engaged with British Muslim leaders and organizations in a post-7/7 environment. These included the solidifying of the New Labour strategy of bypassing national-level representation under the aegis of the Localism Act. There were, however, some differences in approach—in terms of differing ideological commitments and specific policy initiatives—that merit discussion. While New Labour’s post-2001 approach to faith engagement was driven primarily by a communitarian view of the utility of the role of faith groups in providing ‘bridging capital’ in the service of ‘social cohesion,’ the Coalition’s approach drew heavily on the idea of the ‘Big Society,’ which combined the skepticism of the central state inherent to Conservative Party ideology, the desirability of shrinking government liabilities in a period of economic crisis, and a view that any gaps in service delivery could be filled by the civil society sector.

Two Coalition policy initiatives with specific impact on British Muslim organizations—‘Near Neighbours’ and the updated so-called ‘PREVENT II’—demonstrate the differing ideological underpinnings and practical ramifications of the Coalition’s approach to faith engagement. The ‘Near Neighbours’ program is a ‘Big Society’ initiative that established a modest funding stream (£5 million) aimed at promoting interaction between faith and non-faith groups in four specific areas of Britain. The funds are disbursed through the Church of England’s Urban Fund, with applications


requiring the counter-signature of an Anglican priest. The central role of local Anglican Churches reflects the Conservatives’ ‘localism’ and ‘Christian heritage’ agendas. This approach received mixed reactions from Muslim civil society groups. While some saw the deployment of the Church of England’s infrastructure as a welcome corrective to PREVENT’s singular focus on Muslim communities, others remarked that ‘Near Neighbours’ put other faith groups at a disadvantage.

Another policy shift that indicates the Coalition’s different approach can be seen in PREVENT II, its reconfiguration of the operation of New Labour’s PREVENT program. Under New Labour, PREVENT had long been the target of considerable criticism over its conflation of security and integration agendas; its intelligence gathering functions; and its stigmatization of British Muslim communities. The definition of extremism in PREVENT II is highly problematic for a number of reasons. First, by including both ‘vocal’ and ‘active’ opposition to ‘fundamental values,’ PREVENT II does not distinguish between non-violent and violent extremism. This becomes problematic when one considers the specific content of ‘fundamental values.’ For example, defining extremism as ‘vocal opposition’ to ‘democracy’ threatens to proscribe legitimate philosophical and political debate over the nature and notion of ‘democracy.’ Second, PREVENT II fails to provide a demarcated list of ‘fundamental values’ in that its terminology indicates that its list of ‘fundamental values’ is not

exhaustive and that it may be expanded at some unknown point in the future. For example, at what point does the emergent norm of “marriage equality” become a “fundamental value”? Finally, it is unclear what is meant by “the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.” As some critics have noted, the definition of extremism in PREVENT II does not refer to the mutual respect and tolerance of people of different faiths and beliefs, but of the different faiths and beliefs themselves. Some have argued that there is a definitional problem with the word “toleration”: ... in recent years, toleration has shifted to become approbation and approbation has shifted to become celebration. Intolerance is now defined as refusing to celebrate something with which you disagree.

In May 2015, illustrating these problems, then-Home Secretary Theresa May struggled to define ‘extremism’ in a BBC interview. Indeed, May’s touted counter-extremism bill has been stymied by its failure to specify a legally robust definition of extremism.

The problematic of defining ‘extremism’ is not a purely semantic issue but also one that has affected patterns of engagement with British Muslim organizations. Like its New Labour predecessors, the Coalition became embroiled in debates over devising appropriate criteria to determine with whom it should engage, convening a high-level committee to adjudicate these issues, which in turn created divisions in the cabinet by defining many groups and individuals as “beyond the pale” on the basis of “nonevidence-based submissions.” Speaking out towards the end of the Coalition’s term in government, Baroness Warsi noted that ultimate outcome was,
…to view ever-increasing numbers of Muslim organisations or individual activists with suspicion and dangerously narrow engagement to a dozen people from a community of more than three million.\textsuperscript{554}

This indicates that the debate over the breadth of individuals and groups considered acceptable had been effectively won by the Gove-May faction that had long argued for a narrower tranche engagement.

MINAB soon fell afoul of the enhanced sensitivities of the Coalition government, forfeiting its public funding in 2014 when it refused to bow to government pressure to sever links with certain, unnamed, groups. Spokesman Mustafa Field noted that the organization had “very, very limited level of engagement [because government ministers] were not comfortable with some of our members… [with whom] they wanted us to cut ties.”\textsuperscript{555} Moreover, Field indicated his belief in a more ‘means-based’ approach:

\textit{If you have someone who’s sympathetic to terrorists, it’s important to engage with them, otherwise they go underground.}\textsuperscript{556}

While MINAB continued to see an important role for mosques as community hubs and as part and parcel of a means-based ‘firewall’ model, government was further retreating into a values-based ‘conveyor belt’ model.\textsuperscript{557}

The effective defunding of the Quilliam Foundation in 2011 also illustrates the Coalition’s skittishness with regard to the “guilt by association” narratives that have swirled around counter-extremism work in Britain. In the context of shrinking budgets across government, QF and its political supporters in parliament failed to secure a continuation of its funding in 2011. While the “kiss-of-death” optics of perpetuating Quilliam’s dependence on government funding were well noted in the Commons debate,

\textsuperscript{554} Warsi, Sayeeda. 2015. “Muslims Will Speak up for British Values Only When They Know They Will Be Heard.” \textit{The Guardian}, January 24.
\textsuperscript{557} Personal interview with Mustafa Field M.B.E. of MINAB on February 21, 2014.

In 2014, Cameron launched an inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood in an apparent attempt to reach a better understanding of the extent and nature of its activities in Britain. FCO officials opined that the investigation held the possibility of maligning an otherwise non-violent, relatively moderate, and pro-democracy organization. The appointment of the then ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir John Jenkins, to lead the inquiry raised eyebrows and was interpreted by some as indicative of a Saudi role given that the Saudis had classified the Brotherhood as a terror group only weeks previously. When Jenkins’ investigation effectively exculpated the Brotherhood, Cameron felt compelled to postpone the publication of the report over concerns that it might undermine relations with key regional allies.\footnote{Parker, George, and Political Editor. 2015. “David Cameron Pulls Muslim Brotherhood Report.” \textit{Financial Times}, March 16.} Effectively, the inquiry, whatever its findings, was a political no-win situation both from a domestic and international standpoint and the exercise further indicated confusion among the political elite over how to deal with Islamist groups. The resulting narrow tranche engagement has only been further entrenched in the context of the Conservative Party victory in the 2015 general election and the aftermath of the controversial Brexit referendum in June 2016 that indicated the depth of the resurgence of English nationalism, ended David Cameron’s premiership, and saw Theresa May become Prime Minister.
Conclusions

What is striking about comparing the Jewish and Muslim interlocutors of the British state is the fact that, during a history of more than 250 years, engagements between successive British governments and the BDBJ have maintained a consistently *quasi-corporatist* structure, with the Board having never been decertified by a government, and remaining an ‘insider by choice’ throughout. In a long history of internecine struggles in Anglo-Jewish communal politics across time, whether between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, Orthodox and Reform, or Zionist or anti-Zionist orientations, there is no perceptible history of any government intervention that was explicitly intended to favor one faction at the expense of another. In spite of its own representational deficits across time—that have not been considered problematic by successive British governments—the BDBJ has remained a constant force at the center of Anglo-Jewish communal politics in its interactions with the British establishment.

This stands in stark contrast with the apparent instability in relations with British Muslim civil society organizations. This is most starkly illustrated by the ‘honeymoon’ between New Labour and the MCB, followed by the rapid deterioration of the relationship starting in the early 2000s, its 10-month long decertification in 2009, and its sidelining with the electoral successes of Conservatives since 2010. This effectively moved the MCB from its position as an ‘insider by choice’ to a position of an ‘outsider by necessity.’ A more charitable interpretation describes a process of government learning vis-à-vis the representational deficits of the MCB—i.e. its geographic focus in London and its over-representation of Islamist legacy groups and its lack of representation of *Barelwis* and other sectarian groupings. However these facts were long known within government and the evidence presented here indicates that the ‘rebalancing’ was not only an attempt to broaden the spectrum of engagement but rather a
A deliberate strategy to disempower the MCB and empower its competitors. Moreover, it appears that this strategy was driven by vehement disagreements over the existence or not of a causal link between British foreign policy and domestic radicalization that reached a crescendo in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks on London.

A key macro-level driver of the inconsistent approach of successive British governments to engagements with British Muslim organizations relative to Anglo-Jewish organizations has been the enormous scale of the post-colonial immigration to Britain,
primarily from the Indian subcontinent, relative to the period of largest Jewish immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (see Figure 6). By virtue of its size, this postwar migration has presented significant collective action problems for British Muslims. While this immigration transformed Britain’s ethno-religious demography, the management of Muslim minorities in Britain under the race relations rubric of the multicultural model meant that successive British governments failed to pay sufficient attention to the need to accommodate the religious aspect of British Asian identity until it was problematized at the time of The Satanic Verses Affair.

Another confounding factor that has hindered the organic emergence of stable representative structures has been the relative sectarian and ethnic heterogeneity of the postwar transplanted populations relative to the more organic growth of a relatively less heterogenous Anglo-Jewish population over a much longer period of time. Further exacerbating this instability is the fact that there were no significant communal institutions in situ in Britain at the time of the postwar mass-immigration that forms the demographic foundation of present-day British Muslim communities. Moreover, British Asian kinship networks—exemplified by the Biraderi—were directly transplanted from the sub-continent, subject to the ‘myth of return,’ and thus British Muslim communal elites did not participate in any communal ‘socialization’ process under a British multicultural model where racial categories were the predominant organizing principle. British Muslim political networks have until quite recently been located at the political periphery, effectively co-opted by bloc voting agreements with local political parties (traditionally the Labour Party) rather than integrated into the parties themselves. It is these conditions that necessitated the ‘midwifing’ of a more corporatist model—roughly analogous to the Board of Deputies—as a means to bring British Muslims into the political center. While the MCB was not the perfect vehicle for this, it was undoubtedly the most broad-based and democratic option. However, the privileged status and virtual
monopoly it briefly enjoyed afforded it considerably more power than New Labour would have liked at the critical point when their respective agendas diverged, particularly over matters related to foreign policy during the War on Terror.

While relative Anglo-Jewish organizational unity has been unproblematic from the state’s perspective, brief moments of apparent British Muslim unity, on the other hand, have occurred primarily over transnational political issues, first coalescing to a certain extent with the internationalization of *The Satanic Verses* Affair but entering a new phase with relatively broad opposition to British participation in the Global War on Terror. Such demonstrations of unity have been met with withering criticism in the public sphere as well as summonses to meetings at Downing Street. In this sense, the relative instability in relations between the state and British Muslim organizations can be explained by a history of British Muslim transnational politics that is, with some exceptions, relatively poorly aligned with British foreign policy. This stands in stark contrast with an Anglo-Jewish transnational politics that has, more often than not, been relatively well aligned with British foreign policy imperatives since the time of the Balfour Declaration. While there have certainly been moments of relative alignment between British Muslim communities and the foreign policy establishment—for example, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo—other more recent conflicts, such as those in Palestine, Kashmir, and during the War on Terror, have exacerbated tensions between many (though not all) British Muslim organizations and the state. These developments have exerted important effects on the relative stability of relations between the British state and Muslim and Jewish organizations particularly in light of heightened suspicions of, and anxieties over, Muslim transnational identification and organization in the post-Cold War era.
The inconsistencies identified here in patterns of engagement between successive British governments and British Muslim organizations have caused confusion and have undoubtedly damaged trust in government and called the credibility of British government policy into question. In the aftermath of its ‘rebalancing,’ New Labour’s move away from the MCB and toward groups lacking in grassroots support among British Muslims, such as the Quilliam Foundation, caused widespread confusion and consternation.\textsuperscript{560} In the aftermath, the employment of civil service tactics such as developing policies behind the scenes and then presenting them as the outcome of supposedly transparent public consultations, whether through the PET process or the NMWAG, only served to further damage policy credibility.\textsuperscript{561} According to a former Co-Chair of the Conservative Party, the ongoing “policy of non-engagement” between Conservative governments with British Muslim organizations has been based on “non-evidence-based submissions.” Thus, instead of attempting to broaden the base of existing organizations or work in good faith to facilitate cooperation, successive British governments have come to view, “…ever-increasing numbers of Muslim organisations or individual activists with suspicion and dangerously narrow engagement to a dozen people from a community of more than three million.”\textsuperscript{562}


CHAPTER 4
FRANCE

The history of religions in France is a history of crises, and if we come to a policy that avoids such a crisis with Islam, a minority religion, It will be a very positive result—and new.

– Pierre Joxe

State-Church Institutions in France

Unlike in Britain, where patterns of state engagement with minority faith groups are shaped to some extent by Anglican establishment, the fiercely anti-clerical character of the French Revolution involved a full-frontal assault on the marriage between church and state leaving little room for the expression of religious interests in the public sphere.⁵⁶３ Post-revolutionary processes of state formation in France engendered significant hostility between anticlerical Republicans and the hierarchy of the dominant Catholic Church at different junctures, with the vestiges enduring to this day in French political culture.⁵⁶⁴ While Anglican dominance in Britain was contested and then progressively diluted, Catholic dominance in France experienced a radical frontal attack from the Jacobins, which only intensified during the Second and Third Republics. Indeed, for approximately 150 years that followed the Revolution, the pendulum swings of the so-called “conflict of two Frances” pitted republicans against monarchists, socialists against fascists, Parisians against rural peasantry, and Free Thinkers against Catholics.

---

In attempts to consolidate social control in the late nineteenth century, a series of notoriously factious governments of the Third Republic—united more than anything else by their enduring hostility to the Catholic Church—enacted various reforms that excluded the clergy from the administration of hospitals and charities (1879), secularized the education system (1882), \(^{565}\) and promoted the hegemony of the French language over regional languages—and prohibited the inclusion of political commentary—in catechisms and sermons (1891-2). \(^{566}\) These legislative initiatives culminated in the state’s unilateral imposition of the 1905 Law of Separation, which formally abrogated the Napoleonic Concordat of 1801 that had extended state recognition to the Catholic, Lutheran, reformed Protestant Churches—and later Judaism—in return for the right to police and regulate them. \(^{567}\) Undoubtedly the most enduring legacy of the Third Republic, the 1905 law involved a shift away from state recognition of specific denominations to the institutionalization of the non-recognition of any religious denomination and the formal separation of the religious and public spheres. \(^{568}\)

Theoretically, the French model claims to ignore any particular religious and/or cultural identity of the individual citizen and religious concerns are only entertained in political debate if they are supported on rational grounds. While these kinds of considerations prompt Peña-Ruiz (2016) to laud the French model as an ideal

---


\(^{567}\) The Concordat remains in effect only in the provinces of Alsace-Moselle region, which was under German jurisdiction in 1905. For more about the manner of unilateral imposition of the 1905 law and its displacement of the Napoleonic Concordat, see Roberts, William. 1999. “Napoleon, the Concordat of 1801, and Its Consequences.” In *Controversial Concordats: The Vatican’s Relations with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler*, edited by Frank J. Coppa. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press.

manifestation of liberal neutrality, others such as sociologist Jean Baubérot argue that the conservatism of French secularism has in fact made laïcité “a right-wing value.” Indeed, in Jonathan Fox’s *A World Survey of Religion and the State* (2008), France is the only Western democracy coded as “hostile to religion.” In practice, however, French political elites, most notably Nicolas Sarkozy, have at times ambiguously floated the idea of applying *discrimination positive* (i.e., ‘affirmative action’) to ethnic minorities, a consideration that raised the ire of more hardline liberal neutralists.

While the interventions into the religious sphere undertaken by the British state fall more under the rubric of *treasure and organization* in the formulation of Madeley (2007), the preponderance of French interventions in the religious sphere involve the exercise of secular powers of command over the church. These authoritative interventions most clearly manifest themselves in legislative restrictions on formal organizations, proselytizing, public dress, and sects. However, it is important to note that the idea of a “strict separation” of church and state in France is counter-indicated by the legacy of the historical relationship between the Catholic Church and the state and regional and geographic exceptions; the status of various Catholic feasts as public holidays; the fact that the state owns and maintains certain religious buildings, including

---

574 The church-state legal framework in Alsace-Moselle is still based on the Napoleonic Concordat of 1801 and the Organic Laws of 1802–1808 primarily because the region was part of Germany between 1871 and 1919 during which time the major secularization laws were enacted. Likewise, six overseas French administered territories are subject to a variety of indigenous church-state arrangements.
clerical residences, that predate the 1905 law as a matter of preserving France’s cultural (i.e. predominantly Catholic) heritage; the fact that local governments can build and support religious edifices; the provision of state subsidies to private schools (of which about 95 percent are Catholic); the provision of state funding to religious charities; and state funding for chaplains to serve in public schools, hospitals, prisons, and the military. It is widely accepted that these exceptions are the result, at least in part, of the enduring central role of the Catholic Church in France up through 1905. Indeed, the state’s relationship with Lutheranism, Reformism and Judaism since the time of the Napoleonic Concordat, as well as Islam since the founding of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM) in 2003, involves replicating the kind of vertical and top-down national-level structures that mimic how state has historically structured its relationship with the Catholic Church.

Aside from its predominant role as a governing authority, however, the state is also involved in delimiting the boundaries of the organization of the religious sphere in France. These boundaries have traditionally been managed by a Department of Organized

Religions (Bureau des Cultes),\(^{581}\) which administers religious organizations and monitors the use and maintenance of the state’s religious assets. Under the aegis of the Interior Ministry, the Bureau des Cultes registers religious organizations and congregations, which involves the extension of certain benefits and legal privileges such as the ability to accept donations as well as tax exemption.\(^{582}\) However, having been established by the 1905 Law in order to normalize relations with the Catholic Church, the Bureau des Cultes has been challenged by religious pluralization especially the increasing visibility of Islam in France.\(^{583}\)

The creation in 1998 of the Mission Interministérielle de Lutte contre les Sects (Inter-ministerial mission to combat sects—MILS) and the 2005 founding of a successor organization, Mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre les dérives sectaires (Inter-ministerial mission to monitor and combat sectarian deviances—MIVILUDES), constitutes a further state-centered attempt to delimit the acceptable boundaries of religious practice in France. Tasked with, “… analyzing the phenomenon of cultic movements whose activities impinge upon human rights and fundamental liberties or threaten public order or contravene existing laws and regulations,” MIVILUDES has targeted faith groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the United Sikhs, the Church of Scientology, and Raelians under the authority of the ‘public order’

\(^{581}\) I translate Bureau des Cultes as ‘Department of Organized Religions’ as opposed to ‘Department of Religions’ to highlight the distinction between the constitutionally protected culte (organized religion) that falls under its remit and faith groups that do not enjoy such protections.


clause in the 1905 Law. In this capacity, MIVILUDES has been explicitly criticized by U.S. government agencies that monitor international religious freedom issues and has been characterized as posing, “… a serious threat to religious freedom and human rights in France.”

This divergence between French and Anglo-American views of ‘religious freedom’ is in part attributable to differing conceptions of “freedom of religion.” While Article 18 of the 1945 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) embrace freedom of “thought, conscience and religion,” laïcism has tended to emphasize “freedom of conscience” over “freedom of religion.” As Decherf (2001) notes,

The French have, since the end of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, known only one large majoritarian religion. Either one was within the Catholic Church, or one was a free-thinker outside of it. In the tradition of French laïcité that emerged from this context, freedom of conscience is still understood by the French as a freedom from the moral authority of a single dominant religion.

This tendency to place a greater emphasis on “freedom of conscience” as opposed to “freedom of religion” has also manifested itself in the state’s policies toward religious minorities as has become increasingly evident since the first Affaire du Foulard in 1989 (hereafter ‘first Affaire’). As we shall see, the growing public presence of Islam in France—a direct consequence of French colonial adventurism—has complicated France’s church-state model. This hybrid model not only involves institutional arrangements and

legal prescriptions but also a set of norms about the proper role and place of religion that have become entrenched in French civic culture—norms that are open to multiple interpretations and yet undoubtedly imbued with the legacy of France’s Catholic heritage.

An analysis of Roper polling data by Fetzer & Soper (2003) supports the idea of a ‘solidarity of the religious’ thesis in France with support for accommodating the religious practices of Muslims best predicted by active religious practice and exposure to a liberal arts style education. As in Britain, albeit more timidly, the Catholic hierarchy has shown some signs of support for accommodating French Muslims in the context of arguing for a more open laïcité wherein the majority church could also find its “just place.” During the 1989 affaire du foulard, when four Muslim schoolgirls were expelled from a high school in the Paris suburb of Creil for refusing to remove their headscarves, Catholic leaders who were concerned that the affair might contribute to a more restrictive laïcité made it clear that they disagreed with the expulsion of the girls. However, unlike Britain, the true center of gravity of debate in France revolves around advocates of an ‘open’ ‘passive’ or ‘soft’ laïcité and ‘closed’ ‘active’ or ‘hard’ laïcité with Catholic and other major religious organizations supporting the former by embracing “secularism as church-state separation and religious freedom, rather than secularism as an antireligious ideology and state fetishism.”

---

587 Interestingly, Fetzer and Soper (2003) also find that, “French devotees of laïcité were no more likely to oppose the wearing of the hijab than were those who rejected French separatism.” This appears to indicate that laïcité shapes the worldview of French elites much more so than that of ordinary citizens.
Jewish organizational representation in France (1789—present)

With the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 B.C. and the destruction of Jerusalem under Hadrian more than 50 years later, some Jews who were forced into exile, or departed of their own will, settled in Gaul.\(^{590}\) The position of Jews in this region was undoubtedly precarious throughout antiquity and, by the time Charles VI issued an edict of expulsion in 1394, only perhaps a few hundred Jews were affected.\(^{591}\) However, at the turn of the 17th century, Jews began again to settle in France. When Louis XIV annexed Alsace and Lorraine in 1648, its significant Jewish population came under his rule. In 1675, he granted them legal protection but this did not stop their persecution.

Over the course of the 18th century, the situation for Jews in France improved as a more tolerant attitude started to prevail. By the 1780s, there were an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 Jews living in France, mainly in Bordeaux, Metz, Bayonne, and Nancy. In 1788, minister of the *Maison du Roi*, Malesherbes was charged by the king to study the situation of the Jews and received separate responses from the Sephardim in the southwest and the Ashkenazim in the east, with the Sephardim notably requesting that they be that they not be included in any law applying to all the Jews of France.\(^{592}\) The ‘Jewish question’ was raised by Count Mirabeau who had become acquainted with Moses Mendelssohn and the *Haskalah* school in Prussia. In a pamphlet published in 1787, Mirabeau advocated for granting full citizenship rights and civic equality to French Jews.\(^{593}\) Mirabeau’s controversial pamphlet provoked a series of responses and interest in

---


the status of Jews in France was thus on the mind of the French public on the eve of the revolution—albeit out of proportion to their small numbers.

While the French Revolution in 1789 was not an entirely clean break from the ancien régime, it nonetheless constitutes a valid breakpoint for an analysis of Jewish organizational representation in France. Jaher (2002) notes two characteristics of the Jewish response to the Estates General that reflected long-term trends in French Jewry. First, while the more accepted Portuguese and Avignonese Jews of Bordeaux and Saint-Esprit-lès-Bayonne participated in elections to the primary and provincial assemblies, their Ashkenazim coreligionists in Alsace and Lorraine were excluded. Second, until after the First Empire, and as in Britain, most Jews were unimpressed by the prospect of political emancipation, being more concerned with equality in taxes and trade, free movement, the free exercise of religion, the preservation of communal autonomy, and, above all, to be left alone.

With the decree of September 27, 1791, the National Assembly emancipated the Jews of France by, at least theoretically, providing them with the right of active citizenship. While the Catholic Church was the primary target of the Jacobin assault on religious groups, France’s Jewish communities did not escape unscathed and continued to suffer popular hostility through the revolutionary period. In particular, visible Jewish markers of identity were seen to signify religious fanaticism, viewed as contrary to the

---

ideal of a civically uniform loyal citizen, and thus indicative of a lack of support for the Revolution. Yet, as Hyman (1998) notes,

_The Revolution presented, first to the wealthy elite of the Jewish population, a new vision of what was socially and culturally possible. Through the power of the state and the Jewish institutions that would succeed the disbanded autonomous communities, that vision would be translated into methods of socialization designed to produce patriotic French Jewish citizens, fully at home in French culture and loyal to a Judaism consonant with French citizenship._

Thus, both Graetz (1996) and Hyman (1998) argue that the Revolution—and the Napoleonic institutional architecture that was to follow—consolidated and centralized the existing but relatively autonomous Jewish elites. In 1806, Napoleon convened the immodestly named Grand Sanhedrin, an institutional mechanism by which he sought “to endorse and legitimize his policies for integration and assimilation of France’s Jews as full citizens of the regime.” Composed of more than 70 Rabbis and Jewish notables, in a series of decisions over a five-week period, the Grand Sanhedrin asserted the basic compatibility of Judaism with French citizenship, including an affirmation of the supremacy of civil law over religious law and the separation of national and religious identities. Emerging from the Grand Sanhedrin, Napoleon convened the Central Consistory (_Consistoire Israélite_) in 1808 as a hierarchical and centralized framework to

---

600 The Grand Sanhedrin was a committee of Jewish rabbis and leaders that was named after the ancient Israelite governing body the Sanhedrin, which was the High Court at the ancient Temple in Jerusalem. Cohen, Erik H. 2011. _The Jews of France Today: Identity and Values_. Jewish Identities in a Changing World 18. Leiden: Brill.
oversee the ‘integration’ of Franco-Jewry as well as community ‘regeneration.’

This institutional structure aimed to erase divisions between the four relatively distinct and autonomous Jewish communities in France—the more Orthodox Ashkenazim in Alsace-Lorraine and other parts of the east, the more assimilationist Sephardim in Bayonne and Bordeaux, the historical Jewish community of Avignon, and a heterogeneous Paris community—and thereby unite, Gallicize, and integrate French Jewry under the centralized state.

Much like the Board of Deputies across the Channel, the Consistorial project also evolved into an active agent for the transmission of French values and standards to new Jewish immigrants. Following the institutional template of the Protestant consistorial system that was established in 1802, the Consistory system likewise imposed a central hierarchical structure over Jewish communities, which was designed to monitor and enforce their integration and ‘regeneration’ under the supervision of the Central Consistory located in Paris.

On 17 March 1808 Napoleon issued three decrees: the first two established the consistory system, which was designed to enforce the decisions of the Sanhedrin through education and surveillance. The ultimate aim was to exert control over Judaism in

---

602 The idea of the ‘regeneration’ of Jewish communities in France rested on the assumption that the communities necessitated a dramatic improvement in socio-economic and cultural mores before Jews could become productive members of the larger society. As Berkowitz notes, “Jews were continually reminded that regeneration was a sacred obligation upon which the bestowal of civic equality had been conditioned, and members of the Jewish communal establishment quickly internalized this view.” See Berkovitz, Jay R. 2004. Rites and Passages the Beginnings of Modern Jewish Culture in France, 1650-1860. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 101-107


France and thus obtain legitimacy as well as the obedience of Jewish populations. These decrees required the formation of a synagogue and consistory in every département with a Jewish population of two thousand or more with the Central Consistory in Paris acting as the central administrative hub. Originally, the departmental consistories comprised a grand rabbi, one additional rabbi, and three lay members with members being elected by twenty-five affluent and respected community elites selected by the government. The Central Consistory, on the other hand, originally comprised three grand rabbis and two lay members. However, the proportion of rabbis to laymen was legislatively altered during the first half of the nineteenth century in favor of the latter. This Napeoleonic effort to bureaucratize and centralize the administration of France’s Jewish communities had enduring significance with the ideology and agenda of—as well as the programs pursued by—the consistory system shaped by the increasing predominance of wealthy lay members. As Benbassa (1999) notes,

*The aim was to entrust the conduct of affairs to reputable liberal figures who would have preeminence over the ministers of the faith. The grand rabbi of the central consistory would later occupy a privileged place of authority that made him in some sense the equivalent in the Jewish faith of a Catholic archbishop. Those who held the office were on the whole considered progressive.*

Thus, unlike the Board of Deputies in Britain, which despite its statutory recognition has historically functioned as more of a lobby group, the Consistory system was decidedly more corporatist in character eventually becoming a virtual arm of the state authorized to represent Jewish concerns to the government. For its part, the state entrusted the

---

administration of communal affairs to notable liberal figures and the institution was re-designed to ensure the preeminence of lay members preeminence over the ministers of the faith. 609

The functions of the consistories included the administration of Jewish community affairs, responsibility for ‘regeneration’ through philanthropic endeavors to improve education and specialized vocational training, and monitoring to ensure communal compliance with the decisions of the Sanhedrin. 610 To achieve this, the consistorial leadership incorporated the Sanhedrin decisions into the curricula of Jewish schools. 611 Indeed, as Jewish reformers were disdainful of traditional education with its emphasis on Hebrew and Talmudic instruction, the Jewish school—in the hands of the consistories—became the focal point of ‘regeneration’ and socialization of the poor. 612

In practical terms, the Consistory system provided a formal mechanism by which Jewish religious observance and practices could be addressed in a space set apart from the secular ‘public sphere.’ Indeed, under the law of 1808, virtually all Jewish religious activities were deemed illegal without the express permission of the consistory and the consistory did not hesitate to exercise its authority in this regard. 613 These conflicts have included organizing religious instruction in public schools or in Jewish schools recognized by state authorities; 614 harmonizing Jewish and French laws with regard to

marriage; the licensing of kosher slaughterhouses; the granting permits for synagogue construction; and the standardization of burial procedures and construction of Jewish cemeteries.

In her seminal history of the Consistory throughout the nineteenth century, Albert (1977) identifies two phases in the institution’s pursuit of integration. In the first phase, from 1816 through the early 1830s, the consistory sought the equality of governmental treatment for Judaism that Napoleon had promised but had never delivered. After 1831, when the July Monarchy granted state subsidization for the salaries of Jewish clergy thereby formally recognizing Judaism as an official religion, the consistories shifted their efforts to consolidating and expanding authority over religious matters with a view to making Jewish practices conform to French (i.e. Catholic) standards. This involved systematic attempts to harmonize liturgies and educational curricula, standardize religious practices such as weddings and circumcisions, and to define more clearly the roles of rabbis and other personnel.

However, the agenda followed by the consistories was effectively set by the potential provided by their statutory recognition rather than the needs of the community. Thus, after 1831, the wealthy liberal and reform-minded Jewish elites that dominated the consistories pursued a practical agenda aimed at making up the shortfalls incurred by its loss of tax-levying powers as well as ‘regeneration.’ For the most part, this involved

---

pursuing the institutionalization of a ‘lowest-common-denominator’ theology that would be most acceptable to the largest number of French Jews. With the imposition of strict controls over rabbinical education and employment, rabbis were increasingly sidelined with legislation in 1819, 1823, 1844, and 1850 increasing the relative representation of lay people at the expense of rabbinical authorities. Concurrently, the functional role and authority of rabbis in the consistory system was itself effectively secularized over time in that the rabbi’s role shifted from a traditional-charismatic role of a theological scholar and judge to a bureaucratic-rational role of a civil servant with expertise in the legal administration of consistories.

Resistance to the agenda of the consistorial elite came from four main groups. The most active resistance came from Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews who were generally poor and under-represented on the consistories even in départements where they were concentrated because of a system of tax qualification. While the consistories saw the Ashkenazi community and charitable associations as competitors and their prayer meetings were seen as undermining the maintenance of larger community synagogues, many of the Ashkenazi did not desire to be ‘regenerated’ nor were they keen to pay for community activities of which they did not approve. Yet, the Ashkenazi of Alsace often forced the adoption of more moderate policies. Consistorial maintenance of large buildings as temples also caused difficulties for any movements, such as Reform Judaism, that were seen to encourage separate prayer meetings. Opposition to the consistorial elite also came from some political liberals who, while themselves seldom religious, vigorously defended

---

the right of others to practice as they saw fit and were thus ideologically opposed to the consistorial impetus to homogenize Judaism and make it conform to the aesthetic standards of contemporary French Catholicism. Yet, there was a significant number of Jews who simply remained disinterested in religion and/or any organized community activities and, to a certain extent, their indifference fueled the arguments of Reformers.\textsuperscript{624}

The more egalitarian political environment after 1848 resulted in a debate between Orthodox and Reform factions over the advisability of instituting universal suffrage in the consistorial system with more Orthodox factions supporting expanding suffrage and Reform-oriented factions largely opposing it.\textsuperscript{625} When instituted, however, universal suffrage did not greatly alter the religious balance in the consistories. While it encouraged some Orthodox to enter the system, liberals remained dominant especially in the Central Consistory.\textsuperscript{626} However, intra-communal struggles over authority and reform, political instability, heightened anti-clericalism, and uncertainty over the future of the consistorial system in the context of a renewed church-state debate undermined the ability of the Central Consistory to function effectively throughout the Second Republic.\textsuperscript{627} This was most evident in the Central Consistory’s stasis in response to anti-Jewish rioting in Alsace in the aftermath of the 1848 Revolution.

With the support of the Catholic Church, Louis-Napoléon staged his \textit{coup d’état} in 1851, after which the Church reaped significant rewards in terms of increased financial support as well as swelling membership. Louis-Napoléon’s renewed attention on religion

afforded the Consistory an increase in its budget as well as the creation of a new Consistory in Lyon in 1857. In some senses, the Consistory flourished during this period with its ranks swelled by meritorious community notables. The construction of ‘showpiece’ temples and myriad philanthropic endeavors enriched Jewish communal life and both came to be considered as symbolic of the ‘success’ of Jewish emancipation. However, these developments came at the expense of traditional learning and serious dissent between reformers and conservatives continued to simmer just below the surface. Some of these tensions erupted during the Central Consistory’s efforts to standardize liturgies after the 1850s but were largely manifested as a resistance to a government supported agenda of centralization, deculturalization, and the perception of a ‘power grab’ by the consistory rather than along purely theological lines.

Indeed, most of the anxieties of the communal leadership revolved around increasing laxity, declining observance, and general indifference toward religious practice. With ongoing resistance to reforms aimed at reinvigorating religious life—such as the introduction of the organ into the temple, the revision of prayers, and attempts to merge Sephardic and Ashkenazic liturgies into one rite—reformers sought to increase their domination of the consistories as a mechanism to force through reforms. In 1852, the Central Consistory proposed a slate of reforms to the Bureau des Cultes aimed at centralizing power in the Paris Consistory as well as strengthening the position of progressive and reformist forces within the local consistories by exerting control over the

---

École Rabbinique in Metz as a means to consolidate communal control. Not surprisingly, these proposals were met with strong objections, especially from the Ashkenazim in Alsace. However, in 1862, a government decree mandated many of the outstanding reform proposals and also rescinded universal suffrage by disenfranchising Jewish societies and associations that did not contribute an annual sum to the communal treasury.

While conservative and reformist factions continued to debate religious reform in France, there were indications of the emergence of a new movement of more secular Jews who sought a different kind of activist connection to their religious identity. Founded in Paris in 1860, the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) embraced a Jewish diasporic identity and fused it with the universalist French imperative of a *mission civilatrice*. The AIU was met with considerable resistance from the Central Consistory that saw it as an attack on its prestige. Many of the tensions revolved around tactics with the consistory leadership objecting to what they perceived as an organization of intellectual interlopers impinging on their territory by engaging in imprudent open political action on “Jewish questions.” The AIU, for its part, saw the consistory as having been overly cautious at times of crisis such as during the Mortara Affair (See Chapter 3) as well as after rioting in Alsace that followed the 1848 revolution. However, these tensions were also borne of competing mentalities with an image-conscious and assimilationist consistorial elite preoccupied with its administrative and bureaucratic

---


roles and avoidant of public debate at the core as opposed to a more intellectually and politically confrontational AIU on the periphery.\textsuperscript{635}

Distinguishing itself from the consistorial field of action, which was bounded by the \textit{métropole}, the AIU had an explicitly transnational agenda. It was active in defending the rights of Jewish diaspora in foreign lands but its primary focus was in the realm of education and it established scores of elementary and secondary schools for Jewish boys and girls throughout the Middle East and North Africa through the late 19th and early 20th century.\textsuperscript{636} While instruction typically included Jewish history, religion, and Hebrew, the AIU schools adopted a decidedly French universalist ethos and were highly critical of the particularism of the traditional \textit{Talmudei Torah} schools.\textsuperscript{637} In this sense, the AIU explicitly shared the consistory’s central program of ‘regeneration.’\textsuperscript{638} Just as the Central Consistory and the AIU were becoming habituated to each others’ presence, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 marked a significant decline in the population of French Jewry with the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. Yet many of the Jews of Alsace-Lorraine opted for French citizenship and migrated to the interior in greater numbers than their Catholic and Protestant neighbors, a fact that was promoted by communal leaders as indicative of strength of their national loyalty.\textsuperscript{639}

When the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881—and the pogroms and the political instability across Central and Eastern Europe that followed—triggered large

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\end{thebibliography}
waves of emigration, French Jewish elites acted in an almost identical manner to their British counterparts in seeking to re-direct these immigration flows to other countries. As in Britain, the concerns of Jewish elites revolved around how the poverty-stricken Yiddish-speaking refugees with their strong attachment to Jewish traditions might reflect upon the community. Ultimately, of the approximately 3.5 million Jews who fled Central and Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1925, around 100,000 settled in France. Benbassa (1995) notes that,

> French Jews adopted a paternalistic attitude, hoping to make the new arrivals share their devotion to the culture and civilization of their new homeland—to make of them French men and women of the Jewish faith. The schools of the consistory and the lay school system of the republic succeeded in realizing this aim.

While communal institutions continued to have some relevance in the renewed program of ‘regeneration,’ the newcomers often opted to create their own organizations and enjoyed considerable social mobility. Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, Birnbaum (1996) demonstrates that a substantial number of Jews had carved out careers in public service to the Third Republic at the highest levels. However, this combination of far-reaching levels of social mobility along with the socio-economic and political instability of the Third Republic came together to fuel a virulent form of modern political anti-Semitism.

Much ink has been spilled on the history and political ramifications of the Dreyfus Affair and the contending views of the historiography of the affair do not need to

---

be rehashed here. Suffice to say that, for the decade after 1897, the political turmoil that accompanied the unfounded accusations of treason against the Alsatian Jewish colonel, Albert Dreyfus, had profound effects on French coalitional politics and culminated in a firm rejection of ethnic nationalism and clericalism. It is also widely accepted that the surge in anticlericalism that followed Dreyfus’ exoneration helped to bring the conflict between the state and the Catholic Church—and the ‘conflict of the two Frances’ more generally—to a rolling boil that led to the 1905 Law of Separation. Interestingly, a number of historians have criticized the passive response of French Jewish leaders during the affair, although more charitable analyses acknowledge the assessment of the communal leadership that expressions of overt ‘Jewish solidarity’ would likely only further fan the flames of anti-Semitism. While the minutes of the Central Consistory do not contain formal discussion of any aspect of the Dreyfus case, this is likely a case of prudence in minute taking indicative of the Central Consistory’s long-standing aversion to participating in public debate. Neither did the AIU intervene, presumably because it considered the Dreyfus case as one involving an injustice against an individual rather than an injustice against a Jewish individual.

The enactment of the Law of Separation in 1905 involved the withdrawal of political and financial support from the state and the effective termination of the consistorial monopoly over Jewish communal affairs. In response, the consistories

formed religious associations under the law that retained responsibility for Jewish affairs at the local level. These associations subsequently joined to form the Union des Associations Cultuelles Israélites de France et d’Algérie. In spite of their legal reorganization, the associations retained the term ‘Consistory’ to refer to the administrative council of each religious association and the Union des Associations Cultuelles Israélites de France et d’Algérie was now regarded as the Central Consistory.\footnote{Upon being returned to France after the Great War, Jewish affairs in Alsace-Lorraine continued to be administered by the départemental consistories that continued to cover rabbi’s salaries. See Benbassa, Esther. 1999. The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 94.} At the same time, the authority that the Napoleonic consistory system had played in delimiting religious pluralism was also diminished and competing tendencies, such as the Union Libérale Israélite de Tendance Réformée, were subsequently afforded legal recognition under the 1905 law.\footnote{Benbassa, Esther. 1999. The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 95.} Moreover, Jewish immigrants to France in the late 19th century largely resisted the established authority of the consistories much in the same fashion that Jewish immigrants to Britain at the same juncture resisted the authority of the Board of Deputies. With the shattering of the consistorial monopoly, these newly settled Jewish communities found themselves in a position to choose their rabbis without obtaining consistorial approval.\footnote{Benbassa, Esther. 1999. The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 95.} However, in spite of secularization, financial difficulties, and its loss of power, the central consistory continued to represent French Judaism to the state.\footnote{Benbassa, Esther. 1999. The Jews of France: A History from Antiquity to the Present. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 95.}

At the turn of the twentieth century, before the enactment of the 1905 Law, a number of events had converged to undermine the consistory system and render it anachronistic. The rise of a virulent racialized anti-Semitism in France during the
Dreyfus affair challenged the argument that Jews could simply be regarded as ‘Frenchmen of the Jewish faith’ and forced French Jews to defend their status.653 Concurrently, large-scale immigration from East Europe, along with the birth of the Zionist movement, confronted native Jews with a more visibly assertive brand of ‘Jewishness’ defined in more ethno-cultural terms.654 While the majority of French Jews did not align themselves with political Zionism, it started to gain currency in the early twentieth century especially among new immigrants.655 While Dreyfus’ public degradation in January 1895 made a powerful impression on Theodor Herzl, the future founder of Zionism, it would be a mistake to draw a monocausal link between renewed anti-Semitism in France and the rise of Zionism.656 The fact that pre-existing integrationist models of French Jewish identity were in considerable flux and that French Jews were open to exploring new avenues of expressing Jewish identity created some political opportunities for the Zionist movement but it wasn’t until the Holocaust that Zionism really took hold among French Jews.657

Not surprisingly, both the AIU and the Central Consistory publicly expressed their anti-Zionist stance in the interwar period. The AIU’s position was that Zionism was in direct opposition to the French-Jewish model of emancipation that it was busy exporting across the Middle East and North Africa.658 While its public posture was neutral, the Central Consistory drew up proposals at Versailles in 1919 to issue a

“declaration of war against Zionism.” The statement was never disseminated because the Quai d’Orsay opposed its publication. However, this did not stop leading rabbis from delivering sermons that were explicitly hostile to the Zionist project.

The so-called ‘Cambon Declaration’ of June 11, 1917, in which the secretary-general of the French Foreign Ministry provided government backing for the Zionist project, precipitated the much more historically significant Balfour Declaration that was issued in November of that same year. However, as Benbassa (2004) notes, the Cambon Declaration, unlike its British analogue, sank into oblivion primarily because the French government understood that neither the Jewish community nor its institutions were seriously buying into Zionism at that juncture and the Quai d’Orsay rapidly returned to its default anti-Zionist position. Illustrating the predominant attitude of Franco-Jewish elites, Sylvain Lévi, representing French Jewry before the Paris Peace Conference, declared that,

It seems to me shocking to both reason and feeling that scarcely have we gotten past the stage of waiting to obtain equality of rights, we should now demand privileges and exceptional circumstances for the Jews of Palestine. Every exception always ends up backfiring on the person who asks for it and who benefits from it.

While attachment to Britain was also predominant in Anglo-Jewish communities at this juncture, elements at the highest level of the Foreign Office were under the erroneous

---

impression that Zionism was ascendant in Britain, which along with the more salient utility of Jewish settlements in Palestine to the British colonial project, goes a long way toward explaining why the Balfour Declaration attained such historical significance vis-à-vis the Cambon Declaration.

Interest in Zionism began to increase among French Jews in the 1930s as the refugee crisis in Central and Eastern Europe led to renewed immigration and intensified significantly following the mass arrests, deportations, and genocide of the Second World War.665 When the French government fled Paris in June 1940, the Central Consistory retreated to Lyons and the principal Jewish social organizations regrouped in Marseilles.666 The birth of the Vichy regime shattered the Republican consensus and engendered profound shock among French Jews, who had considered their state an inclusionary republican one.667 A self-declared ‘Catholic’ state, the Vichy regime promised to eliminate Jews and other rivals to its authoritarian Catholicism.668 The response of French Jews to the persecution that ensued ranged from indecisiveness, legalism, and defensive co-operation to underground disruption and active resistance.669 Under the Vichy regime, these responses closely mapped the pre-existing divisions between French-born, mainly ‘legalist’ and religiously oriented Jews within the officially

tolerated Central Consistory, and the immigrant Jews of Eastern Europe who were more
diverse and tended to gravitate toward Zionist, Bundist, and communist groups.670

In 1941, the Vichy regime dissolved all existing Jewish associations, save the
Consistory, and their assets were brought under the administration of the Union Générale
des Israélites de France (UGIF), to which all French and foreign Jews were required to
belong.671 The UGIF was intended to represent the Jews before the public authorities and
took slightly different organizational forms in the northern and southern zones. A highly
contentious organization, the UGIF continues to inflame passions today. At the time of its
formation, it was strenuously denounced by the Communists, who accused it of
collaborating with the enemy as well as by immigrant Jews, who regarded it as a structure
designed to exclusively defend the wartime interests of French Jews.672 While
acknowledging that a lack of vigilance on the part of the UGIF exacerbated the plight of
Jewish populations in wartime France, Benbassa (1999) argues that the leaders of the
UGIF made considerable sacrifices in maneuvering between the Nazi and Vichy
administrations in attempting to save whomever they could while attempting to shield
Jewish associations, whether they were members or not.673

Immigrants formed the core of the Jewish Resistance to the Vichy regime and
occupation and they were largely driven by a belief in “Jewish unity, open to an alliance
with the French left.”674 In spite of the relatively fractious political currents within the
Jewish resistance throughout the war, there was a growing consensus over the right of the

Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Princeton University Press, 176.
Princeton University Press, 176.
Princeton University Press, 176.
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 6.
Jewish people to a national homeland and this was effectively inscribed as an objective of the Jewish resistance in the summer of 1943 under the aegis of the Comité Général de Défense Juive (CGD—General Committee for Jewish Defense), which brought Zionists, Communists, and Bundists under a single umbrella, overcoming intra-communal tensions that had flared between Jewish institutions and communist co-religionists following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. As the persecution of French Jewry intensified, this growing unity manifested itself organizationally in the clandestine formation in 1944 of the Conseil Réprésentatif des Israélites de France (CRIF), which brought the CGD and the Consistory, immigrants and native Jews, under one umbrella. The CRIF considered itself “solely qualified to be the spokesman of Judaism in France before the authorities and public opinion as well as before the Jewish organizations of other countries and before international authorities.”

The CRIF’s aspiration to speak for all of French Jewry before public authorities represented a tectonic shift in the historical nature of French Jewish identification, in terms of both organization and political voice. For its part, the Consistory, one of the strongest critics of eastern European Jewish immigrants during the interwar years, began to emphasize the importance of diversity and the sense that the war had united all Jews in


a common fate. Yet, there were still considerable divisions among immigrant groups and vigorous debate over issues such as the restitution of Jewish property, the Nuremberg trials, the rearmament of West Germany, and how to formulate CRIF’s relationship with Israel.

In short, the emergence of CRIF did not lead to immediately visible or effective political action nor did it lead to immediate state recognition as a regular interlocutor on all political issues related to French Jews. It took the best part of a decade for the CRIF to emerge from relative obscurity overcome its crippling internal debates and begin to develop links with its imagined constituency. However, by 1954, the CRIF was effectively acting as the representative of French Jews before the French state, in seeking aid for refugees, reparations from West Germany, and help in combating resurgent anti-Semitism. While the Consistory attempted to retain control of the CRIF in the immediate postwar period, the new organization was adopting an overtly political mode of representation, staking out a more assertive and public ‘Jewishness,’ and injecting itself into public debate in a manner in which the Consistory had carefully avoided.

---


Not only had the Holocaust paved the way for a growing degree of communal unity—marked by a concomitant transition in identification from the ‘Jewish Frenchman’ (Français israélite) to the French Jew (Juif français)—but the Vichy experience had persuaded postwar French authorities of the necessity for Jews to organize politically on the basis of their ‘Jewishness.’ While this would appear to run directly contrary to the anti-communautarisme of the Republic—as well as the fact that the CRIF’s claim to speak on behalf of French Jews was not backed by any democratic mandate—there was no political appetite in post-Holocaust France for contesting the legitimacy of the CRIF. Accordingly, the founding of CRIF marked a shift in French Jewry’s mode of representation from one that was reconcilable with liberal neutrality and French assimilationism toward active participation in French political life, a position the CRIF continues to occupy to this day. However, in its pursuit of an ‘insider’ strategy, Azria (2014) notes that the CRIF and the state have mutually reified the idea of a unified Jewish community and marginalize dissenting voices in a way that is anti-democratic.

With the emergence of the CRIF, the representation of French Jewry gained a political voice in the public sphere, a voice not ordinarily extended to ethno-religious groups in the Republic. For its part, the Central Consistory—with the Chief Rabbi a member by right—continued to fulfill its role as the state’s primary interlocutor over

---

matters involving the exercise of worship and the modalities of Jewish religious life in France. Yet, the experience of Vichy shattered the historical reliance of French Jewish communal organizations on the state and resulted in a pluralization in the representation of French Jewry. This involved an acknowledgement of entrenched exclusivist attitudes among the historical Jewish population who feared that unassimilated groups might undo certain historically acquired benefits. This change in the Consistorial attitude paved the way for greater institutional decentralization of the Consistory as part of a bargain to promote greater communal unity, which in turn improved the conditions for accommodating influxes of immigrant Jews arising from fears for the future given growing political instability across the Maghreb as France started to decolonize in the mid-1950s. From 1950 to 1959, approximately 75,000 Jews from the Maghreb settled in France constituting a majority of the approximately 108,000 total Jewish immigrants during this period.

Mandel (2015) identifies two factors underpinning this transformation in communal leadership: the postwar “Americanization” of French Jewry, which led to increased professionalization, coordination, and centralized fund-raising that was underwritten by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) as well as the dramatic reinvigoration of Jewish spirituality in France in the wake of the arrival of substantial numbers of post-colonial North African immigrants. While relations between new immigrant Jews and those already settled in France had never been never

---

smooth, these new arrivals benefitted from highly developed communal structures geared to facilitating their integration and a leadership determined to defend Jewish interests, particularly when lives were endangered.  

The perception of an existential threat to Israel posed by the Six Day War in 1967 invoked memories of the Holocaust and further strengthened communal solidarity with Israel at a time when the ‘tacit alliance’ between France and Israel that peaked during the Suez Crisis in 1956 came to an abrupt end. President de Gaulle’s desire to align France more closely with the Soviet Union and the Arab world and away from the United States—and, by extension, Israel—was well known and the rapid decline in governmental support for Israel shook French Jewry. Concurrently, French Jewry was beginning to fully understand the cruel uniqueness of its Holocaust experience. The revision of the historiography of Vichy in the 1970s and 1980s—in conjunction with the contemporaneous threat to the State of Israel—prompted many French Jews to redefine their attitudes towards Zionism and to adopt more, organized, militant, and firmly pro-Israel positions. Ultimately, the fact that French Jews found their views on Israel out of alignment with those of the government engendered tensions between ‘French’ and ‘Jewish’ identities. Adding to this political discomfort, new critical scrutiny of Vichy in the 1970s was progressively eroding the mutually constructed myth of

---

Résistancialisme, which had drawn a sharp distinction between Vichy and the French state by insisting that foreign invaders were entirely responsible for wartime atrocities. In the process, as Mandel (2003) notes, Jacobin Republicanism’s de-emphasis of cultural pluralism, “… led [French officials] to treat Jews as one among many of Vichy’s numerous victims.” While not buying into the Gaullist myth that all had suffered equally, French Jewish organizations had tended to avoid discussion about Vichy in the service of national healing and publicly blamed the persecution they had suffered during the war squarely on the Nazis. Indeed, it was only in July 1995, with Jacques Chirac’s famous apology for the crimes of the “French State” (Vichy) against Jews, that the problematic status of French Republicanism in relation to Vichy began to become less fraught.

With French Jewry’s increasing identification with Israel, the onset of the second Intifada in October 2000 saw a significant increase in anti-Semitic events in France and a reassessment of the relationships between Israel and the various Diaspora communities. Cohen (2011) demonstrates that French Jews are far more likely to consider Israel as a possible home when compared with their American co-religionists. Indeed, almost three quarters of French Jews have relatives residing in Israel: 6 percent have children living there, and 47 percent have other close relatives in Israel.


important, however, to not present either French Jews or their communal institutions as a unified homogeneous bloc when it comes to support for Israel. Because of the nationalist demands of French Republicanism, Jewish identification with the State of Israel continues to be considered by many in France as being to some extent disloyal and anti-Israel sentiment continues to be pervasive especially among the French Left.

Accordingly, French Jews and their representative institutions find themselves intimately enmeshed in rallying in support of Israel but also in the vigorous and ongoing debates over laïcité and communautarisme.

Today the CRIF acts as the umbrella federation for over sixty Jewish organizations and continues to play a central role as an unofficial voice for French Jews before the government. However, there is a growing sense that the organization is outmoded and no longer fit for purpose. The CRIF does not represent all Jewish organizations because, for political or religious reasons, some associations are not part of it or have withdrawn. The Central Consistory, for example, withdrew from CRIF in November 2004 because of an ongoing dispute over representation within the umbrella but remains an official interlocutor of the state with regard to religious matters. Internal discord has occasionally erupted over political interventions by the CRIF’s leadership in direct support of French or Israeli politicians whose politics have been at odds with some of its constituent organizations. Moreover, the CRIF has been criticized for its over-representation of the most conservative strands of French Jewry, its undemocratic internal procedures and a lack of representation of Jewish youth groups as well as Sephardim.

Speaking to Le Monde in 2010, Henri Hajdenberg, president of the CRIF in the 1990s

---

702 The Central Consistory asked for at least 25% of votes in the CRIF instead of the 10% allocated. The refusal of the CRIF’s leadership to agree was interpreted by the leadership of the Central Consistory as part of an ongoing attempt to marginalize the religious dimension of Jewish identity. See Ternisien, Xavier. 2004. “La Réconciliation Entre Le Consistoire et Le CRIF Se Fait Un Peu Attendre.” Le Monde, April 20.
noted that, “… the non-practicing liberal fringe of the community, the Jewish cultural elites are not present in the associations that the CRIF oversees.”

In spite of the obvious tensions with Republican principles, successive French Prime Ministers since 1985—and, in certain cases since 2008, the President—have attended the CRIF’s annual dinner as guests of honor. The annual dinner has become institutionalized as part of the national political calendar and the speeches delivered at the event have framed the national discourse on Israel and provided a forum for announcing public policies in the fight against anti-Semitism and Holocaust reparations. The decision of the CRIF’s then-president Richard Prasquier to exclude representatives of the Green and Communist Parties from the annual dinner because of their support for boycotts of Israeli products and controversial Palestinian politician Marwan Barghouti, was seen by some as limiting the republican character of the event. Moreover, the optics involved with the dinner’s high ticket cost, outsized media profile, and celebrity guest list has only further solidified a perception of the CRIF as being out of touch with the communities it purports to represent.

**Muslim organizational representation in France (1905—present)**

The history of Islam in France—and the demographic foundations of French Muslim communities—is intrinsically tied to Napoleon III’s grandiose aspirations to project France as a Muslim power (*puissance Musulman*) starting in the mid-19th century and France’s colonial history through the postwar era. Colonial-era migration flows in

---


and out of France occurred in the context of the colonization of the Maghreb as well as with the legal fiction of the French Constitution of 1848 in which northern regions of Algeria were effectively annexed and held to be an extension of the métropole. This arrangement differentiated Algeria’s status from the protectorates of Tunisia (1881-1956) and Morocco (1912-1956) whose populations did not enjoy the same freedom of movement. While the liberalization of controls at the turn of the twentieth century prompted the first period of Algerian immigration in 1904-5, the extension of freedom of movement to Algerian sujets Françaises in July 1914 facilitated the mass-mobilization of colonial labor and soldiers during the First World War. Moroccan and Tunisian migration flows into France are tied more closely to the postwar labor demands of the Trente Glorieuse.  

While a massive repatriation program was instituted after demobilization, the labor demands of reconstruction generated a further influx of Algerian immigrants between 1920 and 1924 at which time a series of administrative decrees placed strict controls on migration that lasted until the outbreak of the Second World War. Unlike patterns of immigration that follow the traditional pioneer settlement followed by family reunification form that characterize the British case, MacMaster (1997) notes that a crucial feature of Algerian migrations to France until the Second World War was that it was a movement of constant circulation or noria involving mostly rotations of ethnic Berbers from the mountainous Kabylia region of northern Algeria who would typically

707 The term Les Trente Glorieuses refers to the period from 1945 to 1975 when the French economy experienced rapid growth along with high productivity, wages, and consumption.
reside in the *métropole* for periods of less than a year before returning. The inherent dynamism of these patterns—as well as the social and economic standing of the migrant groups—were not conducive to the organic growth or domestic anchoring of communal institutions.

The Liberation following the Second World War prompted a series of legislative measures that once again restored complete freedom of movement to Algerians. At this pivotal juncture, the zone of departure had extended beyond Kabylia to envelop the Algerian plains where ethnic Arabs were predominant. MacMaster (1997) notes that, “…[emigration] began to affect a class of landless proletariat which had weak ties to the land and was more prepared to emigrate permanently.” While these flows from the Maghreb were curbed somewhat by the political crises of the 1950s and wars of national liberation across the region, continued labor shortages prompted by the rapid economic growth of *Les Trente Glorieuses* provided a significant ‘pull factor’ and prompted the *Office National de l’Immigration* (ONI) to extend freedom of entry to Algerian laborers as well as concluding official labor recruitment agreements in the early 1960s with countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

With the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in the mid-1950s and the end of the Algerian War of Independence in the early 1960s, large-scale immigration resumed and the transition toward more permanent settlements in France was well underway. Demographic growth, political instability and repression, as well as economic

---

709 The term ‘noria,’ as deployed by Algerian sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad, describes a seasonal or cyclical immigration patterned by the work of the land in the country of origin with workers returning to the country of origin to participate in agricultural work and being replaced by family members in order to not interrupt the pattern of remittances. MacMaster (1997) notes that this generates a continual dynamic interrelationship between the sending and host societies.


underdevelopment across the Maghreb provided substantial ‘push factors’ for initial migrations as well as providing a motivation for long-term settlement in France. The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) regime in Algeria encouraged emigration as a social safety valve and the subsequent remittances were valuable to the underdeveloped economy. The Moroccan government also pursued an emigrationist policy, “… the goal being to export the largest number of workers possible, essentially to Europe, so as to receive in return the maximum amount of [foreign] currency.” Ultimately these postwar programs to recruit ostensible ‘guest workers’ were brought to a halt by the global economic downturn that followed the oil crisis of 1973, which prompted Western European states to impose visa restrictions in 1974. By this time, Algerians had become the single largest minority group in France with approximately 800,000 residing in the métropole. However, as in the British case, the postwar settlement of migrant laborers was followed by further migrations that occurred within the framework of family reunification programs up through the late 1980s.

It is important to note the difficulties in estimating France’s Muslim population. Where French Jewry has been institutionalized to some extent for more than two centuries, Islam has to a large extent remained in the ‘cellars and garages.’ The French republican model’s insistence on the private status of ethnic and religious affiliation means that no official statistics are maintained on citizens of immigrant origin. The last census of France that included a question on the religion of respondents was in 1872 and

---

Figure 8: Estimated Muslim population of France, 1989 to 2010

legislation passed in 1978 restricts authorities from maintaining data on racial and ethnic affiliation.\textsuperscript{715} More recent estimates of France’s Muslim population that have been produced range from approximately 3.5 million to 6 million, the most common being a little more than 4 million.\textsuperscript{716} However, it should be noted that the more scientific estimates tend toward the lower end of the scale while higher estimates have tended to be pushed by more proselytized Muslims and, on the other hand, those who wish to stir up fear of an ‘Islamic peril.’\textsuperscript{717} Finally, it should also be noted that many of these analyses

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
involve counting “persons of possible Muslim origin” rather than observant Muslims.\footnote{For a full discussion in English, see Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaïsse. 2006. Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 16-22.}

This, again, raises the issue of a paradoxical externality of the French Republican model in that in the absence of reliable statistical data, a faith identity is assigned to those who may be only nominally religious.

Crucially, as there were very few Muslims in France and no mosques at the turn of the century, Muslims were unable to obtain the benefits afforded to other religions under the 1905 Law of Separation, in particular the free use of public buildings as places of worship.\footnote{Cohen, Jean L., and Cécile Laborde, eds. 2016. Religion, Secularism, & Constitutional Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press.} That being said, efforts to institutionalize Islam in France—and even an \textit{Islam français}—occurred at an earlier stage than in Britain.\footnote{According to Davidson (2012), the idea of an \textit{Islam français} emerged from the intellectual and political environment at the turn of the twentieth century and “sought to marry French perceptions of Moroccan Islam with classically “French” values such as liberty and fraternity.” See Davidson, Naomi. 2012. \textit{Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France}. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 18.} In this regard, the construction of the \textit{Grande Mosquée de Paris} (Great Mosque of Paris—GMP) in the 1920s was a defining moment in the organizational life of Islam in France. Conceived as a way to honor Muslim soldiers from the colonies, much of the funding for the mosque’s construction came from the French state and the City of Paris.\footnote{The funding from the state necessitated passing a law in 1920 to allocate 500,000 Francs for the construction of the mosque. The City of Paris provided a subsidy of 1,620,000 Francs that permitted the purchase of the land. See Bruce, Benjamin. 2015. “Governing Islam Abroad: The Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Fields in France and Germany.” Doctorat en Science Politique, Paris, France: Sciences Po, 235; Also, Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine. 2011. “The Case of France.” In \textit{Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present}, edited by Giovanna Zincone, Rinus Penninx, and Maren Borkert. IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.} The Sultan of Morocco, Moulay Youssef, also made a significant donation and his advisor, Si Kaddour Benghabrit, became the mosque’s first rector.\footnote{Bruce, Benjamin. 2015. “Governing Islam Abroad: The Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Fields in France and Germany.” Doctorat en Science Politique, Paris, France: Sciences Po, 235.} In essence, however, the \textit{Grande Mosquée} was not simply a religious space, it was also envisioned as a means to
monumentalize France’s aspiration to be a puissance Musulman (‘Muslim power’), to win the favor of Arab nationalists, and to institutionally embody France’s vision of an Islam français compatible with ‘French values.’

The representation of Islam in France that crystallized around the Grande Mosquée remained relatively unproblematic until the death of Si Kaddour Ben Ghabrit in 1954, which coincided with decolonization in Morocco and Tunisia and the Algerian War of Independence. The post-colonial migration that followed forms the demographic foundation of French Muslim communities today with roughly 711,000 Algerians, 260,000 Moroccans and 140,000 Tunisians settling in France between 1955 and 1974.

Following Si Kaddour Ben Ghabrit’s death in 1954, his nephew Si Ahmed Ben Ghabrit briefly acted as provisional rector, which proved alarming to French officials when support was voiced for North African nationalists at GMP prayer services during his tenure. In May 1957, with the Algerian War of Independence raging, Prime Minister Guy Mollet intervened to assure the ‘loyalty’ of the mosque’s notables by appointing Algerian academic Si Hamza Boubakeur, as rector. Under Si Hamza, a supporter of Algérie Française, the GMP oriented its activities towards the harki community. Katz (2013) notes that the appearance of Si Hamza’s imposition by the

---


728 The term harki refers to Algerian Muslims who served as auxiliaries in the French army during the Algerian War of Independence. More broadly, it is sometimes used to refer to all Algerian Muslims who supported French Algeria during the war. Bruce, Benjamin. 2015. “Governing Islam Abroad: The Turkish
authorities—as well as his explicit choice of sides in the Algerian War of Independence—caused him to be viewed with suspicion and even hostility by many Parisian Muslims.729 As Bowen (2007) notes,

_The mosque’s history illustrates the two general problems of legitimacy confronting the French state and its Muslim “privileged interlocutors.” First, the state wishes to appoint those who represent its subjects, at the risk of thereby weakening the legitimacy of these appointed “representatives.” From its very origins the Great Mosque of Paris was supposed to be created and led by Muslims for Muslims, but only if at the_...
same time those Muslims could be designated by the state—which made them appear as the state’s instrument.\textsuperscript{730}

The extent to which the state was willing to intervene in the administration of the GMP illustrates its \textit{quasi-corporatist} status at this early stage in the development of Muslim associational life in France. Although periodically challenged by the governments of other Maghreb countries, for nearly two decades after the independence of Algeria, the \textit{Grande Mosquée} maintained its grip on the official representation of Muslims in France.\textsuperscript{731} However, Si Hamza’s relationship with both national and local authorities was not unproblematic.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Muslim organizational life began to proliferate, especially in Paris, as new prayer sites, community spaces, and alternative sources of religious authority began to emerge across the city. Yet, through the 1980s, the French authorities continued to outsource the accommodation of religious requirements—from the salaries of imams to the creation of prayer spaces—to immigrants’ home governments.\textsuperscript{732} A number of key organizations, both universalist and ethno-nationalist in orientation, began to emerge at this juncture. Indeed, some of the mosque building initiatives spearheaded by these new organizations found support from the state and the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{733} The \textit{Grande Mosquée} saw the proliferation of new Islamic actors and apparent state support for said actors as threats to its project to consolidate its authority over French Muslims, if not to restore it to its former prominence. With state and city authorities refusing Si Hamza Boubakeur’s requests to


increase their subsidization of the GMP, Si Hamza attempted (unsuccessfully) to play the French, Algerian, and Moroccan governments off one another by dangling the carrot of control of the GMP in front of each of them. Ultimately, believing that the French state had abandoned its vision for an *Islam français* as embodied by the GMP, Si Hamza began to gradually transfer stewardship of the mosque to the Algerian state in the erroneous belief that the specter of relinquishing control of the GMP to Algeria would pressure the state to reconsider its abandonment of *Islam français*.

By the end of the 1970s, three Islamic organizations—the GMP, the *Tabligh Jama‘at*, and the *Association des Étudiants Islamiques en France* (Association of Islamic Students in France—AEIF), a now-defunct student organization linked to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood—were firmly established in France. However, it was a modification to the 1901 French law on associations in 1981 that provided the legal environment for the proliferation of French Muslim associations. The change in the law repealed the requirement for associations founded by foreigners to be approved by the Ministry of the Interior. At the international level, this development occurred in the context of an influx of petrodollars from Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Gulf states such as Kuwait, as well as the Iranian revolution of 1979 and spurred a proliferation of Muslim associations with a worship-oriented, cultural, and/or educational focus. This change in

---

736 Founded in India in 1927 by Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi, the Tabligh Jama‘at is an offshoot of the Deobandi movement that focuses its activities on proselytizing with a view to encouraging the spiritual reform of Muslims at the grassroots level across social and economic lines.
legal status led to the founding of two major federations: the *Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (Union of Islamic Organizations in France—UOIF) in 1983 and the *Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* (National Federation of French Muslims—FNMF) in 1985. However, the changing international and domestic conditions also raised the suspicions of local authorities and the public and impressed upon foreign governments—especially those of Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey—the need to actively monitor the activities of their citizens living in France and the utility of instrumentalizing Islamic networks as a means to do so.

The modification in the 1901 law also permitted Si Hamza Boubakeur to complete the transfer of the patrimony of the GMP to the Algerian state in 1982, at which point he resigned his position as rector. The Algerian government named FLN affiliated cleric, Sheikh Abbas el Hocine Bencheikh, as rector but the French government refused to recognize the transfer and it was formally protested by the Moroccan government. Legal wrangling over control of the GMP continued until 1987 when Algeria’s claim was formalized. Thereafter, the GMP became a conduit through which Algeria could propagate its official state Islam, create new prayer spaces, and attempt to co-opt existing ones, as part of a broader project to monitor and control the Algerian diaspora in France, with similar projects also pursued by Morocco and Turkey.

---

741 For an in-depth analysis of the Turkish and Moroccan projects, see Bruce, Benjamin. 2015. “Governing Islam Abroad: The Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Fields in France and Germany.” Doctorat en Science politique, Paris, France: Sciences Po, 237.
The first *Affaire du Foulard* (Headscarf Affair—hereafter ‘first Affaire’) in 1989 prompted questions in the public sphere over the internal contradictions of French Republican philosophy and the nature of intégrisme (‘fundamentalism’) as well as debates over the most appropriate strategies for managing the integration of large and heterogeneous migrant minorities. The first Affaire occurred in a political context where the ruling left, faced with the improving electoral performance of the far right *Front National* and resurgent Islamism in the Maghreb, was celebrating the bicentennial of the French Revolution, a celebration of the republican aspects of French identity that likely exacerbated the feelings of alienation of many French Muslims.

Much in the same way that the position of Muslims in the public sphere was “broadened and eventually concretized in a largely negative fashion” during *The Satanic Verses* Affair, sensationalist elements of the French media seized upon the first Affaire “… to link Iran, the chador, and book-burning to the plight of the three girls at the middle school” I argue here that the first Affaire, like *The Satanic Verses* Affair in Britain, constitutes what political scientists refer to as a ‘critical juncture’ that precipitated a ‘reactive sequence’ that resulted in a series of state-led initiatives to institutionalize Islam

---


in France. That is, it not only increased the visibility of Islam in French life but, moreover, by stigmatizing French citizens of the Muslim faith, heightened the political saliency of a more mobilizable ‘Muslim’ identity category. As with The Satanic Verses Affair in Britain, this emergence of a ‘Muslim’ political voice was tied to demographic pressures with the children of immigrants having grown up in Europe as citizens but with a sense of relative deprivation vis-à-vis their lack of economic and political participation. Indeed, as previously discussed, Herberg’s hypothesis would predict a growing attachment among third generation immigrants to the religious identity of their grandparents.

---

The first Affaire alerted French political elites to the growing appeal of Islam to French-born Muslim youth, the importance of improving relations with Islamic leaders, and the practical need for new Islamic institutions in order to maintain the political loyalty of French Muslims. This incentivized the French state, civil society actors, as well as some foreign governments to cooperate in devising new means of structuring and institutionalizing engagements between the state and Muslim political actors in France. However, the idiosyncrasies of church-state institutional arrangements in France—as well as the dirigiste impulse of the centralized French state—meant that this process would take a more insistent, top-down, and decidedly corporatist form than in Britain.

The first Affaire du Foulard as a ‘suddenly imposed grievance’

Much ink has been spilled on the first Affaire du Foulard in 1989 and it is only necessary here to give a broad outline of the facts of the case and outline the mechanisms by which it served as a catalyst for various state-led initiatives to institutionalize ‘Muslim’ representation in France. In September 1989, three girls arrived wearing Islamic dress for the first day of classes at Gabriel-Havez middle school in Creil near Paris. The school principal, Ernest Chenière, claimed that the girls were engaged in a form of proselytism and that he was acting to enforce laïcité—a concept whose content is


debated to this day—and requested that they remove their headscarves. The girls, who had previously agreed to a compromise to go unscarved during classes, refused the principal’s request and were expelled on the grounds that the scarves infringed on “the laïcité and neutrality of the public school.” Notably, the girls had worn headscarves during the previous school year, although on several occasions they had been asked to remove them. Bowen (2007) notes that,

*At a different moment, the girls’ appearance would likely have passed unnoticed. Girls had been showing up at this and other schools with scarves for years, and either attended the school with their scarves or agreed to remove them during class. Indeed, an earlier class photo at the same school showed a girl in headscarf as evidence of the middle school’s openness to cultural diversity! But now international “political Islam” appeared on magazine covers in the form of Iranian women in Islamic dress, adding a new dimension to scarves in French schools. The conjuncture of domestic and foreign threats made scarf-wearing into a national “affair.”*

While the Iranians were predominantly Shi’a and North Africans predominantly Sunni, the difference mattered little in terms of the representations of Muslim in the public sphere. The implication, of course, is that it was not the girls who had imposed their religious symbols on the secular French school but rather a changing geopolitical environment that resulted in Chenière’s decision to more strictly enforce laïcité. While Gaspard and Khosrokhavar (1995) estimate that fewer than one percent of French Muslim schoolgirls were likely to be wearing scarf at this time, the controversy nonetheless reverberated at the national level.

The controversy drew varied responses from the political left and right—as well as from various Muslim and other religious leaders and faith based and civil society.

---


organizations—in much the same way that *The Satanic Verses* Affair engendered a multiplicity of responses in Britain. With the left sharply split on the issue, Socialist Education Minister, Lionel Jospin, and President François Mitterrand avoided taking a stand on either side.\textsuperscript{754} In France, more so than in Britain, however, a dividing line emerged between a more state-friendly ethno-national (i.e. Algerian) Islam represented by the GMP and a more conservative transnational Islamist current represented by the *Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (Union of Islamic Organizations of France—UOIF) and the *Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* (National Federation of French Muslims—FNMF).\textsuperscript{755} For its part, the GMP looked to find “amicable solutions” and made efforts to diffuse the confrontation.\textsuperscript{756} GMP rector, Sheikh Tedjini Haddam supported the girls on the basis that, … *laïcité is about ensuring that everybody has a right to express their opinion freely and safely. This right is only limited by the respect of the right of the Other.*\textsuperscript{757}

For the most part, the response of mainstream Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious leaders echoed Sheikh Haddam’s argument for a more ‘open’ *laïcité* as a matter of individual ‘religious freedom.’\textsuperscript{758}

It is essential to note that it was Daniel Youssouf Leclerc, a French convert and former president of the FNMF, who had brought the controversy to a head by advising the three girls to wear the scarf once more after a compromise had already been reached between their parents and the school. As Benhabib (2002) notes,

*Although hardly noted in the press, the fact that the girls had been in touch with Leclerq indicates that wearing the scarf was a conscious political gesture on their part, a complex act of identification and defiance. In doing so, Fatima, Leila, and Samira on the one hand claimed to exercise their freedom of religion as French citizens; on the other hand they exhibited their Muslim and North African origins in a context that sought to envelop them, as students of the nation, within an egalitarian, secularist ideal of republican citizenship. In the years to come, their followers and supporters forced what the French state wanted to view as a private symbol—an individual item of clothing—into the shared public sphere, thus challenging the boundaries between the public and the private.*

759

The predominant Islamist organizations, the UOIF and the FNMF, adopted a decidedly activist line in championing the schoolgirls and both were involved in organizing competing street protests in their support.760 Indeed, the UOIF adopted a policy of granting financial support to lawyers of girls wearing headscarves who make judicial appeals—a policy that continued through 1998.761 Founded in 1983 by a group of transplanted intellectuals, the UOIF had close ties to the Tunisian Islamic Tendency Movement (now known as Ennahda) but, also being inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, has avoided being specifically identified with any particular Muslim-majority country.

Another organization that rose to prominence at this juncture was the *Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* (National Federation of French Muslims—FNMF). Founded in December 1985, the FNMF’s initial rationale was to provide an umbrella


under which associations opposed to the dominance of the Algerian GMP could organize. Thanks to this ‘big tent’ approach, the FNMF was initially able to bring together diverse groups, including the Tabligh, the French branches of the Turkish Islamist organization Milli Görüş, Moroccan amicales (workers’ friendship societies), and the UOIF and all with the support of the Saudi Muslim World League. Much like the UOIF, the FNMF in its initial iteration promoted a French Islam freed from the influence of countries of origin. However, as enthusiasm for the FNMF waned, both the UOIF and Milli Görüş departed and the FNMF came to be identified as representing Moroccan official Islam in the early 1990s.

**Structural inconsistencies: precursors to the CFCM**

It was as a direct response to the first Affaire that, noting a “lack of qualified interlocutors,” then Interior Minister Pierre Joxe (PS, left) took the first steps towards normalizing Islam in cultuelle terms—i.e. as a legally organized religion. One of the primary objectives of this initiative was to ultimately break the state’s quasi-corporatist dependence on the GMP and the GMP’s virtual monopoly on representation. In Joxe’s opinion, government intervention was “inevitable” in face of the reality of a growing

---


Muslim population facing unemployment and discrimination.\footnote{Joxe cited in Mattei, Paola, and Andrew S. Aguilar. 2016. Secular Institutions, Islam and Education Policy: France and the U.S. in Comparative Perspective. St Antony’s Series. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 51.} In effect, changes in France’s ethno-religious demography meant that the state’s failure to give Islam legal status within the bounds of the 1905 Law was no longer a tenable situation. Unfortunately, however, because of the Republican aversion to—and legal prohibitions on—identifying and/or enumerating the ethno-religious backgrounds of citizens, we have scant and unreliable data on France’s Jewish and Muslim populations over time.\footnote{For an illuminating discussion, see Laurence, Jonathan, and Justin Vaïsse. 2006. Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, Chapter 1.}

representatives of Muslims in France.” However, Joxe saw the groups as embodying only a symbolic legitimacy, which was neither democratic nor formal-legal. Thus the CORIF was never itself considered ‘representative’ and the body was only tasked with advising the Minister on policies related to Islamic practice in France such as defining the beginning of Ramadan fast, creating Muslim cemeteries, issues surrounding halal slaughter, general advice on mosques and imams, and reflecting on options for the future organization of Islam in France. The CORIF served at the behest of the government and met a few dozen times in the offices of the Interior Ministry.

While Tedjini Haddam, rector of the GMP has been characterized as “presiding over” the CORIF, he had no specific function and his moral authority within the body was contested. In fact, Frégosi (2008) argues that the French government was keen to curb North African hegemony over French Muslims and the ethnic and sectarian diversity of the members of the CORIF was a purposeful way of signaling that the GMP’s virtual monopoly as the “window” of Islam in France had come to an end. In this vein, Kepel (2005) notes that the founding of the CORIF cannot be treated in isolation from French electoral politics in the sense that it took place after an election cycle during which Charles Pasqua (RPR, center-right), an ally of Jacques Chirac, had orchestrated a photo-

---

op with with Tedjimi Haddam of the GMP, which raised the headline “Algiers votes Chirac.” In effect, with Joxe attempting to break the monopoly of the GMP—and thus pluralize structures of intermediation—under the aegis of the CORIF, the GMP responded by aligning itself with Joxe’s political rivals.

The CORIF was apparently only intended to be a short-lived initiative, an exploratory committee of sorts to introduce the relevant stakeholders to government in order to pave the way and provide a space for the emergence of a more representative organ. Nonetheless, the CORIF is credited as having been behind a ministerial circular that advocated providing Muslim burial plots and the provision of halal meals for Muslim recruits in the armed forces. While infighting on non-religious and primarily ethnic grounds undoubtedly brought members of the CORIF into conflict with one another, Boyer (2005) argues that it was “primarily the victim of external events.”

Indirectly, when then Minister of Defense, John-Pierre Chevènement, resigned in opposition to the first Gulf War, Joxe was moved to the Defense portfolio. More directly, the suspension of the electoral process in Algeria resulted in Tedjini Haddam being appointed to the Algerian Haut Comité d’État (Higher Committee of State) in 1992, a five member collegial presidency entrusted with running the state. This international

development resulted in a period of uncertainty for the future of the GMP. However, with the wheels set in motion, alternating centre-right and centre-left Ministers of the Interior continued the process that Joxe had initiated, albeit with variations between more corporatist and coercive, more pluralist and consultative, and more *laissez-faire* approaches (See Table 9).

When the RPR/UDF coalition under Edouard Balladur won the 1993 legislative election, Charles Pasqua (RPR, center-right) was appointed Interior Minister. Pasqua’s *néo-dirigisme* aimed to place Paris at the center of a more centralized and top-down approach in a number of policy realms. Pasqua rejected the CORIF as a structure that might provide a solution to the problem of representation. Instead, Pasqua re-centered the focus on the idea of placing the GMP—which he perceived as being the only representative, reliable, liberal and republican institution—at the head of a decidedly more corporatist structure that would then be the state’s interlocutor. This coincided with Dalil Boubakeur, son of Si Hamza and a medical doctor with no theological training, becoming the first French citizen appointed rector of the GMP in 1995. These developments cannot, of course, be separated from what French commentators were calling the “Second Algerian War” as a brutal civil conflict in Algeria raged and

---

heightened perceptions in France of an ‘Islamic threat.’ Pasqua’s more corporatist approach that once again privileged the GMP marked an effective reversal of Joxe’s policy—and that of the center-left more generally—of downplaying Algerian influence and pluralizing the leadership pool beyond the GMP’s rector.797 Pasqua attempted to facilitate this by granting the GMP a monopoly on halal certification—worth several hundred thousand Euro each year—in an attempt to consolidate it in the leadership role at the head of a confederation of Muslim associations.798

In April 1993, with Pasqua’s backing, the Coordination Nationale des Musulmans de France (National Coordination of Muslims of France—CNMF) brought together the five major organizations—the GMP, the UOIF, the FNMF, the Tabligh, and the AEIF, a student organization with links to the Syrian Brotherhood—under the leadership of the

---

However, the CNMF collapsed before the end of the year as a result of the withdrawal of the ‘Moroccanized’ FNMF, which complained that the CNMF gave too much power to the Algeria-linked GMP. A subsequent effort, again with government intervention and with the GMP retaining significant influence, took shape in late 1993 in the form of the Conseil Consultatif des Musulmans de France (Consultative Council of French Muslims—CCMF). The goal of the CCMF was to create a “definitive representative structure of Islam in France.” However, while it was theoretically a more inclusive body, the CCMF faced considerable internal discord and the fact that it was a GMP driven endeavor as well as Pasqua and Boubakeur’s extensive links to Algeria put a question mark over its legitimacy and credibility.

The CCMF was renamed the Conseil Représentatif des Musulmans de France (Representative Council of French Muslims—CRMF) upon the adoption of a “Charter of the Muslim Religion” in January 1995, a document penned by a group of intellectuals associated with the GMP that emphasized Islam’s ties to France as well as the value of laïcité and the rule of law. However, by the time the Charter was presented to Pasqua, the CCMF was in disarray with Abdallah Ben Mansour, President of the UOIF, along with representatives of Foi et Pratique and the AEIF, having already abandoned the

---

process in December 1994.\(^{804}\) In effect, for the FNMF and the UOIF, the state of Islam in France remained “administratively Algerian, financially Saudi Arabian, theologically Egyptian” and both joined a temporary alliance with *Foi et Pratique*, and the AEIF in order to oppose the GMP’s dominant role in the process.\(^{805}\)

Pasqua’s successor, Jean-Louis Debré, came to the Interior Ministry in 1995 with the government of Alain Juppé (UMP, center-right). A strong advocate of a more ‘closed’ *laïcité*, Debré thought that it was a mistake to attempt to create an officially recognized Islam of France. He further believed that Pasqua and Joxe had erroneously conferred legitimacy on certain Muslim federations without having the authority to do so.\(^{806}\) Reversing Pasqua’s policy of actively bolstering the legitimacy of the GMP, Debré effectively broke its monopoly on halal certification, which the GMP had thus far failed to turn into a workable system, and granted equal accreditation to the mosques of Évry and Lyon, which were also identified with Algeria.\(^{807}\) Overall, however, Debré effectively took a *laissez-faire* approach, which has been the exception among contemporary Ministers, and his tenure between 1995 and 1997 was characterized by indecision and administrative stasis.

The state project of institutionalizing an Islam of France was revived in October 1999 when Jean Pierre Chevènement (MDC, center-left), Interior Minister under the


government of Lionel Jospin (PS, center-left), launched the Istichara (Consultation) process.\footnote{The Arabic term *Istichara* refers to a dialogue between two parties. Chevènement was criticized by some Muslim leaders for a kind of neo-colonial paternalism in the choice of Arabic nomenclature for his initiative. See Amiraux, Valerie. 2003. “CFCM; A French Touch?” ISIM Newsletter 12 (June): 24.}


Initially, the strategy of the *Istichara* focused on a few strategic issues, notably the establishment of an institute for Islamic studies to train imams, the future of the Paris Mosque, improving the organization of halal food certification, and issues relating to the mismanagement of the dominant television program on Islam.\footnote{Billon, Alain. 2005. “Les Fondements Idéologiques et Les Choix de La Consultation.” French Politics, Culture & Society 23 (1): 23–36.}

However, with little progress made, especially on the flagship institute, the focus shifted to devising an electoral process for a future representative body to realize the “integration and the organization of the Muslim faith in France.”\footnote{Boyer, Alain. 2005. “La Représentation Du Culte Musulman En France.” French Politics, Culture & Society 23 (1): 15.}

Chevènement insisted that his approach was not a ‘top-down’ one:


While launched under Chevènement, the *Istichara* was subsequently vigorously pursued by his successor in the Interior Ministry, Daniel Vaillant (PS, center-left) and Nicolas

---

808 The Arabic term *Istichara* refers to a dialogue between two parties. Chevènement was criticized by some Muslim leaders for a kind of neo-colonial paternalism in the choice of Arabic nomenclature for his initiative. See Amiraux, Valerie. 2003. “CFCM; A French Touch?” ISIM Newsletter 12 (June): 24.


Sarkozy (UMP, center-right) demonstrating an unprecedented level of governmental continuity in spite of electoral alternations.\(^{813}\)

Chevènement noted that, “…a balance had to be struck between the actual representativeness of the people consulted and the need not to form too large a group that would not have been able to work effectively.”\(^{814}\) In 2000, Chevènement secured the participants’ adoption of a non-negotiable text that he referred to as an “oath of fidelity” that bound them to compliance with the laws of the Republic and “…the principles and legal basis governing relations between public authorities and the Muslim faith in France.”\(^{815}\) The text of this document premised entry to the consultation on recognition of … the fundamental principles of the French Republic, in particular Articles 10 and 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen on freedom of thought and freedom of religion in article 1 of the Constitution affirming the secular character of the Republic and its respect for all Beliefs, and finally the provisions of the Act of 9 December 1905 concerning the separation of the Churches and the State.\(^{816}\)

Zeghal (2005) notes that the agreement was reciprocal to some extent with the state also making concessions. First, the original title of the text was amended from the “Declaration of Intent on the Rights and Duties of the Muslim Worshipers in France” to the more neutral formulation: “Principles and legal foundations governing relations between public authorities and the Muslim faith in France.”\(^{817}\) Second, explicit reference


to the right to change one’s religion, was suppressed at the request of the UOIF, with the attestation instead declaring “full and complete adherence to the principles of the Republic.”

Chevènement’s *Istichara* involved an expanded engagement that included the most prominent mosque federations, independent mosques of regional or local importance that were envisioned to represent ‘non-organized Islam,’ and “independent, qualified individuals, including one woman,” intended to represent currents that might be overshadowed by the federation and mosque invitees. The mosque federations included the GMP, UOIF, FNMF, and two organizations linked to the Tabligh movement (Faith and Practice and *Tabligh wa Da’wa*) but also opened up the process to official Turkish Islam represented by the *Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France* (Coordination Committee of Turkish Muslim of France—CCMTF) and to African Islam represented by the *Fédération Française des Associations Islamiques d’Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles* (French Federation of Islamic Associations of Africa, the Comoros, and the Antilles—FFAIACA). Because these federations represented only approximately 50 percent of eligible mosques, a number of independent mosques of regional or local importance were also invited. Finally, six independent personalities, one of whom was a woman, were included to symbolize the sensitivities that were absent from the federations and places of worship not affiliated to the

---


820 The CCMTF serves as the official representation of the Turkish Diyanet (DITIB) within the CFCM, mainly because French officials were uncomfortable with the fact that DITIB is presided over by a member of the Turkish diplomatic mission. See Bruce, Benjamin. 2015. “Governing Islam Abroad: The Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Fields in France and Germany.” Doctorat en Science Politique, Paris, France: Sciences Po, 282.
federations. While it was by far the most plural and inclusive effort to date, the fact that the remit of the *Istichara* was restricted to the religious dimension—and that participation was premised on attachment to a mosque federation, association, and/or management—meant that cultural and laïc Muslims were necessarily excluded. It has also meant that women and youths are far under-represented relative to the older men who tend to dominate mosque associational life.

The initial impetus for the CORIF initiative was undoubtedly driven by Pierre Joxe’s conclusion that official engagement between the state and Islam in France was inevitable given the changing demographic and socio-economic profile of French Muslims. Ultimately, the period between 1989 and 2003 was characterized by substantial structural inconsistencies, largely driven by changing partisanship (See Table 9). However, the fact that these initial engagements involved serious inconsistencies can also be interpreted as being not particularly noteworthy in the sense that they involved an experimental political process whereby the state was attempting to render more legible the various manifestations of Islam within its borders (and beyond). What is noteworthy, however, is the muscular approach of French political elites in intervening to shape who was to be included and who was to be excluded as well as the balance between the various manifestations of Islam in France. The obvious intent here was to actively shape a more ‘moderate’ *Islam de France* through co-opting selected ‘insiders’ while purposely excluding important strands.

**Structural consistency but procedural and legal inconsistencies: The CFCM (2003 to present)**

Shortly after his appointment as Interior Minister in June 2002, Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP, center-right) played the final leading role in the formation of the *Conseil Français*
du Culte Musulman (French Council of the Muslim Faith—CFCM). Sarkozy used the Istichara as the basis for the CFCM, personally negotiating the composition of the CFCM’s Executive Board with representatives of the Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian embassies, the Saudi Muslim World League, and the major domestic federations between October and November 2002. In December 2002, Sarkozy hosted Muslim community leaders at a state-owned château at Nainville-les-Roches where they negotiated the timing of the CFCM’s first elections, the calculations of majorities and coalitions, and the composition of the CFCM’s governing board. Sarkozy secured the agreement of the GMP, the FNMF, and the UOIF to participate in elections for a new representative council by assuring them that the highest offices in the new institution would be reserved for them. The Presidency was promised to the GMP with two vice-Presidentcies offered to the FNMF and the UOIF with the secretariat and treasurer functions reserved for the smaller federations (CCMTF, FFAIACA and Tabligh). While the elections to the CFCM gave victory to Moroccan candidates over Algerian ones, the agreement over the composition of a governing board that would be only two-thirds elected (41) and one-third consensually appointed (23) ensured that no single tendency could be entirely dominant or dominated. The twenty-three appointees included representatives of foreign embassies, national federations, a selection of five unaffiliated mosques, six federations and six government-selected personnalités qualifiées. No comparable level of state

---


intervention in the religious sphere in France had been seen since Napoleon’s convening of the Grand Sanhedrin in the early 19th century.

In the religious field, as a pragmatic matter, Milli Görüs was not initially invited to participate in the Istichara both because of its smaller size relative to the Diyanet-linked CCMTF and presumably because its participation would have caused considerable tensions with the Turkish embassy because of Milli Görüs’ close links with the banned Refah Party in Turkey.826 The AEIF was also excluded from the process with some of its prominent mosques opting out and others never having been solicited.827 Writing in Le Monde, Xavier Ternisien notes that,

… the danger is not to have introduced UOIF into the representation of Islam. Rather, it is not to have created competition from the same tendency. UOIF's traditional rival, the Association of Islamic Students of France (AEIF), represented by influential local figures such as Larbi Kechat in Paris, Mamadou Daffé in Toulouse and Abdallah Boussouf in Strasbourg, was kept out of the picture. The academic Tariq Ramadan, who alone embodies a current of thought original and very popular with young Muslims, has been and continues to be unnecessarily demonized.828

Other notable exclusions included the Ad Da’wa mosque in Paris, whose imam is considered close to the AEIF and which refused to participate for reasons that are unclear.829 Some salafist groups, because of a theologically rooted rejection of politics, have also remained outside the CFCM structure. More broadly, youth associations and the second generation were almost completely excluded. Ternisien (2003) notes that,

… [these] young Muslims, too turbulent, too malleable—too French perhaps—have been sidelined. They constitute, however, the most dynamic

Followers of Tariq Ramadan, a luminary to many young French Muslims who is often identified with youth organizations such as the *Union des Jeunes Musulmans* (Union of Young Muslims—UJM), were also excluded.

In a press release in April 2003, the *Collectif des Musulmans de France* (CCF), an organization inspired by Tariq Ramadan, declared, “We are witnessing the emergence of an opaque body not chosen by the base and occupying a central place. The future will tell us its effectiveness.” Ramadan’s spokesman harshly criticized the CFCM’s elections as “rigged” and compared the leaders of the UOIF to North African colonial notables who allowed themselves to be co-opted by the colonial administration. This criticism was echoed by Soheib Benscheikh, a religious scholar and member of the CFCM, who called on the government to get rid of, “this post-colonial approach.” Ramadan himself has criticized the CFCM as an instrument in the hands of parties or the government that echoes the preoccupations of political elites. Although they share an ideological connection to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Ramadan is not close to the UOIF, which he has criticized for ‘minority thinking’ as well as being overly dependent on foreign funding and foreign personnel to fill leadership posts. Ramadan’s followers also reproached the UOIF for its willingness to be co-opted in the service of the state and there is some reason to believe that the UOIF resented this criticism and saw Ramadan as

---

posing a threat of sorts.\textsuperscript{836} The exclusion of these other actors effectively paved the way for the UOIF to become the sole Islamist voice in the process.\textsuperscript{837} In short, while the UOIF has pursued a decidedly ‘insider strategy’ that is largely aimed at the educated middle class, this has opened a political opportunity space for Tariq Ramadan and his followers to occupy the space of the agitational ‘outsiders’ of the youth of the cités, which has undoubtedly had deleterious effects on the legitimacy of the CFCM.

The electoral procedures for the CFCM were devised under the aegis of the Association pour l’Organisation des Élections pour le Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (Association for the Organization of Elections for the French Council for Muslim Worship—AOE-CFCM).\textsuperscript{838} The AOE-CFCM chose to consider the mosque as the unit basis for electoral voting. According to Billon (2005), “[this] was dictated by the rigors of French secularism, prohibiting any ad hominem list formation on a confessional basis.”\textsuperscript{839} However, it was also necessary to devise a system that took account of the relative importance of each mosque. Ultimately, in the absence of a more satisfactory alternative, a system of weighting between places of worship based on the size of the prayer hall was adopted unanimously.\textsuperscript{840} However, this system was subsequently widely criticized as having advantaged certain actors (especially the UOIF) and for leaving CFCM electoral processes vulnerable to manipulation.\textsuperscript{841}

\textsuperscript{837} The Turkish Islamist organization Millî Görüş is now a constituent member of the CFCM.
Zeghal (2005) notes that it took several factors to bring about the creation of a representative body to act as the interlocutor of the public authorities on the question of Muslim worship. First, it required the personal intervention of political leaders: whether the more pluralist ‘encouragement’ of Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s Al-Istichara or the more corporatist and coercive approach of Nicolas Sarkozy in the process of organizing the first CFCM elections in 2003. Moreover, the vehemence with which political elites pursued the consultation project also created an explicit incentive—if not a sense of obligation—for the leaders of the major Muslim organizations in France to adopt an ‘insider strategy’ in order to avoid marginalization. Finally, the effects of September 11, 2001, provided significant incentives for the various stakeholders in this process of institutional formation to work together to regulate Islam to their advantage by reining in or co-opting of manifestations of Islam that were perceived as challenging the secular order.

The state-led project to institutionalize Islam in France was inherently corporatist and, to a great extent, followed the template of the Protestant and Jewish federations that emerged in accordance with the 1905 law (although French Jews partially freed themselves from the 1905 institutional template with the founding of CRIF in 1943). Before 1905, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews in France had representative bodies that evolved in a relationship with the Republic that was often tense. Today, the authorities of these religions serve as interlocutors with the State in a context where there are no recognized religions in the legal sense. The legal objective of the state’s involvement in the creation of the CFCM was thus to bring Islam into a legal relationship with the state

and to integrate Islam within the legal framework of the Republic.\textsuperscript{844} This corresponded to the double principle expressed by the 1905 law that guarantees the free exercise of worship in the interest of public order while not formally recognizing any religion (Articles 1 and 2). In the interests of preserving public order, the state recognizes the role played by organized religions in encouraging social cohesion.\textsuperscript{845} Justifying the interventionist posture of the state, Sevaistre (2005) notes that,

\begin{quote}
Histortically, when attempting to resolve difficulties, organized religions have often been faced with passivity on the part of the authorities. This situation led them to seldom consult with the relevant authorities and finding solutions that would subsequently be disputed by the authorities. The position of the authorities… is no longer the same… Islam lags behind other religions in terms of organization, the number of problems to be solved and institutional capacity. This situation requires that the authorities work even more quickly with Muslim leaders.\textsuperscript{846}
\end{quote}

The purpose of this project was thus to close the historical and institutional gap between Islam and other religions by supporting a Muslim population for whom discussions with the public authorities at national and local level are often difficult. This, the argument goes, has necessarily involved a significant role for the state in providing more legal and technical assistance to the CFCM than it does to other organized religions.\textsuperscript{847}

Akan (2009) notes that Sarkozy saw himself as leading a Tocquevillean project in which religion could play a role as a political institution. A former advisor notes that Sarkozy “… does not appear to me to be a man of religion, but he has a Bonapartist vision of it, that is to say, he sees in it an important social fact which must be taken into

account in order to direct the French.” Indeed, during this period, Nicolas Sarkozy himself often referred to, and praised, American discrimination positive (‘affirmative action’), which provided much grist for the mill for his political rivals who delighted in labeling Sarkozy a communautariste.

More broadly, Zeghal (2005) points out that, from the time of CORIF through the first elections for the CFCM executive, the institutionalization project involved an effort on the part of the state to ‘know’ the various components of French Islam and to engage in an intense and sometimes conflicting dialogue with them with the ultimate aim of legal recognition. The process thus involved identifying and constructing an interlocutor, even corporatizing an ‘official Islam’ that, once installed, would thereafter be expected to navigate its own way in negotiations with both the faithful and the public authorities. Moreover, the CFCM was also to be granted a political role, sometimes implicit and instrumentalized, as a transnational mediator with foreign Islam. That said, the idea that the CFCM can be thought of as a mere instrument of the state is countered by instances when it has directly challenged the state—and even explicitly challenged its own instrumentalization by political elites.

Comparing Sarkozy to Napoleon, Ternisien (2003) noted that, “one thinks of the emperor of the French… constituting an assembly of notable Jews in 1806, then a *Grand Sanhedrin* in 1807.” However, UOIF leader Fouad Alaoui insists that, “…the executive was not imposed on the elected members of the CFCM board of directors. The members of the management board were invited to comment on the Executive Board proposals—and almost 95 percent of board members supported it.” While the Interior Ministry encouraged the devolvement of as much organizational activity as possible to Muslim community leaders, the government promised that it would “accompany” Muslims on their path to representation.

The first CFCM elections in April 2003 involved voting by 4,031 delegates from 995 officially registered mosques, with the number of delegates for each mosque calculated using a formula based on the surface area of the prayer hall. As we shall see, this formulation, necessitated by the Republican prohibition on maintaining electoral rolls based on ethnic or religious affiliations, would ultimately prove a huge barrier to the efficient functioning of the CFCM. Nonetheless, the result of this first election confirmed the changing landscape of Islam in France with the UOIF and FNMF performing very well at the expense of the GMP. The UOIF’s strategy had involved bringing independent mosques, the *Tabligh* movement, *Foi et Pratique*, and *Milli Görüs* under its banner. In the aftermath, GMP rector Dalil Boubakeur was summoned to return to Algeria to

---

“explain himself.” Nonetheless, the composition of the CFCM’s executive board had been pre-determined by a compromise agreement reached by Sarkozy and the four biggest federations (i.e., the GMP, UOIF, FNMF, and the CCMTF). Accordingly, Boubakeur was appointed President; the Secretary General of the UOIF, Fouad Alaoui, and President of the FNMF, Mohammed Bechari, were both appointed as Vice Presidents; and Haydar Demiryürek, of the Diyanet-linked CCMTF, was named Secretary General. To a great extent, the results reflected the significant investments made by the Moroccan state in the networks of religious associations in contexts where Moroccan expatriate populations are largest. These investments have traditionally constituted a means to exert social control over—and monitor—the Moroccan diaspora with the state instituting reforms to further increase its influence following the terror attacks in Casablanca in May 2003.

At the end of 2004, Sarkozy’s successor at the Interior Ministry, Dominique de Villepin (UMP, center-right) held talks with ‘secular’ and ‘liberal’ Muslims with a view to establishing a more broadly representative body using the CRIF as a template. The rationale was that, since the CFCM only represented practicing Muslims, who made up but 10 percent of French Muslims, its remit was confined to religious issues.

possible scenarios were envisioned. The first was to modify the composition of the CFCM by inserting ‘qualified personalities’ co-opted from civil society. The second was to use the Fondation pour les œuvres de l’Islam (Foundation for Islamic Works), established by De Villepin in November 2004, as a vehicle to finance cultural activities that fell outside the frame of worship-related activities. The final option considered was to establish a ‘CRIM’ using the model of the CRIF—this would include the CFCM in the same way in which the CRIF included the Jewish Consistory. Of course, as Smolar and Ternisien (2004) note, “…this configuration would ‘drown’ the religious in a wider representation of the community.” However, political attention was diverted to the fate of two French journalists taken hostage by insurgents in Iraq who demanded that the ban on the Islamic veil in state schools be lifted and none of these initiatives got off the ground. Moreover, by 2007, the Fondation pour les œuvres de l’Islam had been effectively paralyzed by disagreements between the major federations over how it should operate.

In July 2003, within months of the first CFCM elections, President Jacques Chirac announced the establishment of the Stasi Commission, which was tasked with reflecting upon the application of the principle of laïcité. There had been continued debate about inconsistencies in the application of the 1989 ruling of the Conseil d’État that found that the wearing of religious symbols in schools was not contrary to secularism provided it did not compromise programs, schedules, or school discipline and was not

---

accompanied by manifestations of proselytism inside the school. The debate continued to swirl around issues related to immigration and *laïcité*.

In a post-September 11th environment, Jean-Louis Debré (UMP, center-right), President of the National Assembly, had convened a parliamentary commission to study the divergent positions that had arisen as a result of the 1989 opinion of the *Conseil d’État*. It was in this context that Chirac appointed the “Stasi Commission” and while its mandate involved the broader topic of *laïcité*, the wearing of the headscarf in schools had become the focal point of the social and political debate. While the Stasi Commission report proposed twenty-six measures in total, and the issue of ‘religious symbols’ in school only occupied about eight of the 151 pages of the report, the Commission’s recommendation on banning “ostentatious religious symbols” in public schools was the only one passed into law.866 Akan (2009) sees the coincident timing of the founding of the CFCM alongside the establishment of the Stasi Commission as involving a kind of trade-off where the Stasi Commission excluded expressions of ‘Muslimness’ from the public education system, the constitutive institution of *laïcité*, while including them in French society via the establishment of the first private Muslim high school under state contract as well as the founding of the CFCM.867

Since its founding, the CFCM has consistently pursued formal-legal remedies in response to crises and any dismay and outrage have been expressed through normal institutional means rather than through more contentious forms of politics such as public demonstrations. In 2003, the CFCM urged France’s Muslim faithful to “to express their emotion in the calm, dignity and serenity within the national community” in anticipation of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq although its statement noted, “dismay over this

aggression, which is contrary to international law.” In September 2003, Sarkozy urged CFCM leaders to “have a long-term vision” with regard to the headscarf issue and explained that they had to choose between “confrontation” or “accompaniment,” with the latter option, of course, being preferable. The following month, the CFCM issued a statement intimating that headscarves were a prescription (rather than an obligation) and requested that the 1989 ruling of the Conseil d’État continue to be applied, with school principals permitted to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, however, the CFCM’s response to President Chirac’s announcement of the headscarf ban was again to call for “calm and serenity.” Laurence (2012) notes that,

… the federations saw a no-win situation and sought to mitigate the law in its application. Through their newfound institutional contacts, the UOIF helped shape the implementation memorandum (circulaire d’application) by influencing the language used, eliminating mention of a ban on “all head coverings” (thus leaving open the possibility of wearing bandanas) and assuring the right of “interested third parties,” i.e., CRCMs, to contact local educational officials in cases of conflict.

Yet, some French officials saw the UOIF’s response as an indication of the success of Sarkozy’s project to co-opt it.

The CFCM and its constituent federations have also strongly condemned violent urban disturbances as well as terror attacks on French soil. During the 2005 riots in the French banlieues, the fatwa council of the UOIF issued a legal opinion that deemed participation in the rioting and the destruction of property to be “formally forbidden” and

---

The response of the CFCM and its constituent federations to the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005 and 2006 and the reprinting of selected cartoons by French periodicals *Charlie Hebdo* and *France Soir* also involved explicitly judicial remedies with the UOIF filing a legal complaint against *Charlie Hebdo* for “public insult against a group of people on account of their religion.”

The UOIF’s position was that, “… [the cartoons] went beyond the freedom of expression and constituted an aggression.” Lhaj Thami Brèze, then President of the UOIF, asked French Muslims to “take a responsible attitude,” leave it “for the law to sort out,” and thanked President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin for “condemning the caricatures and for appealing to a sense of responsibility.”

In the fall of 2009, when the French government moved to ban the *niqab* and *burqa*, then CFCM president, Mohammed Moussaoui of the RMF preached “justice and compromise” during Friday prayers. Moreover, the CFCM stated that, “Muslims should pay attention to the society in which they live, and its cultural code, and adopt a religious practice that is appropriate.” Tareq Obrou, a prominent UOIF imam, opined that, “the only Muslims who will survive spiritually are those who know how to moderate, adapt and negotiate their practices with the reality of French society.”

In the aftermath of the truck attack along Nice’s *Promenade des Anglais* in the summer of 2016, when at least 30 towns mostly along France’s southeast coast instituted...
bans on the so-called ‘burkini,’ the CFCM called an urgent meeting with then Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, and expressed concerns over the potential stigmatization of French Muslims. Soon thereafter, a series of judicial decisions struck down most of the bans. When the Conseil d’État suspended the decree made by Villeneuve-Loubet (Alpes-Maritimes), Abdallah Zekri, then Secretary General of the CFCM, called it a, “common sense decision” and a “victory of the law.” Kamel Kabtane, rector of the Mosque of Lyon and CFCM member, affirmed that, “Muslims must be proud of France and its rule of law… Islam has its place in the Republic and today it has the right to the legal framework in which freedom of conscience of the Muslim is exercised, whether he is praying in the mosque or bathing in the sea.”

Since its inaugural elections in 2003, the ‘Moroccan current’ within the CFCM has consistently outperformed the Algerian and Islamist currents. With the switch of Moroccan state support to the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France (Rally of Muslims of France—RMF), which broke off from the FNMF in 2006, the ‘Moroccan current’ has maintained this dominance within the executive of the CFCM. The lackluster performances of the GMP can be partially explained by the slow pace at which it has worked to develop a countrywide federation of mosque associations. Furthermore, the population of observant Muslims of Moroccan origin has surpassed those of Algerian origin, which has boosted the performance of the FNMF and the RMF.

---

881 For the background to the FNMF / RMF split, see Bruce, Benjamin. 2015. “Governing Islam Abroad: The Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Fields in France and Germany.” Doctorat en Science Politique, Paris, France: Sciences Po, 291.
Moreover the weighting of voting by mosque area has resulted in an advantage to the Moroccan federations that have a more rural geographic dispersal and whose mosques have thus a larger footprint. Finally, the long-standing history of the GMP’s proximity to the French state has resulted in the undermining of its legitimacy among many Muslims. Likewise, the perception of the cooption of the UOIF given its proximity to Nicolas Sarkozy between 2003 and 2007—as well as its effective abandonment of ‘outsider’ and agitational politics—has undermined its status as the predominant purveyor of political Islam in France. On multiple occasions, the GMP (2008 and 2011) and the UOIF (2011 and 2013) have boycotted the elections over disagreements over electoral rules that they believed disadvantaged them. However, both the UOIF and GMP remained ‘insiders’ in the sense that they merely announced their boycotts of the ballots without legally registering their exit or resignation from the CFCM, which some commentators interpreted as a negotiating tactic designed to prompt the state to intervene on their behalf. Electoral reform in the CFCM was finally introduced in February 2013, when an agreement was reached to grant a six-year term to a collegiate leadership (a president and at least two vice-presidents, from each of the major federations) with the presidency rotating every two years (first the GMP, then the UOIF and the RMF).

Yet, while some of its political and academic supporters have pleaded from the outset that the CFCM needs time and space to settle into a properly functioning

---

organization—and others have pointed to it as demonstrating support for the inclusion-moderation thesis—internal squabbling between the large federations has resulted in little discernable progress in key areas such as imam training and mosque financing. As a result, according to 2014 Interior Ministry estimates released a decade after Dominique de Villepin called imam training a priority, only 10 percent of the people officiating as imams in France are French imams; 400 imams are attached to—and remunerated by—Turkey, 225 by Morocco, and 120 by Algeria. Indeed, many imams in France—whether self-proclaimed or chosen by the faithful—do not officially exist pointing to the abject failure of Sarkozy’s objective for the CFCM to bring Islam out of “cellars and garages” and to the table of the Republic.

In recent years, a consensus has formed on the inability of the CFCM to emancipate itself from the countries of origin of the Muslim communities of France.

Of course, one might argue that this situation was exacerbated by decisions made in its formative period to include all the major ‘Embassy Islam’ currents while limiting the inclusion of more domestically grounded Islamist currents to those under the UOIF umbrella. Further, the CFCM structure has proven itself unable to keep all of its

constituent federations on board or to garner support from key notables and intellectuals.893 Finally, in spite of its regional infrastructure in the form of the CRCMs, the CFCM has not succeeded in anchoring itself in the regions and its constituent federations have not been able to sufficiently connect with younger generations of French Muslims.894 There has been considerable resistance to its centralizing project and, in the 2013 elections, for example, only 900 mosques took part out of some 2,500 places of worship across France.895 Underscoring this point, a 2017 survey by the think-tank Institut Montaigne found that only 9 percent of individuals who identify as Muslim in France say that they feel the CFCM represents them.896 In short, the CFCM appears to be struggling in the face of growing indifference.

A series of shocking terror attacks in Paris in 2015 and 2016 generated a new sense of urgency on the part of the state to address long-standing concerns over the lack of progress, credibility, and legitimacy of the CFCM.897 However, as Franck Frégosi notes, this belies a tendency on the part of political elites to implicitly link CFCM dysfunction with terrorist attacks—under the erroneous assumption that violent attacks are somehow linked to the worship practices of French Muslims.898 Nonetheless, in the aftermath, Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve (PS, left) indicated that he wanted to build “the most representative body possible” around the CFCM, gathering imams on the ground, intellectuals, academics, and associations.899 Cazeneuve’s plan involved reviving

899 Originally created in 2005 by Dominique de Villepin to raise funds to finance the construction of mosques and the training of imams, the FIF had effectively become dormant as a result of disagreements
Dominique de Villepin’s *Fondation pour l’Islam de France* (Islamic Foundation of France—FIF) and in March 2016 he appointed Jean-Pierre Chevenèment as its President. According to Franck Frégosi,

>The idea was to introduce a new type of actor whose profile is much more secularized, personalities of Muslim sensibility, a certain Muslim cultural elite, but one that is rather peripheral to the ordinary believers and practitioners who frequent the mosques of the Hexagon… The question is to what extent their discourse, their vision of Islam, doubtless more cultural than religious, can bear fruit among the believers. Can they even hear it?\(^{901}\)

In sending the message that the state intended to diversify its interlocutors, Cazeneuve exerted pressure on the CFCM and effectively shone a light on its lack of progress on issues such as imam training and mosque construction, while bringing the UOIF and the Mosque of Lyon back into the CFCM fold.\(^{902}\) However, any state-led and top-down approach to pluralizing the CFCM would be wholly inconsistent with the voluntary means by which the CRIF brought the Consistory together with more secular and/or cultural Jewish organizations under a single umbrella.

In December 2016, within days of succeeding Cazeneuve as Interior Minister, Bruno Le Roux (PS, left) expressed his wish to move quickly to provide transparent financing instruments for Islam in France. Under the presidency of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the FIF was envisioned as an appropriate mechanism to fund the secular training of imams and chaplains with a separate national worship association expected to finance explicitly religious projects, such as the theological training of imams and the

---


construction of mosques.\(^\text{903}\) However this strategic structure has itself become a focus of the ongoing rivalries between the major federations with each jealously guarding their prerogatives vis-à-vis imam training and unlikely to want to see their position diluted by the incorporation of ‘cultural,’ ‘liberal,’ and/or laïc Muslims. Having returned to the CFCM fold in December 2016, UOIF President, Amar Lasfar, regards the proposed structures as creatures of the Interior Ministry having been “made without the Muslims… a hostage of the current electoral period.”\(^\text{904}\) Lasfar complains that the UOIF was marginalized in the process:

> How, and by whom, were the by-laws of the association made? What is the balance between the federations? Why does the Imam’s charter (to which Imams must subscribe) not apply to imams that are “imported” from Algeria, Morocco and Turkey? Who will evaluate imams? It was the state that put this association on the agenda. It is a device made without the UOIF.\(^\text{905}\)

For its part, the GMP denounced “any form of interference in the management of Muslim worship” and announced that it would, “…not take part in the Fondation pour l’Islam de France.”\(^\text{906}\)

**Conclusions**

Mirroring the experience of the Napoleonic organization of French Jewish communities in the early 19th century, the ongoing state-led project to create an Islam de France has traversed a rocky road since its inception in the aftermath of the first Affaire du Foulard in 1988. Between 1988 and 2003, there was some inconsistency and


instability in the structuring of relations between successive governments as changing partisanship resulted in changes in strategy vis-à-vis engagements with French Muslim organizations. However, these inconsistencies can be at least somewhat attributed to the legal complexities and institutional difficulties involved in bringing Islam into the legal framework that governs other cultes as well as the state’s preoccupation with receiving a formal affirmation of the supremacy of civil law over religious law and the separation of national and religious identities and, in these senses, are not wholly dissimilar to the difficulties involved in bringing Judaism into the Concordat system.

Again, as in Britain, it was significant post-colonial flows of labor migrants that form the demographic foundations of French Muslim communities today. While there were more substantial pre-existing Muslim communities in France prior to this, these communities were effectively swamped in the 1950s and 1960s by large-scale migrations, primarily from the Maghreb. While measurement is challenging, during this period the population of Muslims in France likely doubled. Moreover, its character changed in the sense that the noria patterns associated with seasonal agricultural labor migrations from the Maghreb gave way to more permanent migration patterns driven by the industrial expansion of Les Trente Glorieuses. The result has been a major shift in the ethno-religious demography of France. The fact that these postwar migrations to the métropole originated in a variety of Muslim majority countries, only serves to further exacerbate the collective action problems faced by French Muslims in the face of the institutional requirement to present a single interlocutor.
Figure 11: Estimated Jewish and Muslim populations of France

Serious problems are posed by the Republican prohibition on the collection of data by the government—or the creation of electoral registers—on the ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds of its citizens on any basis on religious affiliation.\(^\text{907}\) This has made it excessively difficult to enumerate and analyze France’s Muslim population with any modicum of accuracy. Where the UKACIA and later the NICMU/MB in Britain campaigned to have Muslims in Britain enumerated in the census through the inclusion of a question on religious affiliation, it is legally prohibited to do so in France.\(^\text{908}\) This legal

---


\(^{908}\) The constitutionally enshrined principle of ‘equality’ has been rigidly interpreted as prohibiting the government from collecting data on the ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds of its citizens. A 1978 law
reality has also had deleterious effects on the CFCM’s institutional design. With the CFCM also prohibited from creating a register of French Muslims, its electoral system involves a suboptimal arrangement based on mosque surface areas, which has had a distorting effect by disproportionately benefitting the Moroccan federations (i.e. the FNMF and later the RMF) whose mosques tend to be located outside urban areas and have larger prayer halls.\textsuperscript{909}

While, generally, there has been a political consensus to not impede the process started by Pierre Joxe in the aftermath of the first Affaire du Foulard, a pattern emerges that correlates with changing partisanship whereby Interior Ministers from the political left (Joxe, Marchand, Quilès, Chevènement, and Vaillant) have generally tended to pursue more consultative and pluralist engagements (e.g. the CORIF and Al-Istichara). These initiatives were designed in large part with a view to breaking the virtual monopoly of the GMP over the representation of Islam in France. The Interior Ministers of the political right (Pasqua and Sarkozy), on the other hand, tended to pursue more top-down and corporatist approaches (e.g. the CRMF and the CFCM) that involved attempts to retain some degree of privilege for the GMP, which has traditionally been viewed as representative of an Islam that is more compatible with French (i.e. Republican) values. It is also likely not coincidental that French governments of the political right adopted more dirigiste approaches at times when political elites were preoccupied with spillover from the Algerian civil war (Pasqua/CRMF in the mid-1990s) as well as the September 11th attacks (Sarkozy/CFCM in 2002-3). This highlights the problematic tendency on the part

of European political elites to implicitly link the worship practices of European Muslims with violent extremism.\(^{910}\)

While the structure of engagements between successive French governments and the CFCM have remained relatively consistent since 2003, one might well question the utility of structural consistency in the face of abject indifference to the CFCM and its lack of institutional legitimacy. Illustrating this point, more than two thirds of respondents to a survey conducted by the think-tank Institut Montaigne who identify as Muslim in France said that they were unaware of the CFCM. Only 9 percent saying they felt that it represented them.”\(^{911}\) In the same poll, when asked where they found information about Islam, 73 percent of respondents replied “the internet” or “Google,” while only 47 percent said “an imam.”\(^{912}\) The popularity of ‘internet preachers’ in France, as elsewhere, calls into question the very basis of the kinds of mosque-based structures of representation that form the core of the CFCM model of representation. Here, we must recognize that a new era of global interconnectivity is undoubtedly transforming individual modes of religious expression and precipitating the emergence of new ‘translocal’ communities among younger generations, communities that are distanced from the local mosque authority structure as well as from functionaries in Paris.\(^{913}\) To some extent, these observations validate Benhabib’s critique of ‘strong’ or ‘mosaic’ multiculturalists who, she argues, make the epistemic mistake of understanding cultures


in terms of “clearly delineable wholes” as a means to render them coherent for the purposes of understanding and control.  

Like the Consistory before it, the CFCM has been expected to not only be “an instrument of recognition,” but also to serve as “a domesticating institution.” However, its projected “domesticating” function has also been complicated by the opposing pull of the complex international relationships between France, on the one hand, and Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey on the other hand. Theological issues have also proven particularly sticky for the CFCM, relative to the Consistory, as its constituent federations and currents are relatively more heterogenous in ethnic, sectarian, and national terms with all the attendant diversity in theological orientations. Whereas the pre-1905 Consistory was an arm of the state with considerable power, including the power to determine the very legality of religious practices as well as the imposition of a ‘lowest common denominator’ theology, the constituent federations of the CFCM have found it near impossible to formulate anything resembling a common theology.

These ongoing issues are well known among French political elites and have prompted some discussion about how to ‘fix’ them. However, for the most part, the options under discussion follow the standard French template of corporatist governance involving top-down and state-led initiatives such as former Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve’s (PS, left) idea of rejuvenating the FIF under the leadership of Jean-Pierre Chevènement or the suggestion of El Karoui (2017) of a substantial role for the state in ‘creating’ a ‘Muslim elite.’ There is a catch-22 here insofar as some of the CFCM’s

---

916 See, for example, the policy prescriptions suggested by El Karoui, Hakim. 2016. “A French Islam Is Possible.” Paris: Institut Montaigne.
deficiencies may themselves be rooted in its origins as a state-led initiative and its identification as a pet project of Nicolas Sarkozy. However, the fact that approximately two thirds of French Muslims are unaware of its very existence means that these kinds of top-down approaches have failed to substantially penetrate the communities they are intended to ‘domesticate.’

Moreover, the procedural inconsistencies identified here in terms of state involvement in engineering the desired mix of insiders and outsiders do not appear to have generated the results that French political elites desired. The incorporation of the UOIF as the only Islamist stream in the CFCM left organizations identified with Tariq Ramadan outside the structure. However, 30 percent of the Institut Montaigne survey’s respondents say they are unfamiliar with the UOIF, while only 15 percent are unfamiliar with Tariq Ramadan. This would appear to indicate that institutional/organizational models of representation may not be nearly as attractive to French Muslims than models of representation that reserve space for French Muslim public figures. However, political frustrations with the apparent lack of progress of the CFCM also certainly reflect a measure of short-termism as well as unrealistic expectations about the institution’s capacity to deliver higher-level results given its limited funding and institutional capacity.

Much has been written about the French legislation that banned conspicuous or ostentatious religious symbols in public schools (officially “Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, concerning, as an application of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb that demonstrate religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools”). Some commentators have pointed to the 2014 law as constituting part of an emancipation bargain with Sarkozy’s using the CFCM as an

---

instrument to co-opt, forge unity, and ultimately demobilize French Muslim elites immediately prior to the institution of the law.\textsuperscript{920} What is clear is that some of the members of the Stasi Commission did not intend the law of March 15, 2004 to be the sole outcome of the commission but rather part of a raft of reforms, many of which were more ‘accommodationist’ in spirit.\textsuperscript{921} The selective manner in which the Stasi Commission’s recommendations were applied betrays a significant procedural inconsistency, one that lends support to Jean Baubérot’s contention that conservative secularisms have made laïcité “a right-wing value.”\textsuperscript{922}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
CHAPTER 5
THE NETHERLANDS

State-Church Institutions in the Netherlands

Unlike in Britain, where the progressive dilution of church-state establishment has resulted in a weakly established Anglican church in the present-day—or France, which experienced a radical frontal assault on the dominant church and more than a century of strict church-state separation—the separation of church and state in the Netherlands has never been explicitly formalized. Having first been proclaimed in 1796 with the disestablishment of the Dutch Reformed Church, church-state separation is only implicitly embodied in a combination of guarantees in various revisions to the Dutch Constitution.\(^\text{923}\) Moreover, the historical absence of an established, monopolistic, or even dominant church in the Netherlands since the end of the eighteenth century has resulted in the effective institutionalization of plurality in the religious landscape under the system known as \textit{verzuiling} (‘pillarization’).

With the emergence of a strong Catholic bloc alongside Dutch Calvinists in the late nineteenth century, and with both agitating for state support of religious education, the Dutch consensual or ‘polder’ model was solidified under the so-called “Pacification of 1917” that consolidated the ‘pillar’ system.\(^\text{924}\) In the aftermath, mechanisms rooted in


\(^{924}\) The “Pacification of 1917” involved the addition of an article to the Dutch constitutions that stipulated that confessional groups had the right to equal funding for organizing schools on a confessional basis as public schools. Daalder, Hans. 1966. “The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society.” In \textit{Political}
the Dutch Calvinist notion of ‘sphere sovereignty’ were institutionalized originally as a means to protect Dutch Protestantism from the evils of modernity (i.e. socialism and liberalism) but also to mitigate the potential for social conflict between Calvinists and Catholics as well as between the confessional and non-confessional pillars. Under this institutional schema, Dutch elites approximated liberal neutrality through ‘even-handedness’ in the provision of equal access to a segmented public sphere as means to ensure public order and social peace.

Under this verzuiling (‘pillar’) system, each pillar’s interests was defended by its own political party and the emergence of an elaborate system of ancillary organizations (such as hospitals, schools, trade unions, newspapers, and various other powerful consultative institutions) that played a leading role in the representation of each pillar as well as in cross-pillar elite accommodation. In his famous hypothesis, Lijphart (1968) observed a “pragmatic tolerance” of elites towards the religious beliefs of their counterparts in other pillars that enhanced consensual decision-making and inspired the proportional distribution of resources and functions across the pillars. Indeed, research supports the idea that the legacy of pillarization provides a high degree of legitimacy for

---


claims made on the state on the basis of religious identity.  

Scholars have also pointed to the idea that the Dutch government continues to deploy institutional templates provided by ‘pillarization’ in interactions with Muslim organizations. However, while the literature has often represented the Netherlands as an ideal-typical multicultural state where minority religious groups are accommodated on an equal footing, the reality is that it was native Christians, not non-Christian migrants, that were socially integrated under the old pillarized system. Moreover, important aspects of the pillarization model, such as a certain degree of opacity in elite decision-making processes as a means to facilitate inter-elite compromise, have fallen by the wayside with increased public expectations for transparency and accountability in political life.

While Lijphart’s view of a harmonious consociational democracy is now viewed as somewhat of an overstatement, even critics of the pillarization construct recognize that it captures important elements of twentieth century Dutch politics. Rath (2005) points out that, while the increasing visibility of Islam and the decline of pillarization were more

---

or less coincidental in time (mid-1960s to mid-1990s), to a certain extent they pulled in opposite directions. Indeed, while some have suggested that Muslim immigrants have been unfortunate in the sense that they settled in the Netherlands “too late” to take advantage of the pillar system, many of the social, political, and legal practices and structures of pillarization remain either wholly or partly intact and continue to shape the modalities of state engagements with minority faith groups. This is consistent with the position of those who argue that Dutch society only really ‘depillarized’ with regard to individual behavior, with only partial depillarization occurring on the level of social organization.

However, some scholars point to the potentially detrimental effects of pillarization on religious minorities. For example, Koopmans (2007) argues that by emphasizing ethno-cultural cleavages and divisions, the pillar model has had negative effects on new immigrant groups in the sense that it offers, “a formal and symbolic form of equality, which in practice reinforces ethnic cleavages and reproduces segregation on a distinctly unequal basis.” Likewise, Ghorashi (2006) identifies categorical ‘us’ versus ‘them’ thinking and an essentialist conception of culture as legacies of pillarization that make it “seem almost impossible to detach the individual migrant from his/her cultural

and/or ethnic category.” Again, none of these arguments are necessarily mutually exclusive in the sense that it seems likely that legacies of pillarization legitimate claims made on the basis of religious affiliation while also contributing to reinforcing social cleavages.

Even after constitutional revisions resulted in formal church-state separation in 1983, engagements between the state and minority religions have tended to be characterized by a more pluralist approach in contrast to the muscular corporatism of the French Republican model. Under pillarization, many government functions were outsourced to denominationally or ideologically based organizations subsidized by the state. One legacy of the pillar system is the endurance of formal state recognition for ancillary buffer-type institutions that mediate between the state and its citizens. This intermediary layer of quasi non-governmental organizations has provided the means for Muslims (and other minority groups) to influence state policy and make claims on the state. Indeed, despite church-state separation, Dutch governmental bodies continue to confer official recognition on faith-based organizations as consultative bodies in policy formulation as evidenced by the state’s certification of the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (CMO) and the Contactgroep Islam (CGI) as “recognized conversation-partners” in 2004-5.

In spite of the rise of anti-Islam populists in the Netherlands in recent years, I argue that legacies of pillarization, as a mode of governance designed to mitigate the potential for cultural conflicts between Christian denominations, continues to inform engagements between the state and religious groups of immigrant origin. As we shall

---


later see, Muslim and other minority organizations have adapted to this church-state institutional framework in order to claim state subsidization for their own schools, broadcasting time, and other public goods. In recent decades, claims for accommodations made on the state by minority religious organizations have tended to pit confessional political parties, such as the Christian Democrats (CDA, center-left), against the more secular parties such as the Liberals (VVD, center-right) and Social Democrats (PvdA, center-left). However, the rise of the anti-Islam Freedom Party (PVV, populist right) starting in the mid-2000s, along with the collapse of the CDA’s support in the 2010 general election has weakened the political basis of any ‘solidarity of the religious’ in the Netherlands in recent years. That being said, representative groups of the mainline Christian churches often join forces with Muslim umbrella organizations, for example in expressing public disapproval over Geert Wilders’ provocative anti-Islam film *Fitna* (2008) and issuing joint statements condemning acts of terrorism such as the 7/7 attacks in London.

In the following section, I will outline the development of a Jewish community and its organizational representation in the Netherlands since the French Revolution. This will necessarily involve an account of how Jewish organizations ‘fit’ in, as the pillar system became increasingly institutionalized in the early twentieth century. While there have been several transition points and breaks in the relationship between the primary Jewish organizations in the Netherlands and the state, the structuring of the relationship has been relatively consistent over time and the relationship has been largely politically uncontroversial over the longue durée. Then we shall move to examine the development

---


of Dutch Muslim organizations since the late 1960s in the Netherlands as well as their evolving relationship with the state—one that was only formally institutionalized in the mid-2000s.

**Jewish organizational representation in the Netherlands (1795—present)**

The history of Jewish communities in the Netherlands dates to the turn of the 17th century when Sephardic Jews who had managed to escape the Inquisition fled to the newly found Republic of the United Netherlands after the Spanish conquest of Antwerp in 1585. About 30 years later, the first Ashkenazi Jews arrived in Amsterdam having fled Germany and Poland as a result of pogroms. The Ashkenazi community grew rapidly and outnumbered the Sephardim, who were predominantly Portuguese, by the end of the 17th century. While there were some restrictions placed on the kinds of economic activities that Jews could perform in the Netherlands—as well as restrictions on interactions between Jews and Christians—it had been made clear, by virtue of the 1579 charter of the Republic, that Jews would be tolerated and there was no apparent intention to limit their numbers. Early settlements were concentrated in Amsterdam, where the authorities welcomed Portuguese merchants, cartographers, and printers as assets in a city

---

striving to become a center for world trade during the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic.  

Through the eighteenth century, the Dutch authorities referred to the Ashkenazi and Portuguese Jews collectively as the *Joodsche Nation* (*Jewish Nation*), framing their Jewishness in ethnic terms. However, as elsewhere in Europe at this juncture, the differences between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim were clearly noticeable with the Ashkenazi community speaking Yiddish and emphasizing memorized study of the Talmud while the Sephardim spoke Spanish and Portuguese and, by virtue of their historical circumstances, had little tradition of religious instruction.  

That being said, by the end of the 18th century, there was a growing rapprochement between Sephardic and Ashkenazi elites with both starting to adopt the Dutch language in writings and oratory and a measure of intra-communal integration was underway by the time of emancipation.  

With the political and military decline of the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century came the collapse of the economy, which resulted in general impoverishment among the Jewish population. Indeed, by the end of the 18th century, 54 percent of the once wealthy Portuguese community of Amsterdam was dependent on financial support.  

With the exception of the diamond and book printing industries, very few

---


trades were open to Dutch Jews and most were engaged in trading in second-hand goods and foodstuffs. During the same period, unrestricted immigration from Eastern Europe swelled the urban population of Ashkenazi Jews many of whom were dependant on charity and relief from communal institutions that were supported by a narrow oligarchic layer of more prosperous Jews. The situation worsened after the economic crisis of 1772 and became even more acute during the French occupation after 1794 when trade in goods came to a virtual standstill.

Again, the French Revolution in 1789—and the reverberations throughout Europe in its aftermath—serves as an appropriate breakpoint for an analysis of the history Jewish organizational representation in the Netherlands. In October 1795, the southern provinces of the confederated Dutch Republic were formally annexed by Napoleon’s French revolutionary armies, an event that was followed by the imposition of far-reaching institutional changes including the establishment of a French-style unitary state divided into départements, the replacement of the confederated Dutch Republic’s judicial system with the French revolutionary system, and the suppression of—and confiscation of property from—religious orders. The north fell shortly thereafter, with revolutionary waves preceding the French advance that, ultimately, conferred legitimacy on the Napoleonic invasion of the Dutch Republic.

949 The ‘crisis of 1772,’ refers to a financial contagion that originated in London in June 1772 and then spread to other parts of Europe, such as Scotland and Netherlands, as well as the American colonies. For more on its impact on the Netherlands, see Wilson, C.H. 1939. “The Economic Decline of the Netherlands.” The Economic History Review 9 (2): 111–27.
One of the first acts of the National Convention of the French-installed Batavian Republic (1795-1806) was to disestablish the Reformed Church.\textsuperscript{951} Before 1796, only members of the Dutch Reformed Church were permitted to occupy public positions. However, on September 2, 1796, the National Assembly of the Batavian Republic formally emancipated Dutch Jewry proclaiming that, “No Jew shall be excluded from rights or advantages which are associated with citizenship in the Batavian Republic, and which he may desire to enjoy.”\textsuperscript{952} Accordingly, as of 1796, Jews could hypothetically vote, be elected to all political offices, settle anywhere in the Republic, and participate in economic activities, such as guilds, from which they had previously been excluded.\textsuperscript{953} Jews were, again hypothetically, no longer foreigners belonging to—and subject to the laws of—a ‘Jewish nation’ but were now citizens subject to the laws of the state and with the same rights and obligations as every other citizen.

Many, if not most, Jews were unenthusiastic about this ‘French’ idea as they were habituated to living apart, both physically and politically, and felt a degree of loyalty to the old regime whose protection they had enjoyed for over two hundred years. As elsewhere, Dutch Jews were expected to shed their customs and traditions and integrate into non-Jewish society in exchange for political emancipation. Sonnenberg-Stern (2000) notes that these processes occurred much more slowly in the Netherlands than elsewhere because of the physical segregation of—and endemic poverty among—Dutch Jewry as

\textsuperscript{951} However, there was a period of constitutional negotiation that followed, which left church-state institutions in flux until the re-establishment of the Dutch Reformed Church with the restoration of the monarchy in 1815. For a more in-depth discussion, see Bijsterveld, Sophie van. 1995. “Freedom of Religion in the Netherlands.” \textit{B.Y.U. L. Rev}, no. 2: 556.
well as a general reluctance to renounce religious and cultural traditions. In reality, economic, social, and cultural emancipation was restricted for a long period of time to a small affluent and usually educated upper class. Whereas the post-emancipation migration of the Jewish poor to urban centers such as Paris and Strasbourg promoted social mobility among Jews in France, and the accommodating attitude of local authorities and rapid economic growth provided similar opportunities in Britain, the Jewish poor of the Batavian Republic—two-thirds of whom lived in Amsterdam—faced a less accommodating local government and remained effectively segregated from non-Jewish society. Continued discrimination and intolerance after formal emancipation can be illustrated by a resolution passed by Amsterdam’s local administrators in the very same month as the emancipation decree, which forbade all denominations of the province of Holland from displaying habits which distinguished them from the country’s main religion but singled out the Jewish community by emphasizing that rabbis were forbidden from wearing their garb in public and that the celebration of Sukkoth had to be conducted in private.

Prior to the Emancipation Decree, the management of Jewish affairs had been entirely in the hands of community leaders backed by municipal authorities. Communal issues were routinely resolved at the local level so there was no need or demand for any provincial or national organization. With the de facto abolition of the

---

semi-autonomous ‘Jewish nation,’ the ability of local chief rabbis, *parnasim* (administrative officers of Jewish congregations who interacted with non-Jewish authorities), and *beth din* to enforce obedience to the *halakhah* in the private lives of its members was severely diminished. This crisis of authority resulted in rising tensions between a ‘New Community’ lead by upper-class Jewish intellectuals enamored with the French revolution’s discourse on liberty and equality and associated with the patriotic revolutionary society, ‘Felix Libertate,’ and an ‘Old Community’ of more orthodox-minded Jews lead by the *parnasim* who believed that emancipation would bring about the disintegration of the autonomous Jewish community. The authorities, not eager to assume responsibility for a predominantly poverty-stricken community of Jews, tacitly acknowledged the *parnasim’s* continued command of the policy and affairs of the Jewish community. In 1797, members of ‘Felix Libertate’ established the Adat Yeshurun synagogue, which defied the regulations of the *parnasim* and the ‘Old Community.’

In 1806, believing the Batavian Republic to be too independent, Napoleon moved to bring Dutch territory under his direct supervision by installing his brother Louis Napoleon on the throne of the newly proclaimed Kingdom of Holland (1806-1810). Unlike his brother, Louis’ sympathy for the plight of Dutch Jewry appears to have been motivated by genuine humanitarian concern over their dire poverty rather than political

---

962 The Kingdom of Holland at this time covered the same territory as the present-day Netherlands, with the addition of East Frisia in present-day Germany in 1807 and excepting Limburg, and parts of Zeeland, which were under French control.
pragmatism. Under Louis’ reign, the first serious efforts were made to put formal political emancipation into practice. However, Michman (1981) notes that, “even though Louis Napoleon… strove to effect the implementation of the decree, the lack of support from the non-Jewish public, particularly in Amsterdam, impeded the Jews from attaining complete equality.” Sonnenberg-Stern (2000) notes that,

While formal equality had been granted up to a point, the administrative practices of the city councils continued to discriminate against the Jews and Jewish interests. Scarcely any change occurred in the administrative prerogatives regarding the situation of the Jews; discrimination against Jews lingered, Jewish communities throughout the Batavian Republic remained dependent on the discretion of city councils, and guilds continued to exist after their abolition by law on 5 October 1798… [and] counteracted the declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, since they only protected the interest of the privileged few.

Accordingly the perpetuation of the guild system continued to disadvantage Dutch Jews by effectively excluding them from a significant portion of the labor market, which undoubtedly also contributed to hindering the economic mobility of Dutch Jewry in the first decades of the nineteenth century.

The absence of a centralized representative Jewish communal body for more than a decade after emancipation also caused confusion and exacerbated communal tensions. It was in this context that, as in France, the creation of a national-level organizational

---


structure that would put Jewish communities on a par with other denominations came on
the agenda of both the public authorities and progressive Jewish elites.\textsuperscript{967} While this
impetus for centralization brought Western European Jewry much closer to national
governments, the granting of freedom of worship paradoxically resulted in unprecedented
state interference in religious practice.\textsuperscript{968} Preparations for Napoleon’s \textit{Grand Sanhedrin}
in Paris in 1807 highlighted the political divisions in Dutch Jewish communities. With
only one of four Dutch congregations (the more reform-minded \textit{Adat Yeshurun}
congregation) responding positively to the invitation to attend, the decisions of the
\textit{Sanhedrin} were not considered binding on all Jewish congregations in the Kingdom of
Holland.\textsuperscript{969}

In 1808, Louis Napoleon undertook a radical administrative reform of the Jewish
congregations in the kingdom by imposing a state-supervised centralized bureaucratic
structure, the \textit{Opperconsistorie} (High Consistory), to oversee them.\textsuperscript{970} The
\textit{Opperconsistorie} unified the majority of Dutch Jewry by bringing all Ashkenazi Jews in
the Kingdom of Holland into a single organization and making the parnasim subject and
responsible to the Dutch government.\textsuperscript{971} Notably, the Sephardic congregations in
Amsterdam and The Hague retained their independence and were not forcibly combined

\textsuperscript{967} Wallet, Bart. 2009. “Politics and Jewish Communities: The Centralization of Western European Jewry.”
\textit{Perush} 1.
\textsuperscript{968} Wallet, Bart. 2009. “Politics and Jewish Communities: The Centralization of Western European Jewry.”
\textit{Perush} 1.
\textsuperscript{969} Fuks-Mansfeld, R. G. 2002. “Enlightenment and Emancipation, from c.1750 to 1814.” In \textit{The History of
\textsuperscript{970} “De Totstandkoming, Bestuur En Taken van Het NIK.” 2015. \textit{Nederlands Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap}.
\textsuperscript{971} Michman, Jozeph. 1995. \textit{The History of Dutch Jewry during the Emancipation Period, 1787-1815: Gothic
Turrets on a Corinthian Building}. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 105-6; Sonnenberg-
with the Ashkenazi congregations, as happened in France.\textsuperscript{972} However, Sephardic congregations were obliged to follow the directives of the Central Consistory in Paris and were concurrently under the direct control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Kingdom of Holland.\textsuperscript{973}

The central objective of the Opperconsistorie was to reform the ‘Jewish nation’ into a Dutch-Jewish denomination with the same rights and obligations as any other denomination in the kingdom.\textsuperscript{974} In 1809, the Opperconsistorie organized the registration of Jewish congregations and performed a census of their membership. The congregations were subsequently divided into eleven ‘consistorial churches’ of about 1,500 members each with internal administrative matters, including the election of parnasim, placed under central control.\textsuperscript{975} Moreover, the Opperconsistorie was tasked with a variety of state-building functions such as ensuring that all Jews would use Dutch surnames and the phasing out of Yiddish so that only Dutch would be spoken in synagogues and Jewish schools.

In 1810, fearing the extent to which King Louis I was serving Dutch rather than French interests, Napoleon annexed the Kingdom of Holland into a French imperial province. The Opperconsistorie was subsequently reformed with the establishment of four consistories: a ‘Portuguese’ (i.e. Sephardic) Consistory covering Amsterdam and The Hague and three ‘Dutch-Israelite’ (i.e. Ashkenazi) Consistories covering Amsterdam,


Rotterdam, and Zwolle.976 This administrative reorganization of the Opperconsistorie was only completed in 1813, by which time French rule over the Kingdom of Holland was coming to an end. While the parnasim of the ‘Old Community’ resisted these moves toward institutionalization, centralization, and nationalization, the new consistorial system was gradually adopted as generational replacement produced new and younger leaders. Fuks-Mansfield (2002) argues that the chief rabbis, whom one might expect to have fought to preserve traditional Jewish values, were effectively isolated during this period because of their inability to communicate in either Dutch or French, their inward focus on congregational life, and a tradition of deferring to the parnasim on matters both religious and secular.977

In April 1813, with his imperial ambitions overstretching his military forces in Russia and elsewhere, Napoleon attempted to widen his conscription efforts to include young well-to-do Dutch men, which triggered anti-French disturbances throughout the Netherlands. With Napoleon’s power waning, the Dutch looked to the House of Orange for help. In December 1813, Prince William of Orange returned to the Netherlands where he was crowned King. William I chose not to dismantle the administrative structures of the Napoleonic-era, establishing the Hoofdcommissie voor de Zaken der Israelite (Commission for the Affairs of the Israelites—hereafter Hoofdcommissie) in 1814 as a slightly modified successor to the Opperconsistorie. The Hoofdcommissie, under the remit of the Department of Religious Affairs, served as an intermediary between the government and Jewish communities and notably brought both Sephardim and Ashkenazim under its authority. By virtue of the demographic outnumbering of the

Sephardim, the membership of the *Hoofdcommissie* rendered the Sephardic community subject to the direction of the Ashkenazim for more than a half century until the Sephardim regained administrative independence in 1871.

The *Hoofdcommissie* consisted of nine Jewish members who were appointed by the king—on the recommendation of the Minister for Religious Affairs—to preside over the affairs of Dutch-Jewish communities. The king appointed the original members of the *Hoofdcommissie* with new members appointed from the most prominent community members by the Minister for Religious Affairs on the recommendation of the *Hoofdcommissie* itself. The *Hoofdcommissie* had immense power conferred by its role in advising the minister on policies affecting the Jewish communities, preparing decisions, and ultimately controlling policy implementation and its scope of action involved it in the most important cases in the large congregations as well as in the minor quarrels in the smallest, provincial communities. Wallet (2008) notes that,

> Because of the relatively small size of the Dutch Jewish elite, many members were related to each other and, during the period that the *Hoofdcommissie* functioned, family dynasties with considerable influence developed. Of course, the traditional Jewish elite of merchants and bankers was represented, but so was the new elite, which comprised lawyers and physicians. A third of the commission’s members were active in local, provincial, or national politics. This small Jewish elite, jammed between the Christian patriciate and the broad Jewish community, had to make the policy for the Jewish community.

---

**Footnotes:**


Reminiscent of the role played by the ‘Cousinhood’ in the Board of Deputies across the English Channel, a kin-based elite network took a key role in the leadership of the *Hoofdcommissie* in the Netherlands.

Much like the *Opperconsistorie* that preceded it, the *Hoofdcommissie* pursued similar objectives of regeneration and nationalization, issuing decrees that were backed by the full force of governmental power. It commanded a hierarchical structure that incorporated Jewish educational institutions, rabbinical seminaries, and philanthropic endeavors. Under the *Hoofdcommissie*, congregations were grouped in districts with each district headed by a *Hoofdsynagoge* (Head Synagogue) that was empowered to implement national policy within its own district. Each *Hoofdsynagoge* was directed by a chief rabbi to whom district rabbis and teachers would report and who, in turn, reported to a ‘Rabbinical College’ that was tasked with advising the *Hoofdcommissie* on religious matters and whose doctrinal decisions were binding upon all religious functionaries in the Netherlands.  

Sonnenberg-Stern (2000) notes that,

… the Parnassim were essentially subordinate to the Commission and were consequently impelled to voice their concerns to the different government officials via members who were in favour of reform. As the Commission was subject to the will of William I and his ministers, whose main objective was that the Jews attune themselves to the customs of Dutch society, it was pointless for the Parnassim to make propositions which counteracted the intended course of reform, and the Jewish conservative faction was therefore unable to develop a strong voice of opposition.

This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the *Hoofdscommissie* by default was opposed to the *parnasim*. Sonnenberg-Stern (2000) points out that the

---


Hoofdscommissie made it clear to William I in an early communication that its “principal objective remains the promotion of Dutch Jewry’s interests.”

Ultimately, the parnassim were required to acknowledge the superiority of the state, indicating the state’s intention to separate religious and secular authority. Indeed, in some senses, King William I went further than the preceding Batavian and French administrations in imposing even more authority over Jewish communities. He did so through a ‘divide and rule’ strategy that involved instituting a measure of decentralization in order to prevent more conservative factions in Amsterdam’s Jewish communities from hindering his nationalization and regeneration agenda. In deciding that the Jewish communities would be governed by the twelve largest Jewish jurisdictions in the country, by according each jurisdiction equal power, and with each under the management of its own chief rabbi and parnassim, King William I prevented Amsterdam from taking a leading role.

This impressive degree of administrative engineering was designed to rationalize the Jewish communities of the Netherlands—and render them more ‘legible’—as part of a greater project of nationalization and regeneration. As Wallet (2008) notes, this was “in line with the enlightened, absolutist politics of the era, which aimed at shaping a clear, national identity that had to bridge regional and cultural differences.”

985 As in France,


education was seen to play an important role in this nationalization project. The Napoleonic-inflected Dutch national school system authorized the establishment of two types of schools: state schools founded and subsidized by the authorities and private schools financed through trusts or tuition. However, an exception was made for Jewish schools, which received state subsidies on the condition that Dutch was the language of instruction. In its role of fostering a Dutch national consciousness within the Jewish communities, the Hoofdcommissie oversaw the continued promotion of the Dutch language over Yiddish and Portuguese, encouraged Jewish participation in national festivals, and institutionalized periodic expressions of allegiance to the House of Orange around rites of passage such as births, marriages, and deaths.

With the institutional recognition of the freedom of religion under the liberal Constitution of 1848, the Hoofdcommissie was released from the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and was no longer responsible for implementing regulations bearing upon Jewish communities. By this juncture, with its authority over religious communities in decline, the Jewish religious establishment was in some disarray. From 1838 to 1874, the Ashkenazim had no chief rabbi, with the Sephardic community also without a chief rabbi from 1822 to 1900. Understanding the necessity of establishing an alternative to the consistorial model that had governed Jewish communities since

---

986 Yiddish was tolerated during a transitional period until teachers had been trained and new schoolbooks had been written in Dutch and between 1817 and 1860, the state subsidized the publication of 79 books for use at Jewish schools. See Wallet (2007) in International Handbook of Jewish Education.


1808, the government urged the *Hoofdcommissie* to design new regulations in line with the 1848 Constitution.\(^990\) However, the leadership of the *Hoofdcommissie* was concerned about the ramifications of a complete reorganization and the dissent it would generate between liberal Jews who wanted to introduce more radical changes to synagogue services and Orthodox Jews who thought that existing reforms already went too far.\(^991\) In addition, the central synagogues in the regions preferred to maintain the status quo with the executive of the *Hoofdcommissie* remaining in The Hague because they feared that they would be overwhelmed by Amsterdam’s numerical superiority in any organizational alternative.\(^992\)

What followed was a difficult process primarily involving two extended disputes between various Jewish communities that were not resolved until 1870. The first dispute involved whether to maintain or dissolve the state-imposed union between the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities under the aegis of the *Hoofdcommissie*.\(^993\) This was resolved by a return to the organizational independence of each with the establishment of the Ashkenazi *Nederlands-Israëlisch Kerkgenootschap* (Netherlands Israelite Church Community — NIK) and the Sephardic *Portugees-Israëlisch Kerkgenootschap* (Portuguese Israelite Church Community — PIK).\(^994\) The second dispute revolved around the role that the numerically superior Amsterdam Jews would play in the NIK.


\(^{994}\) The curious choice of the Dutch term *Kerkgenootschap*, which translates as ‘church community,’ reflects the fact that both the NIK and PIK wanted equal treatment to Christians. Thank you to Sanne Van Oosten for this insight.
Amsterdam eventually prevailed with the outcome that the executive of the NIK would henceforth be dominated by leaders of the Nederlandsch-Israëlitse Hoofdsynagoge te Amsterdam (Dutch Israelite High Synagogue of Amsterdam). While the rabbinate remained Orthodox, the members of both the regional and national committees of the NIK tended to be “highly assimilated and even secularized...leaders from the well-to-do middle classes” and, along with the other denominations, the NIK was permitted to levy taxes from its members with the government paying the rabbis’ wages.

For the fifty years that followed 1870, economic growth and industrialization spurred a period of increasing affluence that spanned all sectors of the Dutch population. In the first years of the twentieth century, the policies of Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper institutionalized his neo-Calvinist theory of ‘sphere sovereignty,’ effectively segmenting Dutch society along religious and/or ideological lines and creating the institutional phenomenon that later became known as verzeling or ‘pillarization.’ Social groups such as Protestants, Roman Catholics, social democrats, and liberals formed their own compartmentalized complexes of organizations—or ‘pillars’—in almost every social sphere along with their own distinctive subcultures. Along with their own belief systems, each ‘pillar’ had its own political parties, trade unions, schools, publishers, TV and radio stations and even sporting organizations and teams. This pillar system undergirds the

---


traditional political science view of Dutch society as one that embraces denominational pluralism or “consociational democracy.”

However, neither a Jewish political party nor a general school system ever developed and while there were some trade unions with a disproportionately high number of Jewish members—especially in the diamond and garment industries—Jewish issues did not come to the forefront of their agendas. Moreover, while the size of the Jewish population in Amsterdam may have been conducive to a degree of local pillarization, this would not have fit the national pattern. Accordingly, a distinctive Jewish ‘pillar’ as such never emerged and Jews tended to align themselves with one of the non-confessional pillars. Thus, the working-class that formed the majority of Dutch Jewry tended to align themselves with the social democrats while upper class and middle class Jews tended to favor the liberal pillar, which had no sub-cultural organizations. Moreover, while approximately 10 percent of Dutch Jews were members of Zionist organizations in the 1930s, membership was divided between several organizations that were themselves divided between liberal and socialist currents.

Cahen (2002) note that Jews also became more involved in the economy, arts, and sciences—social spheres

---


where pillarization was less pronounced. As a result, Jewish communities in the Netherlands lacked effective political representation under the pillar system. Nonetheless, similar to the recognized ‘pillars,’ the Jewish confessional organizations provided the unifying structure of the Jewish community and the community’s business and intellectual elite were considered the guardians of Judaism in the Netherlands. Moreover, seats were reserved for Jews in some municipal councils to be filled by leading local Jewish figures—a practice that ended with the increasing dominance of political parties prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.

While it is important to note that only about 10 percent of the 115,000 Jews living in the Netherlands in 1920 were really observant, the overwhelming majority belonged to the NIK at this juncture, not because they were orthodox, or even particularly observant, but rather that they saw the NIK as a vehicle to express their Jewish identity in a society that defined Jews solely by religious criteria. Brasz (1995) notes that, “…Cultural, social, and ethnic minorities as they are recognized today in Dutch society did not yet exist… and any other than the religious definition, aroused the suspicion of the outside world that one did not want to be completely Dutch.” Thus the ‘pillar’ system provided strong incentives for Jews to organize and identify in purely religious terms.

While Jews seldom accounted for more than 2 percent of the Dutch population, the period from 1870 to 1920 saw a significant rise in the size of the Jewish population of


the Netherlands from about 68,000 in 1869 to a peak of more than 115,000 in 1920. Unlike in Britain and France where immigrants fleeing from pogroms in the Pale of Settlement accounted for most of the increases in the size of Jewish populations at this juncture, immigration does not appear to be a decisive explanatory factor for the population increases in the Netherlands at this time. Indeed, the pogroms that occurred in Eastern Europe after 1881 do not loom large in the historiography of Dutch Jewry. Shneer (2016) argues that, most Eastern European Jews saw the Netherlands as a transit point, with Dutch Jews regarding their co-religionists as being in need of assistance to reach their final destinations, not as potential community members. Accordingly, although tens of thousands of Jewish refugees passed through the country, only about 1,000 settled in Amsterdam between 1881 and 1914. Weinberg (2012) suggests that the lack of a significant influx of east European Jewish refugees at this juncture meant that more militant and nationalistic forms of Zionism never took root in the Netherlands. Rather, Blom and Cahen (2002) explain the population increases after 1869 relative to the Dutch population as a whole as a factor of the relatively high birth rates and low infant mortality rates among Dutch Jews with the slower growth rate after

1889 and absolute decline between 1920 and 1930 explained by a drop in birth rates and religious affiliation and perhaps an increase in mixed marriages.\textsuperscript{1010}

Brasz (2011) points out that—as with their French coreligionists—the early emancipation of Dutch Jews, followed by a long process of acculturation, led to a rather rigid type of Orthodox Judaism in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{1011} Observant Dutch Jews adopted a neo-Orthodox model that combined a strictly halakhic Judaism with the possibility for followers to develop themselves—personally and professionally—into productive citizens in the non-Jewish society in which they lived.\textsuperscript{1012} Dutch synagogues saw no dramatic changes in terms of theological innovations but only relatively cosmetic changes such as the introduction of sermons in Dutch and clothing for rabbis similar to that worn by Protestant clergymen.\textsuperscript{1013} As a result, Dutch Jews were generally hostile to the Reform movement that emerged in neighboring Germany in the nineteenth century, which they regarded as part of German Jewry’s attempt to achieve the equal citizenship they themselves already enjoyed.\textsuperscript{1014}

---


equally hostile to Zionism, formed the dominant mainstream of Dutch Jewry until the emergence of the first generation of Dutch Progressive Jews in the 1930s.\(^{1015}\)

Zionism had relatively little appeal in the Netherlands with the rabbinate considering Zionists to be a-religious and with socialist-assimilationist convictions predominant among the Jewish proletariat of Amsterdam. Founded in 1899, the membership in 1939 of the Nederlandse Zionistenbond (Netherlands Zionist Society—NZB) stood at a little over four thousand and the organization was considered to have little influence.\(^{1016}\) Some NZB members expressed ideological solidarity with Zionism through membership only and many within the older generation of NZB leadership saw the organization as being one that supported Zionism as a panacea only for “their unfree religious brethren.”\(^{1017}\) Fishman and Fishman (1999) identify a generational divide in the NZB prior to the war between an older and upper-class generation of leaders influenced by an idealistic, nineteenth-century, view of Zionism as “a goal to be achieved through an evolutionary process that would form part of the general development of Western civilization” and a younger, more uncompromising, generation that championed a more exacting form of Zionism that required *aliyah* (emigration to Israel) and *halujiuth* (pioneering).\(^{1018}\)

The Netherlands also remained relatively impervious to the German strain of Liberal-Reformism through the 1920s and it wasn’t until 1931 that a group of indigent Dutch Jews in The Hague founded the first Liberal congregation. However, Liberal


Judaism in the Netherlands soon became identified with German Jews who had established a second Liberal congregation in Amsterdam in 1932, having settled in the Netherlands in the 1920s in order to escape the political and economic chaos of the Weimar Republic. These two Liberal congregations had a somewhat tense relationship rooted in both cultural (Dutch versus German) and ideological (radical versus traditional) differences, which was only exacerbated by the arrival of greater numbers of Jewish refugees from Germany starting in 1933.

With the Nazi regime in Germany escalating its persecution of the Jews in the 1930s, German refugees flowed west into the Netherlands. According to Blom and Cahen (2002), “In this pillarized society, it was only reasonable that every pillar, every group, would look after its ‘own.’ Jewish refugees were accordingly considered, in Jewish circles and outside, a concern of the Jews alone.” In response, the Dutch Jewish community established the Comité voor Bijzondere Joodse Belangen (Committee for Special Jewish Interests—CBJB) and the Comité voor Joodse Vluchtelingen (Committee for Jewish Refugees—CJV) and these organizations were tasked with assisting the German Jewish refugees. The CJV was tasked with the immediate reception of Jewish refugees and was staffed with less socially prominent personalities than the CBJB, which took a bigger picture approach to dealing with the problems posed by such a large influx of refugees.

---

of Jewish refugees and with the possible anti-Semitic reaction they might provoke.\textsuperscript{1022} Indeed, there were ambivalent feelings and reservations among Dutch Jewish leaders about the German refugees with feelings of Jewish solidarity tempered by fears that the refugees would endanger the relatively favorable social position of Dutch Jewry.

The occupation of the Netherlands starting in 1940 marks a significant rupture in the history of Dutch Jewry. Tragically, an estimated 107,000 of the approximately 140,000 Jews residing in the Netherlands at the start of the war were murdered under the Nazi occupation with Jews accounted for approximately 50 percent of the total number of victims that the war claimed in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{1023} That more than 75 percent of Jews from the Netherlands were killed during the Holocaust stands in stark contrast with neighboring France where only around 25 per cent perished.\textsuperscript{1024} The literature offers a variety of explanations for this dramatic cross-national variation. First, the geography and terrain of the Netherlands—located between the Nazi Germany to the east, occupied Belgium to the south, and the sea to the north and west, with its high population density and no natural mountainous or forested hiding places—made escape difficult and dangerous.\textsuperscript{1025} A second argument holds that the majority of Dutch Jews did not even attempt escape either because of practical reasons, such as a duty of care to parents and/or children, but also because of “…the deference to authority felt by the majority of Jews in


\textsuperscript{1023} According to German registration statistics, of the 140,000 Jews registered in the Netherlands, 121,400 declared themselves members of the NIK and 4,300 of the PIK. See Ben Rafael, Eliezer, Thomas Gergely, and Yosef Gorni. 2006. Jewry between Tradition and Secularism: Europe and Israel Compared. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 33; also Frishman, Judith, and Hetty Berg, Eds. 2007. Dutch Jewry in a Cultural Maelstrom, 1880-1940. Amsterdam: Aksant, 7.


the Netherlands.” Finally, Croes (2006) argues that the predominant role of Austrians Nazis with especially vehement anti-Semitic convictions and the strong presence of the SS and Nazi Party in the civilian administration of the Netherlands resulted in an especially ferocious persecution relative to neighboring countries under military occupation and administration.

In February 1941, after clashes between the militias of the Dutch National Socialist Movement (NSB) and Jews in the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam, the German civilian administration established the *Joodsche Raad* (‘Jewish Council’), which co-opted a coterie of Dutch Jewish leaders to act as interlocutors and tasked them with maintaining public order in the Jewish quarter. Originally created to serve Amsterdam alone, by October 1941, its remit was extended to the whole country. The strategy adopted by the Jewish Council was to fulfill German orders while attempting to gain small concessions, a strategy that proved to be hopelessly submissive and naïve. Within months of its founding, anti-Jewish measures were escalating sharply. The *Joodse Coördinatie Commissie* (Jewish Coordination Commission—JCC), which had been voluntarily established in December 1940 to help Dutch Jews, emerged as an early and trenchant critic of the Jewish Council. Chaired by Lodewijk Ernst Visser, a former lawyer at the High Court of the Netherlands, the JCC was, in principal, against any form

---


of collaboration with the Germans. These divergent strategies brought the JCC into conflict with the Jewish Council and bolstered perceptions of the Jewish Council as collaborationist. The JCC was ordered to suspend its activities in October 1941 and Visser died of natural causes shortly thereafter.

With the demise of the JCC, the Jewish Council became solely responsible for all Jewish issues in the occupied Netherlands. Its initial focus had been on a largely unsuccessful effort to promote emigration from the Netherlands to ‘safe’ countries. This was a possibility that the Germans cynically promoted in order to maintain calm. However, by the time that deportations commenced in July 1942—ostensibly to German labor camps but in reality to extermination camps—the newsletter of the Jewish Council had become “the compliant ‘house-organ’ of the Final Solution, preaching submissiveness and warning its readers of dreadful penalties if they tried to disobey the German decrees.” Indeed, a re-examination of the historiography of wartime Netherlands has strenuously challenged the idea of the positive attitude of the Dutch toward their Jewish compatriots during World War II. For example, Dutch historian Nanda van der Zee has noted that, “[t]he vain national self-image of the most tolerant people on earth, which had assisted its Jewish fellow-citizens so ‘charitably,’ was corroded in the 1960s when the generation born after the war started to ask

Gerstenfeld (2014) argues that, the myth of widespread Dutch public support and sympathy for the Jews has been perpetuated by the Anne Frank story when in fact many Dutch officials collaborated in anti-Jewish activities and the Dutch government-in-exile in London took little or no interest in the fate of the country’s Jewish citizens. The way in which the occupation unfolded (and ended), the ferocity of the Nazi persecution of Dutch Jews during the occupation, and the specific characteristics of Dutch Jewry itself, all had significant effects on the ability of Dutch Jews to rebuild communal organizational capacity at the end of the war. The Holocaust also had a profound effect on the socio-economic structure of Dutch Jewry with the Jewish working class suffering disproportionate losses having often been the first to be deported. With good connections and money having been key to the ability to hide during the Holocaust, those who survived were predominantly drawn from the middle and upper classes.

With the southern Netherlands liberated in September 1944 but the northern Netherlands not liberated until eight months later, it was a small group of Jews in hiding in the south that first emerged and organized in a traditional prewar and non-Zionist fashion under the banner of the Comité voor Israelietische Belangen (Committee for Israelite Interests—CIB). The members of this group claimed to represent Dutch Jews and defined themselves as Dutch first and ‘members of the Israelite faith’ second and

were primarily interested in reclaiming equal Dutch citizenship, staying and reintegrating in the Netherlands. While the Dutch government recognized the CIB, this was of limited value because the government was not inclined to give special help to Jewish communities at this juncture. Indeed, Dutch Jews that emerged from hiding were shown relatively little sympathy and were officially considered “Netherlanders like all other Netherlanders.”

Meanwhile, a small group of radical Zionists, many of whom were affiliated with the NZB, reconstituted the JCC in Eindhoven. This group also claimed to represent Dutch Jews but its members—who ranged from the very Orthodox to Socialist Zionists—were less interested in re-integrating into Dutch society. The postwar version of the JCC was not recognized by the Dutch government but came to be recognized by international Jewish organizations. The New York based Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) saw the Netherlands as a potential tabula rasa for the training of new leaders and

---


1038 Although, in an isolated gesture that was later considered a ‘mistake,’ the CIB was granted 10,000 guilders in October 1944 in light of “…the exceptional position in which the Jews have been placed by the Germans and the associated special difficulties.” See Brasz, F. C. 2002. “After the Second World War: From ‘Jewish Church’ to Cultural Minority.” In The History of the Jews in the Netherlands, edited by J. C. H. Blom, R. G. Fuchs-Mansfeld, and Ivo Schöffer. The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization. Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 337.


1040 While there was no continuity between the postwar JCC and Visser’s wartime organization, the founders of the postwar JCC wished to suggest a continuity and bolster their legitimacy by recalling and identifying with Visser’s endeavor. See Brasz, Chaya. 2002. “After the Shoah.” In Dutch Jewry: Its History and Secular Culture (1500-2000), edited by Jonathan I. Israel and R. Salverda. Brill’s Series in Jewish Studies, v. 29. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 283.


1042 According to Reynolds (2006), Dr. Joseph Schwartz of the JDC recalled in December 1945, “…that when he came into partially liberated Holland...[the JCC] was the only organization in existence and it was functioning well.” Dr Schwartz was mistaken but does not seem to have encountered the Comité voor Israelitsche Belangen (CIB).
for the development of new communal institutions and the JCC soon became a leading force among Dutch Jewish communities due to its role as a conduit for the JDC and other international relief organizations.\textsuperscript{1043} In the domestic realm, the JCC, with the cooperation of charitable and social welfare organizations, created the \textit{Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk} (Jewish Social Work Foundation—JMW) in February 1947. Although the JMW initially faced opposition from religious groups who saw its work as impinging upon their charitable and philanthropic organizations, it had gained general acceptance among Jewish social service agencies by the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{1044}

The early liberation of the south, the lack of interest of the Dutch government, and the assertive policies of international Jewish relief organizations should have provided a political opportunity space for Dutch Jewry to redefine Jewish identity in the Netherlands and reorganize itself in innovative ways as French Jews did under the aegis of the CRIF. However, while the JCC indeed sought to shape a more pluralistic national-level Jewish communal organization, it was ultimately forced to agree to the restoration of the NIK in 1946. Brasz (2002) offers several explanations for the inability of the JCC to recast Jewish organization in the Netherlands as the CRIF had done in France in the immediate aftermath of the war. First, the CRIF emerged in France from the leadership of a distinctive ‘Jewish’ resistance but, with Jewish leadership in the Netherlands concentrated under the aegis of the Jewish Council during the war, there was no organized ‘Jewish’ resistance as such in the Netherlands. As a result, there was no


alternative Jewish leadership waiting in the wings at war's end. Second, in spite of the separation of church and state, pillarization incentivized social group alignment along religious lines and Dutch society was thus still largely defined in terms of religious affiliation. Moreover, many in the Dutch resistance who had opposed the segregation of the Jews also opposed Jews who wished to be identified as Jews first. Instead, they urged a return to seeing the Jews as ‘Dutchmen of the Israelite faith.’ Accordingly, the prevailing social and political conditions in the immediate aftermath of the war were not conducive to the idea of reconstructing a separate ‘Jewish nation’ within the Netherlands.

The assertiveness, continued dominance, and relative wealth of the communal elites that survived the war posed the greatest barrier to establishing an umbrella organization that would better reflect the more pluralistic, voluntary, and secular direction of Dutch communal life. Ultimately, an intriguing proxy battle for the future of the Dutch Jewish community played out in New York with prominent Dutch refugees—and wealthy JDC donors—who favored a return to the pre-war leadership structure winning the debate. While the JDC and elements of the JCC shared the view that the prewar leadership was somewhat anachronistic, the more left-wing and activist Zionist leaders within the JCC clashed with the more disciplined and low-key diplomacy of American Jewish leaders who feared that these elements might trigger an anti-Semitic backlash among the general Dutch population. Ultimately, the JCC disbanded when the JDC withdrew its funding in 1947, which paved the way for the return of the Kerkgenootschap structure that the JCC’s leaders had regarded dismissively as a

“religious straightjacket.” Ultimately, however, both the JCC and the NZB coalesced with the NIK following its reestablishment in January 1946. By this time, the NZB had reoriented its objectives in order to support ‘general Jewish work’ in the Netherlands with a view to reorganizing Dutch Jewry along Zionist lines in order to facilitate large-scale emigration once a Jewish state had been established; transforming the NIK into a unified congregation with a broader basis; and democratizing the NIK. However, attempts to unify NIK with the Portuguese and Liberal congregations (Liberaal Joodse Gemeente — LJG) at this juncture did not succeed with both the PIK and LJG refusing to submit to the final authority of an Orthodox rabbinate.

In 1947, the NIK once again began levying taxes on the congregations under its control, counting more than 19,500 in its membership. However, only three of the twelve prewar consistorial chief rabbis had survived the war and the decimation of Dutch Jewry meant that the NIK had to be radically reorganized into 58 viable local religious communities in 1952 where 139 had existed prior to the war. Haan (2015) attributes the precipitous decrease in NIK membership from 19,532 in 1947 to 12,133 in 1951 to the NIK’s reorganization, which further centralized its decision-making processes in Amsterdam and caused disillusionment and feelings of neglect in regional communities. However, there was also some emigration to Israel as well at this
juncture, about 40 percent of which were German Jews who had originally come to the Netherlands during the 1930s. However, by the middle of the 1950s, the Dutch Israeliite religious community had been reestablished and was relatively stable. Starting in the 1950s, the Netherlands experienced considerable social change that included the weakening of the traditional intertwining of religion and politics in the context of a long process of ‘depillarization.’ Although Dutch Jewry had never constructed its own pillar, it underwent similar processes of declining membership that other religions have experienced. Since the 1950s, the NIK has continued to experience declining membership due to assimilation, intermarriage, the after-effects of the Holocaust, as well as the impingement of new social welfare systems on the traditional preserve of religious communities. Over the same time period, the membership of the PIK and Zionist organizations, although diminutive, has remained relatively constant while Liberal Judaism has experienced some growth. The NIK’s annual report in 1999 counted 5,139 members with the PIK registering approximately 600 members at that time and the Verbond van Liberaal Religieuze Joden in Nederland (‘Religious League of

Liberal Jews in the Netherlands) counting around 2,500 and growing. Brasz (2002) notes, however, that a majority of non-religious Jews in the Netherlands—a community that is much harder to define and measure—remain outside these organizations. Haan (2009) estimates that over 70 percent of the 30,000—or 40,000 if you include non-

As elsewhere, relations between the Dutch government and Israel have exerted effects on relations between the Jewish community and Dutch authorities. The Dutch government was slow to extend both de jure and de facto recognition of the State of Israel although Dutch policy toward Israel was generally relatively sympathetic at this juncture. However, in the aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967, relations cooled off as a new generation of Dutch political elites rose to prominence and the Netherlands began to more closely align itself with a less friendly European Community stance toward

That being said, with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Dutch government found itself taking the most pro-Israel stance vis-à-vis its European partners. This resulted in the Netherlands being one of five countries explicitly targeted by the oil embargo. In 1974, the Center for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI), a professional public relations office working on behalf of the organized Jewish community and with representation from all streams of Judaism, was founded with the support of the Israeli embassy.

In spite of the diminishing size of organized Judaism in the Netherlands, numerous attempts to create a unified umbrella comparable to the Board of Deputies in Britain or the CRIF in France did not bear fruit through much of the 1990s. In the 1950s, the primary roadblock involved the refusal of the executive of the NIK and the rabbinate to acknowledge that it could not realistically subsume other organizations in a general umbrella under its leadership. The PIK and the LJG also had little desire to be brought under the leadership of the NIK and its rabbinate. However, with international media attention in the 1990s focusing on the heirless Swiss bank accounts of those who died in the Holocaust, the question of restitution for Dutch Jews came on the policy agenda of the Dutch government. It was this restitution process, undoubtedly along with shrinking memberships, that finally provided the impetus for the NIK, PIK, LJG, and several

---

1060 In 1973, members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) halted sales of oil to both the United States and the Netherlands because of their support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal were later added to the list of embargoed countries. See “Responding to Major Supply Disruptions.” International Energy Agency. Accessed April 17. https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/subtopics/respondingtomajorsupplydisruptions/.
secular organizations such as the Federation of Netherlands Zionists (FNZ), the JMW and the CIDI to unify under a larger umbrella. Accordingly, in 1997, the *Centraal Joods Overleg* (‘Central Jewish Board’—CJO) was established to coordinate efforts on behalf of Jewish communities in the Netherlands—as well as Dutch Jews and heirs now living abroad—to negotiate for restitution from Dutch banks, insurance companies, and the Dutch government for compensation for assets looted and expropriated during the war.

For different reasons, both the Dutch government and the CJO were keen to exclude the World Jewish Congress (WJC), an international federation of Jewish community organizations that had played a significant role in other European restitution processes, from the restitution negotiations in the Netherlands. Representatives of the CJO believed that the WJC lacked local knowledge and was too ‘American’ in its approach, which they saw as unsuited to the consensual Dutch ‘Poldermodel.’ For its part, the Dutch government feared that the WJC could make additional claims against the state above and beyond those settled with the CJO. In essence, the WJC as well as the organization of Dutch Jews in Israel, *Stichting Platform Israel* (Israel Foundation Platform—SPI), took a harder line than the representatives of Dutch Jewry who preferred to pursue compromise, given the need to remain on good terms with the government and the broader society. A series of separate government commissions were established to deal with the issues of international assets in foreign banks, assets in domestic financial institutions including banks, insurance companies, and the stock exchange, as well as the

---

1062 In 1992, the Netherlands Zionist Organization (NZB) officially became the Federation of Netherlands Zionists (FNZ).

Since the settling of the restitution issue in the early 2000s, the CJO has continued to act as the primary interlocutor for the Dutch government with Jewish communities in the Netherlands, particularly as regards issues related to Holocaust remembrance, anti-Semitism, community security, and interfaith dialogue.\footnote{“Over Centraal Joods Overleg.” 2017. \textit{Centraal Joods Overleg}. Accessed April 14. http://www.cjo.nl/over-cjo/.} Apart from these specific issue areas, the CJO explicitly considers \textit{Halakhic} issues to be the primary responsibility of its three affiliated churches (i.e. the NIK, PIK, and the small but growing progressive Jewish organization, \textit{Nederlands Verbond voor Progressief Jodendom}) and CIDI and FNZ to be responsible for public diplomacy with regard to issues related to Israel.\footnote{“De Totstandkoming, Bestuur En Taken van Het NIK.” 2015. \textit{Nederlands Israëlitisch Kerkenoootschap}. Accessed March 22. http://www.nik.nl/dit-is-het-nik/de-totstandkoming-bestuur-en-taken-van-het-nik/.

1067 Dutch parliamentary records demonstrate that the government continues to consult the NIK...
independently of the CJO on issues that specifically involve Jewish religious practice, such as ritual slaughter, access to cemeteries on Sundays, access to broadcasting time, chaplaincy functions, and legislative proposals dealing with embryo selection.\textsuperscript{1071}

**Muslim organizational representation in the Netherlands (1945—present)**

The French sociologist Georges Henri Bousquet opened his book, *A French View of the Netherlands Indies* (1940), by recalling that, “No other colonial nation governs relatively so many Moslem subjects as do the Netherlands.”\textsuperscript{1072} Accordingly, it is a historical curiosity that the Dutch case stands in stark contrast to the British and French cases in that contemporary Muslim populations in the Netherlands are not inherently linked to the history of Dutch colonialism.\textsuperscript{1073} While the largest postwar immigration to the Netherlands consisted of approximately 400,000 people originating in the former Dutch East Indies upon the independence of Indonesia, many of these were either returning colonial settlers or their offspring (*totoks*) or descendents of Dutch-Indonesian intermarriage (*Indisch Nederlanders*)—all of whom were defined as ‘European’ under colonial law.\textsuperscript{1074} The vast majority of these postwar immigrants were Christians or

\textsuperscript{1071} See “Tweede Kamer Der Staten-Generaal.” 2016. 31 571 no. 27. Den Haag; Derix, Steven. 2006. “Moslim Mag Wel/Geen Vlag Op de Kist (A Flag or Not on a Muslim’s Coffin).” NRC Handelsblad, October 4.
\textsuperscript{1072} Bosquet, Georges Henri. 1940. *A French View of the Netherlands Indies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
\textsuperscript{1073} Of course, that is not to deny that postwar immigration into the Netherlands is intertwined with the country’s colonial past. For a discussion, see Amersfoort, Hans van, and Mies van Niekerk. 2006. “Immigration as a Colonial Inheritance: Post-Colonial Immigrants in the Netherlands, 1945–2002.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32 (3): 323–46.
agnostics and belonged to a Dutch-speaking colonial elite. Accordingly, their resettlement in the Netherlands did not lead to any substantial Muslim community of Indonesian origin or any significant organizational formation on the basis of Islam. Accordingly, while there is a rich tradition of Dutch scholarship that addresses the interface between governance and Islam, albeit through an Orientalist lens and in the service of the interests of Dutch colonial policy in Indonesia, the literature on the postwar institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands exudes a consensus that Dutch colonialism and the “new” Islamic presence in the Netherlands are largely unrelated phenomena.

Aside from the lack of connection with Dutch colonial projects, the history of Muslim immigration to the Netherlands is also noteworthy for its geographic and ethno-religious heterogeneity relative to other European states. However, among this immigration are two communities of Muslims in the Netherlands whose contemporary presence can indeed be attributed to post-colonial migration flows in the postwar era. The first community, something of a post-colonial footnote, are the descendents of approximately 80 families of Muslim Moluccan soldiers and part of a larger resettlement of 12,500 Moluccans who had fought with the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army—KNIL) against the Indonesians during the colonial war. Of much greater numerical significance are Surinamese ‘twice-migrants’ of ‘Hindustani’ (both Hindu and Muslim) and Javanese origin that resettled in the

---

1077 After 1954, these transplanted Moluccan Muslims were housed in a special camp near Balk, a small village in Frysland, before they were relocated to the towns of Waalwijk and Ridderkerk in the mid-1960s. For a brief history of this community, see Maussen, Marcel. 2009. “Constructing Mosques: The Governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 101-4.
Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{1078} This migration was spurred by the political uncertainty that accompanied the run up to Surinamese independence in 1975, with some 80 percent of Surinam’s Javanese and 99.9 percent of Hindustanis opposing independence, and fearing Creole-Christian domination in a post-independence Surinam, many voted with their feet by emigrating.\textsuperscript{1079} Coming from a former colony, these Surinamese immigrants ordinarily spoke Dutch and many had learned Dutch history and geography at school and their integration has generally been considered less problematic relative to Muslim communities of other origins.\textsuperscript{1080}

The vast majority of the present-day Muslim population of the Netherlands is composed of economic migrants of Turkish and Moroccan national origin. The demographic foundation of these communities is rooted in postwar labor recruitment


agreements struck between the Dutch government and the Turkish and Moroccan governments in 1964 and 1969 respectively. These agreements were concluded to fill acute shortages in unskilled and semi-skilled labor primarily in the industrial sector of the Dutch economy. While Dutch government efforts were focused on recruiting so-called gastarbeiders (guestworkers) in Central Anatolia, Turkish immigrants to the Netherlands came from nearly all provinces of Turkey, with approximately half coming from villages, half from provincial cities, and only about 5 percent coming from larger

Figure 13: Muslims in the Netherlands, by origin in 2007
Source: CBS 2007

---


urban areas. Likewise, it is estimated that 60 to 80 percent of Moroccans in the Netherlands trace their roots back to the mountainous Rif area and speak a Berber language.

The industrial sector in the Netherlands was particularly hard hit by the oil crisis in 1973 and, with unemployment rapidly rising and many gastarbeiders losing their jobs, the Dutch government stopped issuing new work permits for all but the most highly skilled workers. By 1974, approximately 30 percent of foreign nationals resident in the

---


Netherlands were of either Turkish or Moroccan origin. Moreover, many had established five years of unbroken residency and demonstrated the means of self-support and had thus become eligible for permanent residency under the Alien Employment Law of January 13, 1965 and many of these had decided to remain in the Netherlands. In the 1980s and 1990s, the numbers of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims increased rapidly due to family reunification as well as ‘family formation’ (i.e. marriages with partners from Turkey or Morocco), which in itself raised the saliency of issues such as accommodations for religious instruction and mosque building. During the same timeframe, a number of Muslim political refugees fleeing civil conflicts successfully acquired asylum in the Netherlands. Some of these asylum seekers were members of Iranian opposition movements who fled after the 1979 revolution, while others came from Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and the former Yugoslavia. These later arrivals tended to align with Moroccan rather than Turkish mosques because Friday sermons are in Arabic, a language with which they are at least more familiar. Finally, there is a small number of Dutch converts to Islam, although this group has traditionally had a larger voice than its size would suggest because converts have often taken leading roles in Muslim organizations.

Because the Turkish and Moroccan labor migrants who came to the Netherlands in the 1960s were the subjects of the ‘myth of return,’ successive Dutch governments paid scant attention to Islam through the 1970s.\(^{1091}\) The subtext of government policies at this juncture was that every effort should be made to facilitate the gastarbeidar in maintaining their cultural identity to prepare them for eventual return to their home countries.\(^{1092}\) However, the declining economic position of immigrants in the aftermath of the oil shocks of 1973—along with a series of domestic attacks by (Christian) South Moluccan separatists—brought the plight of ethnic and religious minorities on the policy agenda of Dutch elites and prompted the establishment of the Department of Minorities Affairs under the aegis of the Ministry of Home Affairs.\(^{1093}\)

In 1976 the so-called General Arrangement for Subsidizing Places of Worship came into force along with a small budget for the construction of mosques in cities with more than one thousand Muslim inhabitants.\(^{1094}\) While the funding was modest and came with a five-year expiration, Landman (1991) argues that it played an important role in the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands insofar as it stimulated “the extremely weak and badly organized

\(^{1091}\) This is reflected in the policy papers of the period including the 1970 “Memorandum on Foreign Workers,” which devoted only two sentences to Islam and the 1974 “Memorandum in Reply,” which did not mention Islam or religious provisions at all. It was only the “Minorities Memorandum” in 1983 that definitively carved out an explicit space for religion in the context of the Dutch government’s nascent ‘Ethnic Minorities Policy.’ See Rath, Jan, Rinus Penninx, Kees Groenendijk, and Astrid Meyer. 2001. Western Europe and its Islam. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 29-33.


\(^{1094}\) Interestingly, the subsidy was restricted to Mediterranean Muslims, thus excluding Surinamese Muslims. According to Landman (1991), this inconsistency appeared to be due to the simple fact that the policies related to the welfare of the Surinamese came under the aegis of another section of the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work. After the expiration of the General Agreement in 1981, mosque-subsidies were continued under the Temporary Arrangement for Subsidizing Places of Worship, which remained in force until December 31, 1983. See Landman, Nico. 1991. “Muslims and Islamic Institutions in the Netherlands.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 12 (2): 415.
Islamic communities to organize themselves, to acquire a legal status and set up an accounting system.\textsuperscript{1095}

By the end of the 1970s, the government began to recognize that most of the gastarbeidar and their families had settled permanently or at least semi-permanently in the Netherlands and the government began to reorient policies toward integration rather than return. As admissions policy was being tightened, the first ‘Ethnic Minority Policies’ (EMPs) were instituted with a view to ameliorating the socio-economic position of officially designated minority groups for which the state felt an “historic responsibility.”\textsuperscript{1096} Accordingly, a number of groups “who did not participate on an equal base in Dutch society,” were designated as subject to the EMPs including Turks, Moroccans, Tunisians, Surinamese, Moluccans, and refugee groups.\textsuperscript{1097} In line with the Dutch conception of pillarization, the EMPs rested on the idea that ‘emancipation’ would be realized with the state-subsidized creation of the kinds of institutions associated with the pillarized model such as religious schools and ethnic broadcasting networks.\textsuperscript{1098} However, in the context of the ethnicity-based logic of the EMPs, increasing societal secularization, and ongoing processes of ‘de-pillarization,’ the primary policy focus rested on ethnicity rather than the religious aspects of minority group identities.\textsuperscript{1099} Yet,

\textsuperscript{1097} The groups subject to the EMPs were: Turks, Moroccans and Tunisians, Surinamese, Dutch Antilleans, Moluccans, south Europeans (i.e. Greeks, Spaniards, and Portuguese), refugees, and Gypsies. See Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu. 1994. \textit{Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe}. Chicago: University of Chicago, 48.
the ethnic and sectarian heterogeneity of immigrant groups in the Netherlands provided a substantial barrier to providing public status to designated ethnic minorities as well as constructing the appropriate infrastructure.

While Joppke and Morawska (2003) argue that state subsidization under the EMPs achieved little for ordinary immigrants, aside from promoting a professional elite of competitive ethnic activists, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the institutionalization of a number of legal allowances and accommodations for Muslims in the Netherlands. These included placing Islamic ritual slaughter (dhabh) on a par with Jewish slaughter, placed the call to prayer on a par with the tolling of church bells, recognition for Muslim festivals and dietary rules (in the armed services and prisons), and facilitating the conduct of burials according to Islamic traditions.

From 1983 onwards, more specific attention began to be paid to the presence of Islam in the Netherlands in the context of discussions surrounding the separation of church and state in the run up to the constitutional revision of 1983. In August 1982, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work set up the Werkgroep-Waardenburg (‘Waardenburg Working Party’—WWP), presided over by a leading scholar of Islam, Jacques Waardenburg, to make recommendations on the desirability of continuing the subsidization of places of worship for religious minority groups. The WWP’s report, published in 1983, recommended that religious organizations be regarded as, “a very natural form of ‘interest organization’ for people coming from cultures permeated by

---

religion.” While Soysal (1994) argues that this policy logic ignores the fact that organizing along religious lines had not been part of Turkish tradition, it doesn’t necessarily exclude organizing along more cultural or secular bases. However, the policy logic of the EMPs was certainly problematic in the sense that Pakistani or Palestinian Islamic organizations, for example, did not qualify for state support because neither was officially designated as an ‘ethnic minority.’

Ultimately, the implementation of the WWP’s recommendations—particularly with regard to continue and even expand the subsidization of new places of worship—soon became a matter of debate and engendered significant political opposition. As Landman (1991) notes, “[this] form of official support for the Muslim minority, which was acceptable for most political parties in the seventies, turned out to be highly controversial in the eighties.” This debate crystallized around the principle of secular non-interference with opposing camps coalescing around confessional and non-confessional parties with Christian Democrats endorsing the WWP’s recommendations, while Liberals and Social Democrats argued that any subsidization of places of worship contradicted the principle of liberal neutrality. Landman (1991) argues that this sea change in the political environment revolved around three major issues.

---

debate over mosque subsidization came to be strongly influenced by contemporaneous changes in the relationship between church and state. These changes involved a significant reduction in the state’s involvement in religious affairs including the effective cutting of financial ties between the state and the Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed Churches—ties that had existed since 1816 as a form of compensation for the nationalization of church properties. The broader debates surrounding these changes had pitted the confessional parties against the non-confessional parties since 1967 and these same political divisions were replicated in the debate over mosque subsidization.\footnote{Landman, Nico. 1991. “Muslims and Islamic Institutions in the Netherlands.” \textit{Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs} 12 (2): 416.} Secondly, by the 1980s it had become clear that mosque subsidization was no longer merely a temporary accommodation made for gastarbeidar but rather a phase in the more permanent institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands.\footnote{Landman, Nico. 1991. “Muslims and Islamic Institutions in the Netherlands.” \textit{Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs} 12 (2): 416.} Accordingly, political divisions coalesced around the desirability of such a process of institutionalization with Christian Democrats again maintaining a more positive view and non-confessional parties a more ambiguous and ambivalent one. Finally, Landman (1991) argues that political attitudes in the Netherlands were already being shaped by the apparent rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Muslim majority countries as well as domestic concerns over the perception that Dutch mosque organizations lacked a democratic character with controversies surrounding the dismissal of imams in Utrecht in 1978 and Amsterdam in 1983.\footnote{In the Amsterdam case, a visiting Moroccan minister pressured the mosque to dismiss its imam after Friday prayers pointedly omitted an element of the Moroccan Malekite rite involving offering a prayer for the Moroccan King as “commander of the faithful.” See Landman, Nico. 1991. “Muslims and Islamic Institutions in the Netherlands.” \textit{Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs} 12 (2): 416, 430; also Laurence, Jonathan. 2012. \textit{The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration}. Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 66.}
On the other hand, the 1983 constitutional amendments prompted policy consultations with Christian, Humanist, Hindu, and Muslim groups, which Rath et al (2001) consider, “… an important milestone in the actual recognition of Islam.”

In stark contrast to the British and French cases, however, these consultations were effectively closed in the sense that they were not illuminated by a media or political spotlight and thus did not become part of a public discussion. As Rath et al (2001) note, …the discussion generally took place in a restricted circle made up of the politicians, officials and organizations directly involved. There was no question of a wide public discussion. The subjects were rarely if ever explicitly on the agenda of political parties. Meanwhile a practice developed by which ministers and officials recognized religious organizations de facto as important partners in the minorities policy, and entered into consultation with them… As far as the wider public was concerned the institutionalization of Islam took place more or less behind closed doors, and very gradually.

Through the 1980s, successive Dutch governments effectively adopted technocratic approaches to the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands. Shadid (2006) notes that, Parallel to a broadening social acceptance and integration of the Muslim immigrant, there was a growing need for more information about these ethnoreligious groups. Both scientists and policy makers realized that applied research, especially in relation to Islam, was indispensable to the integration of these immigrant groups, particularly in regard to providing adequate social assistance in various sectors such as education and health care. Little attention was devoted to Islam and immigration by social scientists until the 1980s, when the subject began to achieve prominence in such disciplines as linguistics, law, and religious studies.

In this sense, Dutch policy in the 1980s was driven by social science research, which would itself become a point of contention as we shall see. Concurrently, the salience of

the presence and visibility of Islam was further heightened by virtue of a series of events in the late 1980s and early 1990s—particularly Khomeini’s *fatwa* during *The Satanic Verses* affair in 1989, the first *Affaire du Foulard* in France, and the first Gulf War in 1990-1991, all of which increased public scrutiny of the political and religious attitudes of Muslim communities in the Netherlands.

**The institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands**

While small concentrations of Indonesians settled in the Netherlands prior to the Second World War, visible signs of the institutionalization of Islam only became apparent in the 1970s as Turkish and Moroccan community organizations began to proliferate. Starting in the early 1970s, Turkish mosques began to explore the formation of umbrella organizations along sectarian lines that duplicated sectarian cleavages in Turkey. Accordingly, a variety of mosque umbrellas have emerged in the Netherlands that reflect the most prominent Islamic movements in Turkey such as the Süleymani, Milli Görüş, and Gülen movements as well as umbrellas affiliated with the ‘official Islam’ of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*).

In 1972, the *Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland* (Foundation Islamic Centre in The Netherlands—SICN) was established in Utrecht by a Dutch convert, Abdul Wahid van Bomme, as a branch of the Koran Course Foundation, an Islamic movement commonly known as the Süleymani.¹¹²⁷ Operating outside the reach of—and in competition with—the *Diyanet*, the SICN opposes the Turkish variant of secularism, has

---

¹¹²⁷ The Süleymani movement is an activist Sufi order affiliated with the Nakshibendi Religious Order and composed of devotees of the religious teacher Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959) who led an anti-secularist movement aiming at religious education of the masses. It differs from most other Sufi orders in its aims to change society and its missionary activities. While critical of the secular order in Turkey at that juncture, Süleymanis in the Netherlands are essentially politically quietist—as in Turkey—and ordinarily focus their activities on Quranic teaching and training.
consistently refused to avail of official Turkish channels in hiring personnel, and has historically trained its own imams in the Netherlands. Through the end of the 1970s, in the absence of a local Diyanet-affiliated organization, the Süleymancis exerted a disproportionate influence with Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands. In its focus on ethical self-improvement and spiritual immersion, the SICN has traditionally been considered as somewhat low key—if not insular—and its Dutch mosques have mirrored this with none of their centers boasting minarets or domes or other design features that would make them recognizable as mosques.

As we shall discuss later, the SICN pioneered an effort to create an inter-ethnic umbrella organization named the Federatie van Moslim Organisaties in Nederland (Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands—FOMON) by bringing together Muslim organizations of various backgrounds. However, the SICN’s virtual monopoly over the Turkish diaspora in the Netherlands was challenged in 1979 when competing Süleymanci and Diyanet imams were invited to minister Ramadan services in Rotterdam. When the majority of congregants voted in favor of the Diyanet affiliated imam, the Diyanet portrayed this as a rejection of the ‘extremist’ Süleymancis. This sparked a bitter and polarizing battle between the Süleymancis and the Diyanet and its

---

local affiliates for the Turkish Muslim rank-and-file that lasted through the 1970s, 1980s, and much of the 1990s.

It is not likely a coincidence then that the *Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie* (Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation—TICF) was founded in Rotterdam in 1979 as an attempt to create a national-level organizational manifestation of Turkish ‘official Islam’ as a counterbalance to the SICN.\(^\text{1132}\) Gathering together 17 mosque associations, the TICF informally aligned itself with the *Diyanet*, concentrated on local issues of Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands, and played a key role in the 1980 formation of the *Islamitische Omroep Stichting* (Islamic Broadcasting Foundation—IOS).\(^\text{1133}\) In 1980, during a conference attended by ambassadors of Muslim majority countries and more than 100 Dutch organizations, an exploratory committee was formed to discuss the idea of establishing an umbrella organizational structure that would be acceptable to all parties. According to Landman (1997)

\begin{quote}
The result of the negotiations, in which the Turks played a dominant role, was a structure based on ethnic background: the seats in the board were to be distributed among the ethnic communities according to an estimation of their numbers. Moreover, the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims were to be represented by the Turkish-Islamic Cultural Federation and the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organisations in the Netherlands respectively, excluding other Turkish or Moroccan organisations. However, this newly designed structure was never put into effect and the new federation existed on paper only.\(^\text{1134}\)
\end{quote}

---


This strategy highlights the apparent preference of the TICF (and UMMON) to attempt to structure the representation of Islam in the Netherlands by distributing power along ethnic lines, with the TICF and UMMON alone representing Turkish and Moroccan communities respectively, thereby sidelining any challengers to the Diyanet’s ‘official Islam’ or the religious authority of the King of Morocco. Maussen (2009) argues that Turkish associations affiliated with the Diyanet remained largely hostile through the 1990s to attempts to develop Dutch Muslim institutions, such as inter-ethnic organizational umbrellas and/or Dutch imam training programs.

In 1982, the *Islamitische Stichting Nederland* (Islamic Foundation in the Netherlands—ISN), also known by its Turkish name *Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi* (HDV), was founded as the formal affiliate of the Diyanet in the Netherlands. Its creation centralized the control of TICF-affiliated mosques in the Netherlands and opened funding streams for mosque construction projects, which Landman (2010) notes has made it “…the most active and successful Muslim organisation in the field of mosque construction in the Netherlands.” As with Diyanet-affiliated mosques in Turkey and other European countries, ISN mosques in the Netherlands are aimed at “promoting and consolidating national solidarity and unity” by propagating a quietist Islam loyal to the Turkish state and countering attempts to mobilize the Turkish diaspora on the basis of

---

1135 One of the sources of legitimacy of the King of Morocco is a claim of descent from the Prophet Muhammad. This claim is institutionalized in Article 23 of the Moroccan constitution, which states that the person of the king is “sacred and inviolable.” See Daadaoui, Mohamed. 2011. *Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge Maintaining Makhzen Power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 52.


religious ideologies opposing the Turkish secularist model (i.e. the Süleymani, Milli Görüs, and Gülen movements, etc.).

Mügge (2010) explains the founding of the ISN as part of a broader Turkish state strategy to deploy the Diyanet as a means to centralize the surveillance and control of the state over the activities of its diaspora in the aftermath of the mass emigration that followed the 1980 military coup and to combat manifestations of ‘unofficial Islam,’ ‘extremist tendencies,’ and to act as a counterweight to Marxist-Leninist organizations. According to the statutes of the ISN, which were written by Turkish embassy officials, the Diyanet-appointed religious attaché from the Turkish embassy in The Hague is, by virtue of that appointment, also the chairman of the ISN and the TICF. Through 2008, ISN-affiliated mosques received imams trained in Turkey sent and paid by the Diyanet for a four-year term. While some scholars maintain that the continuation of the TICF after the founding of the ISN served a strategic purpose as presenting the ‘external face’ of ‘official Islam’—one that permits the ISN to counter criticism that it is an instrument of the Turkish government—others argue that the ISN has recently been bringing the TICF under its control.

Yükleyen (2007) notes that the

---

1141 By agreement, the Diyanet sent imams to the Netherlands for a period of 4 years. In view of criticisms over these imams’ lack of familiarity with Dutch language and culture, the Dutch government abolished this practice in 2004 and after a grace period, the importation of imams from Turkey ceased in 2008. See Anil, Isil. 2010. “Political Integration of Turks in the U.S. and the Netherlands: A Comparative Study of the Role of Turkish Immigrant Organizations.” Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, New York: The City University of New York.
1142 Members of the TICF were automatically members of the ISN and vice-versa. However, while the ISN and TICF share the same demographic, they operated with separate management and decision-making structures. Unlike the ISN, the TICF had no formal direct connection to the Diyanet although Turkish
organizational division between the TICF and the ISN indicates the Diyanet’s ambivalence toward the integration of its Turkish followers in Dutch society:

*On the one hand, they encourage Turkish Muslims to improve their socio-economic status. On the other hand, they aim to maintain the loyalty of Turks to the Turkish state and nation. In accordance with their goal of building national unity and solidarity, there is no tolerance for debates that criticize the Turkish state for example, or its official position on secularism.*

This in turn has resulted in an ambivalent stance on the part of the Dutch state toward the ISN. On the one hand, the Diyanet’s brand of “official Islam” is seen to be relatively ‘liberal’ in the sense that its promotion of the Turkish secular model encourages the privatization of Islam and an emphasis on ethical behavior and the rituals of religious practice. However, one area of contention relates to the ISN’s insistence through the 1990s on importing imams who are appointed by the Diyanet in Turkey for 3 to 4 years and retain the status of salaried civil servants of the Turkish government, which the Dutch government viewed as indicative of a level of foreign interference that runs counter to its integration efforts.

Starting in the early 2000s, the Christian-Democrat-led ‘Purple coalition’ under the premiership of Jan Pieter Balkenende expressed concerns that, because imams trained in Turkey maintain no connection with Dutch society, they may constitute obstacles to integration. However, the underlying assumption that imams play an important role in governmental influence was apparent. In recent years, the ISN has marginalized the TICF. See Sunier, Thijl, Nico Landman, Heleen van der Linden, Nazli Bilgili, and Alper Bilgili. 2011. *Diyanet; The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a Changing Environment.* Amsterdam and Utrecht: VU University and Utrecht University; also Beek, Jan H. van de, Saskia A. van de Mort, and Suzanne van Hees. 2010. “Diversity and the European Public Sphere The Case of the Netherlands.” Online Country Report. Eurosphere Country Reports, 118.


integration processes may be based on faulty premises. Bruinessen (2003) notes that because of the Dutch tradition of perceiving church ministers as ‘moral leaders,’

… there has been a tendency to perceive imams as Muslim ministers and to attribute to them pastoral functions that they never had in the countries of origin. They were often considered to be the most appropriate and representative spokespersons for their communities (or even for all Turks, all Moroccans, etc.), and became favorite targets for programs aiming at the integration of Muslims.1145

During a heated public debate, the Diyanet and its affiliated organizations argued that the long educational trajectory in Turkey guaranteed a qualitative degree that European training institutions could not provide. The TICF further argued that interference by the Dutch state in the sphere of imam training was designed “to control and manipulate the life of Muslims.”1146 However, amid mounting criticism, the Diyanet and its affiliates were ultimately forced to engage in negotiations to establish imam-training facilities in Europe and instead moved to propose that educational programs be developed for imams in the Netherlands without interference from the Dutch government.1147

Ultimately, in 2002, the Balkenende government mandated that imams and other religious leaders imported from Muslim majority countries complete a 12-month language and integration course on basic understanding of Dutch social norms and values before they be all owed to practice in the Netherlands.1148 The Diyanet’s practice of importing imams was ultimately abolished in 2004 and, after a grace period, ceased in 2008. Instead, the government mandated that henceforth imams would be educated and

appointed within the Netherlands with grants provided to three Dutch higher education institutions for this express purpose. In the aftermath, and with its hand forced, the Diyanet has inserted itself into these imam-training processes to the extent possible. In 2006, for example, the ISN, in cooperation with Albeda College in Rotterdam, instituted a three month intensive language and acculturation course in order to prepare new imams for their work tenure in the Netherlands. Moreover, the ISN recently recruited 23 candidates from among Dutch Turkish youth to attend theological training in Turkey.

Another strand of ‘unofficial’ or ‘parallel Islam’ with a significant presence in the Netherlands is Milli Görüş (‘National Vision’), a movement founded in Turkey by Islamist politician Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) in 1969. Its Dutch branch was originally founded in Rotterdam in 1975 as the Federatie van Verenigingen en Gemeenschappen van Moslims but was rebranded in May 1987 as the Nederlands Islamitische Federatie (Dutch Islamic Federation—NIF). The Milli Görüş movement can be distinguished from the ISN and TICF in its emphasis on religion over Turkish nationality as the more salient identity marker. Milli Görüş reflects a conservative

---

1149 The three institutions in question were the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, In-Holland School and Leiden University Anil. See Isil. 2010. “Political Integration of Turks in the U.S. and the Netherlands: A Comparative Study of the Role of Turkish Immigrant Organizations.” Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, New York: The City University of New York, 95.


1152 Milli Görüş has been linked to a succession of Islamist political parties in Turkey starting with the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party—MSP), the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party—RP), and the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party—FP). The Virtue Party, which was banned in 2001, split into two parties, the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party—SP), which is under the control of the traditionalists and the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party—AKP), which is seen as the reformist wing of the movement. Avci, Gamze. 2005. “Religion, Transnationalism and Turks in Europe.” Turkish Studies 6 (2): 201–13.

religious ideology associated with Erbakan and it has traditionally maintained an openly critical stance toward the Kemalist interpretation of secularism.\footnote{Officially, Milli Görüş in the Netherlands denies any direct links to political parties in Turkey. Sunier and Landman (2015) note that Milli Görüş’ manifesto strongly emphasizes secularism and the notion of freedom of opinion and freedom of expression as foundations of democracy and human rights. However, the Milli Görüş interpretation of secularism diverges from that of the Kemalists. In short, Milli Görüs supports complete freedom of religion, without state control, and considers the Kemalist notion of secularism as the ‘dictatorship of the non-believers.’ See Sunier, Thijl, Nico Landman, Heleen van der Linden, Nazli Bilgili, and Alper Bilgili. 2011. Diyanet; The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a Changing Environment. Amsterdam and Utrecht: VU University and Utrecht University, 16.}

In 1997, Milli Görüş in the Netherlands split into two regional organizations: *Milli Görüs Zuid-Nederland* (Milli Görüs South Netherlands—MG-ZN but still commonly known as NIF) and *Milli Görüs Noord-Nederland* (Milli Görüs North Netherlands—MG-NN). While the split has been characterized by Milli Görüş leaders as a means to enhance organizational efficiency, in the aftermath, the leadership of the northern organization took a decidedly more progressive ideological trajectory while the southern chapter remained more conservative and reserved in its interaction with Dutch authorities.\footnote{For an in-depth discussion, see Avci, Gamze. 2005. “Religion, Transnationalism and Turks in Europe.” *Turkish Studies* 6 (2): 201–13; Yükselen, Ahmet. 2009. “Localizing Islam in Europe: Religious Activism among Turkish Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands.” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29 (3): 291–309.} Scholars have drawn parallels between the ideological divergence, at least at the leadership level, between the more conservative NIF and the more progressive MG-NN and the division in domestic Turkish politics between the traditionalist *Saadet Partisi* (Felicity Party—SP) and reformist *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party—AKP) that emerged from the split in the Virtue Party.\footnote{Avci, Gamze. 2005. “Religion, Transnationalism and Turks in Europe.” *Turkish Studies* 6 (2): 206, 209; Azak, Umut. 2008. “Islam and Turkish Immigrants in the Netherlands.” *Turkish Studies* 3 (7): 150.} Indeed, the emergence of the AKP as a dominant political force in Turkey starting in 2002 has provided a more amenable political context for the operation of Milli Görüş affiliates in
Europe as a whole with the Turkish Foreign Ministry issuing a memorandum in 2003 that encouraged Turkish embassies in Europe to cooperate with Milli Görüs.\footnote{Avci, Gamze. 2005. “Religion, Transnationalism and Turks in Europe.” Turkish Studies 6 (2): 207.}

In 1998, Haci Karacaer, a banker connected to the Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party—PvdA, center-left) became the chairman of the northern chapter of Milli Görüs.\footnote{According to Es (2012), “the majority of the members of the movement thought that [Karacaer] went too far in embracing liberal Dutch values.” For discussions of Karacaer’s prominent media profile and the contrast with the conservatism of the Milli Görüs grassroots, see Amersfoort and Doomernik, 2003: 184; Es, 2012: 74-5; Sunier and Landman, 2015: 79; Yükleyen, 2009: 299-302.}

Through the early 2000s, Karacaer made a mark as the open, reformist, and self-critical face of Islam in the Netherlands, although it is questionable whether his tolerant views towards homosexuality, women’s rights, and gender equality in Islam reflected those of MG-NN supporters more generally.\footnote{For an account, see Roose, Eric. 2009. The Architectural Representation of Islam: Muslim-Commissioned Mosque Design in the Netherlands. ISIM Dissertations. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press; ISIM, 163-179.}

Karacaer and MG-NN Deputy Chairman Üzeyir Kabaktepe also soon drew the ire of the conservative leaders of Milli Görüs’ international headquarters in Cologne, who were increasingly keen to rein in the more liberal and maverick tendencies of the MG-NN leadership. Concurrently, the MG-NN leadership was also attempting to navigate the Wester mosque construction project in Amsterdam, a project over which MG headquarters in Cologne wished to take full control.\footnote{Es, Murat. 2012. “Turkish-Dutch Mosques and the Construction of Transnational Spaces in Europe.” Doctor of Philosophy in Geography, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 75; Lindo (2008) cited in Mügge, Liza. 2010. Beyond Dutch Borders: Transnational Politics among Colonial Migrants, Guest Workers and the Second Generation. Imiscoe Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 159.}

Ultimately, relations between Milli Görüs and the Dutch state soured in the mid-2000s with the rising influence of Geert Wilders’ Partij voor Frijheit (Freedom Party—PVV, far-right) and as the more conservative Milli Görüs headquarters in Cologne moved to sideline the more reformist MG-NN in 2006 and seize control of the Wester Mosque project.\footnote{Es, Murat. 2012. “Turkish-Dutch Mosques and the Construction of Transnational Spaces in Europe.” Doctor of Philosophy in Geography, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 75; Lindo (2008) cited in Mügge, Liza. 2010. Beyond Dutch Borders: Transnational Politics among Colonial Migrants, Guest Workers and the Second Generation. Imiscoe Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 159.}

However, Yükleyen (2009) notes that support for the brand of reformism represented by Karacaer and Kabaktepe continued to exist, at least at the leadership level,
both in the Netherlands as well as throughout the various *Milli Görüs* branches across Europe.\textsuperscript{1161}

Ultimately, the variation in characteristics and discourses between more moderate and radical branches of *Milli Görüs* creates ambiguities that make the organization susceptible to charges of ‘double-speak.’ Den Exter et al (2006) argue that, “... [*Milli Görüs*] is characterized by ‘two faces’: a modern, friendly face that is mainly focused on consultation and social uplift of the Turkish youth, and an intolerant, anti-western, orthodox face.”\textsuperscript{1162} German authorities have discussed banning the organization although Yükleyen (2009) notes that arguments in favor of such a ban focus on the more radical elements of the organization based on quotations from *Milli Gazete*, the mouthpiece of the *Milli Görüs* headquarters in Germany, which includes “anti-semitism, anti-westernism, and disapproval of any reformist attitude.”\textsuperscript{1163} Finally, an internal controversy over the ‘Islamic holdings affair’ damaged the reputation of *Milli Görüs* leaderships across Europe who had unwittingly provided access to *Milli Görüs* mosques to unscrupulous Turkish ‘entrepreneurs’ who were engaged in a pyramid scheme that they sold as an “Islamically oriented and patriotic project of national development” and preyed upon congregants, many of whom lost their life savings in the scheme.\textsuperscript{1164}

Turkish Alevi groups represent a decidedly liberal Islamic stream but were latecomers to the institutionalization of manifestations of Turkish ‘parallel Islam’ in the


\textsuperscript{1164} While the scheme targeted both Diyanet and *Milli Görüş* affiliated mosques, the scheme found a more welcoming atmosphere in *Milli Görüş* mosques. See Es, Murat. 2012. “Turkish-Dutch Mosques and the Construction of Transnational Spaces in Europe.” Doctor of Philosophy in Geography, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 75-78.
Netherlands. In Turkey, the Alevi community, which was previously known as the Bektasi, represents approximately 15 to 20 percent of the population. However, Alevis tend to be over-represented among Turkish communities in Europe having fled Turkey in greater numbers after the 1980 military coup because they were identified with a much-exaggerated ‘leftist threat.’ Alevis have some links to Shi’ism, are traditionally regarded as enthusiastic supporters of Turkish secularism, and became strongly associated with the political and even radical left in Turkey in the 1970s. It was not until 1990, however, that Alevi groups in the Netherlands united under the aegis of the Federatie van Alevitische en Bektashistische verenigingen (Federation of Alevite and Bektasi Associations—HAK-DER) based in The Hague. According to Mügge (2010),

The late development of Alevi migrant organisations is best seen in the context of the 1990s ‘Alevi revival’ in Turkey. As Turkey’s official religion—regulated by Diyanet—is Sunni Islam, Alevi houses of worship (cems) and organisations were not officially recognised. In the 1960s and 1970s, Alevis were organised in hometown and saint-based associations. Then in 1977 and 1978, the Alevi community was the victim of massacres at the hands of nationalist Sunnis. A separate Alevi identity began to emerge in the late 1980s as a result of the fall of socialism—previously a surrogate identity for Alevis.

For example, Alevitism is often identified as having a humanist character and HAK-DER makes a point of its support for the concept of equality for all, “without making a distinction between ethnic background, religious affiliation, gender, sexual orientation or language.” HAK-DER website quoted in Beek, Jan H., van de, Saskia A. van de Mort, and Suzanne van Hees. 2010. “Diversity and the European Public Sphere The Case of the Netherlands.” Online Country Report. EurospHERE Country Reports.


Alevi identity in Europe has crystallized around a narrative of communal oppression and victimization in Turkey. However, Yildiz and Verkuyten (2011) note that Alevi organizations are challenged by the fact that, “… the diversity among the Alevis is substantial and there is a lack of consensus about what it means to be an Alevi.” In spite of the fact that Alevi organizations both in Turkey and in Europe have called for the Diyanet’s abolition, HAK-DER has participated in ethnic umbrella groups with the TICF and cooperated with the ISN in an (unsuccessful) attempt to obtain a broadcasting license in the Netherlands. However, HAK-DER’s primary focus has been on issues such as the introduction of regulations and training facilities for Alevi dedes (imams).

A final manifestation of Turkish ‘parallel Islam’ in the Netherlands takes the form of the Nurcu community and, in particular, its Gülenist offshoot, often referred to as Hizmet (‘Service’) whose members are often referred to as Nurcus or Fethullahcilar. While the Süleymançis, Milli Görüs, and the Diyanet were already active in the 1970s, the Gülen movement didn’t start to take root throughout Europe until the 1980s and 1990s. Accordingly, rather than focusing their attention on competing with other more

---

1170 This identity was further solidified after a widely publicized attack on an Alevi gathering in Sivas, Turkey, in 1993 when a mob burned down a hotel, killing 37 intellectuals and artists who were attending an Alevi cultural festival in the town.
1173 The Gülen movement is a transnational Islamist political movement led by Turkish religious scholar, Fethullah Gülen, and his brand of Turkish Islam that draws from the work of Said Nursi (1873–1960), author of several volumes of religious teachings known as Risale-i Nur who was the progenitor of the Nurcu movement. For a broad overview of the development of Gülen’s thinking over time, see Sunier, Thijl, and Nico Landman. 2015. Transnational Turkish Islam: Shifting Geographies of Religious Activism and Community Building in Turkey and Europe. Palgrave Pivot. Basingstoke; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 83-87.
well-established manifestations of Turkish Islam over the control of mosques and issues related to the pursuit of religious accommodations from the state, the Gülen movement has instead concentrated its efforts on young people of the second and particularly third generations who “…have already shown that they are successful and dedicated and who have demonstrated that they have career ambitions.”

1175

Organizationally, the Gülen movement’s focus on a younger demographic manifests itself in the establishment of a network of educational institutions including student dorms and tutoring centers—as well as an emphasis on interfaith dialogue.1176 Primarily as a result of its often-tenuous political position in Turkey, the Gülen movement has tended to closely guard information about its size, support, and activities.1177 In the Netherlands, there are seven or eight Gülen student dorms and tutoring centers that operate under the aegis of the Landelijke Organisatie voor Schoolinternaten (National Organization for Boarding Schools—LOS).1178 Another Gülenist organization, the Stichting Islam en Dialoog (Islam and Dialogue Foundation—SID), is inspired by Gülen’s commitment to interfaith dialogue and organizes interfaith

---

activities aimed at encouraging reflection on “… traditions, sacred texts, and experiences living as devout believers in a secular world.”\(^{1179}\)

In late 2008, a TV documentary accused the Gülen movement of harboring a ‘double agenda’ including a covert ‘Islamization’ agenda. The accusations prompted requests for a parliamentary investigation into its activities in the Netherlands.\(^{1180}\) The resulting report painted a picture of an opaque and insular socially conservative movement but one whose members are often socially very successful. The report found no irregularities in the ways in which subsidies and government funds were being employed by the movement and concluded that the Gülen movement in the Netherlands did not constitute any threat to immigrant integration.\(^{1181}\) Sunier and Landman (2013) note that, while Gülen’s inclusive message stands in stark contrast to its secretive ways,

… to depict these two aspects of Hizmet as contradictory or as the outer and inner face of the movement misses the point. First, it assumes that the transformation of the movement from the 1980s onwards was a strategy of deception that did not reflect Gülen’s intentions. Rather, this transformation took place in response to the movement’s changing position within the Turkish political landscape and the changing demography of the rank and file of Hizmet which also transformed Gülen’s vision of Islam in the contemporary globalized world.\(^{1182}\)


\(^{1181}\) Ironically, the report found that the very opacity that had rendered the movement the subject of suspicion “… is partly caused by the relegation of religious devotional activities to the private realm, while non-religious social activities are in the public domain.” Bruinessen, Martin van. 2010. “Kabinetsreactie Inzake Onderzoek Fethullah Gülenbeweging - Rapport De Fethullah Gülenbeweging in Nederland.” Utrecht: University of Utrecht.

Ultimately, however, because its agenda is neither mosque-centered nor focused on garnering religious accommodations from the state, the Gülen movement has ordinarily eschewed participation in national advisory boards.\textsuperscript{1183}

The advanced degree of institutionalization and vibrant competition between the ‘official’ and ‘parallel’ manifestations of Turkish Islam in the Netherlands stands in stark contrast to the relatively weakly cohesive and institutionalized manifestations of Moroccan Islam. The Moroccan Departments of Religious Endowments and Education has not traditionally intervened in the religious life of its subjects residing abroad in quite the same way as the Diyanet has done.\textsuperscript{1184} However, as with the division between ‘official’ and ‘parallel’ forms of Islam among Turkish communities, Moroccan communities in the Netherlands have tended to experience a certain degree of polarization marked by variations in attitudes toward the Moroccan authorities especially as regards the King’s role as the “Commander of the Faithful.” However, Bruce (2015) notes that the shock provoked by the 2003 Casablanca and 2004 Madrid attacks prompted the launch in 2004 of a “reform of the religious field… [that] constitutes the current frame of reference for the Moroccan state’s view of the religious field both at home and abroad.”\textsuperscript{1185} Accordingly, the Moroccan state has in recent years attempted to exert a more direct and forceful role.

By far the most prominent manifestation of the institutionalization of Moroccan Islam in the Netherlands is the Unie van Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties (Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands—UMMON), which was founded as


a working group in 1977 but didn’t gain statutory recognition until 1982. UMMON claims to represent 90 mosques in the Netherlands and is widely considered to be supportive of the Moroccan government, although attitudes toward the regime undoubtedly vary across UMMON affiliated mosques. Indeed, there has been some controversy over the proximity of UMMON to the Moroccan regime as well as over the extent of state supervision over UMMON affiliated mosques. These controversies are manifested in terms of periodic accusations that UMMON is under the control of the Moroccan Embassy and/or overtly royalist political organizations (i.e. the Moroccan amicales); concerns that the content of Friday sermons are closely monitored, if not determined, by the Moroccan Department of Religious Endowments and of Education; as well as accusation of intimidation and coercion of wayward imams by agents of the Moroccan state. While UMMON affiliated mosques employed imams that were informally trained in local mosques in Morocco through the 1990s, the umbrella organization has more recently advocated for educating imams in the Netherlands, as well as the provision of education in the language and knowledge of Dutch society.

With UMMON seen to be broadly representative of Moroccan Islam in the Netherlands while also representing the ‘official Islam’ of the Makhzen, a number of individual so-called ‘free mosque’ organizations have sought to institutionalize an alternative ‘regime critical’ mosque umbrella that is more adaptive to the European

---


context but with little success. A case in point is that of Yahia Bouyafa who has been linked with a variety of Muslim Brotherhood affiliated and legacy organizations. Bouyafa has been outspoken on the subject of the current representation of Moroccans in the Netherlands:

*The representation is done by a few Moroccan first generation guest workers that have been in that position ever since the 1970s. As a mosque chairman, I’ve never heard from them in all those years… When we contacted them with the proposal to renew the organisation [UMMON], they didn’t feel like cooperating. That’s why we started an organisation of our own, the RMMN.*

While Bouyafa asserts that the premise for establishing the *Raad voor Marokkaanse Moskeeën in Nederland* (Moroccan Mosque Council in the Netherlands—RMMN) was out of frustration with the inefficacy of UMMON, Roose (2009) points out that, “…although these [regime critical] Moroccan-Dutch mosque community leaders have varying backgrounds, they basically share an ‘Islamist’ dislike of the royalist inclination of Moroccan Islam.” Ultimately, the extent of support for the RMMN within Moroccan communities is unclear and its website neither identifies nor enumerates its affiliate organizations.

---


The final grouping of Islamic umbrella organizations of significance has emerged from the Hindustani Surinamese population in the Netherlands. Approximately 70 percent of the Surinamese Hindustani Muslims are Sunni and about 30 percent are Ahmadi.\textsuperscript{1195} The Sunni majority of this demographic is strongly influenced by the Barelwi school of British India and this community maintains a theological orientation towards Pakistan.\textsuperscript{1196} According to Hoffer (1992),

\textit{… the relation between Pakistani pîrs and Surinamese Muslims became even stronger after the migration to The Netherlands, as some of the Brelwi pîrs, living in the United Kingdom, crossed the North Sea and gained disciples on the continent. This process was stimulated by the creation of the World Islamic Mission by Brelwi shaykhs in England, Pakistan and India during the pilgrimage to Mecca of 1973, in order to strengthen the Brelwi-movement internationally.}\textsuperscript{1197}

Rivalry between three pîrs has resulted in the emergence of three umbrella organizations in the Netherlands, two of whom use the name World Islamic Mission, which has caused some confusion in the literature.\textsuperscript{1198} However, by far the most prominent among these

\textsuperscript{1195} Two different branches can be distinguished within the Ahmadiyya movement. The Lahore and the Qadian branches differ in terms of their interpretation of the importance of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The Lahore branch sees Mohamed as the only prophet of Islam and who consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad a reformer while the Qadian branch believes in the possibility of prophets following Mohamed (including Mirza Ghulam Ahmad). Most other Muslims consider the adherents of both currents to be kafrs (unbelievers), which has resulted in widespread persecution of Ahmadi. Most Hindu Muslims (in the Netherlands) are followers From the Lahore branch. See Heelsum, Anja van, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2004. Islamitische organisaties in Nederland. Moslim in Nederland, E. Den Haag: SCP.


\textsuperscript{1198} Heelsum et al (2004) identify them as follows: (1) the branch headed by Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani Sidiq (1926-2002, Pakistan) closely involved with the WIMN in the Netherlands; (2) the branch led by Pir Maroof (Bradford, UK) who founded the Stichting Islamitische Wereldmisie (World Islamic Mission Foundation—SIWM) in 1981; and the branch led by Pakistani pir Abdul Wahab Siddiqui, who fell out with Noorani and subsequently founded the International Muslim Organization (IMO). Heelsum, Anja van,
organizations is the WIMN, which was founded in May 1984. Mosques affiliated with the WIMN are also associated with Sir Noorani Siddiqui who founded the Pakistani political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), advocated for Pakistan to be established as an Islamic Republic, and lobbied for the Ahmadi to be declared non-Muslims in Pakistan, which he achieved by parliamentary resolution in 1974. Siddiqui started visiting Surinam in 1964 where he stoked animosities between Hindustani Sunni and Ahmadi Muslims and increasingly positioned himself as vehemently anti-Ahmadiyya and anti-Wahhabi. As we shall see, the resulting hostility between Surinamese and Ahmadiyya communities has had important effects on the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands. The Surinamese Ahmadiyya have a long-standing presence in the Netherlands since the late-1940s and have organized under a variety of umbrella organizations over time, with the most prominent current umbrella, the Union of Lahore Ahmadiyya Organizations in the Netherlands (ULAMON), representing the Lahore branch.

Dutch ‘New Realism’ and the Fortuyn and Van Gogh murders as ‘suddenly imposed grievances’

In 1991, influenced by events in Britain and France as well as emerging notions of a ‘clash of civilizations,’ the conservative-liberal leader of the opposition, Frits Bolkestein (VVD—center-right), triggered what later became known as the ‘national

---


minorities debate’ when he delivered a speech titled “On the collapse of the Soviet Union.” In the speech, Bolkestein criticized immigrants from Turkey and Morocco and advocated for a more uncompromising assimilationist integration policy. While scholarly analyses attributed the difficulties of Moroccan and Turkish migrants (vis-à-vis apart their Dutch Eurasian, Surinamese, and Antillean counterparts) to more disadvantaged socioeconomic circumstances and a lack of common elements of history and language, Bolkestein reduced the difficulties of Turks and Moroccans to a fundamental incompatibility between ‘Islam’ and ‘liberal values.’

While Bolkestein’s comments were fiercely contested, this narrative resonated in a context where the institutionalized multiculturalism of the EMPs was coming under fire in light of ongoing social deprivation and segregation especially among communities that happened to originate from Muslim majority countries. Ultimately, Bolkestein’s speech translated into electoral support and heralded the emergence of a current of thinking in Dutch politics that later became known as “new realism,” a discourse that has involved sustained political opposition to any policies designed to assist ethnic or religious minorities and, in recent years, has taken on a decidedly anti-Islam character.

---

1205 ‘New Realism’ is a strain of populism in Dutch politics that is characterized its proponents’ perception that they have developed “the courage to confront taboos, break silence, intervene ‘with guts’ and speak the truth surrounding societal ills hidden by a (leftist) consensus of political correctness.” Since Bolkestein’s speech in 1991, this “new realist” narrative has been identified with a number of Dutch commentators and politicians such as Paul Scheffer, Pim Fortuyn, and most recently Geert Wilders, and has undoubtedly had a
This discursive shift prompted the Christian Democrat-led coalition under Ruud Lubbers to reconsider the basis on which the EMPs had operated in the preceding decade. On a policy level, government reports and commissions were advocating various remedies to address the controversies over the EMPs. The Advisory Council on Government Policy (WRR) proposed that the EMPs should be extended to all disadvantaged non-indigenous groups. However, in the run-up to the 1994 elections, the Lubbers government moved to shift the relative weight of the onus for integration from the more multicultural group level approach inherent to the Dutch legacy of pillarization to a more assimilatory individual level approach that emphasized not only the rights but also the duties (e.g., Dutch language acquisition and acculturation) of new citizens.

Concurrently, significant contestation emerged over the nexus of research and policy in the domain of integration in the Netherlands. Some of this contestation was undoubtedly driven by the increasing popular currency of ‘new realist’ discourses and the electoral successes of right-wing parties in Dutch politics. The association between social


science researchers and the Dutch multicultural model became particularly controversial, with the discrediting of the multicultural model in the public sphere. For example, in 2003, the year following the assassination of Pim Fortuyn, the Dutch Parliament convened a committee that was tasked with investigating why the country’s integration policies had shown little signs of success. The committee in turn commissioned an extensive study that concluded that in fact there had been significant progress made over the preceding decade in the fields of education and labor participation, which was interpreted as indicative of a relatively successful process of integration of immigrants into Dutch society. However, Scholten (2011) notes that,

Leading politicians discarded the conclusions of the researchers as naïve and biased, and held on to their original conclusion that the policy was a failure. Government referred to crucial areas such as social cohesion, religion and criminality, which the investigative committee had ignored. The government could agree that the policy was partially successful, but also insisted that it was unsuccessful in the aforementioned areas.

Clearly, researchers, politicians and policymakers had different ideas about how the integration process should be operationalized, which resulted in divergent interpretations of the available evidence and evaluations of policy success or failure. Politicians accused researchers of harboring a “multicultural bias” given their involvement in developing the policies that they were now evaluating. Ultimately, Scholten (2011) concludes that the aftermath of Fortuyn’s assassination led to a “…wide rejection of what was considered an elitist way of policymaking, reflecting a perceived interference by scientific expertise and systematic politicisation.”


What strongly differentiates the Dutch case from the British and French cases is the fact that the critical junctures that galvanized the establishment of an institutionalized structure of intermediation between the state and its Muslim communities involved two ‘suddenly imposed grievances’ that triggered the airing of resentments of the broader population in the Netherlands rather than those of its Muslim minority communities. The murder of Pim Fortuyn (LPF, right), a rising star in Dutch politics, profoundly shocked the Dutch public coming as it did during the 2002 general election campaign in which Fortuyn’s party, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (Pim Fortuyn List—LPF) was expected to perform well. However, it is important to note that polarization between Western Europeans and Muslim minority communities were evident in the Netherlands before the upheavals of the early 2000s, including the September 11th attacks. In short, the beliefs of each about the other were not a product of these events but rather provided the basis for reactions to them.1213 Locating himself as a forceful voice within the Dutch ‘new realist’ school, Fortuyn had made a name as a trenchant critic of the “so-called multicultural society” starting with the publication of his booklet *Against the Islamization of our Culture* (1997).1214 In the run-up to the elections, Fortuyn became the subject of considerable controversy when he called for “zero-immigration” because the Netherlands was “full” and also advocated for a “cold war against Islam,” which he dismissed as “an idiotic culture.”1215 Polling prior to his assassination indicated that his ‘new realist’ message was resonating with the electorate.1216

1216 See Scholten, Peter. 2011. *Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective.* IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 14; also
While Fortuyn’s assassin was a white Dutch radical environmentalist, Fortuyn had become associated in the public imaginary with a populist platform that had politicized immigrant integration, an issue that he had propelled to the top of the political agenda during the election campaign. In short order, the Dutch multicultural model became the primary target of the backlash that followed Fortuyn’s murder.\textsuperscript{1217} De Koning and Meijer (2011) note that, in the aftermath,

\ldots Muslims felt themselves confronted by an almost solid oppositional front of White Dutch adversaries (although some politicians did defend the civil rights of Muslims), while internal ethnic and religious differences made it almost impossible for them to form a united counter-movement.\textsuperscript{1218}

Scholten (2011) notes that this so-called ‘long year of 2002’ in Dutch politics had two direct effects. First, it resulted in the emergence of a stronger political leadership in migration and integration policy in 2002 with policy responsibility shifting towards the Department of Justice under Hilbrand Nawijn (PNV, center right) and then Rita Verdonk (VVD, center right) with a corresponding shift in policy framing from a more open and universalist towards a more closed and assimilationist formulation.\textsuperscript{1219} Accordingly, the Netherlands, with its long-standing history of consociationalism and its reputation as a bastion of multiculturalism, was moving to the forefront of the ‘multiculturalism backlash.’\textsuperscript{1220}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Yükleyen, Ahmet. 2007. “The European Market for Islam: Turkish Islamic Communities and Organizations in Germany and the Netherlands.” Doctor of Philosophy in, Boston: Boston University, 272.
\item Scholten, Peter. 2011. Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective. IMISCOE Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 186.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The political vacuum created by Fortuyn’s death saw his confrontational ideas being co-opted by other political and media figures who were sympathetic to Dutch new realist and anti-Islam discourses. Among them were Dutch-Somali anti-Islam activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali and writer Theo van Gogh. When Hirsi Ali went into hiding after receiving death threats, she was persuaded to stand for parliament by the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Conservative Liberal party—VVD). However, Hirsi Ali and van Gogh shot to international notoriety after their film Submission was broadcast on Dutch television in August 2004. The terms of the debate that followed its broadcast resembled those generated by The Satanic Verses whereby vehement objections to the movie were identified as a sign of ‘Muslim’ cultural backwardness.\footnote{1221} Within a matter of months, van Gogh was brutally murdered by a Dutch youth of Moroccan descent, which further fueled Hirsi Ali’s popularity.

While Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s political career in the Netherlands came to an end under controversial circumstances, her critique of Islam continued to resonate in the platform of other Dutch politicians. In 2006, Geert Wilders, a former speechwriter for the VVD, founded the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party—PVV), which he has presented as an explicitly anti-Islam party.\footnote{1222} Taking on the political mantle of a ‘new realist’ populist strand in Dutch politics, Wilders followed in the footsteps of Hirsi Ali in March 2008 when he released the provocative anti-Islam film Fitna.\footnote{1223} Wilders political rise during

\footnote{1222} As of the 2017 general election, the PVV holds 20 of the 150 seats in Dutch parliament. From 2010 and 2012 the PVV supported the VVD-CDA coalition government led by Mark Rutte.
this time period has contributed to the further polarization of the national political discussion surrounding issues of immigration and integration.\textsuperscript{1224}

\textbf{Attempts to form inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian ‘Muslim’ umbrella groups}

Unlike the British and French cases, the constitutional requirement that specifically religious subjects be discussed with a national representative body provided incentives for repeated bottom-up attempts from within civil society starting in the mid-1970s to form a national-level inter-ethnic Islamic umbrella organization. These initiatives led to the creation of a series of mostly short-lived umbrella organizations including the \textit{Federatie van Moslim Organisaties in Nederland} (Federation of Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands—FOMON, 1975-1980), the \textit{Moslim Organisaties in Nederland} (Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands—MON, 1982-1983), the \textit{Nederlands-Islamitisch Parlement} (Dutch Islamic Parliament—NIP, 1982-1986), the \textit{Islamitisch Landelijk Comite} (Islamic National Committee—ILC, 1989-1990), and finally the \textit{Islamitische Raad Nederlandse} (Dutch Islamic Council—IRN) and the \textit{Nederlandse Moslim Raad} (Dutch Muslim Council—NMR) both of which were established in 1992.\textsuperscript{1231}

In 1974, at a time when the Süleymanci had a near monopoly on the representation of Turkish Islam in the Netherlands, the SICN pioneered an effort to create an umbrella organization named the \textit{Federatie van Moslim Organisaties in Nederland} (Federation of Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands—FOMON) by bringing together Muslim organizations of various backgrounds (Dutch, Indonesian, Surinamese,

Pakistani, Turkish and Moroccan). The FOMON was largely financed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Muslim World League and its remit included negotiations over mosque construction, obtaining permission for halal slaughter, gaining access to suitable facilities for Islamic burial, and the incorporation of Islamic religious education within the established frameworks. However, the initiative had failed by 1980 due not only to the absence of a common language but also because of the contradictory political influences exercised by the countries of origin, the conflicting interests of international mother organizations, and because the Dutch government demanded that any ‘representative’ organization include all Muslims, in particular the heterodox Ahmadiyya movement.

In 1981 another attempt to form an inter-ethnic umbrella resulted in the establishment of the short-lived Moslim Organisaties in Nederland (Muslim Organizations in The Netherlands—MON). However, only Turkish organizations joined

---


1234 The Ahmadiyya are named for founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who was born in 1835 in Qadian, Punjab, and is regarded by his followers as a prophet. Orthodox Muslim groups in Pakistan regard the ‘Qadianis’ as heretical and the community is one of the most relentlessly persecuted in Pakistan. Both Ahmadi and Sunni Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands have traditionally recruited their Imams in India or Pakistan and have tended to have more institutionalized links with India and Pakistan rather than with Surinam. Accordingly, sectarian tensions between Ahmadis and Sunnis in the subcontinent have been at least somewhat replicated in the Netherlands with many Orthodox Muslims refusing to recognize the Ahmadiyya as Muslims. See Mügge, Liza. 2010. Beyond Dutch Borders: Transnational Politics among Colonial Migrants, Guest Workers and the Second Generation. Imiscoe Research. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 89. Schrover, Marlou. 2010. “Pillarization, Multiculturalism and Cultural Freezing. Dutch Migration History and the Enforcement of Essentialist Ideas.” BMGN - Low Countries Historical Review 125 (2–3): 329; Shadid, W. A. R., and P. S. Van Koningsveld. 1996. “Islam in the Netherlands: Constitutional Law and Islamic Organizations.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 16 (1): 111–28; Koningsveld, Pieter Sjoerd van, and W. A. R. Shadid. 1991. “Institutionalization and Integration of Islam in The Netherlands.” In The Integration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe, edited by P. Sj van Koningsveld and W. A. R. Shadid. Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House.
MON, with several Pakistanis and one Surinamese as some time council members.\textsuperscript{1235} As a reaction to the establishment of the MON some ‘dissident’ organizations created the \textit{Nederlands-Islamitisch Parlement} (Dutch Islamic Parliament—NIP) around 1980, which also appears to have mainly existed on paper.\textsuperscript{1236} Rather, the 1980s were far more notable for the proliferation of organizations founded on the basis of national, sectarian, or political preference.

In the midst of \textit{The Satanic Verses} Affair, another attempt at forming a more broad-based umbrella led to the founding of the \textit{Islamitisch Landelijk Comite} (Islamic National Committee—ILC). The committee represented itself to the government as the representative of Muslims in the Netherlands and spoke out against Khomeini’s fatwa, but the government refused to recognize the ILC on the grounds that it only represented Sunni organizations.\textsuperscript{1237} This determination belied the lack of realism in the notion of a 100 per cent representative body of Muslims in the Netherlands given, for example, the problematic relations between Sunnis, the \textit{Ahmadiyya} and other sectarian groups.\textsuperscript{1238}

In 1992, the ILC was dissolved with the intention of replacing it with a more broad-based organization. However, what resulted was the formation of two competing Sunni umbrellas, the \textit{Islamitische Raad Nederlandse} (Dutch Islamic Council—IRN) and the \textit{Nederlandse Moslim Raad} (Dutch Muslim Council—NMR). The Turkish dominated

IRN was broadly representative of the ‘official Islam’ of countries of origin bringing together the Turkish ISN/TICF, the Moroccan UMMON, and the Surinamese WIMN under one umbrella. The NMR, on the other hand, brought together nine other Islamic denominations including the most prominent representations of ‘parallel Islam,’ the SICN and the NIF. The IRN and NMR engaged in significant competition over broadcasting time on Dutch TV, with the Dutch Media Commission tending to favor the NMR as more ‘open’ and ‘representative.’ Attempts to tamp down the intense rivalry between the IRN and the NMR and to create a single body only resulted in further fragmentation. In 1997, for example, the Raad van Moskeeën (Council of Mosques—RVM) was founded by TICF, ISN, SICN, and NIF with the latter two organizations becoming detached from the NMR. UMMON and WIMN were subsequently invited to participate in the RVM but their participation did not materialize, leaving the RVM firmly in the hands of the Turkish organizations.

While Dutch governments in the 1980s had adopted technocratic responses to the institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands, the increasing prominence of issues related to immigration and integration in the early 2000s resulted in what Shadid (2006) characterizes as,

… an enormous increase in direct and indirect Dutch government intervention in Muslim religious affairs, in the creation of a representative body for Muslims, in founding a Dutch center for educating imams, in forbidding Muslims to contract their own religious leaders from the

countries of origin, and in controlling the content of their religious lessons and materials.\textsuperscript{1242}

Again, a reinforcing sequence operated here which built the impetus for Dutch government to convene a consultation structure with Muslim communities in the Netherlands. A vigorous national debate over Dutch multiculturalism preceded the September 11th attacks. The debate was first triggered in the spring of 2000 by the publication in NRC Handelsblad of an article authored by Paul Scheffer titled “The Multicultural Drama.”\textsuperscript{1243} In the article, Scheffer, a prominent member of the Labour Party (PvdA, left), took up the ‘new realist’ mantle in arguing that Dutch multiculturalism had failed. The outcome of these failed policies, Scheffer argued, was the emergence of a new “ethnic underclass” of immigrants who did not identify with Dutch culture and society, and who would eventually undermine social cohesion and the functioning of the liberal democratic state because of their supposedly illiberal ideas. This national debate further intensified when, in an appearance on Dutch television in May 2001, Khalil El Moumni, a Moroccan born Salafist imam at the al-Nasr mosque in Rotterdam, likened homosexuality to a contagious disease that threatened Dutch society because it prevented procreation.

In May 2001, responding to national preoccupations stirred up by the El Moumni Affair, Minister for Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities, Roger van Boxtel (D66, center), convened an \textit{ad hoc} consultation with Dutch Muslim organizations.\textsuperscript{1244} To Van Boxtel’s consternation, more than 100 representatives showed up to a meeting room


\textsuperscript{1244} For a discussion of the genesis of the CMO as a reactive sequence triggered by the El Moumni Affair, see Es, Murat. 2012. “Turkish-Dutch Mosques and the Construction of Transnational Spaces in Europe.” Doctor of Philosophy in Geography, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 55.
that could accommodate no more than 25 attendees. Thijl Sunier characterized the meeting as analogous to an “Islamic Maze” and Van Boxtel responded by instructing the attendees to establish a unified umbrella. However, only the previous year, a report by accounting firm KPMG had concluded that it would not be feasible in the short term to bundle the various Dutch Muslim organizations under a single supra-umbrella. Nonetheless, and ominously on the morning of September 11, 2001, an exploratory meeting was held to consult with Dutch Muslim organizations about the possibility of constructing such an umbrella. The attacks later that day, and press reports of

---

1247 Groen, Janny. 2001. “‘We Zoeken Leiders Die de Dialoog Voeren.’” (“We are looking for leaders to consult with”). De Volkskrant, October 27.
1248 The following organizations participated in this meeting: HAK-DER (Turkish Alevi), the ISN (Turkish, Diyanet), MG-NN (Milli Görüs Northern Netherlands), NIF (Milli Görüş), NMR (Dutch Muslim Council, itself a supra-umbrella and holder of the official broadcast license), SICN (Turkish, Süleymançlı), TICF
Moroccan youth in the town of Ede celebrating the attacks, further increased the sense of urgency throughout government for convening a broad-based dialogue partner.  

It was in the context of the emergent ‘new realist’ discourses and the increasing preoccupation of Dutch political elites with Muslim minority communities in 2000 and 2001, that Pim Fortuyn rose to prominence as the leader of the so-called ‘Fortuyn Revolt,’ the ‘Livable Netherlands’ Party, and later the *Lijsst Pim Fortuyn* (Pim Fortuyn List—LPF) With the public outcry following Fortuyn’s assassination in May 2002 reinforcing the ‘new realist’ message of the failure of Dutch multiculturalism, the short-lived Balkenende-led first ‘Purple coalition’ government under Jan Peter Balkenende moved responsibility for integration policy from the Department of Home Affairs, which had been the coordinating department since the late 1970s, to the Department of Justice thus signaling a more pronounced law-and-order approach to immigrant integration. Moreover, Hilbrand Nawijn (LPF, right) was appointed Minister for Integration and Immigration further signaled a shift to a more assimilationist—if not explicitly anti-Islam—approach in Dutch integration policy.

**Structural consistency but procedural and legal inconsistencies: The CMO and CGI (2004 to present)**

With the collapse of the first ‘Purple coalition’ and the return of Jan Peter Balkenende’s second ‘Purple coalition’ in May 2003, Rita Verdonk (VVD, center-right) became Minister for Integration and Immigration. Verdonk pushed forward the notion of

---

1249 Groen, Janny. 2001. “We Zoeken Leiders Die de Dialoog Voeren.” (“We are looking for leaders to consult with”), *De Volkskrant*, October 27.  
convening a single interlocutor for Dutch Muslim communities to the government under the aegis of the Contactorgaan Moslims en de Overheid (Government-Muslims Contact Unit—CMO). Needless to say, the plan did not proceed smoothly. With some groups excluded from the CMO umbrella, separate discussions were held between the government and Alevi and Shi’a umbrella groups in November 2001 and the Ahmadiyya umbrella ULAMON in July 2003 and January 2004.\textsuperscript{1251} As negotiations progressed, Hikmat Mahawat Khan, the spokesman for the Surinamese Ahmadiyya umbrella, ULAMON, complained that ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ minority currents such as the predominantly Surinamese Shi’a and Ahmadiyya communities were being excluded from the ‘conservative’ and ‘orthodox’ CMO.\textsuperscript{1252}

Predictably, the WIM publically vetoed the participation of ULAMON in the CMO because they refused to consider the Ahmadiyya as “true Muslims.”\textsuperscript{1253} Moreover, as might be expected, Salafist organizations have also remained outside the CMO who they consider to be “too liberal.”\textsuperscript{1254} The following month, the Alevi umbrella HAK-DER announced that it would not be joining the CMO and indicated that it might join the Humanist Alliance, explaining that its “liberal vision” would not be welcome in the CMO’s “conservative-oriented club.”\textsuperscript{1255} Ultimately, several groups that had participated in the exploratory talks for the formation of the CMO—including HAK-DER and a

\textsuperscript{1254} Personal interview with Rasit Bal of the CMO, May 10, 2017.
predominantly Iraqi Shi’a umbrella group, *Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging* (OSV)—were working behind-the-scenes to establish a second contact group.1256

Meanwhile, the CMO’s preparatory working group’s seven constituent organizations agreed on draft statutes, which were submitted to the government in May 2003.1257 Acknowledging that one hundred percent representativeness would not be achievable, Verdonk explained to parliament that she saw the CMO as sufficiently representative (i.e. of about 80 percent) of Muslim communities in the Netherlands and had received assurances from the CMO that it would be “open and democratic” and “responsive to applications for accession.”1258 The CMO was formally established in January 2004 but that same day the NMR, holder of the broadcasting license for Muslim communities in the Netherlands, withdrew from the CMO umbrella citing its concern that the umbrella was not sufficiently representative.1259

Despite the government’s preference to consult with one major representative umbrella organization, Verdonk soon faced the reality of two rival Muslim umbrella organizations when a parliamentary majority (including the PvdA, VVD, GroenLinks and LPF) opposed granting the exclusive right of consultation to the CMO.1260 With the CMO

---


1257 The seven constituent members of the CMO preparatory working group were: Islamitische Stichting Nederland (ISN), Milli Görüs Noord Nederland (MG-NN), Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (NIF), Nederlandse Moslim Raad (NMR), Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie (TICF), Unie van Marokkaanse Moskee Organisaties in Nederland (UMMON), and World Islamic Mission (WIM). See “Tweede Kamer Der Staten-Generaal.” 2003. 811. Den Haag. Sunier et al (2001: 124) note that the presence of both the ISN and the TICF in the CMO effectively gives the Diyanet a double vote in the CMO. While the NMR soon departed from the CMO umbrella, several groups later joined it including the SICN, the Iraqi Shi’a umbrella OSV, the Islamic Society of Bosniaks in Netherlands (IVBN), the National Platform for New Muslims (LPNM), and the Turkish Federation Netherlands (TFN).


now exclusively Sunni in character and excluding non-Sunni currents (i.e. Alevis, Ahmadiyya, Shi’a, etc.), a second umbrella coalesced under the aegis of the Contact Groep Islam (Islam Contact Group—CGI). While Nurettin Altundal of HAK-DER argued that what he saw as the CMO’s “exclusion policy” was indicative of its inability to build bridges to other faith and secular groups, CMO Chairman, Mohamed Sini, argued that the umbrella had already experienced considerable difficulty unifying Sunni groups and indicated that it was pursuing a “growth model” in the long term that would remain open to non-Sunni groups in the future.  

With the exclusion of the Alevis and Ahmadiyya and the last minute exit of the NMR, the CMO was reduced to being an exclusively Sunni umbrella. With a single overarching umbrella representing Dutch Muslims no longer feasible, Verdonk was compelled to officially recognize a second interlocutor, the Contact Groep Islam (CGI), in January 2005. At its founding, the constituent umbrellas of the CGI included HAK-DER (Turkish Alevi), ULAMON (Surinamese Ahmadiyya), the NMR (various Sunni groups), and the OSV (Iraqi Shi’a). As such, the CGI framed itself as representing the “…broadest reflection of Islam in the Netherlands.” However, as of 2004, research conducted by the accounting firm KPMG purporting to measure the ‘representativeness’ of each umbrella estimated the CMO as representing approximately 500,000 and the CGI as representing approximately 115,000 of the Netherlands’ estimated 945,000

1262 In 2006, the Iraqi Shi’a umbrella OSV joined the CMO. See Vellenga, Sipco, and Gerard Wiegers. 2011. Religie, Binding En Polarisatie. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 93.
1263 The Iraqi Shi’a umbrella OSV joined the CGI in 2004 but later made a transition to the CMO in 2006 citing the better functioning of the CMO umbrella. See Vellenga, Sipco, and Gerard Wiegers. 2011. Religie, Binding En Polarisatie. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 93.
Muslims. Yahia Bouyafa’s RMMN later joined the CGI, but subsequently left while continuing to retain a second-hand affiliation through its membership of the NMR. The immediate aftermath of the establishment of the CMO and the CGI saw considerable competitive activity in areas such as securing public broadcasting time, consultations with government over the provision of imams to the military and prisons, issues related to military burials for Muslim soldiers, and ongoing issues related to imam training initiatives.

The last minute exit of the NMR from the CMO umbrella resulted in both the NMR and the CMO applying for formal recognition to the Dutch Media Commission as the legitimate claimant to public broadcasting time. With the CMO considered to represent more Muslims in numerical terms but the NMR seen as representing a broader cross-section, the Media Commission, in recognizing both claims as legitimate, asked them to explore a ‘collaboration model’ similar to the one employed by Protestant denominations vis-à-vis broadcasting time. The calculus here involved the ongoing wish of the government to account for the full spectrum of Dutch Muslim organizations while providing plurality in the media landscape by attempting to combine highly diverse


religious groups within one agency. These efforts ultimately failed. Rasit Bal of the CMO notes that, “…the broadcast issue created a crisis and turned into a mess… it was compromised because we quarreled over it. That was a problem at the very beginning.”

Notably, the CMO has not received any core funding for more than 10 years. While praising the role of Rita Verdonk in the formation of the CMO, its Chairman, Rasit Bal, notes considerable variation in the approaches of successive government ministers—in terms of the extent and quality of contact—as well as a sense of differential treatment for ‘established’ religious organizations. More deeply secular politicians, such as former Minister of Housing, Neighborhoods, and Integration (2008-2010), Eberhard van der Laan (PvdA, center-left) demonstrated little interest in engaging with the CMO. Meanwhile, the CGI suffered from the departure of some central figures and effectively disappeared from public view at the end of the 2000s. With this development, the CMO might have been expected to retain a monopoly on representation. Indeed, Bal notes that, “…strictly speaking, legally speaking, we should be the only interlocutor, but we are not.” However, the Dutch government under the direction of Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA, center-left), never formally recognized the CMO as a sole interlocutor.

Indeed, since the effective demise of the CGI, subsequent governments have moved to continue the relationship with the CMO while simultaneously also engaging

---

1273 In August 2006, Hikmat Mahawat Khan, Chairman of the CGI resigned complaining to the media that other Muslim leaders were exhibiting “socially desirable behavior” toward the government in order to curry favor while failing to tackle problems. From June 2007, the CGI was chaired by Yahia Bouyafa of the RMMN but effectively disappeared from view in 2009.
with smaller groups outside the CMO umbrella. In the view of Rasit Bal, this involves a deliberate “divide and rule” strategy designed to avoid empowering a single institutionalized structure. Yet, parliamentary reports demonstrate that through 2016, the CMO continues to be consulted by political leaders on a wide range of topics including imam training and registration initiatives, political fallout from the Turkish coup in July 2016, questions over activities at a Salafi mosque in Utrecht, issues related to religious slaughter, issues related to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), and parliamentary questions over the foreign financing of religious organizations.

While the Dutch government’s approach to the structuring of engagement has been relatively consistent across time, the 2015 ban on face-covering clothing in education and healthcare institutions, government buildings, and on public transport constitutes an apparent legal inconsistency in how the Dutch government engages with religious minorities in recent years. That said, the state broadcaster, NOS, noted that the ban would only affect several hundred Muslim women, most of whom only wore such clothing occasionally. This bill was a diluted version of a bill drawn up by the first Rutte coalition, a minority government that depended on the support of Geert Wilders’ PVV. While populists and parties of the political right have enjoyed a groundswell of support in the Netherlands over the last 15 years, it remains unclear whether the apparent electoral...
popularity of the PVV’s anti-Islam platform is rooted in more secularist or more Christian identity worldviews.

Conclusions

As elsewhere, the scale of the postwar migrations to the Netherlands, particularly those originating in Turkey, Morocco, and Surinam in the 1960s and 1970s, have generated a significant shift in the ethno-religious demography of the Netherlands (See Figure 16). This shift is especially stark in the context of the devastating effects of the Holocaust on Dutch Jewish communities. As elsewhere, the size—as well as the ethnic, national, and sectarian heterogeneity—of the migrations to the Netherlands from Muslim majority and Muslim minority countries has presented significant collective action problems for Dutch Muslims. This stands in contrast to the more organic and smaller scale historical growth patterns of a less fragmented Dutch Jewish population.

Again, in the Netherlands, there were no significant communal institutions in situ that could be seen as analogous to the NIK or its precursors at the time of the postwar labor migrations from Turkey, Morocco, and Surinam that form the demographic foundations of present-day Dutch Muslim communities. In the absence of a Jewish pillar, and in the context of societal depillarization, the political and temporal conditions were never conducive for the construction of a ‘Muslim’ pillar. Dutch Jews never constructed their own pillar and some have attributed this fact not only to demographic (i.e. their small numbers) and geographic factors (i.e. their over-concentration in Amsterdam) but also to reluctance among Dutch Jews for emphasizing their ‘otherness.’ Ultimately, to the extent that the pillar system encouraged a segmented multiculturalism, neither Dutch

Jews nor Muslims have been enthusiastic about the idea of constructing their own pillar.\textsuperscript{1284}

The historical development over the long term of what can now be considered a Dutch Jewish ‘lobby’ and the contemporary developments in engagements between the Dutch state and its Muslim communities prompts a number of observations. In the first place, in the Netherlands, the state ultimately adopted a mixed approach to encouraging the development of Muslim political representation in the Netherlands. This has involved encouraging civil society groups to organize in the most broadly representative fashion possible and then legitimating these organizations through official licensing and recognition. In this sense, the case of Dutch Muslim organization tracks closely with that of Dutch Jewry where national (i.e. Sephardic/Portuguese and Ashkenazi) and theological currents (i.e. Orthodox and Reform) maintain a small number of separate channels to the government. Thus, while the Dutch government in the early 2000s expressed a preference for a single interlocutor with Muslim communities, there was already a precedent for institutionalizing a structure that involved a limited number of interlocutors. With the effective demise of the CGI in the late 2000s, the CMO was left in the position of holding

\textsuperscript{1284} This sentiment was expressed to the author by Rasit Bal of the CMO, May 10, 2017. See also Bax, Erik Hans. 1988. \textit{Modernization and Cleavage in Dutch Society: A Study of Long Term Economic and Social Change}. Groningen: Groningen Universiteitsdrukkerij.
a practical monopoly on Muslim representation in the Netherlands. However, much to the annoyance of the CMO, successive governments have continued to engage with a selection of former constituent member organizations of the CGI umbrella originally excluded from the CMO (i.e. HAK-DER—Alevi and ULAMON—Ahmadiyya, etc.).

A notable divergence between Jewish and Muslim representation involves the fact that the representation of Dutch Muslims continues to involve a ‘religious straitjacket’ that excludes non-religious organizations that might identify culturally as ‘Muslim.’ However, it must also be noted that Dutch Jewry only formed an umbrella that bridged religious and non-religious organizations when the Holocaust restitution process came on the agenda in the 1990s. Although the conditions might have been considered ripe for a radical restructuring of Dutch Jewish representation in the immediate aftermath of the

---

Holocaust, this did not occur in part because of the legitimacy that pillarization lent to identification on religious lines in the public sphere. Interestingly, it took significant demographic shrinkage of Dutch Jewish communities along with the emergence of Holocaust restitution as an issue to create the political conditions favorable to the formation of an umbrella that brought the NIK, PIK, LJG, and a variety of more secular Jewish groups under the single umbrella of the CJO. In short, we see in the Netherlands the emergence of an umbrella in the 1990s that better represents the diversity of Dutch Jewry, as happened in France at the end of the Second World War, while Dutch Muslims remain in the ‘religious straitjacket’ in both contexts.

Yet, while no Jewish or Islamic pillar was ever constructed, there can be little doubt that both Jews and Muslims have benefitted from the “principled pluralism” of the state-church regime in the Netherlands, especially in areas such as education, welfare, and media and it is undoubtedly true that the claims making of migrant religious communities in the Netherlands has benefitted from the vestiges of pillarization. Indeed, in the case of Muslim politics in the Netherlands, we see the field of Islamic broadcasting—a tangible legacy of the pillar system—as having been a major arena of intra-communal contestation over the past three decades. Moreover, in spite of variations in the extent and quality of engagements between government and the CMO, CGI, and other smaller groups, as well as the growth of anti-Islam political populism, the Dutch system has clearly more satisfactorily accommodated the religious claims of Muslims relative to other European states.

That said, the CMO is noteworthy for its low public profile relative to its analogues in Britain and France. While one might be tempted to see this as part of a Dutch legacy of opacity in elite decisional structures, the CMO’s chairman, Rasit Bal, attributes its low public profile to a lack of organizational resources for communications, a lack of time, and ultimately public and media disinterest.\textsuperscript{1288} It must be noted that, as has happened elsewhere, the internet has become a significant venue for sourcing information, the seeking of \textit{fatawa} (religious edicts), and/or expressions of Islamic piety.\textsuperscript{1289} Accordingly, Dutch Muslims have become less dependent on local mosques or imams, which again calls into question the basis of mosque-based representative structures.

\textsuperscript{1288} Personal interview with Rasit Bal of the CMO, May 10, 2017.
The previous case chapters highlight that the shifting ethno-religious demography of Western European states in the postwar period has posed substantial challenges to pre-existing church-state arrangements that were developed over centuries-long processes of state formation and nation-building as institutional means to regulate religious cleavages. Both the size and the heterogeneity of migrations from Muslim majority (and minority) countries into Europe in the postwar period, relative to historical migrations of Jews into Western Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, exacerbates these challenges. The migrations between 1881 and 1917 that form the demographic foundations of contemporary Jewish communities in Britain and France, for example, were relatively small and relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnic and national origin. The scale of the postwar labor and post-colonial migrations from Muslim majority countries is both much larger and more heterogeneous. The scale and heterogeneity of these migrations has created collective action problems for European Muslim communities that have been further exacerbated by the strong initial preference of European governments for a single organizational point of contact into Muslim communities. This substantial ethno-religious demographic change underlies the inconsistent patterns in the application of church-state institutions that have been identified in the preceding chapters and constitutes a synthetic finding across all three cases.

As a percentage of total population, contemporary Muslim populations in Britain, France, and the Netherlands are significantly larger than Jewish populations were at their peak. The Anglo-Jewish population in Britain is widely considered to have peaked in
1950 at approximately 430,000 or less than 1 percent of the total population of Britain at that time. The Jewish population in France is thought to have peaked in 1975 at approximately 535,000 also just under 1 percent of the total population at that time. Finally, the Jewish population of the Netherlands is thought to have peaked in 1942 at approximately 155,000 or less than 2 percent of the population. The percentage of national populations that self-identify as Muslim exceeds 5 percent in Britain, France, and the Netherlands, according to the most recent figures.¹²⁹⁰

The structural and procedural inconsistencies outlined here and the attendant problems of time inconsistency and policy credibility call into question whether the European state is capable of making credible commitments to its Muslim communities. While Kalyvas (2000) and Warner & Wenner (2006) argue that there is something in the horizontal authority structure of Islam itself that inhibits Muslim organizations from making credible commitments to the state, recent political developments in Europe also point to apparent difficulties on the part of the state in making credible commitments to Muslim organizations. It was only with a series of ‘suddenly imposed grievances’—such as The Satanic Verses Affair the Affaires du Foulard, and the ‘long year’ of 2001 in the Netherlands—and the reactive and reinforcing sequences that followed them that the European states examined here began to come to grips with the necessity of addressing the lack of national-level political representation for these relatively large Muslim populations.

Moreover, the attempts to institutionalize Muslim interlocutors that followed these critical junctures lacked foresight in a number of respects. In the first place, the demand for a single interlocutor in the British and Dutch cases demonstrated a mindset rooted in mosaic multiculturalism. Here, European governments made the epistemic

mistake of understanding their heterogenous Muslim communities as “clearly delineable wholes.” As we noted, Selya Benhabib contends that cultures only look like delineable wholes to those outside them or to those of their members who make it their project to recast them. This research indicates that the fact that European Muslim communities, to borrow Benhabib’s words, are “polyvocal, multilayered, decentered and fractured” has undermined these projects.\textsuperscript{1291}

The efforts on the part of European governments to institutionalize single points of interlocution with their Muslim communities failed to recognize the inherent difficulties involved in midwifing a single organization to represent the full spectrum of Muslim communities. British and Dutch governments soon concluded that their initial dependence on single interlocutors was lending too much power to organizations that were unable to deliver in the ways that government wanted. In both cases, this subsequently led to a measure of distancing. The structuring of the French state’s relationship with its Muslim communities resulted in the creation of the CFCM. After close to 15 years, the organization continues to struggle to garner credibility and legitimacy. In the meantime, successive French governments have been severely constrained by the rigidity of French church-state institutional arrangements in terms of their latitude for action when it comes to the funding and capacity building of the CFCM.

Second, there is the associated question of whether the mosque-based structures of representation that are central to all of these efforts can adequately represent large European Muslim communities in contexts where many may not be affiliated with a mosque or may not consider themselves religious. On the one hand, the growth of the internet and information communication technologies more generally has created new

venues for the construction of Islamic knowledge and interpretative authority. Accordingly, ‘traditional’ religious authorities now operate in tandem with Internet based imams, online fatwa councils and databases, and individual blogs. This may be especially true in European contexts where there is a dearth of institutionalized religious authority. On the other hand, many European Muslims who identify as ‘cultural’ or sociological Muslims are not likely to have their preferences adequately represented by faith-based models of representation. However attempts to pluralize structures of representation in order to bring ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’ Muslim organizations under a single umbrella, a current topic of discussion in France at the time of writing, are also challenged by the fact that it is not in the interests of existing mosque umbrellas to partner, and thus share access to government, with ‘cultural’ Muslim organizations.

While some recent analyses, including Laurence (2012), have pointed to pan-European convergences in how states interface with Muslim communities, this dissertation highlights the fact that state-church institutions still matter. In other words, the manner by which states engage with religious minorities largely persist over time and we can observe considerable within case convergence with the state’s relationship with Muslim communities involving the adoption—at least initially—of institutional templates presented by centuries of interaction with Jewish (and other) religious minorities. These patterns continue to be shaped in large part by histories of the development of church-state institutional arrangements. In Britain, this has traditionally involved a quasi corporatist approach and informal recognition (although this template was broken in the mid-2000s); in France, a more muscular corporatist approach and formal-legal recognition; and in the Netherlands it has involved a mixed approach that affords formal-legal recognition to ethnio-religious supra-umbrellas that fulfill certain representative requirements. Moreover, the remits of these organizations are, in some senses, not

So how do church-state institutional arrangements effect how states interact with religious minorities? In Britain, a centuries-long history of contestation over Anglican dominance has created opportunity space in the public sphere for the expression of religious interests in the political process. The fact that Catholic—and later Jewish—emancipation unfolded through legal political processes rather than by a radical anticlerical attack on the dominant church have created the political conditions for what Tariq Modood refers to as “embryonic multi-faithism,” which affords the state increased latitude of action and permits it to better approximate neutrality in some policy areas relative to more strictly secular states. The ability of religious communities to self-organize in a voluntary manner is relatively unhindered in Britain and this has facilitated the emergence of a vibrant British Muslim civil society in recent years—one that creates space for both religious and ‘cultural’ Muslims to organize and provides latitude for the state to accommodate their claims.

While state intervention in the organization of minority religious representation has, historically, tended to be relatively gentle in Britain, it is noteworthy that the state became much more interventionist after 2001 as it began to view British Muslim communities through an increasingly securitized lens. The British government’s midwifing of the MCB as an interlocutor for British Muslims in the late 1990s was soon complicated by fears of the potential ramifications of its empowerment, criticisms over its lack of ‘representativeness’ as well as political squabbles rooted in fundamental disagreements over the presence/absence of causal links between British foreign policy
and radicalization. After the 7/7 attacks, these disagreements—as well as the securitized lens of the PREVENT program through which British governments increasingly viewed Muslim communities—prompted a ‘rebalancing’ in relations with British Muslim civil society. This involved the co-option and targeted capacity building of more liberal and sectarian foils to the MCB, which reflected a marked departure from pre-existing institutional templates as well as violations of the secular principle of liberal neutrality.

In France, the church-state institutional framework continues to impose a ‘religious straitjacket’ on the interface between Muslim citizens and the state. Whereas the trauma of the Holocaust—and the active role of a French Jewish resistance—permitted French Jewry to radically restructure and pluralize its representation under the aegis of the CRIF, the relationship between the state and French Muslims remains constrained within the separationist formula of explicitly religious representation. Paradoxically, part of the issue with the institutional formulation that Republican model imposes is that the secular state is forced to confer a religious identity on people, many of whom would not claim it for themselves. As a container for French mosque umbrella groups and the primary interface between the state and Islam, the CFCM has only ever technically been an interlocutor on issues related to Muslim worship and religious practice and is explicitly not recognized as representative of French Muslims. Various attempts and suggestions to bring non-religious Muslim associations into a formal-legal corporate structure have been opposed on the basis of the French Republican distaste for communautarisme. Yet the state continues to reserve a privileged role for the CRIF, which maintains a claim to represent both religious and non-religious Jews in France and is thus able to act as more of a lobby group. There is little doubt that temporal sequencing plays an important role in this institutional anomaly. In other words, without the traumatic break provided by the Holocaust as well as the active role of French Jews in the
anti-Nazi Resistance, it is highly unlikely that the political conditions would have been present for the creation of the CRIF.

With the French Republican model disincentivizing organization along ethnic or religious lines, the *Grande Mosquée de Paris* (GMP) remained the institutional locus of the interface between the state and Islam through the early 2000s. While the foundational focus of the GMP in the early twentieth century was to act as a sort of crude talisman of French imperial desires to be taken seriously as a *Puissance Musulman*, it was gradually instrumentalized by the Algerian state as an institutional node through which it could monitor its diaspora in France in the early 1980s. Yet, the GMP continued to be a privileged interlocutor of the state well into the 2000s, even while its credibility and legitimacy were widely questioned because its leadership and the ‘official’ Islam it represented were seen to be sufficiently liberal in character. While Nicolas Sarkozy did attempt to retain a privileged position for the GMP within the CFCM, in much the same way that French political elites legislatively ‘packed’ the Consistory with more liberal laymen and progressive rabbis in the nineteenth century, its Moroccan and Islamist rivals soon overshadowed it. However, tensions between ‘official’ and ‘parallel’ Islam as well as national rivalries have resulted in stasis in the CFCM, which has floundered in recent years with questions over its credibility and legitimacy and little to no progress made on key issues. Over time, the idea of restructuring representation to include ‘cultural’ or secular Muslims has come on the agenda but the church-state institutional arrangements on France naturally mitigate against such ideas. Moreover, increasing the breadth of

---

1293 That being said, it’s worth noting that the CRIF languished for a decade after its formation, and has yet managed to monopolize Jewish community representation in France for over seventy years.
representation naturally exacerbates the collective action problem by introducing conflicts between religious and non-religious actors into the mix.

In the Netherlands, the combination of the origins of Napoleonic corporatist organization of Jewish representation, a softer approach under the aegis of the *Hoofdscommissie*, and a subsequent split into Sephardic and Ashkenazi communal institutions has provided an institutional precedent for a hybrid model that has vacillated between more corporatist and pluralist modes of representation. Moreover, the pillarized model in the Netherlands has historically promoted social organization on religious bases and its institutional legacies endure to this day and are manifested in the reserving of special privileges for organizations “with a spiritual root” as well as through the provision of public broadcasting time to major religious groups. This system has provided considerable incentives for communal self-organization and cooperation so when Ahmadiyya, Alevis, Shi’a, and other sectarian groups were effectively excluded from the predominantly Sunni CMO, the state acquiesced to the formation of a second umbrella—an arrangement that followed the historical precedent of separate state recognition of the NIK, PIK, and other smaller Jewish communal organizations.

While every European country formally adheres to the notion of liberal neutrality, Britain and France have both departed in significant ways from this principle, especially when foreign policy and/or security preoccupations are ascendant. We see various historical and contemporary examples where the state has actively intervened in disputes within minority religious communities in ways that can be seen to favor particular theological interpretations. The principal of liberal neutrality was undoubtedly contravened with New Labour’s targeted capacity building of Sufi/Barelwi umbrellas (e.g. the BMF and SMC) and more secular-liberal Muslim groups (e.g. Quilliam, BMSD, etc.) while effectively decertifying the more conservative MCB as part of a rather clumsy
attempt to ‘rebalance’ its relationship with British Muslim communities in the aftermath of 7/7. In the same ‘rebalancing’ effort, we saw an attempt to corporatize the regulation of mosques through MINAB as well as a fleeting attempt to promote the representation of Muslim youth and women under the aegis of the YMAG and MWAG respectively. We also see departures from the ideal of liberal neutrality in Nicolas Sarkozy’s micro-management of the founding elections of the CFCM in France where the state intervened to manipulate the institutional procedures in order to favor the representative of the more state-friendly manifestation of Algerian ‘official Islam,’ the GMP. However, ideas about instituting any kind of discrimination positive (‘affirmative action’) in France have been met with vehement political opposition, with any perceived departures from the laic model of theoretical liberal neutrality remaining highly controversial.1295

Recent events such as the Brexit referendum and the impressive electoral performances of right-wing parties and candidates prompt the question of what this apparent wave of nationalist populism might entail for religious engagement. Currently it remains unclear whether this populist groundswell is more secular or more ecclesiastical in nature but it certainly holds the potential of driving further inconsistencies in church-state relations if political agendas in this issue area can be linked to shifting political attitudes. This is an area that is thus ripe for further research. What it does suggest is that the post-nationalist thesis advocated by Soysal (1994) may have been a product of its particular moment in time—a moment of triumphant supra-nationalism.

Accordingly, while much ink has been spilled on the relationship between European states and their Muslim minorities, given the time horizon involved, the

---

framing of these analyses necessarily tends toward focusing on causal processes, events, and outcomes of interest that unfold over a relatively short time period. Given the truncated time horizons of outcomes, the development of Muslim communal institutions across Europe can only be viewed in the present as a *histoire événementielle* (‘evental history’). Indeed, as the previous chapters illustrate, the various roles played by the state in steering the formation of these communal organizations has often been a reactive one driven by current events as well as the short-term preoccupations of political elites. Accordingly, *The Satanic Verses* Affair in Britain, the *Affaires du Foulard* in France, and the Fortuyn and Van Gogh assassinations in the Netherlands can be identified as critical junctures that have prompted states to take a more active role in encouraging the formation of interlocutors whether through informal encouragement and ‘midwifery’ in the case of the MCB and its various civil society competitors in Britain or through muscular top-down corporatism in the case of the role of the state in the formal-legal formation of the CFCM in France or a more mixed approach as with the CMO in the Netherlands.

For example, in Chapter 3 we saw that it took approximately one century from the Jewish ‘resettlement’ in Britain in the mid-17th century before Anglo-Jewish community elites formed a representative body, the Board of Deputies, in 1760. Intra-communal cleavages between Sephardim and Ashkenazim remained salient into the early 19th century. It took a further 70 years for reform-minded Anglo-Jewish elites, who by this time were well integrated into the economic fabric of Britain, to start to agitate for political emancipation starting in the 1830s. As World War I drew to a close,

---

demographic shifts that followed the large-scale immigration after 1881 produced a process of internal democratization of communal institutions, which paralleled those occurring across British society more generally, and saw the lingering vestiges of the ‘Cousinhood’ oligarchic elite slowly pushed aside—a process that involved punctuated conflict between Zionist and ‘Cousinhood’ factions.

The interface between the autonomous and geographically scattered historical Jewish communities in France and the state, on the other hand, was organized through the muscular corporatism of Napoleonic decrees in 1808. Through this structure, the state exerted its control over Judaism in France in much the same way that it had Gallicized other religious groups in order to obtain legitimacy and ensure the obedience of Jewish populations. It did so by providing some modicum of democratic selection to Jewish communities with periodic legislative alterations to the proportions of rabbis to laymen in the Central Consistory to ensure that control remained in the hands of “reputable liberal figures.” With the Consistory acting as an arm of the state, communal conflicts and debates between Sephardim and Ashkenazim as well as Orthodox and Reform strands played out in an institutional space set apart from the secular ‘public sphere’ where consistorial elites institutionalized a ‘lowest-common-denominator’ theology and gradually rationalized the charismatic authority of consistorial rabbis. It took almost 150 years—and the active role of a ‘Jewish’ resistance during the Second World War—for an opportunity space to emerge that permitted French Jewish leaders to break the stranglehold of the Consistory over the representation of Jews in France and its effective pluralization under the aegis of the CRIF.

In the Netherlands, the absence of a centralized representative Jewish communal body for more than a decade after formal emancipation caused confusion and exacerbated

---

communal tensions between upper-class Jewish intellectuals enamored with the French revolution’s discourse on liberty and equality and more orthodox-minded Jews who believed that emancipation would bring about the disintegration of the autonomous Jewish community. It wasn’t until 1808 that Louis Napoleon undertook a radical administrative reform of the Jewish congregations in the kingdom by imposing a state-supervised centralized bureaucratic structure, the Opperconsistorie (High Consistory), to oversee them. The parnasim of the ‘Old Community’ resisted these moves toward institutionalization, centralization, and nationalization and, unlike in France, the Sephardic congregations initially retained their independence but were later brought under the umbrella of the Hoofdcommissie in 1814. A 30 year long dispute between Sephardim and Ashkenazim over whether to maintain or dissolve the state-imposed union between the Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities followed the separation of church and state in the constitution of 1848, with the Sephardim eventually regaining their independent status in 1871 with the creation of the NIK and PIK.

While the traumatic break of the Holocaust might have provided an opportunity space for the restructuring of Dutch Jewry, a number of factors mitigated against the establishment of an umbrella organization that would better reflect the more pluralistic, voluntary, and secular direction of Dutch communal life. These included the institutionalization of social group alignment along religious lines under pillarization, the lack of any organized ‘Jewish’ resistance, the nationalist-assimilationist ethos of the leaders of the Dutch resistance, and the assertiveness and relative wealth of the communal elites that survived the war. In combination, these factors contributed to the re-emergence of the NIK and PIK after the war. It wasn’t until 1997, in the context of restitution claims against Dutch banks, insurance companies, and the Dutch government
that saw the creation of the CJO that brought the major religious and secular Jewish organizations under a single umbrella.

In stark contrast, given the truncated time horizon involved, the development of Muslim communal institutions in Britain, France and the Netherlands can only be viewed in the present as a *histoire événementielle* ('evental history'). While much ink has been spilled on the relationship between European states and their Muslim minorities, the framing of these analyses necessarily tends to focus on outcomes of interest that unfold over a short time period given the short time span over which the bulk of Muslim immigrants arrived in Europe. In other words, to turn to Paul Pierson’s examples from the natural sciences, analysts have tended to treat the issues surrounding the integration of Muslim communities in Europe as akin to ‘tornadoes’ that involve short-term causal processes and outcomes. Instead, I argue that would be better served treating these issues as more akin to ‘global warming’ or ‘meteorite/extinction.’ In the former case, we might view these issues as involving long-term causal processes (i.e. centuries-long histories of Orientalism, the effects of European colonialism on North African and South Asian societies, etc.) or, in the latter case, involving a short-term causal process (postwar labor demand) with both involving long-term outcomes (processes of immigrant integration and intergenerational change).

---


APPENDIX 1

List of interviews

Anonymous interviewee, British Muslim civil society leader, February 2014.
Anonymous interviewee, Contactorgaan Muslim van Overheid (CMO), May 2017.
Rasit Bal, Contactorgaan Muslim van Overheid (CMO), May 2017.
Mustafa Field, Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), February 2014.
Dr. Omar El-Hamdoon, Muslim Association of Britain, February 2014.
Dr. Usama Hasan of the Quilliam Foundation, February 2014.
Tehmina Kazi, British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD), February 2014.
Yousif al-Khoei, Al-Khoei Foundation, June 2014.
Dr. Anas al-Tikriti, Cordoba Foundation & British Muslim Initiative, February 2014.
APPENDIX 2

Definitions of relevant causal mechanisms suggested by McAdam et al. (2001)

Borrowing

*Borrowing involves importation of a boundary-cum-relations package already existing elsewhere and its installation in the local setting.*

Brokerage

…the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another and/or with yet other sites. Most analysts see brokerage as a mechanism relating groups and individuals to one another in stable sites, but it can also become a relational mechanism for mobilization during periods of contentious politics, as new groups are thrown together by increased interaction and uncertainty, thus discovering their common interests.

Category formation

*Category formation creates identities. A social category consists of a set of sites that share a boundary distinguishing all of them from and relating all of them to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary. Category formation occurs by means of three different submechanisms, through invention, borrowing, and encounter. Invention involves authoritative drawing of a boundary and prescription of relations across that boundary…Borrowing involves importation of a boundary-cum-relations package already existing elsewhere and its installation in the local setting…. Encounter involves initial contact between previously separate (but internally well connected) networks in the course of which members of one network begin competing for resources with members of the other, interactively generating definitions of the boundary and relations across it.*

Identity shift

…alteration in shared definitions of a boundary between two political actors and of relations across that boundary.
Diffusion

…diffusion includes any transfer of information across existing lines of communication. Here we concentrate on transfer in the same or similar shape of forms and claims of contention across space or across sectors and ideological divides.

Suddenly imposed grievances

…actions that mobilize opposition through [a] mix of alarm and outrage… [it] involves both changed relations among actors and altered cognition on the part of at least one actor.
APPENDIX 3

Prime Minister Blair’s 12-point anti-terror plan, August 5, 2005

1. The home secretary today publishes new grounds for deportation and exclusion. Deportation is a decision taken by the home secretary under statute. The new grounds will include fostering hatred, advocating violence to further a person's beliefs or justifying or validating such violence. These grounds will be subject to a short consultation period which will finish this month. Even under existing grounds, however, we are today signalling a new approach to deportation orders. Let no one be in any doubt. The rules of the game are changing.

These issues will, of course, be tested in the courts. Up to now, the concern has been that orders for deportation will be struck down as contrary to article 3 of the ECHR [European convention on human rights], as interpreted by the European Court in the Chahal case in 1996; and indeed have had such cases struck down.

However, the circumstances of our national security have now self-evidently changed and we believe we can get the necessary assurances from the countries to which we will return the deportees, against their being subject to torture or ill-treatment contrary to article 3. We have concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with Jordan and are close to getting necessary assurances from other relevant countries. For example, just yesterday, I have had very constructive conversations with the leaders of Algeria and Lebanon. There are around 10 such countries with whom we are seeking such assurances.
France and Spain, to name just two other European countries, do deport by administrative decision. The effect is often immediate and in some cases the appeal is non-suspensive in other words it takes place outside the country. The assurances given by the receiving nation are adequate for their courts and these countries are also subject to the ECHR and apply it directly.

So it is important to test this anew now, in view of the changed conditions in Britain. Should legal obstacles arise, we will legislate further, including, if necessary amending the Human Rights Act, in respect of the interpretation of the ECHR. In any event, we will consult on legislating specifically for a non-suspensive appeal process in respect of deportations.

One other point on deportations. Once the new grounds take effect, there will be a list drawn up of specific extremist websites, bookshops, centres, networks and particular organisations of concern. Active engagement with any of these will be a trigger for the home secretary to consider the deportation of any foreign national.

2. As has been stated already, there will be new anti-terrorism legislation in the autumn. This will include an offence of condoning or glorifying terrorism. The sort of remarks made in recent days should be covered by such laws. But this will also be applied to justifying or glorifying terrorism anywhere, not just in the UK.

3. Anyone who has participated in terrorism or has anything to do with it anywhere will automatically be refused asylum.

4. We have already powers to strip citizenship from those individuals with British or dual nationality who act in a way that is contrary to the interests of this country. We
will now consult on extending these powers, applying them to naturalised citizens engaged in extremism and making the procedures simpler and more effective.

5. Cases such as Rashid Ramda wanted for the Paris metro bombing 10 years ago and who is still in the UK whilst France seeks extradition, are completely unacceptable. We will begin consultation, on setting a maximum time limit for all future extradition cases involving terrorism.

6. We are already examining a new court procedure which would allow a pre-trial process. We will also examine whether the necessary procedure can be brought about to give us a way of meeting the police and security service request that detention pre-charge of terrorist suspects be significantly extended.

7. For those who are British nationals and who cannot be deported, we will extend the use of control orders. Any breach can mean imprisonment.

8. To expand the court capacity necessary to deal with this and other related issues, the Lord Chancellor will increase the number of special judges hearing such cases.

9. We will proscribe Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the successor organisation of Al Muhajiroun. We will also examine the grounds of proscription to widen them and put proposals forward in the new legislation.

10. It is now necessary, in order to acquire British citizenship, that people attend a citizenship ceremony, swear allegiance to the country and have a rudimentary grasp of the English language. We will review the threshold for this to make sure it is adequate.
and we will establish, with the Muslim community, a commission to advise on how, consistent with people's complete freedom to worship in the way they want, and to follow their own religion and culture, there is better integration of those parts of the community presently inadequately integrated. I have asked Hazel Blears to make this part of the work she is currently undertaking.

11. We will consult on a new power to order closure of a place of worship which is used as a centre for fomenting extremism and will consult with Muslim leaders in respect of those clerics who are not British citizens, to draw up a list of those not suitable to preach who will be excluded from Britain.

12. We will bring forward the proposed measures on the security of our borders, with a series of countries specifically designated for biometric visas over the next year. Meanwhile, the Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office are compiling an international database of those individuals whose activities or views pose a threat to Britain's security. Anyone on the database will be excluded from entry with any appeal only taking place outside the country.
APPENDIX 4

Text of the full-page advertisement appearing in *The Times* (London), August 12, 2006

Prime Minister,

As British Muslims we urge you to do more to fight against all those who target civilians with violence, whenever and wherever that happens.

It is our view that current British government policy risks putting civilians at increased risk both in the UK and abroad.

To combat terror the government has focused extensively on domestic legislation. While some of this will have an impact, the government must not ignore the role of its foreign policy.

The debacle of Iraq and now the failure to do more to secure an immediate end to the attacks on civilians in the Middle East not only increases the risk to ordinary people in that region, it is also ammunition to extremists who threaten us all.

Attacking civilians is never justified. This message is a global one. We urge the Prime Minister to redouble his efforts to tackle terror and extremism and change our foreign
policy to show the world that we value the lives of civilians wherever they live and whatever their religion. Such a move would make us all safer.

Sadiq Khan MP, Shahid Malik MP, Mohammed Sarwar MP, Lord Patel of Blackburn, Lord Ahmed of Rotherham, Baroness Uddin, Association of Muslim Schools, British Muslim Forum, Bolton Mosques Council for Community Care, Confederation of Sunni Mosques Midlands, Council of Nigerian Muslim Organisations, Council of Mosques, London & Southern Counties, Council of Mosques Tower Hamlets, Da’watul Islam UK & Eire, Federation of Muslim Organisations – Leicestershire, Federation of Students Islamic Societies (FOSIS), Indian Muslim Federation, Islamic Forum Europe, Islamic Society of Britain, Jama’at Ahle Sunnat UK, Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK, Jamiat-e-Ulema Britain, Lancashire Council of Mosques, Muslim Association of Britain, Muslim Council of Britain, Muslim Council of Wales, Muslim Doctors and Dentists Association, Muslim Parliament, Muslim Solidarity Committee, Muslim Students Society UK & Eire, Muslim Welfare House (London), Muslim Women Society (MWS), Muslim Women’s Association, Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association (NIMFA), Sussex Muslim Society, The Council of European Jamaats, UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, UK Islamic Mission, UK Turkish Islamic Association, World Federation of KSIMC, World Islamic Mission, Young Muslim Organisation UK, Young Muslim Sisters (UK), Young Muslims UK.
REFERENCES


Allen, C. 2013. “Passing the Dinner Table Test: Retrospective and Prospective Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia in Britain.” *SAGE Open* 3 (2).


Ansari, Humayun. 2004. *“The Infidel Within”: Muslims in Britain since 1800.* London: Hurst and Co.


396


Cohen, Justin. 2014. “JNF Chief Attacks JLC: New Community Leaders Are ‘much Needed.’” 
*Jewish News*, September 23.


407


Ministers of Social Affairs and Employment, Foreign Affairs, Security and Justice, of
Financial and Home Affairs and Kingdom Relations. 2016. “Fundamental Rights in a
Pluriform Society (Letter to the President of the Lower House of the States-General),”
December 4.


7577. Norwich: TSO.


Mirabeau, Honoré-Gabriel de Riquetti, comte de. 1787. “Sur Moses Mendelssohn, Sur La
Réforme Politique Des Juifs: Et En Particulier Sur La Révolution Tentée En Leur Faveur
En 1753 Dans La Grande.” London.

Mirza, Munira, Abi Senthilkumaran, and Zein Ja’far. 2007. “Living Apart Together: British

61: 143–60.


Quarterly 65 (1): 53–73.

———. 1996. “‘Race’ in Britain and the Politics of Difference.” In Philosophy and Pluralism,
edited by David Archard. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40. Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1997a. “‘Difference’, Cultural Racism and Anti-Racism.” In Debating Cultural
Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism, edited by Pnina
422


http://www.salaam.co.uk/themeofthemonth/january03_index.php?l=40%82%22=0.


BIOGRAPHY

Gerald T. FitzGerald received his Bachelor of Science from New York University in 2008. He received his Master of Arts in Political Science from George Mason University in 2010.