CHINESE-INDONESIAN RELIGIOUS-INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONISM IN POST-1998 SOCIETY

by

Joshua M. Mahuna
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements of the Degree
of
Master of Science
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Committee:

______________________________________  Director

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________  Department Chairperson

______________________________________  Program Director

______________________________________  Dean, School for
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Date: _________________________________  Spring Semester 2019
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
Chinese-Indonesian Religious-Institutional Protectionism in Post-1998 Society

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University

by

Joshua M. Mahuna
Bachelor of Arts
Hawaii Pacific University, 2014

Director: Leslie K. Dwyer, Professor
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Spring Semester 2019
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to extend a sincere and heartfelt gratitude to my friends, family, and supporters who have contributed their invaluable effort and time towards the realization of this work. I want to thank my colleagues and advisors at Universitas Sanata Dharma for their guidance and academic support, especially Romo Baskara Wardaya; to mbak Sani, Izzy Rhodes, and Volunteers in Asia-Indonesia (VIA); to Ibu Heru and her family; my colleagues at George Mason University for their countless critiques, ideas, and theoretical framework additions during this process, in addition to their contributions to narratives and respective analyses, as well as their emotional and moral support; to Dr. Leslie Dwyer for her expansive knowledge on Indonesian affairs and guidance in processing narrative, trauma, and culture; to Drs. Agniezska Paczynska and Tehama Lopez-Bunyasi for their critiques and support in developing my writing and analytics; to my family who have spent countless hours in emotional support during emotionally-trying times; and to my wonderful research assistant, Fairy Abdulghani, who supported me endlessly throughout my time in Indonesia and has humored my endlessly analytical-self, and has become a close and trusted friend…and to the brave individuals who battled through unfathomable grief while telling me their stories.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Background</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: THE SECURITY APPARATUSES OF TRIDHARMA:</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLENTENG, LITHANG, AND VĪHARA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: THE JUXTAPOSITION OF THE ‘DOUBLE-MINORITY’ - PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ON SECURING EMPTINESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: THE WISDOM OF TOLERANCE</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

CHINESE-INDONESIAN RELIGIOUS-INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONISM IN POST-1998 SOCIETY

Joshua M. Mahuna, M.S.

George Mason University, 2018

Thesis Director: Dr. Leslie K. Dwyer

Chinese-Indonesian communities are experiencing identity crises from socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination. Since the conclusion of the Suharto administration, Chinese-Indonesian populations are publicly victimized for the degradation of the state—labeled as ‘suspicious’ ‘foreign orientals’—and have experienced devastating violence. Basing this sentiment and discrimination on centuries of compounded social, colonial, and nationalistic perceptions, Chinese-Indonesians experience structural violence that continues to impede their observation of cultural-religious affinities and security in lieu of Indonesian societal-exceptionalism. In response to this environment, Chinese-Indonesian communities have erected communal security apparatuses founded within religious institutions in attempt to solidify the components of Chinese-Indonesian-ness to mitigate continued violence. This thesis analyzes these apparatuses to identity the dilemma and status of Chinese-Indonesian cultural identity.
INTRODUCTION

During the summer of 2016, I traveled to the Special Region of Yogyakarta, Indonesia to study the situational dynamics of Chinese-Indonesians as a socially separate ethnic group, entirely apart from the construction of Indonesian cultural-exceptionalism. While initially knowing very little of the Chinese diaspora within Yogyakarta, the project developed into an expansive study that not only critiqued my numerous years of Sino studies throughout the East and South-east Asian regions, but in respect to the kaleidoscopic melting pot of cultures within the Indonesian social construct. Over the term of this project, I was granted the privilege of interviewing key members of Chinese communities through religious, cultural, and educational institutions that provided critical additions to my viewpoint in human security, pluralism, and religious tolerance; and how wawasan nusanatara (archipelagic concept) changed (and changes) dramatically based on these fundamental, dynamic values.

In the study of Sinology, South China Sea territoriality, and Indonesian culture, the field of conflict analysis and resolution provides numerous advantages in analyzing changes in the social construct. Physical, psychological, and structural violence have continued to cement the livelihoods of minority populations throughout Indonesia, and thus challenging the ability of Western scholars to effectively penetrate social stigma (and lack of minority participation) into understanding how dominant social dynamics
actively manipulate minority populations. Even as Chinese represent a small percentage of the Yogyakarta construct, the dynamics resultative of Chinese participation (and lack of it) profoundly change the effective means by which other populations also function.

These dynamics are particularly important when considering notions of ethnicity, religion, identity, and collective memory as the traumatic episodes of the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis are still very present in Chinese memory and identity. These episodes are foundational to the characterizations of Chinese and have caused numerous additional challenges aside from individual and group behavioral dynamics to contend with social stigma, socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment, and discriminatory policies that carry residual tendencies in the tracks of 1965 and 1997-1998. While nearly 20 years after the Asian Financial Crisis, this episode continues to heavily burden Chinese communities in an ethnically and religiously-based nexus that simultaneously seeks reparations for the degradation of the economy and the denigration of the state image.

Of course, the frequency of anti-Chinese sentiment, discrimination, and violence are often interspaced with relative terms of negative peace. Perceptions of Chinese within Yogyakarta are often met with the differential perceptions for Chinese as an ethnic group, compounded by foreign religious systems that (allegedly) integrate into a substantial anti-Indonesian block of influence. Community economics, religious institutions, cultural observances, and the ability to live comfortably among other populations are cautions for Chinese. The existence of the Chinese population as a singular body questions its existence and function in a society that normalizes violence against them despite the
numerous advantages and benefits derived from Chinese participation. This is a remarkable instance in the juxtaposition of necessary community-development and group function while simultaneously upholding discriminatory policies that are rooted in history, and thus normalized in society based on custom. Without any tangible recourse for seeking justice, the inability to insist on communal or social change rests in the prolonged, indefinite reversal regarding perceptions of Chinese ethnicity as a legitimate consideration in Indonesian-exceptionalism.

On the other hand, Chinese persist in the insistence to abide by discrimination and anti-Chinese sentiment through operating behind closed doors as a means of protecting the nature of cultural norms. Among other marginalized communities, the experience of violent ostracization usually results in some degrees of revolution, restorative justice, or channel for recourse that seeks to establish a sense of equilibrium for dismantling socio-normative notions of violence for present and future generations. While in the contrary, Chinese leaders tend to forego these perceptions for change and opt to generate a ‘take-it-how-it-is’ platform for survival among Indonesian societal violence.

This structural determination for prevailing against increased degrees of violence via self-restriction (and even to some degree of accepting violence as normative) has led me to further investigate the plight of Chinese survival, in which this work seeks to inquire upon- and demonstrate the plausibility of erecting security apparatuses based on religious-institutional principles as means of mitigating social and structural violence. This research cannot fully be considered without also noting the importance of Indonesian national philosophy, *Pancasila*, especially when comparing the
exceptionalities between Chinese-ness and Indonesian-ness. I seek to examine how Chinese groups have successfully utilized *Pancasila* to substantiate religious systems into communitarian life while maintaining both fundamental cultural affinities to ethnic identity and social factors necessary for security. Current social structures tend to restrict public displays of Chinese culture, and public education through Chinese lenses are obstructed through claims that societal function is separate from integrative measures between Chinese and Indonesian spheres; the Chinese curriculum is an ersatz alternative.

On the contrary, by denying cultural exercises to Chinese, communities can neither adequately align themselves with socially designated functions nor participate in the necessary roles that ethnic factors designate for society or communal groups. This work argues that religious security apparatuses are constructed in reaction to the increasingly destructive social politics directed toward Chinese and further represses the ability to effectively utilize Chinese cultural-exceptionalism as means of vitalizing Chinese-ness in the wake of modern Indonesian social identity. The only social prescription to this plight of seeking an alternative is to initiate an assimilationist or integrationist approach that denies Chinese cultural-exceptionalism in favor of a monocultural Indonesian social system—the higher cultural ideal.

The repressive promotion of a higher cultural ideal hypocritically utilizes democratic, pluralistic, and tolerant views as exemplified through the late Indonesian president Abdurrahman al-Dakhil Wahid ‘Gus Dur,’ and canonized through the national motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). This manifestation of philosophically practicing democratic approaches towards realizing pluralism and religious tolerance is
nearly non-existent for the Chinese (and other minority groups, alike). There are numerous factors that can be configured into a plausible explanation as to why Chinese experience intense degrees of discrimination and violence. But, the gravitas of violence revolves in the nexus of historiographical, configurational-determinism for Chinese function, participation and influence in the concurrent construction of anti-Chinese sentiment that cannot be exacted. This is not to claim that Indonesian archipelagic history is calm in this determination, or that the construction of anti-Chinese sentiment is episodic and quickly normalized. On the contrary, both are turbulent. The history of constructing and solidifying a basis for anti-Chinese sentiment is muddled within a political and socio-cultural devaluation of the Chinese identity to a point where stigmatization and generalization become dogmatic.

Despite ‘Gus Durian’ attempts to re-antiquate Chinese-ness back into the socio-cultural system as an important actor in the social construct, the outlook for Chinese continues to witness a sense of disaggregation of the social and communitarian Self through the institution of socio-normative anti-Chinese considerations that explicitly discriminate. While the prospect of integrating or assimilating Chinese culture into the social system has gently introduced notions for accommodating the conjunction of Chinese-ness and Indonesian-ness, this accommodative-integration creates a repercussive atmosphere that highlights other avenues for explicit discrimination. For example, the celebration of Tahun Baru Imlek (Chinese New Year) has been allowed to openly exhibit in public; Confucianism is (re-)considered an official religion; and the re-introduction of the Chinese writing script is gradually receiving more positivity than negativity in
schools. Yet, integration of Chinese influences has directly radicalized anti-Chinese sentiment within Islamist and cultural groups that seek to foment the need for institutionalizing (or enforcing) a socio-normative appeal to repress Chinese influence—continuing a historical perception of divisive, suspicious, and foreign influences of the Chinese. Anti-Chinese sentiment continues to remain strong and impacts the livelihoods of younger generations insomuch that ethnocide is a significant consideration (the removal of cultural identity) as a fundamental, socio-cultural institution to efface the continuity of Chinese identity in times to come.

It can be argued that two contradictory narratives exist: one being that Chinese do experience gradual accommodative-integration into Indonesian society (such as the election of Chinese former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja ‘Ahok’ Purnama); while the second insists that Chinese do not maintain legitimacy in Indonesian society originating from economic degradation and the political near-collapse of Indonesian society. Both these narratives can be substantiated (in varying degrees) but cannot disregard the amount of Chinese influence interspersed throughout the archipelago, nor assert that Chinese culture is absent from the social construct. The mechanisms for deriving a sense of Chinese-exceptionalism within Indonesian society is prevalent in how Indonesians consider Indonesian cultural-exceptionalism apart from Chinese influences. These cultural and social considerations question the fundamental pillar of Chinese influence as part-and-parcel to the construction of the social fabric. Whether Chinese can effectively be removed from the socio-cultural landscape, and thus can be considered an ethnically obsolete group in the societal construction, remains to be seen.
Therein, this thesis intends to analyze the various roles of Chinese throughout sphere, especially in relation to the penetration of religious-institutionalism and its impact on securing Chinese communities. How do these religious communitarian systems mitigate discrimination and structural violence from a strictly, socio-normatively anti-Chinese society? While there are numerous considerations that must be checked to account for dynamic dimensions regarding perception and normalcy, considerations of Indonesian societal-exceptionalism and Chinese cultural-exceptionalism, ethnic-exclusivity, solidarity, generational trends, and the incorporation of inter-faith dialogue must be thoroughly questioned and considered appropriately through this analysis.

Further, the inclusion of the Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika play important roles in determining the social psyche, especially within the consideration that the Pancasila shifts and changes in political climates, providing different rights and abilities to different groups throughout various times.

In pursuit of this analysis, I consider the various components of the socio-economic sphere in relation to the significant structural considerations of religion and politics; and considerations of recognizing legitimacy and authenticity of religions and affiliated ethnicities. Cultural establishments, religious institutions, schools, marketplaces, and small communities effect the change in how society perceives the social Other. It is critical to understand the Chinese ‘dilemma’ in how to maneuver between these varying dynamics, and how best to secure comfortable livelihoods amid the ever-changing social landscape (dependent upon the ‘degree of heat’ in society; l’air du temps). What aspects of Chinese-ness contribute to the social construct? Are these
aspects negative or positive to the outlook of Chinese security? Each piece is interconnected and shares numerous commonalities in the social structure, which simultaneously contribute to the ideas and perceptions of Chinese-ness, its existence, exceptionalism, and function.

I pay specific attention to religious leaders as these individuals remain culturally and communally important to changing security apparatuses vis-à-vis l’air du temps. While these religious leaders and their communities’ narratives (both a mainstream Chinese narrative and the multitudes that separate from that narrative), I also explore perspectives from the socio-economic sphere insomuch that Chinese communities are built upon the marketplace to observe and practice cultural traditions, experience shifting dynamics, and exist (in near entirety) within the boundaries of the marketplace. This expansion opens the discussion to individuals who contribute alternative perspectives on the outlook of Chinese in respect to the ‘Chinese Question’ and the ‘Chinese Problem’ (massalah Cina). These views make the important case for maintaining the intersectionality between Chinese identity and Indonesian identity, and the accommodative-integration of Chinese into Indonesian society.

To begin this discussion, I will briefly explore the history of Chinese in the modern context, marking important considerations to the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. These two events distinctively shape the directions of the ‘Chinese Question’ and masalah Cina and address the configurational-determinants for how Chinese view their outlook. After a brief historical context, I will consider the principles of material and structural determinants through ethnic and religious lenses.
(Critical Race Theory) in representing positionalities and identities as two cooperative lenses that question ethnic and religious identity (Social Representation Theory) through which both the ‘Chinese Question’ and the masalah Cina exist. These two theories will then launch the discussion of how religious communities shape security apparatuses vis-à-vis the ‘Chinese Question’ and formulate the fluid equation of maneuvering the socio-religio-politico-economic body from actualizing a dissolution of cultural-exceptionalism.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Anti-Chinese sentiment is multi-faceted and cannot be pinpointed to a singular configuration of why Chinese are viewed so violently. Numerous forces exist within each social sphere and can be aligned or misconstrued to shape social policy platforms that can either benefit or disadvantage the Chinese population. Given the complexity of the ‘Chinese Question’ and masalah Cina, the notions of democratizing multiculturalism, pluralism, and tolerance in the current environment are nonetheless false pretenses to the innocuous toxicity of the Chinese-Indonesian dichotomy. These considerations of a dichotomous relationship are continuously contorted by members of the political and religious elites in attempt to reconfigure positions and roles for Chinese populations. Whether these configurations scapegoat or redistribute resources for more popular groups, Chinese populations ultimately experience the brunt of these exercises, which provide certain indications in how Chinese must adapt to l’air du temps vis-à-vis social roles, function, and participation.

It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze a holistic sense of the masalah Cina or to provide a thorough approach for Chinese perceptions regarding proto-Indonesian nationalism in the early-to-mid 20th century (alongside concurrent concepts of Chinese trans-nationalism). However, the Dutch colonial era provides a foundational look into how the Chinese were perceived by both colonizers and Indonesians. From the
arrival of the Dutch in the East Indies (Indonesian archipelago) beginning in the 17th century, the existence of the vast archipelagic network was already filled by numerous ethnic groups and traders originating from Europe, Arabia, India, and China. While European influences dominated much of the maritime trading traffic in the 17th century, the most notable mariner, Cheng Ho (Mandarin-Chinese: Zhèng Hé, 鄭和), emerged as the ‘father of Chinese-ness’ to Indonesia through trade and religious exchange—a designation from whom modern Chinese and Islamic groups both claim heritage. Of course, this claim is often disputed within Islamist scholarship arguing Islamic arrival and distinction of its arrival cannot be associated with a historically Chinese figure. Yet, it cannot be entirely disputed that Cheng Ho’s cultural affiliation retains important contributions to the construction of Chinese cultural validity in historical influences on Indonesian society and to the spread of Islam.

While Islam (arguably) arrived with Cheng Ho, the publicization and normalization of Chinese religions had already reached an institutional level throughout the archipelago. These belief systems contributed to the construction of various social systems in communitarian life, such as the implementation of an accommodative religious environment throughout systemic diversity. The significance of Buddhism can be traced throughout several millennia (with special significance to Sailendra, Mataram, and Srivijaya dynastic eras), whereas Confucian and Daoist systems were also popular

---

(mainly among majority Chinese communities). Through religious historiography, we can identify the strains of Chinese influence and the various social nodes that Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism have on Indonesian society. These systems must be given (at least) partial credit for the individualistic fostering and contribution to pluralism and multiculturalism in Indonesian society, and for the evolution of the Pancasila—a platform that seeks to build upon the hope of dissolving monolithic, monocultural aspects of society that are absent of Chinese influences.³

Chinese culture is traditionally rooted in Confucianism, representing the nexus of social morality through observing harmoniousness, sanctimoniousness, and filial piety (among other values). Regardless of social or religious system, the implementation of Confucian ethics on the Chinese mainland and its gradual integration into local life through Indonesia contributed substantially to the simultaneous construction of Chinese and Indonesian notions for fiscal responsibility, work ethics, perceptions of family and child rearing, and the honoring of the dead. Especially within majority Chinese communities, Confucianism provided a framework that accommodated differences through a gradual integration of traditional Chinese characteristics with local exceptionalities. This mode of communitarian construction centered upon the various intersectional contributions of ethnic and religious aspects for one socio-communitarian construct. Alternative religious and social systems existed within these communitarian constructs as significant actors for the evolution of customs and institutions, whereas

different perceptions regarding Confucian principles and the normalization of this system were neither deemed as destructive nor penetrative. Rather, careful considerations for religious diversity and the integration of various systems is a unique and vital concept to majority Chinese communities, mechanizing the utility of pluralism, tolerance, and multiculturalism into a readily available facet for collaborative construction to an indigenous-cum-Confucian structure.

Even as Confucian structures allow for accommodationist and integrationist initiatives, the arrival (and occupation) of the Dutch introduced Christianity into the socio-religious landscape, penetrating and dissolving carefully constructed communitarian structures. Indigenous-cum-Confucian considerations were deemed as sinful, false systems that overly imposed direct challenges to Dutch authority (and moreover, the exploitation of resources). To be certain, the introduction of Christianity did not suddenly dissolve the institutions of communitarian structures, but introduced a higher, more moral perception of Christian ideals over the primordial socio-religious Other.

Through Christianity, two dynamic concepts emerged that changed the social landscape in favor of institutionalizing (and founding pillars of-) colonialism: cultuurstelsel (cultivation) economics and self-governance. Dutch occupation and colonialism necessitated the requirement of massively extracting resources to supply the Netherlands. Numerous industries were significantly affected by the massive exportation

---

of goods and resources, leaving little-to-no remainder for Indonesians;\(^5\) therein destabilizing communitarian structures and ultimately infringing on the moral grounds of socio-religious systems via Christian moralism, ethics, and the institutionalization of both. Where colonialism required the extraction of resources to be returned to the homeland, the availability of these resources to Indonesians depended upon the perception of humans existing as resources. Considerations for alternative theological systems, in line with colonial perceptions of ethnic and racial hierarchies, created a pseudo-fascist social structure that capitalized on the extraction through mandating an ethno-economic hierarchy in consideration of alleviating or promoting different social groups. The ‘primordial’ social nature of Indonesians ultimately mechanized and legitimized Dutch ‘messianic’ arrivals, therein serving Christianity as a catalyst to initiate a moral lens over indigenous systems, cultures, and customs by exploiting resources (and human capital) to the greatest benefit possible—an exploitation that most Dutch in the Netherlands were made unaware. Primordialism constituted justification over colonialism, therein bastardizing notions of indigenous-exceptionality and the possibility of countering Dutch Christian cultuurstelsel with Indonesian socio-religious alternative systems.

Throughout the 19\(^{th}\) century, notions of the French Enlightenment swept across Europe and eventually permeated the Dutch social mind by reconsidering the institution

of colonialism and its effects on indigenous inhabitants.⁶ Notable examples of publicizing the conditions of Dutch colonies were witnessed and politicized in the scathing anthropological work *De neger-slaven in de kolonie Suriname⁷* and *Max Havelaar of de koffij-veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij.⁸* These publications called into question the ethical treatment of the colonies and the indigenous populations by comparing conditions to the qualities described in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, ultimately testing the legitimacy of Dutch colonialism as a necessary component to Dutch sustainability. Existing without any direction to account Christian principles as vital to Dutch survival, the ideals of “hypocritical [Christian missionary] reptiles”⁹ capitalized on massive mobilized labor policies that could not sustain the wealthy livelihoods of “parrot Christians,” and were discounted for the ethical mistreated of the indigenous and the demoralization of the Dutch peoples.

In order to account for this hypocritical proselytism (depicted in Julien Wolbers’ 1863 brochure *Jaarboekje Christelijke Weldadigheid*), the Enlightenment invoked that considerations for the indigenous be compared to the ‘rights of man and of the citizen,’ relegating the ‘right’ of the colonized to construct new systems based on specific economic needs of the colonies themselves; the creation of a “state within a state”¹⁰ that could appropriate pseudo-definitions of self-governance and self-determination, and

---

⁶ See: Dick et al: British occupation of Java in 1811 provided circumstantial political dealings amid European powers within the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 (14).
⁸ Ibid, 61.
⁹ Ibid, 57.
¹⁰ van der Kroef, 152.
therein separate notions for administrational power carefully balanced in the hands of indigenous peoples as a “[right] of natives.”\textsuperscript{11} This new access to the right of self-governance was administered and balanced under the authority of Dutch indirect rule, wherein an overarching juridical-cum-administrative structure maintained the freedom to exercise the right to rescind any and all access to natives. Yet, the very provision of allowing indigenous participation in governmental affairs did not automatically ensure self-governance but maintained the separation of powers (and class, among other social categories) under the authority of Dutch ethics;\textsuperscript{12,13} a moral trend that was considered a necessary delivery to account for the guilt felt by many Dutch individuals in the Netherlands.

From the 1830s to the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the Dutch instituted the Welfare Policy and the Ethical Policy that substantiated a system for alleviating moral wrongs-done over indigenous populations to account for the various socio-economic depravities experienced from cultuurstelsel.\textsuperscript{14} This extension of overseeing an ethical responsibility from French-influenced colonialist principles stipulated national sovereignty, humanitarianism, and the development of territoriality and natural resources\textsuperscript{15} through the careful liberalization of economic policies via laissez-faire principles.\textsuperscript{16} Massive mobilization efforts, or corvée labor, countered the claim of ethical

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, 153.
\textsuperscript{13} Janse, 63.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 74.
\textsuperscript{15} van der Kroef, 161.
\textsuperscript{16} von Gé, 26.
mistreatment as the ever-present need to modernize the colony elevated developmental policies apart from Netherlander advocacy for Enlightenment politics. Corvé labor prioritized the need to mobilize, and thus become the forefront-argument against dissolving current structures in favor of ethical change. Yet, if the Dutch government had legalistically structured a system to modernize and provide pseudo-considerations for indigenous self-governance, then the prescription to meet the necessity of mass-mobilized corvée labor was to ascribe a new sense of cultural-exceptionalism over indigeneity. Given the multicultural social fabric of the archipelago, the Ethical Policy combined the proponents of the Welfare Policy to provide certain indigenous peoples (disregarding Arabian, Chinese, and Indian ethnic groups) to accede to a higher social classification in the hopes of regaining some sense for ‘Indonesian authenticity.’

New considerations for indigeneity and nativism give great cause to social cleavages underlying Dutch colonialist societal construction. Under the Welfare Policy and the Ethical Policy, the “inlander.” or the true native to Indonesia (restricted to reside in the hinterland), was thereby granted pribumi (or native) status to “pay a debt of honor.” The consideration of other ethnic groups (who already maintained a vast history and lineage to the archipelago, and otherwise were communally considered as indigenous) did not receive such classification and were not granted the same welfare benefits. The differences in the indigenism-nativism complex did not account for historical inhabitants, but only considered the basic population to be ‘indigenous’ based

18 Janse: 73-74.
on ethnic characteristics. Illegitimate considerations to distinguish *pribumi* from *asli* (foreigners) mechanized a distinctive categorization scheme that has been used to determine authentic Indonesian-ness apart from the remaining population.

Through Welfare Policy and Ethical Policy lenses, and legalizing reclassification over indigenous peoples, ethnic classification schemes contributed to social perceptions of those who received welfare; redefining considerations related to function and the ability to achieve upward mobility. This social mobilization created false hopes for minority populations from achieving upward mobility as it sought to dissolved Western concepts of capitalist gains and a new social structure. Rather, society was toxified from the very economic considerations that were prescribed to alleviate these challenges. Classes were tied to ethnicities and cemented these ethnic groups to various social strata, entirely “[sweeping] away” all local resistance surrounding a centralized Dutch administration based on false promises of ethical change and economic welfare.\(^{20}\)

The concept of indigeneity for minority ethnic groups does not specifically fit the eligibility requirements of *pribumi* but radically ostracizes and marginalizes other populations that have otherwise considered themselves (and are considered by Indonesians) as indigenous according to historical lineage. Whereby the notion of certifying *pribumi* status in communitarian constructs disregards classifying individuals and/or groups as indigenous based on communitarian function. Communitarian structures necessitate and designate various roles according to the functionality of the specific provisions each individual and/or group can provide. Despite ethnic, economic, or

\(^{20}\) Dick *et al.*: 15-17.
religious characteristics inherent to certain groups, the unique aspects of
communitarianism remove the liberal realization of ethnic, economic, or religious factors
from the communitarian construct. 21, 22, 23 However, despite the institutionalization of
ethnic classification/categorization schemes, social perceptions of various ethnic groups
have tended to normalize function, capacity and ability according to establishmentarian
power dynamics, regardless of concept obscurity.

As pribumi experienced a relative affluence in society based on ethnic
characteristics, Dutch ‘welfare’ and ‘ethics’ developed these policies to
classify/categorize other ethnic groups according to the distinctive characteristics in
relation to socio-economic standing. As Chinese populations were afforded relative
security within the bounds of communitarian constructs, Dutch
classification/categorization schemes diminished the status of the Chinese ethnicity/race
based on numerous criteria, including the stigmatized generalizations of foreign natures
among Chinese socio-religious and economic characteristics. While Chinese populations
previously had no need to assert counter-claims to hierarchical placement or socio-
normative perceptions in defense of Chinese indigeneity, the justification for expanding a
mercantilist market system or (allegedly) utilizing cultuurstelsel economics for
ethnically-exclusive benefits (i.e. maritime trade, conglomerative business ventures, or

21 Gerry van Klinken, “Return of the Sultans: The Communitarian Turn in Local Politics,” The Revival of
Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism (London:
22 Amy Gutmann, “Review: Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 14, no. 3
23 See: J.H. Boeke, The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy (New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1942).
institutionalizing Confucian fiscally responsible principles in communities) were re-framed to devalue or toxify Chinese influences. Claims that the Chinese ethnicity/race did not fit previous considerations in the social hierarchy fit well within new perceptions regarding the Chinese Other.²⁴

Despite multiple attempts to seek accommodative measures, to integrate Chinese-ness into Indonesian society, or even assimilate (i.e. inter-ethnic marriage, adoption of Javanese or Malay names, etc.),²⁵ the interweaving of Chinese-ness into society could not retain its former prominence or influence from characteristic Chinese-ness from the (alleged) toxicity that it brought. Rapid influxes of Chinese merchants, artisans, and developers continued to contribute expansive changes throughout numerous social spheres regardless of perception, therein binding the concept of Chinese-ness to Indonesian-ness; further concluding the argument that Indonesian society is built in-part by Chinese characteristics and influences based on function.²⁶

Regardless of how influential or characteristic Chinese-ness is to the construct of Indonesian society, Chinese populations were never afforded total immunity or protection aside from social hierarchical constructs that attributed any sense of discrimination or violence towards them. On the contrary, Chinese influxes and influences are part-and-parcel to the social construct that are ultimately diminished to subject perceptions of Chinese populations as being foreign. The foreign nature of Chinese culture revolves around communitarian institutionalization of Confucianism, whereby concepts such as

²⁴ M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 85.
²⁵ Ibid. 117.
²⁶ Ibid. 119.
strict structures of fiscal responsibility, filial piety, sanctimoniousness, and harmoniousness do not perfectly align with the fluidity of Indonesian social structure. Vigilant observation of cultural-exceptionalism can alienate the Other. The success and efficiency of Chinese entrepreneurialism throughout several social spheres exhibited the wealth of foreign capital and were (allegedly) ineligible for pribumi attainment. This separation of socio-economic and socio-religious classes neither categorizes nor classifies Chinese as occupants of an upper echelon, but distinctively separates Chinese-ness from Indonesian-ness based on structure, history, and cultural differences.²⁷ Not considered indigenous or native, Chinese were deemed as “foreign orientals,”²⁸ a term that solidified intrinsic Othered qualities. Where the Welfare Policy and the Ethical Policy sought to establish alleviatory programs for pribumi, “foreign orientals” were excluded under a refusal to recognize the contributions of participation, influence, or historical considerations for pribumi and/or Indonesian-exceptionalism.

In the Special Region of Yogyakarta, Chinese communities were highlighted and ‘zoned’ (wijkenstelsel) by Dutch authorities to restrain Chinese influence from spreading into pribumi neighborhoods, or to designate these areas as ‘cultural zones’ for the ease of

---
classification/categorization and ethnic grouping.\textsuperscript{29,30,31} Even as Chinese zones were designated, the social upheaval of \textit{wijkenstelsel} created a degree of anti-Chinese sentiment that quickly normalized vigilante justice (punishing Chinese who sought to reside elsewhere). Early accounts attribute a sense of justice towards anti-Chinese sentiment,\textsuperscript{32} through which Dutch classification/categorization and zoning reaffirmed these new social laws (whether definitive or normative)\textsuperscript{33} despite individualistic communitarian opinion of the sentiment.\textsuperscript{34} Considerations regarding sentiment was most significantly highlighted in schools, whereas \textit{Hollandsch-Inlandsche} (Dutch-Native schools; an upper-class establishment) and \textit{Hollandsch-Chineesche} (Dutch-Chinese schools; a Dutch-influenced establishment to pay lip service to the significance of Chinese economic influence in society while diminishing Chinese ethnicity to a lower scale) represented socio-economic differences related to ethnic or racial perceptions—clarifying the attributions of “foreign” and “inlander.”\textsuperscript{35} These establishments remained ethnically divided to maintain classifications for an ideal “model minority.”\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{29} Andreas A. Susanto, \textit{Under the Umbrella of the Sultan: Accommodation of the Chinese in Yogyakarta during Indonesia’s New Order} (Radboud: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2008), 48.
\textsuperscript{35} Ricklefs, 201.
\textsuperscript{36} Walujono, 29.
Through constructing a “model minority,” perceptions of anti-Chinese sentiment teetered among various groups. While Chinese entrepreneurs were often viewed to exist in a higher social class based on economic influence, they were thought to ‘sneakily’ infiltrate the marketplace through governmental persuasion; utilizing Confucianism as means of substantiating socio-economic status. On the other hand, the Sultan of Yogyakarta considered Chinese participation in Yogyakarta society as a means to develop and advance the economic system through well-preserved, sound economic principles. To this end, the Sultan appointed numerous Chinese aristocrats and entrepreneurs throughout the governmental arena to secure a socio-governmental system with Chinese-Confucian characteristics.

Yet, even as Chinese individuals operated within high-level positions throughout society, the distinctions disregarding Chinese-exceptionalism cannot be ignored. Chinese were not considered *prihumi* and were not afforded the privileges of ‘indigenous status.’ The social change institutionalized by Dutch classification schemes stretched beyond the juridical-cum-administrative restrictions, whereby communities were segregated; schools became institutions of structural, physical, and psychological violence; and the majority of Chinese merchants experienced a severe loss of economic activity, succumbing to the work traditionally found in ‘cooler towns’: restaurateur, handicraft, jeweler, or remaining within other lower-class levels (and thus denigrated to this status). These perceptions of anti-Chinese sentiment and the tangible effects realized by Chinese

---

37 Dick *et al*: 15, 30.
38 Vickers, 28.
constitutes the fundamental conceptualization of indigeneity and who legitimately fits within the category, despite function, participation, or historical status. These changes ultimately led to the initiation of social movements in consideration for establishing a higher Indonesian culture, society, amid proto-nationalist ideas.\textsuperscript{39}

The budding concepts of indigeneity, Indonesian-ness, and the eventual dissolution of Dutch colonialism spurred the debate within the Chinese ethnic population as to reassert Chinese-exceptionalism amid massive social movements directed towards nationalism, culture, and history. Even as Indonesians considered these concepts, nationalistic appeal from the Republic of China upended perceptions of Indonesian-ness for Chinese groups, especially as an equally powerful (if not more-so) movement directed diasporic Chinese populations across the world to organize. What was Chinese-ness for the Chinese-Indonesian and how did this concept form within an Indonesian society?

From 1900-1927, the gradual surge of Chinese nationalism created a symbolic association with Chinese republicans to reconsider a resurgence of cultural affinities through religious organizations, educational institutions, and expanded political affiliations across the region. Chinese influence gained a firm foot-hold among ethnic populations through the creation of a ‘body politic,’ extending an arm through education, religion, and politics to form a budding Chinese-Indonesian form of nationalism. Organizations, such as \textit{Republik Rakjat Tiongkok} (Chinese People’s Republic), \textit{Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan} (Association of Chinese), \textit{Partai Tionghoa Indonesia} (Chinese Party of

Indonesia) and Khong Kauw Tjong Hwee (Chinese Confucian Religion Society),
utilized the derivative of historical and cultural lineage to form a unique understanding
for how totok (pure-blooded Chinese) and peranakan (mixed-blooded Chinese) advanced
the influence of Chinese-ness within Indonesian society. On the contrary, Chinese
nationalism was considered a threat to the emerging proto-Indonesian nationalist,
infiltrating Indonesian-exceptionalism to the same extent that Dutch colonialism sought
to institutionalize; a Chinese replacement.

Despite communitarian exceptions, nationalist movements manifested an uneasy
‘suspicion’ of Chinese influences and the affects that the Chinese population could
deliver. The rise of Chinese-ness considerably strengthened the suspicions of “foreign
orientals” through the collective minoritization of ethnicity, thereby returning to
primordial ‘roots’ under the claim that Chinese-ness was indigenous to the construction
of Indonesian nationalism. Not only did these movements destabilize the fragile
relationships instigated between the Chinese, Indonesians, and priöbmi, but the

---

40 The English translation of Khong Kauw Tjong Hwee or Khong Kauw Hwee relates to the religious school
of Confucianism, which implies one side of the establishmentarian argument in terms differentiating
between institutionalizing religiosity or implementing a loosely organized state of societal religiosity; many
members debated the technicality of this name until the organization evolved into the present day
MATAKIN (Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia; The Supreme Council of Confucian Religion of
Indonesia). (See: Charles A. Coppel, “The Origins of Confucianism as an Organized Religion in Java,

41 It should be noted here that Chinese nationalism spawned a much greater, counter philosophical-cultural
consideration in the existence of proto-Indonesian cultural-exceptionality (given that ‘Indonesian-ness’ was
not yet conceptualized in an institutional philosophical degree). Organizations such as Budi Utomo (BU)
esentialized key narratives within the priöbmi consideration of indigeneity and antiquated this essentialism
as superior to the “infidel[s]”—the Chinese. (See: Leo Suryadinata, “Indigenous Indonesians, the Chinese

42 In terms of this work, the organization, institutionalization, and the conceptualization of proto-Indonesian
(philosophical) nationalism will be disregarded (in significant degree) as this work studies the ethnic-
Chinese contribution to indigeneity. However, the significance of the proto-Indonesian movement is
essential towards the holistic comprehensive understandings of why there are distinctions between
Indonesians and Indonesian-Chinese.
particularity of asserting Chinese-ness as fundamental to Indonesian nationalism exposed the gradual dissolution of ‘tolerance’ (or deceptive generosity)\textsuperscript{43} regarding Chinese populations.\textsuperscript{44}

This notion of tolerance or deceptive generosity is an interesting aspect to consider when discussing the \textit{Pancasila}, especially when modern contributions of \textit{Gus Durian} politics (democracy, pluralism, tolerance) maintain fragile foundations already. Despite socio-normative perceptions of anti-Chinese sentiment and the various means through which discrimination and violence are initiated, the consideration of Chinese-ness as partial to the construction of Indonesian nationalism (and Indonesian-ness) revolves around the ability to coalesce a sense of integrationist Chinese influence and the best means on how to mechanize integration into an assimilationist society. The provision of the \textit{Pancasila} allows the currently expansive and critical debate into what falls under nationalistic ideals for instituting modern, progressive, and equitable reforms for \textit{all} groups. While proto-Indonesian nationalism, Chinese (trans-)nationalism, and remnants of colonialism remain prominent in the current evolution of the Indonesian social construct, there continues to remain a formidable block of social forces that attempt to institutionalize anti-Chinese sentiment as an establishmentarian aspect to Indonesia. (The practical application of instituting anti-Chinese sentiment as establishmentarian


effectively sways the benefits of securing an anti-Gus Durian provision in Indonesian nationalism that maintains the necessity for normalizing discrimination and violence.)

On the other hand, popular outlets for opening debate into the evolution of the Indonesian social construct justify the social requirement to extend this debate into considering the need to institutionalize anti-Chinese sentiment or acknowledge the growth of anti-Gus Durian ideals and implement the radical changes into stabilizing and securing a national identity (in line with aspirations for establishing a ‘high-culture’). Popular religious, educational and political actors have proved to be extraordinarily persuasive to the expansion and dissolution of certain ideals and beliefs, integrationist politics in mercantilism, communitarianism, and religiosity. Questions surrounding the configuration of nationalism, Indonesian-ness, and contributions by various groups have been masterfully maneuvered by Chinese groups, providing a not-too-subtle authority to Chinese influencers.

Regardless of how well ethnic groups perform or earn positions in society based on the attributed social roles and functionalities, Indonesian nationalism combines cultural exceptionalities and removes the insistence that these cultures are specifically, uniquely, and performatively exceptional. In the contrary, Indonesian nationalism promotes an exceptional society that contends the contribution and construction of a society built upon diverse exceptional groups. It could be argued that the common Indonesian citizen is ‘artificial’ and ‘non-realistic’ insomuch that cultural hybridity (the combination of cultures into one socio-cultural entity) cannot holistically or resolutely reorganize successfully, but rather negates cultural-exceptionalism from forwarding the
mechanisms necessary to mitigate Indonesian social groups from existing among the “in-between-ness of the displaced.”

Authentic indigenism becomes a fluid concept that derives legitimacy based on economic values rather than nationalistic aspirations or ethnic characteristics.

At this point, we must address how Chinese populations sought to integrate cultural-exceptionalism into the societal exceptionality that was (and continues to remain) intrinsically anti-Chinese? While the Pancasila offers socio-governmental provisions for acknowledging, accounting, and integrating Gus Durian idealisms into the social construct, there is no capacity for protecting Chinese characteristics regardless of how the framework is configured. Converging nationalist movements both operate underneath the residual structure of Dutch colonialism, facing upward battles when asserting rights and privileges. Indonesian-ness and Chinese-ness represent a social cleavage that cannot attest for the right to exist without infringing upon the Other. Of course, Indonesian nationalism takes precedence in the social construct, but cannot deliver a holistic narrative towards how society should view the masalah Cina in configuring social progression. The obstruction of socializing Chinese culture as a normative consideration is hampered by the indistinguishable question of what constitutes Indonesian-

---

45 Coppel, 1983.
exceptionalism, therein simultaneously determining the various mechanisms for ensuring that the process can initiate a directive to achieve an intrinsically Chinese-absent society.49

Religious institutions serve as a unique mode for integrating both cultures together. Cultural practices are overlooked (to a point) as religious customs take precedence and maintain institutional order through a degree of separation. Even as religious institutions are provided the protection of autonomy via governmental recognition, the basis of observing cultural-exceptionalism stems from communitarian nodes of functionality and participation. Confucianism is the most culturally significant religious system characteristically tied to Chinese culture and exceptionalism. The social organization instituted by Confucian principles delegated adherence to a system of filial piety, harmoniousness, and sanctimoniousness; all of which are necessary and intertwined within numerous Chinese customs. Through this structure, it has been possible (and practiced) among numerous communities where, for example, Javanese culture is integrated into the Confucian structure to abide by the multicultural, pluralistic, and accessible tenants of the social system that Confucianism seeks integration. Therein, this degree of separation—allowing both Javanese customs and Confucian structure (with Chinese characteristics)—integrates both social systems into a unique religious communitarian system.

If integration can be seen as a means of securing a sub-social structure into the majoritarian social system, then a simplified version of Chinese-Indonesian-ness could

49 Citizenship Act 2.296 (1910); Walujono, 27.
theoretically institute an operable, cooperative social construct that mitigates conflict while establishing precedence for enacting a peaceful solution. However, the tenants for Indonesian perceptions regarding the “foreign oriental” can neither be dismissed nor quietly suppressed. Proponents to proto-Indonesian nationalism (with a monocultural mindset) and totok Confucian followers both sought to remove the ‘improper [sacrificial] entities’ that had tainted the exceptionalities of Indonesian-ness and Chinese-ness; to remove that which was not purely Indonesian or Chinese. While many peranakan groups (the instigators of integrating ‘improper [sacrificial] entities’) substantiated the claims that integration among communitarian constructs abided by both the Confucian structure and the social system; these communities dictated the significance and methodologies of integration, and thus were the authorities on the matter regardless of proto-Indonesian nationalism or totok politics. However, given stark contrasts between totok and peranakan influences in Javanese society, the Chinese ethnic population (dictated and guarded by totok) differed over “whatsoever [is] attached to matri-locality,”

51 Suryadinata, 223.
52 Tjia Tjiep Ling, secretary of Khong Kauw Tjong Hwee, admitted that the course of philosophical understand was skewed, confusing, and varied. Three broad movements of Confucianism displaced many followers: (1) an older, traditional group considered the Soe Sie as written; (2) a second group considered the Soe Sie as mystical; and (3) the third group called for modern interpretations of the text to include Javanese influences. ‘Worship’ could neither be considered absolute nor cohesive in terms of reaching the Confucian audience apart from the traditional vs. modern debate (similar debates took place among Chinese nationalists).
53 Walujono (30) presents an interesting correlation to the three broadened movements through a socio-political categorization, whereas Chinese political leanings were divided into three groups: (1) “passivists”: comprising the vast majority of the Chinese community, consisting of shopkeepers, traders, and general labor; (2) “participationists” [sic]: formal and informal leaders of the Indonesian-Chinese community, i.e. newspaper editors and correspondents, businessmen, and representatives; and (3) “assimilationists: ‘Those who attended Dutch or Indonesian language schools…[believing] in the endeavor to merge…into the society and culture of the majority…” These comparisons may correlate to the socio-religious as well as the socio-political spheres insomuch to direct varying degrees of participation amid Chinese transnationalism and proto-Indonesian nationalism.
therein demanding the *totok* purification processes over integrationist Javanese-Confucian systems be instituted as the establishmentarian directive.

However, perceptions of Confucianism as an establishmentarian system stood as a significant obstacle to the *peranakan* insistence that security depended on integration, wherein Confucianism existed as a practical structure to ensure for security in communitarian constructs. On the contrary, while Confucianism has never been regarded (among *totok* or mainland Chinese philosophy) as an official religion but rather as a social system of instituting an observance of the rule of law, there are numerous components that can be framed to constitute the system as religious. Canonical texts, such as the *Soe Sie* and *Hauw King*, bring ambiguity and nuance to the establishmentarian case of considering the system as atheistic, especially as canon dictates the necessity to remain immovable to reform. As Confucianism dictates social law, the regularization of *peranakan* conceptions to Confucianism could not be holistically established in communitarian constructs as the firm platform of integration substantiated a significant obstacle of effectively penetrating *peranakan* politics with *totok* statutes.

Reform cannot solely be considered a *peranakan* case for instituting Confucianism, but also in the frame that *totok* politics demanded that Confucianism be modernized to consider the outstanding nationalistic adherence to the *Pancasila*, and to maintain that *totok* Confucianism accommodated the desires of consecrating the system

---

to the socio-cultural considerations of Indonesian-ness. In short, Confucianism must reform to abide by Indonesian law. However, ‘integrative’ elements from peranakan introduced elements that attracted Javanese and other ethnic populations to observe Confucianism in a modern, peranakan lens. Putting politics aside, Chinese trans-nationalism dominated much of the socio-political discussion between totok and peranakan camps, especially in the wake of proto-Indonesian nationalism and the cause for the creation of a monocultural social system that depended on the institutionalization of assimilating all other “foreign orientals” into the cultural exceptionality that was Indonesian-ness.

Given the advance of Chinese trans-nationalism and the attraction among Javanese observers to Confucianism, advocates from Tjong Hoa Hwe Kauw (THHK; the leading institution for Confucian establishment on Java) claimed that reform was necessary to reset social perceptions of both Confucians and the Chinese ethnic population to substantiate culture and religion as a means of establishing a “state religion” through religious schools of thought.55 Through educational, cultural, and religious institutions, Confucianism became an accessible religious system that demanded purification of the social structure so as to maintain adherence to canon and to filial piety. These ‘reformist’ processes ostracized numerous Javanese-Confucian observers as the accessibility negated the cultural belief in the connections between spirituality and superstitions. Without the possibility of integrating ‘immoral [sacrificial] entities,’ Javanese- and peranakan Confucians were strongly discouraged from observing

numerous practices that were integral to communitarian funerary or marriage customs (such as the filing of a bride’s teeth). Yet, the THHK implementation of purification or institutionalist reforms were unable to proactively enact lawful purification throughout communities, and thus maintained no power structure to ensure that Confucianism remained both reformative and totok—a critique that compared THHK as overextending its influence by acting similarly with Dutch-Christian socio-religious power constructs, disabling the effective means of controlling Confucian population to abide by canon and/or the rule of law.\(^{56}\)

The THHK establishment claim to institutionalize Confucianism as an official religion proved difficult under constant debate whether the purification scheme held authority to totok politics while simultaneously lacking authority to observe its own rule of law in communitarian constructs. Neither could the forces of Dutch-Christian socio-religious power dynamics nor the rise of both proto-Indonesian nationalism and Chinese trans-nationalism distribute authenticity to various groups that sought to observe Confucianism in the manner that they desired; canon did not provide sufficient moral/filial piety arguments to sway the debate one way or the other. By 1923 in Yogyakarta, the decision to appease both totok and peranakan was decided by including writings of “other men of letters (poedjonggo) of the past and present which are thought useful and proper” into canonical scripts that were meant to secularize and broaden Confucian jurisprudence. Thereafter, a combination of secular-nationalists was

\(^{56}\) Ibid. 185.
introduced and administered this neo-Confucianism that allowed observances for *peranakan* communitarian structures.

While the status of Chinese populations teetered throughout the next several decades in regards to substantiating a national cultural ideal, especially in regards to the conception of a high-culture (during the Sukarno (*Bung Karno*) era), communitarian constructs legitimized the essential nodes for social order, everyday livelihoods, and the right to observe religious systems aside from social perceptions regarding the foreign nature of the Chinese and the supposed inability for Confucianism to authentically integrate into the social order. The next section of historical background that I will discuss is based on the ‘1965 Affair’ and its lead into the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. These two periods are distant but uniquely integrated based on racial overtones, ethnic marginalization, and the significant rhetoric used to ‘Other’ Chinese populations amid economic, political, and social collapse. Of these several decades the main point to consider and be aware of is in the eventual rise of institutional anti-Chinese sentiment and the fall and rise of nationalistic trends, the Sino-Soviet divide, Maoist communism, and the political-security state-of-affairs during the Cold War. All these movements affected Chinese well-being and the frames through which many populations view the ‘suspicious’ ‘foreign orientals.’

The ‘1965 Affair’ on 30 September 1965 riveted Indonesian politics with a sudden shift; a change from Soviet-associated communistic socio-economics into a Western-leaning, industrialist center under an authoritarian regime. An alleged coup d’état led by Indonesian General Suharto presented Indonesian society with a severe
politico-economic shift from Bung Karno-esque NASAKOM ‘Guided Democracy’ (nasionalisme, agama, komunisme – NAS-A-KOM; nationalism, religion, and communism)—failed national perspectives for a modern emerging state.\textsuperscript{57, 58, 59} By instituting a socio-normative ‘reign of fear’ that mechanized monoculturalism, ethnic minority populations suffered great dealings at the hands of the Pak Suharto regime insomuch that the (continued) denigration of Chinese-ness cauterized socio-normative racial and ethnic tensions into the social mind. The conceptualization of anti-Chinese sentiment reached a point that cemented the causes of the Indonesian struggle (Chinese trans-nationalism alongside the spread of Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics, etc.)\textsuperscript{60, 61} to be fundamentally a problem with the Chinese; masalah Cina.

On an ethnic affront, paradoxical considerations of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and the Pancasila were reframed to constitute legitimacy and causal authority for specific ethnic


\textsuperscript{59} Nationalism intertwined with monoculturalism (Indonesianization), hybridity (accommodationist), and assimilation were in no way clearly standardized. The problem to nationalism was rationalized by the unjust position of the Chinese in the economic favor; “indigenism” [sic] was a necessary component to nationalism to generate a “harmonious commercial middle-class.” (Suryadinata, 42.)


groups that maintained adhering characteristics to the concept of Bung Karno high-culture. Socio-normative suspicions questioned the authenticity of ethnic minorities, specifically Chinese populations (a “diverse and socially active group”),\(^{62}\) as justifiably Indonesian—therein continuing the debate whether Indonesian cultural-exceptionalism was founded on a pillar of Chinese culture. However, these considerations of Chinese-ness in contrast to Indonesian-ness initialized a socio-cultural assimilation program (Program Pembauran) that sought to destabilize cultural pillars of Chinese communities to gradually (if not immediately) consume any identifiable notion of Chinese culture within a society that was inherently not Chinese.

Numerous policies attempted to assimilate Chinese populations into becoming dissolved cultural icons, such as the usage of Chinese characters; prohibited public exhibition of cultural or religious ceremonies; and enforced legal changes to the person (such as name change, intermarriage,\(^ {63}\) or the banishment of “alien” attributions in society).\(^ {64}\) By 1967, Pak Suharto circulated Presidential Decision No.240/1967 and Presidential Instruction No.14/1967 that removed the ability/freedom to observe religious customs outside of households or religious establishments.\(^ {65}\) By 1979, Pak Suharto further determined that the utility of Confucianism was an unnecessary mechanism for instituting and promoting socio-governmental policies for cultivating Indonesian culture,

---

\(^{62}\) Walujono, 11.

\(^{63}\) Considerable opposition to intermarriage was wide-spread among older peranakan as the implications of intermarrying with Indonesians were like the intermarriage of Dutch colonists. Indonesianization was viewed through a neocolonialist lens that continuum of dissatisfaction between pribumi and asli (foreigner); see: Mary Frances Ann Somers, “Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia,” (dissertation, Cornell University, 1965): 262-268.

\(^{64}\) Ibid. 62.

\(^{65}\) Susanto, 41.
and there disestablished the Confucian religion and figures from the Ministry of Religious Affairs.\textsuperscript{66}

Confucianism did not disappear from the social fabric, especially as Chinese entrepreneurs depended on the fiscal practices taught under the Confucian system. Chinese businessmen, even during the \textit{Pak} Suharto era, made significant advancements throughout numerous industries and markets, substantiating an underlying fact to Indonesian modernity that depended on Chinese influence and trade for the desired goal of \textit{Pak} Suharto politico-economic interests. Nevertheless, the significance of Chinese advancement for the economic sphere suffered a diminished influence from various cronies appointed to manage economic systems from afar, and to pay credence to family members and friends close within the \textit{Pak} Suharto inner circle,\textsuperscript{67} further continuing the pre-conceived notion of Chinese suspiciousness (even after the considerable advances made for Indonesian economics).\textsuperscript{68} Underneath the juxtaposition of establishing Indonesian high-culture alongside Chinese-dependent politico-economic interests, the ‘red scare’ operated alongside the ‘reign of fear’ that dynamically influenced anti-Chinese sentiment that was built upon an unsubstantiated risk to social security. Chinese suspiciousness could not be justified as the sole variable but was mechanized to


determine all possible means to further ostracize Chinese entrepreneurs through the caricature of a “fearful, dangerous people.”

The 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis can be perceived from numerous viewpoints that, ultimately, confuse the very stature of regarding one configuration as responsible for the Indonesian socio-economic crisis from another. Collusion, corruption, and nepotism (KKN: kolusi, korupsi, nepotisme) have been highlighted as the main instruments for advancing Pak Suharto politico-economic policies that aligned with Western- and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-strategies to reduce economic hardship for Indonesian society. However, these mechanisms do not fully account for residual cultuurstelsel economic strategies reminiscent of Dutch colonial structures that Pak Suharto willingly utilized to foment a modern, industrial, and Western-/capitalist-leaning economic platform. These strategies sought to create a socio-economic ‘power house,’ like the Asian Tigers, that could launch Indonesia into the modern state that it sought to become. On the contrary, a heavy export-led, currency manipulative, economy that depended on foreign loans to substantiate wealth beyond the means of self-sustaining (‘renewing’) dissolved the vitality, validity, and stability of Pak Suharto and IMF.

---

70 Susanto, 174.
71 Walujono, 65.
72 Ibid. 235.
73 Dick et al., 204.
economic strategies to, indeed, launch a nation out of global and social perceptions of its ineptitude for achieving an Asian Tiger platform.\textsuperscript{74}

Even as IMF-directed loans attempted to alleviate the self-directed denigration of numerous industrial markets, Chinese conglomerates were essential in exporting goods abroad, as well as developing modern, fiscally responsible financial policies (for conglomerate-use only). Often described as the ‘middleman,’\textsuperscript{75} Chinese entrepreneurs were structurally barred from directly operating outside of socio-governmentally designated markets. However, the collapse of the Thai baht re-envisioned Chinese economic participation to secure the livelihood of Pak Suharto politico-economic policies (that aligned with KKN structure). Chinese conglomerates were loosely organized and functioned to provide high profits for a secretly funded KKN network of politico-bureaucrats in attempt to construct a separate economic structure that secured the livelihoods of these bureaucrats while publicly bandwagoning with the Pak Suharto politico-economic platform. This structure ‘diplomatically’ assured Chinese conglomerates that productivity secured the survival of the Indonesian economic system, which in turn would secure the Chinese financial system. By diversifying Chinese enterprise through a politico-bureaucratic track, economic ‘offerings’ loosely structured


\textsuperscript{75} Chua, 108.
the ‘diplomacy’ that situated a fragile relationship on the dependency of money. The protections afforded to the ‘diplomatic’ relationships instigated a predatory ‘check and balance’ against Chinese conglomerates.

By January 1998, Chinese conglomerates confessed significant losses via currency manipulation and hyperinflation, insecure diplomatic relationships, and the inevitable closure of numerous enterprises; “those which were very close to the political elite in the New Order… enjoy[ed] special facilities and privileges [were]… investigated, scrutinized and cornered.” ‘Non-recoverable’ domestic loans and well-connected entrepreneurs negotiated with the government to restructure conglomerate politico-bureaucrat relationships, continuing the condemned nature of a “mess with hundreds of subsidiaries and affiliated companies scattered around the world.”

Throughout the Crisis, socio-economic tensions steadily increased, first as small riots and demonstrations that emerged into a demanding social movement for political and economic reform. While these demonstrations were on small scales, the evidence of where these riots took place noted a demonstrable change in the views of social policies regarding Chinese populations. Unquestionably, the socio-economic divides between the Chinese entrepreneurs (generalized to encompass the entirety of the Chinese population)

---

77 Chua (109) indicates the relationship between Chinese conglomerates and politico-bureaucrats through a simple corporatist state ideology that essentialized a military-esque dictatorship through a somewhat ‘forced agreement’ without any opposition; a functionalized, centralized institutional gatekeeping ensured licenses and credits to be indirectly authorized to Chinese conglomerates, which helped monopolize the structure to feed the relationship by rationalizing corrupt structures in the hopes of stabilizing an economic-political underlying construct.
78 Chua, 116.
79 Ibid. 114.
80 114.
and *pribumi* represented the inexcusable distortion of social constructions and the failures of *wijkenstelsel* to catalyze the condition of the modern Chinese individual.\(^\text{81}\)

As social unrest and violence spread across the landscape, students began to discuss and demand a political overhaul of the *Pak Suharto* administration; to ultimately seek *reformasi* (reform). Disorganization and social unrest effectively created a suitable platform for political change. Overwhelming debt accompanied by the impossibility to produce realistic economic reformatory procedures hastened the inevitable departure of *Pak Suharto* himself. In the hopes of aspiring to secure his position and to cast blame for the entire Crisis, public incriminations were strategically placed throughout media outlets that substantiated social claims regarding the Chinese as being the sole nexus for the Crisis. Numerous Chinese individuals were indicted, arrested, and prosecuted without due process—all to behoove public opinion to (further) sway against the Chinese populations (deeming the nexus as an ethnic/racial issue; begetting financial failure from culturally manipulative practices). Chinese populations were no longer considered in an anti-sentiment lens but highlighted as holistically problematic to society (*masalah Cina*); as a plotted ‘assassination’ to the Indonesian economy.

Socio-political, economic, and anti-Chinese driven tensions culminated in massive demonstrations in Jakarta on 12 May 1998. Thousands of demonstrators and students took to the streets to demand social change. The *Angkata Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces; *ABRI*) was deployed to control social

order, voice and mind, but re-asserted the ever-present dynamic of the 1965 ‘reign of fear’ that reiterated the outlook and continuum of Pak Suharto politics. After continuous insinuations and accusations from both reformasi and ABRI camps, military forces broke the lines and killed four students (and injured dozens more) at Trisakti University.

Violence spread into an unstoppable chaos through Jakarta, Surakarta, and Medan, re-igniting the violence of the ‘1965 Affair,’ culminating into a “time of madness.”

Chinese pecinan witnessed the most destructive violence as these were particularly targeted: marketplaces, enterprises, and storefronts were ransacked for goods and burned; Chinese individuals and families were barricaded inside their stores and homes and burned alive; women were raped and murdered—leaving numerous accounts only witness to the dead. Actual figures accounting for the violence in the chaotic miasma will never be known.

On 21 May 1998, Pak Suharto resigned and instated Vice President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998-1999) in replacement. This was not the change the reformasi movement demanded. Rather, the move instigated a re-vitalization of Pak Suharto-style politics, and more importantly, further established the governmental policy of disregarding the 33-year ‘reign of fear’ regime atrocious to the Indonesian social construct. Since 1998, the status of anti-Chinese sentiment has been met with severe

---


cognitive dissonance, even among Chinese groups, that insists on the prevention of fully accounting for the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. These are marks of social uncertainty and an unwarranted re-visitation to a false ‘need’ to secure ‘collective memory loss.’ Amid this dichotomous, inverse relationship between Chinese populations and socio-governmental perpetrators, the ability to normalize relations and seek reparations is silenced. Anti-Chinese sentiment remains a fundamental aspect to Indonesian society, and many continue to consider masalah Cina as a humiliating institution; representative of the humiliation of the Crisis, the destruction of a structured, peaceful state, and the inept relationship between pribumi and the “foreign oriental.”

The fragility of the Chinese ethnic population has been given some considerations and provision in the post-Suharto era in the hopes of restoring justice and mitigating continued, underlying violence. After 1999, the third President of Indonesia Abdurrahman al-Dakhil Wahid ‘Gus Dur’ (1999-2001) relinquished Presidential Decision No.240/1967 and Instruction No.14/1967 on the base that cultural-exceptionality maintains a distinctive part of the Indonesian social construct; whereas Chinese populations have contributed to significant advances for the Indonesian nation, and thus must be allowed to peacefully be integrated into the public sphere (in addition, fifth President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ‘SBY’, 2004-2014, re-established Confucianism an the sixth officially recognized religion). In the contrary, Chinese populations have continued to face discrimination and segregation in educational, religious, and political institutions despite numerous advances. Chinese populations continue to debate the importance of substantiating the cultural-
exceptionalism, the implementation of Confucianism as a religious-cultural structure, and re-visiting psychological, physical, and structural ‘collective memory loss.’ Do Chinese populations actually occupy a place in Indonesian society? If so, how can they bridge the gap between a substantively anti-Chinese society with the uncertainty of cultural-exceptionalism?

In the following section, I will examine the masalah Cina and the considerations of race, identity, and social representation in social and communitarian constructs. This discussion will provide the basis for constructing and constituting an appreciative inquiry for how religion serves as a means for bridging this socio-cultural gap. Security in relation to the masalah Cina, questions the unpleasant consequences for how Chinese populations must frame identity that is acceptable to Indonesian society and the outlook of Chinese survival.
LITERATURE REVIEW

This discussion must consider the relative theoretical applications to appreciatively inquire upon social structure; and the social and communitarian constructs that are built upon ethnic identities in trauma; and positioning in-groups that dictate functionality appropriately and aside from intrinsic anti-Chinese sentiment. Aspects of monoculturalism, multiculturalism, and hybridity can provide detailed comprehensions of how Chinese populations are viewed in economic and identity, wherein Chinese place themselves throughout this paradigm when publicly conducting culturally-specific practices or everyday tasks. Through this literature review, I will present the requirements for establishing security apparatuses that build upon both the historical background and the social theories presented here towards an integrationist or assimilationist socio-political platform. Legitimate expression through a combination of ethnic and/or racial identities can simultaneously operate within a pious appreciation towards Confucian social and communitarian constructs. Yet, Chinese ostracization between history and anti-Chinese sentiment and modern conceptions of Indonesian nationalism vs. *Gus Durian* politics continued to entrench notions of integrationist platforms aside from observing cultural-exceptionalism.

Confucianism remains to be a foundational socio-juridical structure that dictates and demands Chinese religious-cultural operation. These social laws re-cycle notions of
cultural-exceptionalism, community identity, ethnic history, and collective memory much in the same effect of constructing an order for harmony, sanctity, and piety.

Confucianism maintains that communities adhere to these laws to regulate operation. Religious communities operate in a similar way as institutions become the nexus of culture, identity, history, and memory, dictating communal laws in relation to religious pillars. Yet, Confucianism and religious-institutionalism become intertwined to act as a center for assuring Chinese communitarian validity and authenticity and gaining legitimacy for adherence to culture.

The validity of these institutions exists either as a cog of multiple gears for administering social laws or as a monolithic construct that captures an image of how communitarian constructs should identify and then spread one vision across multiple communities. These institutional structures, whether they represent any number of communitarian identities, must be carefully considered when regarding adjustments and/or adaptations to counter anti-Chinese sentiment. It is imperative to decide what points of interest converge for institutional change or passively abide by material or structural determinism.

The overarching challenge to institutional functionality is the masalah Cina and the ‘Chinese Question.’ These concerns view the Chinese ethnicity/race as a ‘toxin’ to the proto-nationalistic ideal insomuch that Chinese populations must navigate through various obstacles riddled in anti-Chinese sentiment to ensure survival and sustainability. Whether the Chinese can be considered as pribumi can be further debated within the masalah – Question discussion, whereas the function of Chinese populations in
Indonesian society can be claimed to be (in-part) of a characteristically Chinese nature for the development of society. This same utility can be contrasted through the lens of viewing Chinese populations as a foreign entity that dissolves the cultural exceptionality of Indonesian-ness; a leech to the unique characteristics of *pribumi*.

*Pak* Suharto politics successfully engineered anti-Chinese sentiment that utilized primordial socio-political divisions—establishing a befuddledment of ethnic, religious, and socio-communitarian dynamics in total contrast to each other.85 Dewi Anggraeni presents various instances when these dynamics contribute to the advancement of Indonesian society, such as *peranakan* contributions as traders, merchants, counsellors, advisors, newspaper editors and businessmen. Even as a significant number of individuals changed characteristically identifiable traits (such as Chinese sounding names through intermarriage), ethnic/racial traits were then utilized under a primordial lens to gather formidable anti-Chinese effects; wherein discrimination and violence pounced upon these identifiable traits. Regardless of retaining any sense of social plurality (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*), the imbalance between Chinese participation and Indonesian violence accounts for the complex of Chinese-incurred and Chinese-directed discrimination.86 Whether one exhibits Chinese characteristics or not, the attributive claim that one may be Chinese incurs relative damnation.

This imbalance may be configured to be an affiliation between Chinese ethnic populations and the rise of Chinese trans-nationalism in contrast to proto-Indonesian

---

85 Drakeley, 153.
86 Anggraeni, 257.
nationalism. Even if Chinese populations did not adhere to mainland Chinese republican or communist politics, the wave of Chinese trans-nationalism automatically locked the distinction of ethnic populations that sympathized with mainland China to affiliate oneself as intrinsically against the Pak Suharto body politic. Chang-Yau Hoon and Amanda Walujono both consider this relation as a ‘guilty by association’ effect by being identified synonymously with anti-Indonesian-ness, in addition to assimilationist politics as dividing factors for social and communitarian constructs underneath an overarching ‘politics of recognition’ scheme; a subversion of identity to category amid heterogeneity in the abandonment of tying Chinese cultural-exceptionalism to the Chinese ethnic community.\textsuperscript{87}

There is an “irony in itself” that concedes to the establishment of anti-Chinese sentiment as socio-normative. Discrimination and violence towards minority groups cements the impossibility of eliminating Chinese characteristics. By ‘speaking out’ against discrimination and violence, claiming that minority groups become “other-ized” [sic], this act ironically disempowers the ability to ‘speak out,’ and therein doubly disenfranchises the already marginalized at the behest of substantiating identity politics for the dominant group.\textsuperscript{88} Justus M. van der Kroef noted that “if only the social characteristics had differed, then possibly could the rationalization of the ‘Chinese Question’ be reversed.”\textsuperscript{89} Monoculturalism, as the preferred socio-cultural indicator, exists as a nodal concept to the Pancasila, whereby this synonymous distinction with the

\textsuperscript{87} Hoon, 153.  
\textsuperscript{88} Walujono, 61.  
\textsuperscript{89} van der Kroef: 460-464.
Indonesian cultural ideal subverts *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* to become an utility of an engineered nationalistic violent society—discouraging assimilation not as a choice but as a social requirement.

Hoon continues this and suggests of a possibility for conceiving cultural hybridity that draws from the plurality denoted by *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* while maintaining the institutional concept of a high-culture. This ‘in-between-ness of the displaced’ positions Chinese populations to transform the identity of intrinsic anti-Indonesian-ness into an accommodative socio-cultural entity that represents the “cutting edge of translation and negotiation”; as a “migrant who experiences multiple rootedness and consciousness…is forever mixing and mixed, forever crossing, traversing, translating linguistically and culturally. He is not either/or, but both.”

How does an alternative consideration for hybridity (an accommodative Chinese) promote the identity politics of the *peranakan*? Hybridization does not infer the loss of an identity but extends an identity towards the integration of exotic alternatives.

This consideration does not empower Chinese populations to consider themselves as a new version of *pribumi* or even on the track of attaining such a category. *Peranakan* can neither attribute Indonesian values upon themselves nor can they exhibit Chinese characteristics; both groups “inhibit the choices of ethnic Chinese about expressions of their identity, both political and culturally…[the Chinese] express a tension between the desire for voice, but also the desire to express loyalty to the Indonesian nation and

---

90 Hoon, 161.
Within this paradigm, *peranakan* are continually faced with communitarian and ethnic obligations to consider the communal institutions of ‘chosen trauma’ and ‘collective memory.’ How now can Chinese seek hybridity aside from the historical construction of anti-Chinese sentiment that continually distances assimilation, integration, and accommodation? Can Chinese populations legitimately express themselves through an assortment of combinations? These questions are often diminished as there is (yet) no effective chance for Chinese populations to ably remove the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis from living memory, history, or identity. These events must be re-framed into order to initiate a structural change that re-considers the authenticity and *pribumi*-esque features of Chinese populations. Even so, the possibility of restructuring in such a radical shift does not seem likely.

Security apparatuses, then, become networks of maintaining cultural identities that can be viewed as ‘cultural compromises’ by strategically adapting to the variability of socio-political dynamics. Apparatuses can serve as a balance towards exhibiting Chinese characteristics while maintaining Indonesian national identity and vice-versa; to

---

legitimately project Indonesian characteristics while remaining well within the
boundaries of the Chinese ethnic population. This idea comes from the notion that there
are organic and mechanical components to racism that are fundamental within every
society but diverge from contrasting perceptions to regard different heuristic mechanisms
from grounding these characterizations. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic explain that
the structural and material determinants of society are intersectional in every aspect at the
dictation of majoritarian social self-interest, and are illustrated to highlight the
intrusiveness of foreign populations for the delegitimization of one group over the other.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr. contends that subordination in this manner manifests as an ‘interest
convergence dilemma’ in which the majority ensures that the minority is unable to realize
any possibility of upward mobility based on mechanics of ‘Othering.’ Mechanical and
organic in nature, the social structure depends on utilizing material determinants to shape
the unfortunate outlook of minority groups and implant structural nodes for ensuring
mechanics work in prolonged favor; whereas in the contrary, the “superior societal
status” of the majority is “[threatened]” by the very existence of the
minority/marginalized possibly attaining a higher position.

Considering the Komnas Perempuan study of Chinese-directed violence in the
eruption of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, reconciliation and reparation efforts are
suppressed in favor of negating wrongs-done in the denial of any actions may have been

99 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, “Interest Convergence, Material Determinism, and Racial Realism,”
100 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., “Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma,” eds.
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, Critical Race Theory: The Key
wrongly committed in response to the economic situation. Ethnic/racial characteristics cannot be considered as a threatening, monolithic ‘essence’ to the socio-political landscape, but as an “unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social meaning” derived from cultural-exceptionalism, community identity, ethnic history, and collective memory.101

The eruption of violence is impossible to simplify (as well as unethical), regardless of which groups are involved, especially when configuring an ethnic component as sole reasoning in this genocidal episode. These dynamics are structurally rooted in society which dredge the underbelly of the socio-political landscape with manifestations of systemic racism. One narrative cannot be disregarded for a better sounding one through the hope that empathy—empathy based on the confusion or tense relations of the majority—will resound throughout social conscience. This is fallacious and misguided.102

Richard Thompson Ford states it best:

Even in the absence of racism, then, race-neutral policy could be expected to entrench segregation and socioeconomic stratification in a society with a history of racism. Political space plays a central role in this process. Spatially and racially defined communities perform the “work” of segregation silently. There is no racist actor or racist policy in this model, and yet a racially stratified society is the inevitable result. Although political space seems to be the inert context in which individuals make rational choices, it is in fact a controlling structure in which seemingly innocuous actions lead to racially detrimental consequences.103

102 Delgado and Stefancic: 33-35.
Critically considering race and the material, structural determinants that shape socio-political dynamics require minority populations to adapt according to the ebb-and-flow of how they are perceived. Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets premise that the “internalized positional designation” of a person determines the vitality of action in reaction to these dynamics. Reflexive behavior, positionality politics, and social recognition of individual and socio-political dynamics (at-large) are responsible for changing perceptions in l’air du temps.\textsuperscript{104, 105}

Standard heuristics of how Chinese populations perceive and are perceived cannot be cemented. Communities and institutions have framework for applying countering prescriptions to anti-Chinese sentiment. Identities shift continuously based on these perception differentiations and dynamics in functionalities. Even as society ebbs-and-flows based on l’air du temps, the pinnacles of what constitutes Indonesian-ness and Chinese-ness cannot be justly compared as there is no distinctive means to solidify the constitutions of either entity.\textsuperscript{106} Only loose negotiations can substantiate the definitions of either, in which both are intersectional with the other.\textsuperscript{107} The l’air du temps, or ecology, acts as the standard for adjustment and/or adaptation (for both entities), which is


\textsuperscript{106} Burke and Stets: 130-154, 175-196.

diplomatically embodied in how society and communities want to shift perceptions of norms, patterns, and expectations.\textsuperscript{108, 109, 110, 111}

Therein, institutions must serve in a community-based, ethnically-influenced network to adjust/adapt to economic changes; strategically determining entities that dictate function and interaction between Chinese groups and Indonesian groups. Constructing policy platforms through this lens are necessary to maintain to provide a rational, stable entity in which multiple groups can seek support and guidance for transitioning from one function to another in \textit{l’air du temps}.\textsuperscript{112, 113} While institutions can provide a stable support structure, the coinciding invariability of alleging policy-making decisions based off \textit{l’air du temps} questions the validity of institutions apart from an allegiance to material determinism independent from itself. Institutions could then be

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{109} Carter’s study indicates the moral capacity of shifting identities between categories (additionally based on ecological effects). This study does not analyze the moral effects of group change between ethnic-Chinese and Indonesian groupings, but I contend that this study would extend the workings of this thesis into the consideration of social ethics of attributing one identity versus the other within various situations (disregarding ecology).
\textsuperscript{110} I cannot fully consider the role of these three theories without acknowledging the importance of Positioning Theory as an entirely comprehensible factor into the holistic regard of social and communitarian construction. Legitimacy into the ‘chess-play’ of an individual or group emphasizes the entire enactment of social issues and norms through behaviorism, and the perspectives that are brought into play. If by dynamism and post-structuralist argumentation, the positions by which ethnic-Chinese are granted/allowed and per chance opportunistically employed, cognitive dissonance contributes to the overall probability of manifesting one decision versus another. Within these liquidated ‘chess-play’ movements, the possibility of constructing a methodology by which behaviorism, interest convergence, and self-verification strays from crystallized expectations and results in the individualist components of shifting identity category according to needs, interests, and positions—therein establishing an individualistic set of possibility. (See: Thomas Duus Henriksen, “Liquidating Roles and Crystallising Positions: Investigating the Road Between Role and Positioning Theory”, eds. Fathali M. Moghaddam, Rom Harré, and Naomi Lee, \textit{Global Conflict Resolution Through Positioning Analysis} (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC., 2008): 41-64.)
\textsuperscript{111} B. J. Biddle, “Recent Developments in Role Theory,” \textit{Annual Review of Sociology} 12 (1986): 69.
\textsuperscript{112} Biddle, 74.
\end{flushleft}
considered as viable contributors to the marginalization of groups, inhibiting plausible functionality for improving and securing livelihoods. However, this possibility is mitigated even given the considerable and formidable efforts put forth to reduce marginalization from happening to these groups. Yet, institutions are often questioned to ascertain culpability according to the authority of these institutions that represent functions, positions, and interests as these entities represent the foundational nodes to communities.

The positional approach for institutions to consider the functions, positions, and interests for effective representation must adhere to the following by Campos and Lima: whether groups share a common field of knowledge regarding Indonesian society and adjust policy platforms to the *Pancasila*. They must evaluate judgement over positionality according to both in-group and out-group variability regarding behavior, positionality politics, and social recognition in respect to interest convergence. Furthermore, they must dictate whether these reflexive policies are essential towards securing the livelihood of the community.\(^\text{114}\) Social representation contains “[organizational] principles of individual positions”\(^\text{115}\) that contend to the distributions of economic, socio-cultural, and symbolic capitals. The difficulty in distributing these capitals anchors incessant processes of trying to identify with numerous categories that indirectly affect the policy platform of the institutions. Dynamics, capitals, and identities essentialize the impossibility of effectively ascertaining adjustment/adaptation to

---


\(^{115}\) Ibid. 40.
converge with l’air du temps, and therefore cannot secure a holistic narrative for livelihood. This is the crux of minority populations as both institutional representatives and represented communities are culpable to the material determinants that reflect individualistic dynamics for perceiving Chinese-ness in society. The process is cyclically toxic yet prescriptive to the notions of group, communitarian, and institutional aspirations.

Despite these dynamics, the gravity of combining institutional structures with cultural symbolism secures an appreciative inquiry into the complexities of the Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, religious-institutionalism and security apparatuses. These are pillars that must be both static and fluid accounting for the facets of culture, identity, history, and memory.\footnote{Colin Hay, “Good in a Crisis: The Ontological Institutionalism of Social Constructivism,” New Political Economy 21, no. 6 (2016): 521-522.} Ensuring security is the raison d’être of institutional Chinese-ness in addressing these institutional necessities while ensuring that necessity maintains an isomorphic character. Institutional health must continually re-consider dogmatic approaches to socio-political dynamics rather than imposing static livelihoods. This inductive approach traces culture, identity, history, and collective memory as a political anthropological pillar for institutional action and change by rejecting dispositions for institution-to-community equilibrium.\footnote{Ibid. 526.}

On the contrary, religious institutions cannot automatically afford a secured policy platform through this process. The adjustments/adaptations much be considered prescriptive rather than culpably coercive to utilize habitus as a heuristic for dealing with
the social Other. Yet, a religious-institutional heuristic must be stable in nature unaffected by *l'air du temps*.118 This stable, prescriptive heuristic is unique given the affordability of Chinese characteristics as automatically assumed to be part-and-parcel to the recognition of religious systems, *e.g.* Chinese variations of Buddhism and Confucianism (and the determinants in Daoism). Unfortunately, ideal heuristic structure cannot account for the public assertions of religious-cultural affinities within the *habitus* heuristic that can appreciate Chinese-ness.119 The heuristic must act apart from characteristics part-and-parcel to the religious systems to account for non-Chinese ethnic groups within the community. This allows a ‘grandfathering’ of the religious system to shift into an establishmentarian node for religious recognition. However, in this light, institutions do represent the “cutting edge of translation and negotiation” through an evolution to gradually socialize, normalize, and influence asymmetrical dynamics within critical junctures to confine the interest convergence dilemma.120, 121

While each institution and community are unique to individual interpretations of *l’air du temps* and the *Pancasila*, institutions must also maintain a pillar of institutional representation in accordance to *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (the *Pancasila* doctrine of the belief in one supreme religious entity). The penetration of ‘improper [sacrificial] entities’


119 Divergence is also necessary within the isomorphic distribution of institutional capitals. Securing *both* interest convergence and capital divergence allows the institution to fluctuate the standard heuristic into a shifting set of guidelines.


is translated into the socio-religious landscape, especially as majority Chinese populations are predisposed to Indonesian perceptions of socio-religious interaction. Iem Brown and Bunki Kimura explain the integration of ‘improper sacrificial entities’ through a Buddhist historiographical lens that utilizes a sacred-secularist integration, bypassing (in a sense) the requirement to abide and appease the monotheistic ideal of *Pancasila.*¹²²,¹²³ The story of Bhikkhu Ashin Jinarakkhita and the socio-religious movement for establishing an ‘Indonesianized’ Buddhism through Javanese Buddhist canon *San Hyang Kamahāyānīkan*¹²⁴ derives an indigenous interpretation to *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* and Javanese-Buddhist lineage, thus naturally abiding by the *Pancasila* through Buddhist interpretations of divinity and a supreme being.

Buddhist integration in a sacred-secularist lens allows for religious institutions and communities to adjust/adapt from a *Pancasila* interpretation. In so doing, contribution to social function is expanded in alternative means for solidifying various routes for integrating Chinese-ness into Indonesian-ness via religion. Buddhism is not unique to this integration, as each recognized religion (particularly Confucianism, in establishing *Nabi* as a supreme divine entity, whereas *Nabi* is merely a singular prophet and not a divine entity) maintains various majority Chinese congregations that integrate

Chinese characteristics. Yet, while this conclusion supports the fundamental aspect of Chinese characteristics within the socio-religious sphere, the masalah Cina continues to constrain these attempts. Indonesian societal-exceptionalism establishes and recognizes religions and must remain so for Chinese-dominated congregations to consider recognition as a means of establishing Chinese identity. The role of religious institutions must pertain to the l’air du temps and dictation of function and must reflect these platforms in response to protect Indonesian-ness from Chinese characteristics.

In conclusion to this discussion, institutions must take on two roles: (1) to represent the culture, identity, history, and memory of the populations that comprise its populace; and (2) to reflect the constraints of social engineering to dictate policy over their directed population. Yet, these institutions are specifically constructed on the utility of Indonesian recognition for the integration and security of Chinese characteristics. The process of adjusting/adapting to l’air du temps is a challenge as the fragile dynamics of institutional livelihood causes social chasms to affect the policy-making process. Institutions balance on a fulcrum that shifts ever-so-slightly to socio-political movement regarding perceptions of Chinese populations, which can shift at a moment’s notice. Even as institutions exist within this fragile state, the ability of institutions to foment a sense of security depends on the communities and populations that comprise congregations; wherein, religious institutions must diplomatically engage in a loosely organized

---

structure of securing Chinese-ness. However, this juxtaposition leaves institutions and their communities struggling for survival, determining whether to remain isomorphic or ontological regarding l’air du temps or not.

In the next chapters, I will discuss the various security apparatuses in reflection of collective memory to the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, and how these two events significantly exacerbated the socio-religious landscape. In these respects: culture, identity, history, and memory can be used as mechanisms for establishing both physical and policy security measures to ensure the livelihoods of Chinese communities. Through numerous interviews from individuals and groups within Buddhist, Catholic, Confucian, Daoist, Islamic, and Protestant systems (among additional individuals for contextual references), I will construct the basis of a modern-day Chinese-Indonesians from a security lens to justifiably frame causality for the ‘Chinese Question’.

Chapter 2 will describe the ‘Tridharma,’ a unique sacred-secular trifecta of Chinese religions (Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism) and the incorporation of cultural affinities (specific to each religious system) in combination to construct a socio-religious pillar for Chinese communitarianism. Chapter 3 will present the Catholic and Protestant security divergences through theological and community-security lenses that consider the varying outlooks of opportunity for the long-term existence of these two religious camps. Further, Chapter 3 will also analyze the Muslim-Chinese group Persatuan Islam Chinese Indonesia (Chinese Islamic Association of Indonesia) and its significance ‘double-minority’ identity that both affiliates and ostracizes the group from both Chinese and Islamic camps. Both Christian and Islamic camps surround notions of
emptiness, as discussed in Chapter 1, but will diverge from the ethnically-exclusive/religious-inclusive (and vice-versa) component into religious liberty and ethnic condemnation. Finally, I will present the utility of inter-faith dialogue as a modern socio-political movement as a counter culture to the long-standing institution of anti-Chinese sentiment; triggering both successes and failures in consideration of opportunities and the future.
This chapter will consider the combination of the three characteristically Chinese religions (Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism) and the institutionalization of these systems into one religious complex, Tridharma (three teachings). These systems focus ethnic/racial aspects to the construction of communitarian systems and establish religious institutions that adhere/cater to cultural-exceptionalism, community identity, ethnic history, and collective memory as priority considerations. Further, Tridharma institutions seek to foment a wary appreciation of Chinese ethnic history, especially in the sense of considering the fundamental pillars and publicization within the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis; settling security in the sense of fulfilling moral responsibilities to obtain trust, justice, and recovery.\textsuperscript{126} In so doing, Tridharma religious institutions consent towards reconstructing identity for the “foreign oriental,” the abject, and secure the characteristics of Chinese-ness within governmentally sanctioned boundaries to ensure their livelihoods.

Before continuing, it is important to acknowledge the gravity that Komnas Perempuan indirectly asserts for requiring a reconstruction of Chinese identity through the institution of collective memory. While true numbers accounting for the violence in

\textsuperscript{126} Komnas Perempuan, ix.
1965 and 1997-1998 will never be fully known, the depravity of accounting for these numbers does not disenfranchise the possibility for a reconstruction of Chinese identity but recognizes that the losses unaccounted for contribute to the larger social picture that there is an utter lack of social interest for restorative justice in response to societal-exceptionalism, and diminishing the socio-normative consideration for administering violence as a form of Indonesian social identity. This denial of social participation in the 1965 and 1997-1998 events commits governmental officials to plausibly deny accusations that anti-Chinese sentiment was used as a means of mechanizing violence over the Chinese ethnic population, wherein violence could not be identified as a socio-normative pillar in Indonesian social identity. Marginalized groups are then considered as victims of the ‘fog of war,’ in which the violence is neither considered instrumental towards societal-exceptionalism nor diminutive of Chinese cultural-exceptionalism. If Chinese seek accountability for these atrocities, then they would have to claim Indonesian societal identities, as *citizens*, which could legitimize the Chinese desire to be considered Indonesian through either accommodation or integration processes. On the other hand, by seeking accountability for 1965 and 1997-1998, Chinese populations could be identified as an already assimilated group, therein retracting the legitimacy of accusing socio-governmentally directed violence towards ‘ethnically targeted...
populations,’ and dismissing the violence as ambiguous factuality. Victims have no recourse but to resign themselves as victims of ‘self-inflicted’ trauma.127, 128, 129

Counter arguments mechanize a system for continual silence (from both groups) that secures the dichotomous relationship between the majority population and minority groups. Even as there is an alleged institutional socio-governmental pillar of anti-Chinese sentiment, structural violence restricts minority populations to adhere to ascribed identities. There is no course to attain Indonesian identity. On the contrary, religious institutions provide means for navigating through socio-governmental anti-Chinese sentiment through government approval. Ethnic solidarity among religious institutions initializes mechanisms for minority groups to establish security apparatuses for protecting cultural-exceptionalism and symbolic interactions via ethnic-exclusivity, an ability that is foregone amid majoritarian society.130, 131

Yet, institutions that commit to ethnic-exclusivity as a form of alternative resilience to the majoritarian idea of Indonesian monoculturalism or societal-exceptionalism risk the endangerment of exponentially ostracizing congregations, i.e. employment opportunity in Chinese-owned conglomerations, or participating in religious

131 The difficulty in substantiating a claim to represent victims through distancing trauma in narrative—to draw a degree of factuality to the account—is to remove the didactic ulterior motive behind the work and to report the trauma through alternative means of accounting perpetrator over victim. (See: Leslie Dwyer, “A Politics of Silences: Violence, Memory, and Treacherous Speech in Post-1965 Bali,” eds. Alex Hinton and Kevin O’Neill, Genocide, Truth, Memory and Representation: Anthropological Approaches (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009): 113-146).
ceremonies based on ethnic characteristics/identification. While these exclusive mechanics are demonstrative to Chinese advancement, resultative effects for establishing a formidable anti-Indonesian workforce is interpreted in no positive fashion. This paradigmatic juxtaposition for societal appreciations of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika exhibits a gradual divergence to succumb to the ideas of societal-exceptionality amid a stressed socio-religious landscape. Institutions (regardless of specificity, exclusivity, etc.) desire to achieve the ideals of the Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika but are driven from realizing these from socio-normative mechanisms for structural violence. Dicky Sofjan attributes this concurrent divergence as an effect of ‘minoritization,’ a process that essentializes the need for the majority society to categorize/classify minority groups to appeal to self-interests. Considerably re-evaluating the majority identity at risk, minority groups concurrently anti-essentialize the social requirement for an assimilationist/integrationist politic, wherein institutions remain separate from the societal-exceptionalism ideal.132

This juxtaposition further exacerbates masalah Cina amid the ‘Chinese Question’ perspective from institutional anti-essentialization of majoritarian social ideals and segregates Chinese cultural-exceptionalism into a different social category, therein establishing a sense of a hierarchy that devalues the exceptionality of Indonesian society—an impossibility for society to consider! Neither consideration publicly stipulates that the Other group adheres to contrary politics, but demands that security be fully considered when institutionalizing a differential approach towards societal-

exceptionalism and the *Pancasila*. The problem for Chinese populations is a security question, especially through solidifying a significant cultural appeal to adhere to social requirements and customs while maintaining a lesser albeit important Indonesian social identity. If, indeed, Confucian characteristics are incompatible with Indonesian structure, then there is no clear means of ascertaining distinctive identities between community and society; intertwining the two represents the ‘in-between-ness of the displaced,’ and fixes Chinese identity in a fluid state that is both Chinese-Indonesian and abjectly neither. Mechanizing both identities to fit with a less-than-satisfactorily socio-communitarian relationship contorts comprehending legitimacy and misidentifies social category from either group.

*Tridharma* institutions provide Chinese populations with a governmentally sanctioned establishment that brings three characteristically different religions into one institution; whereby varying religious and cultural symbolic interactions converge together by antiquating commonalities. The point of establishing a ‘three teachings’ dynamic removes the institutional need to ascertain protection for one but for an entire ethnic group that (by the majority) identifies with one of these religious systems. Distinguishing each system is no longer a process of identification to systems in approach to provision and access, but the best means for regulating systems that appeal to an ethnic protectionist scheme while utilizing the various characteristics that make-up each system to propagate this protectionist agenda.

Amid *totok* and *peranakan* camps in the Chinese ethnic population, Andreas Susanto claims that there is no distinctive differentiation among modern-day camps, but
rather synonymizes generational practices and trends to each group. Totok may no longer truly exist within the ethnic population as these distinctions have become too fluid, and ethnic characteristics are lost through protectionist strategies (e.g. intermarriage). However, cultural adherence to separate group identities obfuscates the totality and solidarity between totok and peranakan insomuch that the definition of authentic Chinese-ness has become an abstract concept that cannot be comprehended by younger generations. Although there are assertions that some groups are totok, this creates an abstract hierarchy that is utilized to legitimize and position the authenticity between camps despite the lack of evidence to prove whether one camp is totok or peranakan. Among these groups, religious organizations debate over the best methods to establish policies that adhere to totok traditions or succumb to the ‘improper [sacrificial] entities’ of peranakan. This consideration takes priority regarding the evolution of Confucian or Buddhist adherence to Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika amid socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment. Two organizational entities (MATAKIN and WALUBI, respectively) attribute traditional Confucian and Buddhist characteristics while implementing specific Chinese contributions to the fold (whereby the necessity of establishing policy is not a directive of mandating dogma but rather the dynamics of Chinese ‘mutations’ to dogmatic principles), and how these contributions can affect Chinese populations. Characteristics become key to the establishmentarianism in recognizing religious systems, but these can only be implemented in communal constructs (absent in socio-governmental recognition).
Chinese contributions to religious-cultural institutional constructs are specifically implemented to adhere to the histories of each system and how religious organizations maintain compliance to societal interest convergences; whether MATAKIN can establish itself as an organization that does not primarily ascribe to Chinese heritage but can resolve tensions through inclusivity; or whether WALUBI can diminish a characteristically Chinese branch through universalist inclusivity. Nonetheless, local communities can combine religious establishments into one *klenteng*, the name given to *Tridharma* institutions that are characteristically Chinese and can prescribe varying policy recommendations to the institution that is uniquely individual while remaining strictly adherent to the system of choice (this is not an immovable facet for individuals though, whereas Confucians may also observe Buddhist and/or Daoist practices and vice-versa, and so forth). These dynamics do not alienate different Chinese religious groups but act as a conduit for mechanizing *Tridharma* as a means of congregating Chinese ethnic populations under one sustainable, sanctioned roof.

The consideration for securing ethnic identity within differential religious identities serves to be the most sustainable security apparatus that abides by the *Pancasila* and *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* but is not the only means for securing Chinese identity. Throughout this chapter, the *klenteng* serves as a central institution and serves the most practical benefit to ethnically-exclusive Chinese populations, but also Buddhist (*vīhara*) and Confucian (*lithang*) institutions provide meaningful aspects to security apparatuses through religious adherence and community development, respectively. It is interesting to note these differences and how each institution can work in collaboration
with the Other religious system/institution, and how these developments mechanize different dynamics that nurture institutional ecological health.

To begin this discussion, I will present the most prevalent klenteng in Yogyakarta, *Tempat Ibadah Tridharma Kwan Tee Kiong* (*Kwan Tee Kiong*), which acts as a centerpiece to the historical *wijkenstelsel* that continues to act as a prominent cultural establishment within the modern *pecinan*. *Kwan Tee Kiong* represents two nodes of Chinese history in the *pecinan*: (1) the integration of differential religious systems as a means of securing a community-wide apparatus that sustained physical and religious protection, and (2) acts as a pillar for Chinese identity in Yogyakarta due to its inclusivity policy for methods of protectionism. While the origination of the *klenteng* prescribed an adherence to the three religions (originally *Sam Kauw Hwee*, 1934), the practice of including Confucian members (1967) and Buddhist members (1984) demonstrates the gradual growing need of expanding communitarian protectionism to include the ethnic populations at-large. Yet, even as the Sultanate of Yogyakarta provides a historical ‘tolerant’ environment for its multitude of ethnic peoples, the comfortable ideal of a Sultanate ‘umbrella’ of protection does not equate a societal consideration under the same course.

Why should the *klenteng* initially seek to establish itself as an inclusive, *Tridharma* (or *Sam Kauw Hwee*) institution when socio-governmental normativity already considered Buddhism and Confucianism as official religions? *Sam Kauw Hwee* initially appealed to the interests of the surrounding *wijkenstelsel/pecinan*, and therein established itself as an inclusive entity that appealed to the larger Chinese ethnic
community but altogether promoted itself as a Daoist institution. This history is only conveyed as a necessity to adhere to the interests of the community itself aside from any politico-religious dynamics that were taking place during the rise of Chinese trans-nationalism and proto-Indonesian nationalism. Yet, while taking this shift into consideration, the prominence of establishing Sam Kauw Hwee as a religious center capitalized on its existence as a nexus for practicing Chinese culture and identity.

Colonial Indonesia operated within the wijkenstelsel system that conjunctively operated according to a cultuurstelsel structure. The prominence of instituting a Chinese institution symbolized a communitarian adherence to cultural-exceptionalism under the pretense that religions were not recognized or regulated by the indirect-rule structure of Dutch/Javanese administrative personnel.

By 1923, totok and peranakan groups debated dogmatic principles laid out by canonical Confucian texts, such as the Soe Sie and Hauw King, and whether these texts constituted a legitimate organizational initiative to establish Confucianism as either a religious or cultural entity (by which religious or socio-cultural rules could implement policy for congregations). THHK set guidelines for the future institutionalization among communities, especially regarding debate in Yogyakarta, in which initiatives required adherence to Indonesian national philosophy. Chinese cultural-exceptionalism within the trans-nationalism lens also abided by proto-Indonesian nationalistic trends that rectified the ‘improper [sacrificial] entities’ towards the maintenance of canonical dogmatic applications. Yet, even as organizational forces advocated for either totok- or peranakan-influenced dynamics, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono VII of Yogyakarta issued a unilateral
decision to include peranakan-descended texts to resolve the debate. These texts were meant to appease both Chinese and Indonesian nationalist camps by considering both traditional (totok) and Javanese-influence (peranakan) scripts to be both “correct and proper.”

By 1934, the rise of Chinese trans-nationalism continued to spread throughout Java as (then) Chinese republican Dr. Sun Yat-sen sought to uproot Dutch colonialism and proto-Indonesian nationalism in efforts for the construction of a Chinese wave for solidarity—not as a revolutionary cause against states, but as a movement for recognizing a Chinese cultural, national, and republican ideal within his Three Principles platform (democracy, nationalism, and livelihood). Even as numerous organizations established themselves as news outlets, publishing companies, emerging businesses, and educational institutions, a concurrent push for establishing Confucianism as an official system capitalized on trans-nationalism. The purpose of pushing for Confucianism alongside Chinese trans-nationalism was two-fold: (1) to signify that Chinese cultural-exceptionalism maintained an important part to the social construct, and (2) to symbolize the evolution of Chinese culture to adhere to the Pancasila through an Indonesianization initiative (via Javanese-influenced characteristics in Confucian principles).

The second aspect to Confucian recognition is especially interesting as the consideration for a singular cosmic identity is not found with traditional canon. However, the unilateral decision made by Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono VII of Yogyakarta initiated

---

134 See: Julie Lee Wei, Ramon Hawley Myers, and Donald G. Gillin, Prescriptions for Saving China: Selected Writing of Sun Yat-sen (Stanford: Hoover Institutional Press, 1994).
a substantial contribution of peranakan influences to dogma, wherein these groups adhered to Pancasila doctrine by acknowledging Thian (also known as Thi Kong or Toehan Allah) to be a manifestation of individuals long-passed who have traveled to the sacred divine realm. These individuals comprise a cosmic entity, through which Nabi represents the Great Prophet, and turned his teachings into law and order to adhere to the required sanctimoniousness, harmoniousness, and filial piety characteristic of Confucianism. This consideration of a cosmic entity (a being comprised of numerous individuals) complies with the Pancasila doctrine of upholding the belief in one supreme being. However, the bastardization to ‘secularize’ traditional Confucianism to meet evolutionary religiosity in compliance to Indonesianization derives heated debate over the legitimate consideration of Confucianism as an actual religious system or as a conglomeration of social regulations.  

Nonetheless, the concern for justifying a legitimate cosmic entity is not the point of this discussion. Thian or Toehan Allah plays an important aspect into the constitution of lithang and k lenteng as these establishments maintain that sanctimoniousness, harmoniousness, and filial piety represent “the soul of the Chinese nation” as a mechanism to withstand the “pressure from above and [form the] possibility of resistance to [an] unequal power relationship that appear[s] as [a] societal convention[.]” Evi Sutrisno argues that the legitimacy of Confucians does not revolve around the adherence to a cosmic entity, but substantiates the survivability of the Chinese

---

ethic population around a religious and/or philosophical system that provides an Indonesianized aspect to an otherwise “improper [sacrificial] entity” to societal-exceptionalism. Chinese trans-nationalism, then, became a system of local confrontation to Indonesian structural violence for change via a “religious rationalization”\textsuperscript{137} agenda by shifting the Othered perception of Chinese populations into an evolving Chinese-Indonesian sub-group.\textsuperscript{138}

From these understandings, Daoism and Confucianism are two religious/philosophical systems that characterize the heart of the Chinese nation. Kwan Tee Kiong manifested as a cultural entity for allowing like-minded Chinese individuals and groups to coalesce a sense of religious-cultural solidarity within the wijkenstelsel. In my discussions with the administrator at Kwan Tee Kiong, the establishment was relatively peaceful throughout the wave of Chinese trans-nationalism as the Sultanate of Yogyakarta maintained its stance on pluralism, tolerance, and protection for all ethnic groups underneath its “umbrella.” Furthermore, as Daoism represented a cultural symbol rather than a religious system, establishments that publicly practiced religious customs experienced little-to-no structural violence apart from general considerations for Chinese populations.

The accession of Pak Suharto and the ‘1965 Affair’ ignited tensions between the movements for Chinese trans-nationalism, Maoist communism, and the alleged

\textsuperscript{137} “Religious rationalization” is an interesting take on Indonesianization insomuch that that Lie Kim Hok’s Hikajat Khonghoetjoe dispenses the idea of a civilian that lives by moral politics—a body politic that establishes filial piety as the primary component to considering adjustments for \textit{l’air du temps} and utilizing this concept as a catalyst for explaining Chinese existence and function inside an anti-Chinese society.

\textsuperscript{138} Coppel, 195.
affiliations between Chinese individuals and the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; PKI). Truly, the allegations arguing for an ‘ethnically-targeted population’ during the ‘1965 Affair’ cannot be substantiated, just as Susanto, Robert Cribb and Charles A. Coppel, and Mark Woodward suggest insomuch that Yogyakarta Chinese populations suffered only through societal perceptions rather than affiliations and the resulting violence like so many of their population.\(^{139}\) Even so, the wariness of Chinese populations did not retreat in the face of protecting their own ethnic community.

In response to the ‘1965 Affair’ and the eventual implementation of Presidential Decision No. 240/1967 and Presidential Instruction No.14/1967, the disestablishment of Confucianism and Chinese public practices throughout society were quelled in the name of substantiating Indonesian societal-exceptionalism aside from the “foreign oriental.” The Decision and Instruction represent the reductionist node of societal-exceptionalism among the *Pak Suharto* body politic through the lens of constructing a well-controlled environment for the reconstruction of a post-*Bung Karno* NASAKOM society.

The important factor of a post-*Bung Karno* NASAKOM society reconstructs identity and outlook into a methodology that equips socio-governmental normalization over marginalized minority groups that do not necessarily agree with the body politic of a *Pak Suharto* platform. The supposed lack of violence towards an ‘ethnically-targeted population’ stands as an indicator to the substantiality of Chinese populations seeking security apparatuses. Socio-political unease translates directly to psychological, physical, and emotional harm even to populations that did not directly experience any directed

\(^{139}\) Cribb and Coppel: 451, 460.
violence towards themselves. However, masalah Cina and the ‘Chinese Question’ transcend notions of direct violence in consideration to the fragility and instability of state-enforced policies regarding an external Other (an obstacle experienced by all groups during the ‘1965 Affair’)—establishing triumphalist rhetoric over the alleged victim for affirmation of state-enforced policies.\(^{140}\)

In response to the ‘1965 Affair’ and the ensuing tensions between Chinese populations and the growing anti-Chinese sentiment that was therein legitimized by the Pak Suharto body politic (and furthered by the 1967 limitations to land ownership implemented by the Vice Governor of Yogyakarta in 1975, and the dissolution of MATAKIN in 1979),\(^ {141}\) Kwan Tee Kiong opened its doors to allow persecuted Confucians to assemble under the guise of a Daoist organization. This is an incredibly significant moment in the platform for Kwan Tee Kiong through its evolutionary institutionalism for securing a religious identity of Confucianism alongside a cultural identity in Daoism (again, Daoism has never been recognized as an official religion, and thus must be exhibited as a cultural icon rather than a religious system). Whereas the institutionalization of Kwan Tee Kiong existing as a mere cultural icon for the minority Dao-Chinese community expanded exponentially by the sheltering Confucian community.

The very act of opening doors to Confucians is a reaction to the increasing amount of violence allegedly directed towards a specific ethnic group. Despite the

---

\(^{140}\) Woodward, 46.
\(^{141}\) Suryadinata, 81.
factuality of ethnically-directed violence, the ambiguous factuality that dominates religious-institutional and communitarian rhetoric penetrates the communitarian mind through a reflection of miasmic threat and fear. If the Chinese ethnic community is limited in terms of function and participation via threats and fear, then the consideration of establishing an alternative social construct substantiates protectionist policies for the survival of the ethnic identity. Therein, the security apparatus is fueled by the logic of living in fear and under threats.

By combining Daoism and Confucianism into one institution, the promotion of this institutional complex is limited only by the exigencies for l’air du temps dictate Chinese populations to gravitate towards their own communities. What dynamics shift these establishments for security apparatuses? These socio-political ‘boundaries’ indicate a crossroads to Daoist and Confucian members: if these members attend Kwan Tee Kiong out of necessary protection measures by operating behind closed doors that are governmentally sanctioned, the very observance to religious practices (albeit lawful) increase the likelihood of violence from the basis of an increased rate in attendance to Chinese cultural icons. The negative effects of Chinese trans-nationalism continue to harbor anti-Chinese sentiment within most of society despite the ‘boundaries’ that society has placed on the minority. Operating under guises in recognition of sanctioned observances does not diminish the likelihood of experiencing violence regardless of functionality. Nonetheless, Daoist and Confucian populations have mechanically utilized the imperatives of fear and threats as means of solidifying cultural-exceptionalism
through a combined religious-cultural lens. Protection to observe religious-cultural secures the ability to recognize ethnic solidarity via religion and culture.

This paradox of institutionalizing threat and fear through a self-inflicted degradation via ethnic solidarity indicates that Chinese culture grows in strength but deteriorates the communitarian-psyche by the promotion that it seeks to consider itself as a strength. By asserting ethnic solidarity through religious-cultural means, most of the society can utilize this institutional evolution as a means of concentrating anti-Chinese sentiment, therein dismantling fragile security apparatuses that are infantile, loosely organized, or even renegotiated. This does not condemn the establishment of security apparatuses, however. Other means can strengthen promotions for ethnic solidarity via inclusivity of different religions or ethnic groups.

During the same period as MATAKIN dissolution, Kwan Tee Kiong also opened its doors to allow Buddhists to observe and practice religious customs. This, among a nation-wide establishment of Tridharma as the official “three religion organization,” supplanted an institutional consideration for Buddhist-Chinese to practice both religion and culture within Tridharma. While the establishment of Kwan Tee Kiong originated as Sam Kauw Hwee (formerly not including Buddhism), the consideration for allowing non-Chinese Buddhists within its walls was only under a cultural pretense for which Daoism occupied the primary religious-cultural position. Only under discrimination, structural violence, and ethnically-targeted violence were Buddhists readily accepted (and readily sought) at Kwan Tee Kiong as a religious-cultural institution for which both aspects of the Chinese population could be adhered to.
By 1979, *Perwakilan Umat Buddha Indonesia* (Indonesian Buddhist General Organization; WALUBI) was established as the leading Buddhist organization that had branched into seven Buddhist schools: Indonesian Buddhism, *Buddhayana*; contiguous Southeast Asian Buddhism, *Theravāda*; mainland Chinese Buddhism, *Mahāyāna*; and *Kasogatan* (which consists of three smaller branches: Taiwanese Buddhism, *Maitreya*; Japanese Buddhism, *Nichiren*; and a small sect of Javanese Buddhism); and *Tridharma*. Of these seven, *Tridharma* and *Buddhayana* Buddhism surfaced as the majority two schools for which the system evolved to incorporate *Pancasila* doctrine (apart from simultaneous debate whether to forward differential aspects of each school to appeal to the larger demographic or socio-political leanings). *Tridharma* had previously established itself as a Buddhist entity while primarily appealing to Chinese populations that also shared the characteristics to *Mahāyāna* Buddhism (from mainland China) (and possibly *Maitreya* Buddhism from Taiwan). The incorporation of *Buddhayana* Buddhism stands as a unique facet to the establishment of WALUBI insomuch that the school maintains an unorthodox construction of a cosmic entity specifically in response to the *Pancasila*.

In short, the story of Bhikkhu Ashin Jinarakkhita Mahasthavira (Ashin Jinarakkhita) considers the integration of Buddhist doctrine to be inconceivable without the consideration of a cosmic entity that attributed the rightful divinity for conceiving the Buddha. These ‘improper’ considerations for a divine entity directly contrasts with dogmatic principles of Buddhism (whereas the consideration of a cosmic being negates the eventuality of achieving Buddha-like qualities or attaining nirvana). However, the development of Indonesian societal-exceptionalism and proto-nationalism dynamically
contributes to the co-construction of a *Buddhayana* Buddhist lens in consideration for *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* that is assuredly Indonesian. During the early 1950s, Ashin Jinarakkhita adhered to the socio-political belief that *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* also applied to Buddhist canon being that the integration of differential schools of thought were part-and-parcel to the journey of a Buddhist; “This is Indonesian Buddhism. We need not be limited to accepting only the doctrine and practice of any particular sect and denomination.”\(^{142}\) Whereas specifics of *Mahāyāna* Buddhism contribute to the dogmatic principles, and characteristics of *Buddhayana* Buddhism fundamentally construct an individually significant system (but not separate) for Indonesians. However, Brown stipulates that the constitutionality of *Buddhayana* Buddhism dissolves folk-religious elements and Chinese-influenced characteristics, and to adopt a recognizable version of Buddhism among all *pribumi* and *asli* to justify observance.\(^{143, 144}\) Buddhism is not a Chinese religion, but a universal system based on inclusivity.

However, the consideration of inclusivity among all ethnic groups can also be an impediment for acknowledging and identifying within Buddhist character. Just as Ashin Jinarakkhita taught on the universality and cosmic components to *Buddhayana*, socio-political movements constricted the evolution of religious and/or philosophical systems, whereby the construction of these systems were affected by concurrent constructions of

---


\(^{143}\) Brown: 111.

\(^{144}\) In 1965, a follower of Ashin Jinarakkhiita, Dhammaviriya, published a small book (*Ketuhanan dalam Agama Buddha*) in which he summarized the main points to account for Islamic and Catholic/Protestant understandings, fulfilling the main requirements for government recognition of the religion, and legitimizes *Buddhayana* among other Buddhist sects (Brown, 1987: 112-113).
societal-exceptionalism and the application of Pancasila to various nodes in social functionalism. The introduction of the Ādi Buddha, the conceptual entity derived by the cosmic characterizations of the Buddha, essentializes the necessary foundation for which Pancasila and Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa derive. The belief in “one supreme being” constricts the application of universality and inclusivity from the foundational pillars for Buddhayana, therein Indonesianized Buddhism requires an adherence to the Pancasila and socio-political movements. These considerations are otherwise considered as mystical contributions that Buddhayana Buddhism sought to dissolve. Nevertheless, syncretizing Javanese-Buddhism into Buddhayana Buddhism is meant to adhere to local customs and application for the general populace of Indonesia (therein evolving legalese from Ketuhanan to Tuhan—indicating ‘one-and-the-same’; whereby the introduction of the Ādi Buddha can be perceived as “safety for Buddhism.”

What can we derive from the philosophical changes to MATAKIN and WALUBI in application to Kwan Tee Kiong? If we view the changes in a materialistic structure where various positionalities and interests govern the actions of one group versus the Other, then we can configure a deterministic outcome based on the ‘1965 Affair’ and the surmounting structural violence attributed to Chinese populations vis-à-vis socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment. Ethnic and religious considerations stand as two foundational pillars to institutional identity, especially institutions represent cultural centers in the wijkenstelsel and as a religious hub for the pecinan. Ethnic considerations for the institutional expansive inclusivity approach to other religious groups (within the

---

145 Kimura, 65.
Chinese ethnic population) cannot be considered as a protectionist approach, but as the amalgamation of ethnic groups observing ethnic solidarity under one roof, in which relative protection is a moot point except for a physical ‘battle of numbers.’ Yet, communitarian considerations for the growth of congregations contributes to a relative strengthening in the community fabric, whereas physical protection can account for microcosms of socio-cultural change apart from macrocosm of attribution. Therein, I do not configure a deterministic outcome from ethnic factors alone, albeit considerable in the constitution of such formulations.

On the other hand, philosophical ‘evolutionary’ measures must account for the institutional gravitas for the inclusivity approach. Both MATAKIN and WALUBI approach the *Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* as foundational to the social construct, regardless of individual communitarian dynamics regarding the Chinese ethno-religious sphere. By approaching *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* as a mechanism for enforcing an Indonesian social ideal, the constitutive parts to societal-exceptionalism restrict the ability to establish oneself or one group apart from preconceived notions for what defines Indonesian-ness. *Thian* (or *Toehan Allah*) and Ādi *Buddha* represent an accommodationist approach from Chinese-ness to Indonesian-ness, as neither account for the cultural-exceptionality of Chinese characteristics (Ashin Jinarakkhita even denouncing the contributions of the Chinese in Buddhism!) to adapt to an evolving macro-religious structure for “safety.” Moreover, within the “safety” lens, the introduction of singular cosmic entities goes beyond an accommodationist approach and asserts a group-directed assimilationist approach. Indonesian-ness occupies the
forefront identity for these ethno-religious groups, and thus maintains a protectionist necessity to adopt a new identity for “safety.”

The security of *Kwan Tee Kiong* as an ethno-religious center in the *pecinan* affords the institution with a unique ability to promote religious diversity among a singular ethnic population; further accorded with additional security gives the expansive access to the greater population (especially in geographic proximity from the adjacently-established Jogja Chinese Art and Culture Centre (JCACC)); and provided Sultanate protection. This unique platform is singular in effect and does not provide similar protective boundaries for *Vihara Buddha Prabha (Buddha Prabha)* (colloquially known as *Klenteng Gondomanan*) also located in Yogyakarta, where anti-Chinese sentiment surrounds differential communitarian nodes based upon historical and cultural linkages that are far-and-few-between. Protectionism, as derived from an alternative view-point in Gondomanan, depends on the congregational interpretation of *l'air du temps*.

*Buddha Prabha* was established as a *klenteng* in 1845 to provide cultural and religious services to the Chinese population in the Gondomanan neighborhood (*kampung*), Yogyakarta. While *Buddha Prabha* forwarded a Confucian-leaning platform rather than attributing Daoism as an equally fundamental religious pillar, both religious communities could observe and practice accordingly. However, in this case, Confucian followers sought both religious and cultural affinities, whereas Daoism was considered as merely a religious system; ethno-religious affinities were reversed between *Buddha Prabha* and *Kwan Tee Kiong*. Even as religious-cultural affinities were reversed, this
allowed access for the pre-Confucian inclusion at *Kwan Tee Kiong* to observe Confucian identity at *Buddha Prabha*.

In response to Decision No.240/1967 and Instruction No.14/1967, the widely known *klenteng Gondomanan* quickly changed its name to *Buddha Prabha* in attempts to promote a Buddhist identity that was already recognized by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, rather than an affiliated (or characteristic) Chinese identity. While Woodward argues that Yogyakarta falls under a myth of politicide in physical violence following the wake of the ‘1965 Affair,’ the resulting collective fear from the *alleged* violence (in partial retaliation to the growing linkages between Maoist communism, Chinese transnationalism, and the PKI) *does* account for a formidable line of psychological and emotional trauma from ecological detriment and fragility. Therein, utilizing the Buddhist identity at *Buddha Prabha* bears true to the morbid reality of Ashin Jinarakkhita’s consideration for Buddhist “safety” as *raison d’être*.

Identity represents the maintenance and nexus for institutional functionalism at *Buddha Prabha*, whereas ethnic-inclusivity and religious-exclusivity present a unique paradigm unshared by *Kwan Tee Kiong*. While Buddhism exists at the forefront of the institution, historical *klenteng* characteristics diminish the universality of *Buddhayana* Buddhism and contrarily produce the stereotypical Chinese characteristic of ethnic-exclusivity to mute additional *vihara* functions. On the contrary, *Buddha Prabha* practices an ethnic-inclusive atmosphere within its three systems (while not publicly stated) to negate the eventuality of diminishing *Buddhayana* Buddhist characteristics from the omnipresent Chinese characteristics at the *klenteng*. If identity can be shifted
towards an ethnically-inclusive – religiously-exclusive paradigm, then philosophical principles can be maneuvered to take the forefront of institutional characteristics. The religious elder at *Buddha Prabha* denoted this philosophical maneuvering as practicing *emptiness*:

“There is no Self in Buddhist ‘culture’—there are no Chinese, there are no Indonesians. We are humans, and even this [identity] distracts us from the [philosophical] necessity of realizing the need to remove ourselves from the ‘Other’…To be empty is to be Buddhist. Chinese [identity] [is] empty. We adapt to be empty.”

Emptiness in Buddhism is not new to the philosophy. Buddhists are instructed to remove their personal interests and gains from the social construct so to achieve an ideal that is universally Buddhist for both the *vīhara* and the community. Advocating for the Self continues to adhere to the egoistical nexus for intrinsic individualism, whereas these dynamics negate the goal of muting the continuous barrage of worldly suffering over the Self. In this light, emptiness is a necessary adoptive identity to form a transcendentalist lens in viewing the dichotomous relationship between the egoistical Self and the Other to the ‘empty’ Self. To be Buddhist is to be empty—this is a key aspect to the Buddhist Self that cannot be taken any other way.

On the other hand, the ability to be empty by the natural ethnic/racial characteristics ascribed to individuals and groups from the social construct is an impossibility. Chinese will be viewed negatively within social stigma despite any effort

---

146 Personal communication, 2 July 2017.
to change functionalism contributory to society. Furthermore, the same effect is placed on Indonesians: to the Chinese community, the negativity of Indonesian-ness ascribes a radical violence over the ethnic/racial amalgamation for which there is no alternative means of considering the oppressive Other. If there are no available spaces for Chinese qualities within the social fabric for Indonesians, then there cannot be a place for Indonesian qualities within the Chinese communitarian fabric. This mechanization is only pseudo-absolutist as the justification for the Chinese communitarian fabric that ultimately disregards the significant positionality of Indonesian society, an impossibility to fully restrict penetration. Whereby the continence of maintaining a perfect ethnically-exclusive Chinese sphere is continually barraged by Indonesian dictation of social functionalism and participation, especially within the socio-religious sphere.

Exposure is an essential component to the Chinese Buddhist. If the role of a Buddhist is to remain empty, then identification processes as Buddhist, Chinese, or Indonesian (via assimilation) are moot considerations based on social requirements either constricting or liberalizing these processes. According to majoritarian social dictation for whether Chinese individuals and/or groups effectively align function/participation poles to societal poles, identities and categories must fluctuate based on l’air du temps. Yet, the juxtaposition of constricting or liberalizing Chinese or Indonesian characteristics is surrounded by fear and threat to individuals and/or groups, especially pertaining to security apparatuses as Buddhists. There is a continual fluctuation between the acknowledgment of identity as a Chinese and a Buddhist that can only be determined by a societal reaction in an ever-changing representation for these contrasting characteristics.
Exposing Chinese-ness diminishes security for cultural-exceptionalism; exposing Indonesian-ness diminishes communitarian acceptance and legitimacy as a Chinese.

Fluctuating in this manner protects the Chinese from adverse effects of classification, categorization, and segregation only if Indonesians perceive the “foreign oriental” as acceptably retaining function according to l’air du temps and the dictation of this function. This can be viewed as part to the security paradigm of the institution itself. As Buddha Prabha maintains a Buddhist identity of emptiness, then the consideration of an efficiently identifiable Buddhist remains as the sole characteristic for all ethnic groups. Ethnic characteristics become obsolete: empty identifiable markers to anyone and anything insomuch that Buddhist lenses transcend traditional (even post-modern) notions of what comprise group identity aside from similar philosophical attainments.

While Buddha Prabha essentializes emptiness as a foundational pillar to its establishment, the essence of emptiness can only be captured from a congregation that also considers the pillar to be foundational for them, as well. Buddha Prabha is primarily founded by the Chinese groups that also established it as klenteng Gondomanan, and this congregationalist dynamic remains the same in the modern-day. Whereas there are few individuals who attend Buddhist services, the number of non-Chinese individuals is few, even more so when considering the Confucian component.

The institutional shift from portraying klenteng to vihara signifies a dynamic change from adhering to religious-cultural affinities towards securing the ethnic community within its walls. Much in the same tactic as Kwan Tee Kiong, Buddha Prabha (while not relying on ethnic-exclusivity to amass a congregation) acknowledges the
inevitable identification and categorization of Chinese characteristics to be, indeed, Chinese. As the religious elder confessed his resignation to this position, there is no way around physical Chinese-ness attracting violence, and thus the adaptation required by Buddhists is to portray a resignation of Chinese-ness in favor of emptiness as a Buddhist and not as an Indonesian. (On the contrary, Indonesian-ness is a characteristic that is necessary for survival, but not wholly desired. Buddhism maintains the ‘middle-ground of the displaced’ so that both ethnic groups can be appeased while conditioning the appeasement of relinquishing ethnic identity for a religious identity.)

Emptiness for other vihara is not so well conditioned in communitarian politics as communities themselves must perceive and consider the establishment of Buddhism amid individualistic functionalism and participation in the community. Other Yogyakarta vihara, such as Vidyāsenā Vihara Vidyāloka, Vihara Karangdjati, and Vihara Dharma Wijāyā mechanize the utility of identifying in emptiness to dissuade communitarian categorization/classification and ignore the ethnic identity stereotypically asserted over them. Ethnic identity shifts from the stigma associated with it to how well these individuals and groups function in communities. Even as categorization and stigma pose potential threats to Chinese individuals within these three vihara, these communities have constructed nightly patrols on a volunteer basis (for which there are never vacancies) to ensure that the community is kept secure, especially from outside individuals/groups wishing to impose harm on the Chinese inhabitants. Emptiness becomes a means of survival to ensure collective gathering and achieve a singular identity for the community
itself rather than portraying a variety of ethnic identities within a Buddhist community. Geographical security measures ensure community boundaries are more developed than abstractions of philosophical principles, but developmental for communitarian function and its members.

What can we draw from the paradigm of identity and integration between Kwan Tee Kiong, Buddha Prabha, Vidyāloka, Karangdjati, and Dharma Wijāyā? The simple utility of governmental sanction for Buddhist and Confucian religious practices are not weighted enough to withstand stigma from social anti-Chinese sentiment. There must be alternatives towards the construction of security apparatuses that protect ethnic groups.

From Kwan Tee Kiong: religious-inclusivity among an ethnically-exclusive environment promotes the Chinese community in numbers and strengthens the ability to claim government recognition, therein securing its ethnic position both within the pecinan and previously approved socio-governmental boundaries. From Buddha Prabha: religious identification shifts from a characteristically Chinese system to a more inclusive system.

Youth members of the Vihara Karangdjati actively participate in “Dharma Dutra” which explicitly shares in the proselytization of Buddhism to non-Buddhist members of their community (and neighboring communities) in the efforts to engage in inter-faith dialogue and community development. While this Dharma is necessary in the Buddhist fashion, the probability of extending risk factors is two-fold insomuch that the extension of Chinese Buddhist-ness exemplifies the public display of a Buddhist characteristic among Chinese ethnic groups, which could display the promotion of Chinese-ness (in hopes of achieving an accommodationist or integrationist initiative).

Viha Bodhicitta Maitreya (Taiwanese in nature) asserts a continuous invitation for different ethnic groups to engage and observe Buddhist services as a means of welcoming the community. Furthermore, these events are meant to construct community development initiatives to counter increasing anti-Chinese sentiment through social participatory functionalism. While Maitreya Buddhists are ethnically Chinese, there seemed to be little acknowledgement of anti-Chinese sentiment to the congregation—even so much as refuting any possibility of considering violence in general.

One monk at Dharma Wijāyā expressed to me the institutional concern for Chinese individuals after the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, in which the community established a food bank for Chinese who experience threats from outside communities. This works dualistically: (1) to ensure a physical security to Chinese congregates in the vihara and communities, and (2) to ensure Chinese-ness is safeguarded within a Buddhist lens.
to negate the portrayal of Chinese-ness—emptiness promotes the convention for assimilation. From Vidyāloka, Karangdjati, and Dharma Wijāyā: communitarian politics shift religious and ethnic identities towards practical functionalism that integrate the necessities for community-development in replacement of the stigma of ethnic function within a religious outlook.

Whether these means of securing ethnic and/or religious communities can be viewed under an operationalist guise in Buddhism or an as assuage from ethnic characteristics, institutional adaptation to appease or combat the continually presiding effects for assimilation are demonstrative of effective protectionism aside from the bombardment of anti-Chinese sentiment. However, this effectivity teeters on the fulcrum of Chinese groups asserting too high degrees of totok or peranakan characteristics (or any Chinese characteristic). Moreover, processing Chinese-ness to assert more characteristics in society (sinicization/sinification), especially through ethnic and/or religious avenues, diminishes the likelihood and comfortability of livelihoods for all Chinese groups. The possibility for achieving a successful accommodationist platform for Chinese religious-cultural affinities is a ‘suicidal’ venture.

Unfortunately, the outlook for Chinese groups within Buddhism and Confucianism is not certain. I take this under my own consideration of interviews held with numerous individuals from both old and young generations; both perceive the future as rooted in the mythical sensation of Gus Durian integration and the reality of anti-

---

153 Sai and Hoon, 70.
Chinese sentiment laid out before them. Even as ‘Gus Dur,’ SBY, and current President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) have laid out policies and principles for the gradual integration of marginalized groups, the likelihood of a holistic integration, or even setting accommodative initiatives, do not prevail against the ever-present socio-normative assimilationist policy. Despite modern advances in recognizing cultural-exceptionalism, multiculturalism, and renegotiating Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, the narratives provided to me in neighboring Surakarta (Solo) resonate on the opposite end of Gus Durian politics. These considerations for the outlook may reside in residual effects for Pak Suharto politics or may forward notions of anti-Chinese sentimental groups that dominate the socio-cultural rhetoric. Nevertheless, hopes for either Gus Durian or Pak Suharto politics continually balance on the fulcrum of destructive initiatives for either party regardless of geographical location, communitarian dynamic, or religious-institutional boundaries.¹⁵⁴

These fears are not new but are continuously remembered in consideration of l’air du temps and the supposed advancement of Chinese groups, especially at the klenteng Tridharma Sie Kok Tien. In 1998, anti-Chinese sentiment in reflection of the Asian Financial Crisis and consequential violence that swept through Surakarta demonstrates a continuous representation and reminder of how normatively Chinese populations are viewed. Sie Kok Tien was razed to the ground, along with surrounding pecinan shops and adjacent conglomerative-owned shopping mall (a city icon of modernization). Laid to

¹⁵⁴ Destructive initiatives can manifest in two ways: either the re-occurrence of razing the sole klenteng and surrounding pecinan in Surakarta (which occurred in 1998) or the suppression of dominant groups’ rhetoric that seems to puppet normative considerations against marginalized groups.
waste for nearly a decade, an underlying story for re-construction surrounds spiritual beings from *T’ian* visiting the temple and removing the warren remains—only to the utter surprise of Chinese individuals who passed by the following day. Re-construction swiftly began after accounts of these individuals, who consider the sight as a divine intervention to re-build the *klenteng*. Further, the destruction and sudden refurbishment of the *klenteng* represents another aspect to the story, one so significant in that the *klenteng* is only a metaphor for the reconstruction of Chinese religious-cultural affinities, but also as an institution for solidarity, livelihood, and revitalization of Chinese populations. In the modern day, *Sie Kok Tien* experiences a relatively healthy environment: the *pecinan* is rebuilt, the shopping mall has been repaired and dominated by Chinese-owned businesses, and the *klenteng* serves as a community institution where cultural practices and traditions, such as Chinese influenced *wayang kulit* (shadow puppetry shows) are publicly displayed.

Even as these advances demonstrate the relative comfortability in Chinese-Surakarta communities, I visited three elderly gentlemen who originally were frequent members to the *klenteng* but remained absent since 1998 due to psychological and emotional trauma in memory of the violence. As explained to me during a secretive meeting in the countryside, the liberty of observing Chinese practices at *Sie Kok Tien* is an incredible risk, edifying the state of the Chinese dilemma that once was, and ignoring the inevitability of reoccurring violence if society negates Chinese-exceptionalism from public appeal. They expressed countless stories of violence done to them and their families, even bringing some to tears and refusal to discuss further—whereas *Sie Kok*
Tien cannot peacefully remain as an institution unaffected by 1998. On the contrary, Sie Kok Tien is an icon of the violence, of anti-Chinese sentiment, that counts down the days to witnessing inevitable violence again. The tragedy of the ‘May 1998 riots’ is the realization of culture being “washed away”; “This is the [aggressive] society in Solo” that represents the struggle and stubbornness from accounting for trauma that failed to surface as a measure for reconstruction.

What can be taken from these different narratives? The fragile mechanisms expressed by Kwan Tee Kiong, Buddha Prabha, Vidyāloka, Karangdjati, Dharma Wijāyā represent the communal-development for reemerging as a definitive, but infantile, security that bases identity through ethnic-exclusivity, religious-inclusivity, ‘emptiness,’ and community-development; whereas Sie Kok Tien represents the residual memories institutionalized in negative-peace—a simple prescription (under the guise of positive-peace) to adapt to an ever-shifting society that (nearly) requires the institution anti-Chinese sentiment as compulsory to assimilation. The effects of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis (regardless of Yogyakarta or Surakarta politics) exerted such force on Chinese populations that demanded a consistent adherence to l’air du temps and the changing tides of Chinese-directed self-Indonesianization. Anti-Chinese sentiment is an

---

155 The intent of secretively meeting in the countryside was to mitigate individuals witnessing open discussions with me. Intrusion into the well-kept secrets of Surakarta-societal-directed violence against Chinese groups would incur a destructive effect to these men and their families. They could not bear talking much about 1998 or their insomnia resulting from trauma, but their desire to make these stories known brought them to meet with me. Recognition, acknowledgment, reparation, and community re-development for Chinese is ignored by society, and any account to re-visit the atrocities or reconciliation are effectively muted. If there is no chance at finding answers for the past, then the only way to seek accountability is through alternative means. I served as that means for these men, and it is an honor to be told their stories of grief, terror, and consternation.

156 Personal communication, 16 July 2017.
essential component to society that demands function, categorization, and adherence to
identity from which one is categorized. Even in this dire conclusion, these fragile
mechanisms are the only means of reconstructing a future for Chinese culture apart from
inculcating existential trauma.

Through this discussion, we have discussed that the social construct maintains
Chinese communities to continuously adjust to *l’air du temps* but warns that Chinese
groups may not dictate function for themselves. This is a juxtaposition that eliminates the
freedom for Chinese populations to effectively create policy-platforms in relation to *l’air
du temps*. Yet, the provision of recognizing Buddhism and Confucianism as official
religious creates a socio-religious cleavage in the normative pillar of anti-Chinese
sentiment—one that removes the ability to freely discriminate and enact violence on
Chinese communities and separates the essence of anti-Chinese sentiment to exist outside
of these boundaries. Ironically, the *wijkenstelsel* and *pecinan* provide avenues for
geographic security among Chinese congregations and populations where segregation
promotes ethnic-exclusivity, communitarianism, security in numbers, and like-minded
policy platforms. Even as differential communities insist on the construction of security
apparatuses for fearful Chinese (such as *Dharma Wijāyā*), essentializing this as a
contributory component to religious-institutional protectionism is necessary. Physical
notions for security represent one-half of the apparatus albeit necessary; whereas some
institutions follow-suit, and others adhere to philosophical security rather than physical.

‘Emptiness’ represents the second half of the apparatus and exists in an abstract
realm (while taking on tangible connotations) that dictates categorization/classification,
self-identification and self-verification. This cognitive utility provides a means of re-
discovering ‘cultural access’ and manifesting a method of integrating Chinese-ness with
Indonesian-ness under the operationalist guise of religion. Yet, even as these mechanisms
and the emptiness utility construct an effective security apparatus (in both physical and
abstract notions), the ability to separate collective memory in trauma from securing a
comfortable livelihood is unstable, uncertain, and unaccounted. If the security of
emptiness balances on the notion of separating physicality from identity, the remaining
factor is to essentialize Buddhist emptiness within the consternation of Confucian filial
piety. Even as Tridharma would signify that it could serve as a possible outlet for
practicing this utility, differential systems among differential communities represent
problems for unification and solidarity alongside equally important factors of ethnic-
exclusivity and religious-inclusivity. The ‘Chinese Question’ remains unanswered, and
further displaces those of the middle-ground.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the utility of emptiness as a means of solidifying
Christian and Islamic religious systems within the Chinese ethnic populations and
explaining this utility as both religious liberty and ethnic condemnation. The introduction
of emptiness is an especially important concept going forward in the discussion, but it
should not be considered as an absolute for adhering to the Pancasila. It is only a nodal
component to the social construct and communitarian dynamics of Chinese populations.
Especially within religious institutions, emptiness and Pancasila go together, but require
new characterizations of ethnic identity and religious affiliation before any policy
initiative can attribute a wholesome change for either Christians or Muslims—and in turn, the construction of a security apparatus.
CHAPTER 2:
THE JUXTAPOSITION OF THE ‘DOUBLE-MINORITY’ - PERSPECTIVES ON SECURING EMPTINESS

This chapter will consider the differentiations and unique similarities between Christianity and Islam among the Chinese ethnic population. ‘Emptiness’ is fundamental in the construction of a communitarian ethno-religious sphere. Interestingly, aspects derived from ethnic-exclusivity and religious-inclusivity do not maintain similar connotations for Christian-Chinese but remain paramount for Muslim-Chinese—aspects that neither contend nor disrupt tracks for ethnic and/or religious continuity for communitarian constructs. Despite the considerations of anti-Chinese sentiment and the residual Pak Suharto body politic in the continuous construction (and validation) of Indonesian societal-exceptionalism, the Chinese ethnic community has supplemented underlying aspects to these religious systems at-large, disguising Chinese-influenced characteristics that have become pillars to both Muslim-Chinese and Christian-Chinese.¹⁵⁷

The truly profound consideration of the social complex suggests that the exception of Christian-Chinese and Muslim-Chinese categorize themselves (via

¹⁵⁷ This is not to claim that Chinese religious groups have splintered from Christian or Islamic systems, but to contend that Chinese religious groups maintain unique Chinese-influenced characteristics to (in some degree) establish alternative sects to majoritarian Islam or Christianity.
Tridharma-Chinese or other groups) as entirely separate from the Chinese ethnic community. Considerations regarding a differential classification of the Chinese category supplies a consequential viewpoint for Chinese to consider themselves as truly existent in solidarity, exclusivity, and communitarianism. If classes fragment in the ethnic community, then the Chinese community at-large cannot commit to institutionalizing protectionist policies for the livelihood and security of the population at-large. Ethnic characteristics no longer maintain semblance as a unifying aspect but is relinquished for the prominence of religion as the forefront identifying constant.

The separation of classes and categories for the Chinese population at-large is not a significant concern. Rather, the mere existence as a Chinese represents the larger problem: masalah Cina. Regardless of classification or categorization/classification schemes attributed by society or different religious communities, the fundamental cause for concern among Chinese is how to abide by the socially initiated ‘institution of suffering.’ Ostracism, segregation, alienation, discrimination, violence, etc. cement the livelihoods of Chinese into the masalah Cina and the ‘Chinese Question’ and tend to dissuade any action for achieving a cross-religious connection despite ethnic similarities.

“We look to the Cross as an analogy for ourselves,” a leader explained at Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (UKDW), “Jesus suffered on the Cross. We, too, will suffer until we die. There is no escape from this [situation]. We, as Chinese, must embrace it.”\footnote{Personal communication, 20 November 2017.}

On the other hand, Muslim-Chinese represent a different perspective on the ‘institution of suffering’ insomuch that classification and categorization operate jointly
with ostracism and segregation introduced by the Chinese ethnic population. Whereby, in this instance, the fundamental alienation is not initiated by society (rather that the two groups share the commonality religious similarities) but by the Chinese ethnic population; viewing Muslim-Chinese as ‘traitors to the Chinese race’ (paraphrased). This communitarian chasm originates from multiple factors and compounds in both negative and positive lights but constricts the senses of *Tridharma* values in ethnic-exclusivity, religious-inclusivity, and communitarian solidarity. While these points disrupt the likelihood of achieving a sense of cultural-exceptionalism for the ethnic community, Muslim-Chinese utilize a different approach to the chasm by following through on ostracism and segregation: Muslim-Chinese are dissimilar to *Tridharma*-Chinese through-and-through.

This chapter will discuss the communitarian constructs evident among Christian-Chinese and Muslim-Chinese and compare the varying ethno-religious communitarian aspects in relation to the larger ethnic sphere. Moreover, the social mechanisms explained in Chapter 1 continue to remain active in both Christian and Muslim communities but take on additional attributes that dynamically change the characteristics of Christianity and Islam among the Chinese ethnic population. If the ‘institution of suffering’ is *both* a societal and communitarian attribution to differences among religious and ethnic populations, how do Christians and Muslims construct security apparatuses that guarantee (to a certain degree) livelihoods are protected? This question is vital to the system of communitarian religious-institutional protectionism and how it contributes to the considerations of the *masalah Cina* and the ‘Chinese Question’. 

98
There are three notions of security that both Chinese Christians and Muslim-Chinese must consider: (1) the pillar of religion and its affinities in the community, (2) ethnic dissimilarities among the religious community, and (3) accounting for these cleavages in reflection of societal perception. When diverging from Tridharma to either Christianity or Islam (or alternative religious system), the ethnic sphere may vary according to societal perspectives over these ‘alternative’ religious/philosophical belief systems. Whether Christian-Chinese or Muslim-Chinese can effectively assimilate or integrate into the social construct, ‘accommodationist’ prescriptions for alleviating negative considerations from society must exist as mechanisms for balancing the fragile relationship with both society and the Tridharma population. Otherwise, differential religious and/or philosophical belief systems diverge and represent a rejection to Tridharma (if not totok) pillars in preferential replacement for Indonesianization. Even as Christian-Chinese and Muslim-Chinese experience social violence, additional Tridharma violence incurs from the (relative/perceived) undesirability to integrate with traditional Chinese characteristics. These differences are key towards understanding ‘double-minority’ terminology and how these implications are therein mechanized from one social body to the next—Chinese incur a status that alienates them from both Indonesian society and Chinese communities.

Furthermore, these cleavages manifest into new social and communitarian constructs that shape capacity and ability for how social function and participation initiate an ordered liberty complex over these new Chinese groups; either elevating or negating the potential outlook for divergent sub-groups. In these cases, the considerations for
Muslim-Chinese statuses are elevated in Indonesian Islamic society; whereas similar considerations for Christian-Chinese reside within the same status of the remainder of the Chinese ethnic population. However, relations between these two groups are simultaneously inversed regarding the Chinese ethnic population, alienating the Chinese Self to become an Other.

While the changes to Tridharma religious-cultural affinities in reflection from Presidential Decision No.250/1967 and Presidential Instruction No.14/1967 have largely been reversed in the Gus Durian era, these customs were unable to survive cross-religiously. Christian and Islamic observances may be viewed as a means of surviving social scrutiny, discrimination, and violence through the lens of mitigating Tridharma relationships. Even as ethnic considerations remain significant obstacles for the Chinese ethnic population at-large, religious affiliations should mitigate the ethnic considerations from the platform of an ethno-religious divide. On the contrary, the substantiality of Christian-Chinese and Muslim-Chinese positionalities existing apart as a religious sub-group is an impossible factor to instigate possible integrationist-assimilation, assimilationist-integration, or accommodationist socio-religious politics—ethnic-exclusivity remains at the forefront of who ultimately will choose to affiliate with a majoritarian Chinese religious group, and to whom is afforded the possibility of acceptance within the Chinese religious group.\footnote{Similar to the wijkenstelsel, Chinese populations and groups ‘naturally’ congregate according to ethnic similarities, and thus the neo-colonial imposition of achieving assimilation cannot naturally accommodate the pillar of Chinese congregationalism nor Indonesian socialization.}

This does not impede the likelihood of Chinese sub-groups from accessing various utilities to effectively mitigate affiliation with
Tridharma groups, but neither should this consideration imply that these groups are “innocent” in the social construct. Even if considerations for Chinese religious sub-groups infer a differential mechanism from Indonesian society to the sub-group, the intrinsic application of masalah Cina contorts the ability for sub-groups to actively seek or achieve acceptance into the social construct.

This dialogue presents a key into understanding the formation of communities and how each adheres to the social construct. Especially for Christian-Chinese, who exist in a more progressed ‘double-minority’ existence than Muslim-Chinese, the utility of institutions must be directed to educate Christian-Chinese towards realizing how the moral becomes political. This is achieved “in accordance to Biblical principles… in becoming good Christians, [students] will also become good citizens of the country.” By considering religion as the superior identification marker among individuals and groups, the capacity and ability to function and participate in society (in conjunction with the ‘double-minority’ status) reconstitutes a sense of the socio-religious landscape, and the ability to reduce indirect factors from identifying within one sub-group or another (ethnically or otherwise).

Edward Aspinall, Sebastian Dettman and Eve Warburton offer a derivation of an abstract hierarchical construction from manipulating identity markers from social

---

160 Hoon (2011): 403 – Innocence is an interesting term used to describe the structural violence and perceptibility of Chines existence—neither are Chinese innocent nor guilty per se, but the challenge of accessing the ability to self-advocate is not afforded any group in the eyes of majoritarian Indonesian society.
161 In reference to Sutrisno (2017).
162 Ibid. 409.
construction to the construction of Chinese communities themselves; whereas religious identity no longer concedes to societal discrimination and violence but is perceived (among sub-group communities) as mechanisms to forward majoritarian Islam and neo-colonialist Christianity. As Islam dominates the modern socio-religious landscape and maintains considerable power, Christians seek to maintain association to Dutch Christianity as the superior system (in addition to connotations regarding socio-political power). Ethnicity, then, becomes a diminished feature throughout sub-group communities and is replaced with the sole identity of a religious follower. Given the complexities of socio-normative anti-Chinese sentimentality intertwined with the hierarchical socio-religious structure, the notion of a Christian or Islamic ‘double-minority’ dualistically provides a confluence between minority and majority spheres. The juxtaposition that once dominated rhetoric between capacity and ability is reduced and provides a new social position to access assimilationist-integration or integrationist-assimilation initiatives. These initiatives can be used to navigate the complexity of the social construct through a religious avenue rather than solely negotiating via ethnic considerations.

These considerations in religious affiliations assume primary identifiable characteristics do not fully negate the substantial anti-Chinese sentiment in the social construct. Even as Indonesian society may barrage these communities with discrimination and violence, Tridharma groups tend to compound actions towards these sub-groups with anti-Christian-Chinese/Muslim-Chinese sentiment with discrimination and ostracism—therein marking a ‘double-minority’ from within and with-out. The ability to fully account for true Tridharma or totok characteristics throughout the entire
Chinese ethnic community is a slim actuality. Wherefore, the process of seeking accommodationist and integrationist socio-cultural platforms asserts a ‘cultural compromise’ to indicate that extended hybridity (even among the same ethnic group) works throughout the communitarian sphere. Extrapolating various ethno-religious aspects intertwines the complexities of intersectional communitarian constructs and security apparatuses and provides the possibility of observing Chinese-ness within and with-out the ethnic and/or cultural spheres.

Hoon mechanizes the notion of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika to work in conjunction with ethno-religious sub-groups for constructing security apparatuses while clearly defining the capacities and abilities for function and participation. The nature of ethno-religious sub-group communitarian constructs depends on the Chinese Other to contend to the will of the social construct (or the Social Self) to mitigate anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination for the indirect effect of establishing effective security apparatuses. The juxtaposition of operating within the context of the Social Self amid the Chinese Other separates the constitution of how security apparatuses ought to exist. (This paradigm of how to navigate the ethno-religious intersectionality between Chinese-ness and Indonesian-ness must be carefully navigated and fully considered throughout the discussion as it is an imperative directionality for both Christians and Muslims (and Tridharma.))

Natan Setiabudi provides a thorough insight to the Christian-Chinese ‘double-minority’ dilemma and has given a special reference to Gereja Kristen Indonesia (Christian Church of Indonesia; GKI) in representation of minority group integrationist-
assimilation policy. The Christian-Chinese evolution (per neo-colonialism) crystallizes the religious system through correlative distinctions in the conceptualization for newly perceived Chinese characteristics and ideals—attributing a relativize heuristic for “[T]he whole of ‘Chinese-ness’ […] cast[ing] [a] new perspective; [through] certain elements of the Chinese culture [that are] abandoned[,] [exposing] the problem of a minimal ‘remainder of Chinese-ness’ as a pluralistic element to be contributed to the Indonesian pluralistic society.”¹⁶⁴ In other words, Chinese-ness cannot be holistically conceived as a monolithic entity that exists outside of the social sphere, but one that represents a contributive element as a singularly cultural aspect to societal-exceptionalism. The consideration of Chinese-ness within Indonesian-ness is phenomenologically crystallized into the Pancasila via the recognition of Christianity as an official system and through adherence to hierarchical considerations for historically Dutch-Christian existences in the social construct. Christian-Chinese groups can adapt to this pre-conceived notion of acceptable Christianity within the Dutch lens and can thus attribute this acceptability (vis-à-vis Pancasila) and can be partially considered as Indonesian.

This ‘middle-ground’ adversely affects security apparatuses of Christian-Chinese groups that mitigate discrimination, inversely increasing anti-Christian sentiment from within the ethnic sphere. The disregard for ethno-religious differences apart from Tridharma adherence obfuscates solidarity from within and with-out the Chinese ethnic sphere. Christian-Chinese are not considered part-and-parcel to the ethnic community (neither are Muslim-Chinese). The distinction between the Social Self (an individual

¹⁶⁴ Setiabudi, 50.
within the Chinese population at-large) and the Chinese Other (an individual from an out-group among the Chinese population at-large) resounds throughout this paradox of asserting Chinese-ness while simultaneously experiencing ostracism from the Chinese ethnic sphere. If Christianity can mitigate social discrimination, it contrarily increases ethno-communitarian discrimination; and while social and communitarian constructs operate differently (from whence acceptance and alienation operate inversely), the aspect of a differential-to-Chinese religious system seems to transcend traditional nodes of function and participation. Imagining perspective in a community that is intrinsically distinctive from the Chinese ‘Self’ bears the possibility of accessing integrationist-assimilation amid maintaining foundational Chinese characteristics.

Differentiations between religious-cultural affinities in each community dictate functionalism and participation through capacity and ability that creates a complex web of how communities should act and react according to l’air du temps. Differentiations and variations create interdependent relationships among the Chinese ethnic population that substantiate various roles. These roles contribute to and affect each community differently. This interdependencies indicate that security apparatuses can exist as “faith/trust [relationships] that [have] a value far more expensive, far greater [worth] than even trillions of rupiah.”165, 166 This assertion of “expensive” security apparatuses relates to both communitarian fabrics and neo-colonial constructs of wijkenstelsel that extends well beyond the derivative societal fear-mongering by directly affecting the

165 Purdey, 429.
166 In reference to the estimated 3.1 trillion rupiah in damages from the ‘May 1998 riots.’
communitarian ability to productively/sufficiently portray means of fulfilling capacity via ability. The difficulty in maintaining an interdependent web of Chinese-ness complicates and obfuscates necessity vis-à-vis l’air du temps in configuring platforms for confronting perceptions.

How do Christian and Muslim religious-cultural communities combat perceptions among society and other Chinese communities to stabilize the fragile threads of interconnectedness? Among discussions held at UKDW and various churches throughout the community, there are two means of achieving this goal: (1) to promote Chinese characteristics only through aesthetic means, while (2) maintaining strict allegiances to the community at-hand for ethno-religious cultivation. These are ‘boundaries’ that designate where specific Christian-Chinese-ness is observed while maintaining an affiliation to both society (via recognized Christianity open to Indonesians) and the Chinese ethnic sphere (via specific cultural events). On the contrary, these methods must ‘reject’ Tridharma-Chinese-ness in favor of establishing an Indonesianized version of Chinese culture. Rejection is only considered as a guise, however, and is not fully attributed to the construction of a micro-communitarian structure for alienating Chinese-ness from Christian-Chinese-ness; rejection contributes to the capacity and ability of the Chinese religious community for the sole survival of existence as an Indonesianized Christian-Chinese spotlight.

In this same light, ethnicity can be ‘rejected.’ Aspinall, Dettman and Warburton claim that ethnicity can easily be forfeited in the tide of l’air du temps to redirect socio-political goals. Ethnicity becomes a mobile facet in this junction, and those who
dualistically categorize/identify among multiple spheres can help maneuver religious communities to best pilot themselves between ethno-religious exclusivity/inclusivity. If religion and ethnicity are viewed as two battling aspects, both can be manipulated to portray extensions of one or the other to actively engage with communitarian policy platforms to combat *l’air du temps*. Mechanization of these utilities could diminish social discrimination when the socio-religious landscape becomes too embroiled with controversy. Yet, the freedom to elevate religion over ethnicity (and vice-versa) can become a disastrous effect for ‘double-minority’ Christian or Muslim groups when reclassifying oneself with the ethnic sphere, especially as neither group can maintain a solid platform to assuredly mitigate discrimination. In every instance: individuals, sub-groups, communities, and the Chinese ethnic sphere at-large must weigh the cost-benefit of asserting one facet over the other and must contend with the effect of anti-Chinese sentiment in response to either maneuver.

Of course, there is debate between Christian groups in validating the ‘emptiness’ of ethnic identification, -categorization/classification, and -verification. Substantiating an ‘emptiness’ identity turns socialization initiatives into an integrationist-assimilation process; whereas Indonesian characteristics are forwarded to exhibit Indonesian-ness to society; and dismantle the constructions of ethno-religious exclusivity/inclusivity for the sub-group vis-à-vis society. The point of discovery as a ‘double-minority’ is to remove Chinese-ness and opt to accept the Indonesian-Other as part of the Self. This can only be accomplished through religious accession as a primary component for the Self. Yet, theological faculty members at UKDW contend that one surmounts to this gain only
through the analogous portrayal of existentialism: “Disabilities are not just physical but exist in other spheres that transcend the restrictions of the body.” The ‘Chinese Question’ is not just a social complex, but also obfuscates the essence of *masalah Cina*, allowing one issue to be viewed through two different lenses. Considering these issues of anti-Chinese sentiment exhibits Chinese-ness as an inherent degradation to *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*. Christian-Chinese-ness can only be realized if it can self-validate through the *Pancasila*.

However, Indonesianization of religious communities does not fully account for potentially mitigating anti-Chinese sentiment. Neither does the ‘cultural compromise’ necessarily implicate the Chinese identity. Rather, this identity can be reincorporated as a developmental communitarian utility as a unit of restricting the extent of communities to engage with surrounding areas. These units do not represent the age-old struggle between the Chinese and Indonesians but reflect the struggle through acceptance. Just as the Christian symbol of the Cross represents forgiveness and death, the Chinese also must accept those same characteristics to abide by both religious doctrine and societal suppression. Accepting the social plight that Chinese experience changes the narrative of the ‘middle-ground of the displaced,’ wherein victimhood is used as a characteristic for constructing policy platforms, and the mechanization of religious community engagement in society reflects “…turn to them the other cheek…” in a pragmatic, realistic sense.

---

167 Personal communication, 28 November 2017.
168 Matthew 5:39
This is a vital component in viewing Christianity as a sub-group within the Chinese ethnic sphere. Neither are Christian-Chinese so distanced from the Tridharma affiliation as they are considered as partially contributory to the ethnic cause. Uniquely situated as an alternative religious system, Christian educational institutions served as a respite from the violence of 1965 and 1997-1998. While never publicly claimed, the insistence that Christianity can serve the Chinese ethnic population as a means of sheltering ethnicity from Indonesian discrimination does provide an alternative security apparatus to the ‘Chinese Question.’ This exception is two-fold: while ethnicity finds security within an alternative religious system, Christian-Chinese find a reduction in discrimination as they assimilate to a socially-recognized religious system albeit non-majoritarian. The consideration of excepting Christianity as an acceptable alternative to Chinese-ness can also work contrarily to the ethnic cause, as the dissolve of Chinese culture in favor of neo-colonial Christian affinities operationalizes culture from a religious ‘scalpel.’

The extension of Christian-Chinese-ness as exceptions of socially-recognized or non-Tridharma acceptability must cement religious adherence as the fundamental characteristic of religious communities, whereas ethnicity cannot take the forefront. Even as this agency is difficult to maintain, dismantling notions of hierarchy, racial classification, and philosophical recognition becomes essential towards the effective demonstration of noting Christianity as a post-structuralist system. In discussions with the chief of Tiong Hoa Kie Tok Kauw Hwee (Hokkien-Chinese Christin Church; THKTKH), the policy platform of maintaining a post-structuralist view on Christianity in Indonesia
remained cemented, while historical considerations and resentment for a Christian philosophy continue to remain in the memories of those affected by the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. Socio-normativity regarding Chinese does not dismiss the phenomenological construction of post-structuralism in the Christian sense “…because we are Indonesian that we are also Chinese. Christian Chinese remove themselves from Indonesia.”

Religiously-based hierarchic constructions attribute a significant presence throughout society, where the socio-religious landscape attributes policy for sub-groups, these institutions also indirectly manage the interaction and engagement of non-affiliates throughout the same landscape. Ethno-religious derivatives indicate philosophical aspects to the social hierarchy, which promote alternative social structures based on the current systems of socio-religious order. The THKTKH leader continued [paraphrased]: ‘If we can operate not as Chinese but as Christians, then we have a better chance at no discrimination. We can go on with our daily lives aside from our ethnicity. Ethnicity is permanent, but religion is better. We survive based on religion.’

Later, the chief of THKTKH interjected: “We are better than them.” This may come across as a riddle of exaggerated positionality among a farfetchedness that connotes the conception of societal-exceptionalism as an embattlement within neighborhood religious-institutional hierarchical determinations. Altogether, this establishes a counter-notion to the

---

169 Personal communication, 27 November 2017.
170 The concept of survival is interesting here, especially as the elder could not readily provide an example of when members of the congregation suffered losses connected to the ‘1965 affair’ or the ‘May 1998 riots.’ Rather, the implication of diminishing anti-Chinese sentimentality via religion is the core of his meaning.
conception of societal-exceptionalism from a sub-group hierarchical perspective on socialization over religion. Congregations rarely encounter one another, and when they do, an ordered liberty amid controlled communication must be present to secure a peaceful engagement (even among Protestants and Catholics).

Even as Christian-Chinese value the fundamentality of deriving a sense of suffering from Christian philosophy amid societal suppression, the consideration for Muslim-Chinese provides a contributory aspect to the Christian chasm of the socio-religious landscape. Considering mosques as central pillars to communities would illuminate a sense materialistic flamboyance—a characteristic absent to Muslim-Chinese communities regardless of Islam maintaining the forefront position of the socio-religious landscape. However, the consideration of the mosque brings a survivability clause amid social stigma and communitarian isolation. Among Tridharma constructs, providing for those in the ethnic population derives solidarity and cultural-exceptionality. Yet, given the divergence from Tridharma to Islam, Islamic characteristics act as a counter-claim to the insistence that majoritarian Islamic groups dictate the extent of capacity and ability for social function. On the contrary, Muslim-Chinese are uniquely barred from observing core community Islamic customs as this would undermine fragile security apparatuses among Tridharma groups and degrade the phenomenology of Christian-Chinese. Further, Muslim-Chinese would gather no assurances from core Islamic communities as the considerations of ethnicity mute counter-claims to religious prevalence. The sequence of possibilities for determining whether a Muslim-Chinese is either Chinese or Muslim or
neither is endless, limiting the slim margins of mitigating socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment.

There is a core difference between Muslims and Christians in the consideration that the ‘double-minority’ exists as a conception of both ethnic-exclusivity and religious-exclusivity. The dualistic nature of existing between both ethnic and religious groups maintains the notion that Chinese existence can neither mechanize social change nor contend to religious pluralism. Muslim-Chinese become a ‘trans-local’ phenomenon that dismisses the idea of Chinese-Indonesian-ness to exist among two separate spheres but integrates as one only if the cost-benefit of categorization and classification cement group-think and an effective, security policy platform. In this regard, Muslim-Chinese operate monolithically entirely separate from ethnically-based interests and core Islamic religious interests. Communitarian exceptionality remains at the forefront of the platform, a higher appreciation for societal-exceptionalism, in which an integration for Chinese-Indonesian-ness despite the ‘middle-ground of the displaced’ emerges as a diasporic, adaptive initiative to clashing narratives for what exceptionalism means for different groups.

Transitive characteristics as either religiously-exclusive/inclusive and ethnically-exclusive/inclusive loosely allow Muslim-Chinese to relativize Indonesian-ness and/or Chinese-ness for the promotion of exhibiting ‘indigenization’ and ‘purification’ of the religious-/ethnic-Self. Instead of viewing symbolic interactions leveraged between material and structural determinism, the Muslim-Chinese balance between communities and society constructs a continuous renegotiation of capacity, ability, and perceptions of
procedural assimilation and integration. Muslims can be more fluid than Christians based solely on religious affiliation but are barred from doing so from and ethnic standpoint. If the determinative factors attributing assimilation or integration rely on religion and ethnicity, where do Muslims succinctly fit within the paradigm of societal-communitarian dimensions?

The first dimension to understand this is in the transnational connection among Chinese and local negotiation for Chinese identity. 20th century efforts to substantiate Chinese transnationalism evaded the counter-productive efforts of Islamizing Indonesia, especially in the connection between those Chinese that had already assimilated or those that sought protection from within the majoritarian/dominant society. Promoting Chinese-ness among an anti-Chinese society requires a tremendous amount of socio-political maneuvering and energy, an attribute that can only be acknowledged by a phenomenological sub-group.

Secondly, trans-local formations of Muslim-Chinese cultural identities organize upon the basis of Chinese ethnicity with Indonesian Islam taking the forefront. Symbolic interactions between Chinese mosques and Indonesian mosques share commonalities of religious and cultural convergences that mark constructivist imaginations for constituting a unification between Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and the Pancasila. These dimensions provide the ability to migrate between social spheres—from Muslim-Chinese to Indonesian Muslims (and even access additional sub-groups)—and

\[\text{171} \text{ Founded on the religious-cultural combination/compromise of harmonious coexistence; an imaginative negotiated interplay of characteristics and actualization.}\]
extraordinarily represent the pluralistic identity of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and the Muslim-Chinese experience. Cultural orientation, conversion experience, religious affiliation, social class, gender, locality, and other factors contribute to the unique (continuous) reidentification, recategorization, reverification processes that Muslim-Chinese must undergo to proceed along an assimilationist-integration track into societal-exceptionalism.

Delicately identifying within multiple social spheres, the constitution of Muslim-Chinese maintains an absolute adherence to the belief in Islamic security, which then translates into Chinese security. This is a limited avenue, however, as the historical and socio-normative perception of ‘suspicious’ ‘foreign orientals’ continues to dominate the rhetoric among social groups that highly distrust the authenticity of Chinese Islam. This narrow scope represents a unique congregationalist penetrative mechanism into the socio-economic sphere that can mitigate discrimination based on religious affiliation; and utilize the *Tridharma* ‘emptiness’ aspect to remove ethnicity from the religious-cultural dialogue. Purposing a bridge between ethnicity and religion, Muslim-Chinese become “economic animals” that uniquely tie the stereotypical character of fiscal responsibility and effective business practices with religious observance. Economic stature, and thus tolerant social activity, benefit Muslim-Chinese “by promoting the Chinese contribution in Islamisation, the indigenous people [of Indonesia] will have better perception[s] towards ethnic Chinese, including non-Muslim Chinese.”

---

172 Weng: 632-633.
This concept of maintaining a significant economic participation for Muslim-Chinese redirects the notion of ‘suspicious’ ‘foreign orientals’ from the anti-Chinese Islamization debate, especially noting that if Muslim-Chinese can rectify historical considerations of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, then anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination will subsequently diminish. Muslim-Chinese cultural-exceptionalism then becomes cemented within the economic spherical dialogue and is no longer devoid of Indonesianization processes forced upon Tridharma and Christian groups. Muslim-Chinese exist within an even narrower displacement in the middle-ground that intersects with societal-exceptionalism.

This venture has become part-and-parcel to the policy platform exercised by Persatuan Islam Chinese Indonesia (Association of Muslim-Chinese in Indonesia; PITI) to effectively change the stereotypes and narration of the Muslim-Chinese experience in society. By mechanizing the Tridharma initiative of identifying as ‘empty,’ the aspect of Chinese ethnicity no longer takes a toll on Chinese Islam but forwards the notion of community-development through socio-economic means by highlighting unique Islamic economic ventures for fulfilling this societal-exceptionalism requirement. By socializing Islam within the stereotypes of Chinese-ness, Chinese populations change socio-normative parameters of the masalah Cina through an Islamist lens, the adapt from within the Indonesian social mind. The possibility of retroactively engaging with anti-Chinese sentiment reverses indications of impossibly accessing assimilationist-
integration efforts; “al-‘adah mu’addalah” (custom is made law) requires the diversification of Islam to accommodate Chinese Islam.\textsuperscript{173}

Diversification of Islam does not necessarily automatically accommodate Chinese Islam via Indonesianization but allows differential social spheres to interconnect and intersect in the attempt to mitigate socio-normativity from anti-Chinese sentiment. \textit{Gus Durian} doctrine attempts to remove the veil so conditionally applied to the social Other. In defense of Chinese-ness, communitarian – societal paradigmatic constructs operate according to fundamental notions of capacity and ability; and supersede the Other when confronted with pragmatic attempts at reversing social hierarchical notions of which groups can accede in terms of cost-benefit. The essence of Chinese Islam, then, is to forward an alternative narrative through actualizing policy into practice for the benefit of changing stereotype and classification scheme of the traditional Chinese enigma. Zainal Abidin Eko Putro confirms the conversion from anti-Chinese towards viewing the religious sub-group as a positive divergence caused only by an “individual choice to seek a solution for securing […] life in the future.”\textsuperscript{174} The path for securing a life free from social discrimination does not alleviate the burden of discrimination from the Chinese community. But maintaining a constant narrative of attempting to Other-ize the stereotype from \textit{Tridharma} and Christian groups is to subvert the clash of theological convergences. This presents an entirely new conflict and continues to compound upon obfuscation in attempts of forwarding a new identity.

Contrary to the Christian exception in socially-recognized religious systems versus non-Tridharma acceptability, the existence of Muslim-Chinese alienates the ethnic cause of the core Chinese population. Considering the social dynamics that substantiate hierarchical structures, *i.e.* religious-cultural affinities, socio-economic participation, and the insistence of *Gus Durian* policies underneath the majoritarian society, Muslim-Chinese can neither penetrate effectively into either Chinese communities nor Indonesian society. Exceptions exist, of course: as Islam is the key towards assimilationist-integration, but this cause indirectly relates to the subsistence of ethno-religious communities built upon collective memory, history, and trauma. The Other in religious politics must insistence on an assimilationist-integration platform while fully withdrawing from the core Chinese ethnic population. This policy reduces anti-Chinese sentiment and religious discrimination, but fully alienates the Other from concepts of Chinese-ness, Indonesian-ness, and Islam. This complex provides no succinct path for Muslim-Chinese to embark upon.

Therein, the ‘double-minority,’ regardless of religious/philosophical belief system, undergoes alternative forms of discrimination from both the societal and communitarian spheres. Religious affiliation and ethnic characteristics must continually battle with the other to distinguish the forefront aspect of Chinese-ness to whichever population the Chinese group seeks to dismantle. Even as these characteristics are maneuvered in order to appease *l’air du temps*, the inevitability of reducing discrimination, in one way or another, is a futile attempt. The attractive sense of maintaining numerous stereotypes can gradually reduce socio-normative anti-Chinese
sentiment when it turns into more of a societal, interest-based discursive motivation. Moreover, the pragmatic consideration of alleviating discrimination/socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment through distancing oneself from stereotypical Chinese-ness (ethnically or religiously) can, too, create an additional security aspect to the social curve. Yet, the position of relativizing Chinese-ness to bend towards considerable reductionist cultural compromises limits access to integrationist-assimilation or assimilationist-integration processes either within the Chinese ethno-religious community or Indonesian society. Neither process can effectively maneuver perceptions of Chinese-ness in any way but rather allows an adaptability to perform social functionalism in alternative means; maneuver vis-à-vis restrictive mechanisms to reclassify a (morbid) “rejection” of Tridharma Chinese-ness in favor of Christianity and Islam.

Continually reordering Christian and Muslim policy platforms to necessarily ‘empty’ Chinese-ness compromises externalizing the social or communitarian Other. This does not satisfy the exclusive or inclusive needs of either group. It is impossible to appease the Other but contrarily stimulates the possibility of realizing an alternative Self that is reflective of Gus Durian politics. Access to culturally compromise bears witness of UKDW and PITI members to achieve a sense of ‘emptiness’ that is neither Chinese nor wholly Indonesian but is specifically Chinese-Indonesian. Christian-Chinese and Muslim-Chinese must continue to adapt to changing policy platforms to contend to the notion of emptiness as ensuring security in a gradual curve of reducing discrimination; gambling assurances of alienating ethnic characteristics to appeal to the greater socio-religious landscape. All-the-while, can Chinese groups exact themselves as nothing more
than ‘economic animals’ and free themselves from the limits of the cost-benefit of more dominant groups? Or can this be a shift towards something more socially pragmatic that promotes a democratic realization to a more plausible intersectionality? This itself is a notion that appeals to current policy platforms for religious-institutional protectionism that cannot be disregarded.

The case for Christian-Chinese and Muslim-Chinese to determine a strategy for placing policy must seek to reduce the intrinsic Chinese-ness of the Self, and to promote socially-inclined Indonesian characteristics through neo-colonial versions of Christianity and majoritarian Islam. Regrettably removed from the Chinese ethnic sphere and Tridharma groups, access to achieve these goals is limited in portraying relativized externalization as a representation of emptiness. Only through alternative religious lenses amid a socio-economic – socio-religious matrix does protectionist policies account for the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis and find adequate methods of combining the two social entities to promote a unified social ideal.

In this chapter, we discussed the policy platforms and security apparatuses of ‘double-minority’ Christian and Muslim groups and elevated the imaginary directional for both society and communities to consider these minority groups. However, even as there are differential tracks for reducing discrimination and anti-Chinese sentiment, the continuous juxtaposition for both Christians and Muslims is represented by neocolonial and majoritarian stereotypes that negatively impact groups based on ethno-religious affiliation. These complexes multiply and compound when it comes to the socio-economic – socio-religious matrix and the intervention of religious communities when
determining capacity, ability, and hierarchical structures. In the next and final chapter, I will consider how inter-faith dialogue simultaneously promotes and fails to commit an alternative directional for all groups. Where the wisdom of contributing to an alternative structure is part-and-parcel to the Indonesian societal complex and the Pancasila, but the effort obfuscates the tangibility of realizing identity and function for a post-structuralist age.
CHAPTER 3: THE WISDOM OF TOLERANCE

Through our discussion on material and structural determinism and how these aspects affect the dualistic construction of religious communities’ ability to mitigate discrimination and violence, a substantial facet of these two forces meet in the modern, 
*Gus Durian* approach to inter-faith dialogue. There are numerous aspects towards constructing security apparatuses in religious institutions, ethno-religious communities, and the ethnic population, but *Gus Durian* social politics provides a logical derivative for maneuvering interests accorded for the *ideal socio-religious landscape*. Whether this landscape provides space for minority religious communities to actively observe religious-cultural affinities or participate within the socio-economic – socio-religious matrix, Chinese populations can access different avenues for changing society. However, the only means to achieve this ideal, gradual process of realizing accommodation and/or integration is to provide (and gain) enough legitimacy to encourage dialogue in difference among religious communities. Though constructive dialogue and the actuality of achieving this goal is limited, the course of beginning an alternative option for social construction is paramount to defining modern Indonesian-ness aside from the historical woes of national history.

Inter-faith organizations, such as *Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama* (Forum of Religious Harmony; FKUB), *Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman* (Brotherhood in Faith
Forum; FPUB), and Institut Interfidei (Institute for Interfaith Dialogue; Interfidei), all coalesce around a central narrative that provides an alternative socio-religious construct to the status quo. Through an interconnected, intersectional policy platform, inter-faith dialogue brings together like-minded groups for the accentuation of dogmatic, *Pancasila* principles to guide society into democracy, pluralism, and entrepreneurialism. Keeping in mind that inter-faith dialogue presents an alternative perspective to constructing society through a socio-religious focus, the idea of securing marginalized group identities within the nexus of *Pancasila* doctrine *could*, in theory, present a modern outlook for protecting Indonesian ideals with *Gus Durian* characteristics.  

Religious-institutional protectionism and ethnic minorities form new communitarian structures to combat anti-Chinese sentiment and discriminatory rhetoric to adhere to a ‘silent majority.’ In this alternative to the status quo, the final chapter will discuss the paradigm of countering anti-Chinese sentiment through inter-faith dialogue; and analyze the security apparatuses that result from this alternative. Further, the parameters of how effective (or ineffective) a loosely organized ‘silent majority’ garners legitimacy and authority in a constant realignment of Indonesian societal polarities are taken into consideration.

If this idea can be deconstructed into abstract notions of socialized aggression by perceiving capacity and ability in alternative forms, the numerous juxtapositions of *masalah Cina* and the ‘Chinese Question’ confront the tensions contributory to both concepts. Even as the *Pancasila* provides guidelines for resolving tensions, *Pancasila*

---

175 This does not imply that *Gus Durian* characteristics are absent of Indonesian ideals, but to suggest a more *Gus Durian*-focused *Pancasila*.

doctrine must take root in local communities that already exhibit alternative nodes to the social construct; *wijkenstelsel* and *pecinan* no longer serve any function that align with the socio-economic – socio-religious matrix. The advantages that religious systems can provide to the eventual reduction of discrimination, violence, and anti-Chinese sentiment can only be dictated through religious-institutional protectionism that coexists under these communitarian constructs.

The practice of participating and observing inter-faith dialogue as a means of institutionalizing ‘nature and nurture’ complicates the socio-normative classification schemes handed down from the colonial era. On the contrary, self-categorization, self-identification, and self-verification appropriate social perspectives that reflect *l’air du temps*, and cannot mitigate the ensuing discrimination, violence, and anti-Chinese sentiment that follows from the natural congregationalist outcome of the gravitas in ethno-religious communitarianism. Each individual, group, and sub-group functions per the capacity, ability, and functionality appropriated per social construction. Yet, as previously discussed, these mechanisms of maintaining structure do not deliver on the dogmatic institutions of *Pancasila, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, and *Gus Durian* philosophy. Therein, the ‘silent majority’ exhibits strong dynamism that (albeit existing on the underlying channels of social rhetoric) has created an inquiry into how Indonesian-ness substantiates, legitimates, and authenticates the forms of discrimination, violence, and anti-Chinese sentiment. Institutions as dogmatic reflections of discrimination, violence, and anti-Chinese sentiment, weaponize mechanisms of isomorphic institutionalization, and stunt all forces of underlying social rhetoric into an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy.
How can these values become institutions where the majority of society finds themselves at economic juxtapositions with these Pancasila principles, and therein seek collaborative, religio-economic change?

Despite the phenomenology of the Muslim-Chinese existence, the crossroads that intersect Tridharma, Christian-Chinese, and Chinese Islam limit the ability to seek an Indonesian identity that is holistically and (all-the-while) partially Indonesian in maintaining the freedom to preserve Chinese religious-cultural affinities. Despite exceptions (mainly from PITI), these affinities are incompatible, if not dysfunctional, in the paradigm of Chinese communitarian constructs. Sofjan argues that this complexity indicates a rise of intolerant fundamentalist Islam, a return to monoculturalism, and a fervent reflection of a societal-exceptionalism that is representative of these monolithic, immovable concepts; indications of an explosive impossibility destructive towards exercising notions for pluralism. These indications dynamically change the socio-religious sphere apart from religious adherence to seeking notions against structural violence, the status quo, and relinquishing advances of Gus Durian politics in the form of elevating backward considerations in the name of Pancasila exceptionality.

Sofjan: “[Indonesian Islam] represent[s] a form of modern, progressive, and syncretic religion, which not only engages, but infuses local cultural practices, embraces ‘civic pluralism,’ and is seemingly accepting towards religious others… Recent developments and trends in the country, however, have pointed to a more assertive, if not aggressive, form of religiosity that seems to confirm the notion that Islam is a violent and intolerant religion… with a ‘democratic deficit.’”177

---

177 Sofjan, “Religious Diversity,” 55.
Perceiving the ‘silent majority’ as a “democratic deficit” impedes efforts of substantiating “social capital”\(^\text{178}\) in the socio-economic – socio-religious matrix that directly negates *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* as perverted representations of Islamic pillars for majoritarian societal symbolism. This dictation for whether Indonesian nationalism is subjectively directed goes beyond *Pancasila* doctrine and perceives such as dogmatic notions for dismantling anti-Indonesian characteristics and values. In this case, the *masalah Cina* is no longer solely an Indonesian issue, but also spills over into minority ethnic group considerations—the Chinese (as symbols of anti-Indonesian sentiment) prospect the eventual operationalization to demote Indonesian Islamic culture for the accession of a sacrosanct Other.

However, many Islamists do not consider fundamentalist rhetoric or action mandated in the social construct. Reforming socio-normative institutions that disenfranchise marginalized populations also maintains significance within the ‘silent majority’ of Islam itself. Belief in the promotion of Islam counters fundamentalist religious and ethnic groups’ efforts to suppress the socio-religious Other. These groups become a “passive resistance focused on the individual cultivation of spirituality and character…”\(^\text{179}\) The constitutionality of regarding the socio-religious Other *must* transcend notions of institutionalized, mechanical derivatives that represent the status quo rather than the evolutionary socio-religious landscape. In this, religion, as a central component, intertwines with the *Pancasila* as an effective method to instigate social

---


\(^{179}\) Machmudi, 97.
change for normativity, perceptions, and implications that regard alternative decision-making processes in favor of integrationist-assimilation. Through generational divides, democratization, and modernization, social change raises an inquiry of propagative- and binding laws that seeks reform through institutions that favor integration and dialogue.

These ideas have begun to culminate into a stronger ‘silent majority’; rather, a change to the rhetoric that is politicized by fundamentalist groups. As inter-faith dialogue structures incorporate essential elements of numerous systems, each individual religious system can officially recognize the religious Other as a means of promoting cooperation and collaboration; and seek to uphold Gus Durian and Pancasila facets for pluralism, multiculturalism, and tolerance. While this inter-faith structure is loosely organized, there is a significant appeal among younger generations, especially among those that represent congregations from minority groups. Organizational settings within institutions come at a cost, however—costs that reflect liberal communities’ seeking to transform the status quo. These representations disservice groups that favor exclusivity and the security apparatuses that are already in place. If these apparatuses are threatened, what will replace them and how much damage will minority groups incur?

There is much to be said about the efficacy of inter-faith organizations, such as FKUB, FPUB, and Interfidei. But there is also much to be said about their equal ineffectiveness to bridge religious differences through dialogue. This dialogue tends to be viewed as an abstract nature to unwelcomed liberalism and post-structuralism and furthered by impractical means of developing inter-communitarian inclusivity. There is only a small capacity to recognize religious diversity between communities and inter-
faith organizations. Whether there is an invitation or degree of inclusion between inter-faith organizations and the communities where these organizations are placed, the capability to observe a peaceful agreement between these two entities remains to be seen. Insisting that inter-faith organizations establish a successful counter to the rise of fundamentalism suggests that there is a desire to dismantle current structures; and to further suggest that fundamentalism is not welcomed (as it already maintains security, stability, and Indonesian cultural-exceptionalism). The initiative to seek agreements between these organizations are succinctly ‘top-down’ methods for pluralism and tolerance, ineffectively establishing mutually agreed-upon notions for inter-faith (and inter-communal) relationships. These inter-faith/inter-communitarian constructions tend to not accommodate minority groups (especially in a liberal, post-structural lens), which cannot substantiate necessary ‘bottom-up’ reflections from the wijkenstelsel or pecinan perspectives.¹⁸⁰

However, the threat to communitarian and institutional security is not necessarily threatened by the lack of community-development and cooperation, but the unwillingness for Islamic establishments to provide indirect security over public defamation. Wherein, the absence of speaking out against fundamentalist defamation or discrimination highlights the strength of certain groups.¹⁸¹ Within the Yogyakarta socio-religious – socio-economic matrix, the potentiality of violence is neither witnessed nor exhibited through physical episodes between religious communities but is instead indirectly

¹⁸⁰ Dhaewayani, 77.
¹⁸¹ Personal communication, 10 October 2017.
strengthened through religious group lobbying to parliamentarians or other public authority figures. Though the ‘umbrella of the Sultan’ provides an overarching sense of protection from significant violent episodes between ethno-religious groups, the security apparatuses (for majoritarian and politico-bureaucrats) sets policy-making directives to ensure fundamentalist cultural and Islamic groups are favored. Just as Tahun Baru Imlek and other public displays for Chinese religious-cultural affinities are restricted, the consideration of living in a ‘fearful’ time (for both extremes of the social paradigm) underlines the political games that powerful clergymen play in Yogyakarta politics. While these dynamics are not explicitly witnessed, the reduction of public events, veiling of religious icons, and the reduction of Chinese inter-community participation are clear signs of politico-religious maneuvering.

There are numerous doubts over exhibiting certain characteristics, or publicizing practical observances, related to Chinese culture or Tridharma. The validity, authority, and legitimacy of individuals and/or groups exhibiting these characteristics outside of their communities’ concerns destabilizes security apparatuses and dismantles fragile communitarian systems that have taken years to construct. Yet, even as these concerns are important, it is also equally important to appear as a grounded organization that seeks to diminish these perceptions. This debate questions possible outcomes when projecting an image of security that is based not only on the socio-religious landscape but suggests that perceiving inter-faith dialogue is an additional means of stimulating the local economy. If Chinese groups could be considered as part-and-parcel to the authenticity and legitimacy of co-constructing social, religious, and cultural exceptionalities within
communities, then distressed economies could access Chinese communities as *both* neighbors *and* consumers. The inability to foment a sense of Chinese-influenced ‘bottom-up’ re-construction represents the utter lack of appreciation for communitarianism, especially within the socio-economic sphere. Status quo institutions do not perceive that change is necessary.¹⁸²

In order to imagine the ‘silent majority’ and establish a sense of community upbringing, the conjoining of matrices must demand (and depend) upon cultural compromise and the deinstitutionalization of *cultural categories*. Institutions must shift perceptions of neo-colonial (*wijkenstelsel* and *pecinan* community structures) to indeterminably imagine (and actualize) feasible methods of working outside of these norms. Differences between “rule-takers” and “rule-makers”¹⁸³ can ultimately present new dynamics that reconsider the status quo as a vehicle for exposing entrenched social progress; security cannot be protected if the means for strengthening important community values remain suppressed in the hands of a few. Communities must redefine “definitional work”¹⁸⁴ for themselves—redefining capacity and ability to better define *who* and *what* are part of the communitarian system—and to externalize these underutilized mechanisms for achieving community-development.

Ibnu Hasan Muchtar and Farhan Muntafa highlight these possibilities and suggest that inter-faith dialogue organizations are the very mechanisms of which these

¹⁸³ Capoccia, 1101.
¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 1106.
communities desire. Even as elitist, politico-bureaucratic administrative bodies muddle progress in inter-faith organizations and affiliated religious institutions (within the FKUB network especially), the effective workings of inter-faith organizations (particularly in Yogyakarta) represent (at least) one possible venue for reconciling the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. Community harmoniousness results from coming together as a way to reconsider cultural compromise, deinstitutionalizing cultural categories, and redefining capacity and ability for community-development, i.e. after-school tutoring sessions (apart from religiously-based subjects), cleaning the local stream or river from plastics, creating a local food bank among Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims, and sharing space for observing religious practices outside of the establishment’s own system.185 “Therefore, it is necessary to empower thoroughly both from the capacity of institutions and FKUB resources to be optimal in providing effective influence on the increase of religious harmony.”186 Simple, yet effective, mechanisms for collaborating with the socio-religious Other demonstrates plausible developmental initiatives that overlook the differential facets of religious systems, and promotes the construction of similarity based on economic necessity.

The forces initiating community-based development must continually renegotiate with each other to configure communitarian and institutional structures that adhere to l’air du temps and the careful compromises that are critical to community harmoniousness. If communities and institutions can co-construct these fragile structures,

185 Personal communication, 26 November 2017.
186 Muchtar and Muntafa, 73.
they are simultaneously compounding upon security apparatuses that are religiously, economically, ethnically, and geographically based. Socio-religious and socio-economic capacities for social function and participation continuously redefine notions of compromise and community-development. Further, these developments concurrently revisit *Pancasila* doctrine in pursuit of community-minded goals; Giovanni Capoccia: “…we should not abandon current theories of endogenous institutional change but rather *extend* them to more fully understand the institutional conditions and the strategies that favor *endogenous institutional stability.*” By shedding light on the variabilities that can happen through constant renegotiation and adaptation, we can note of the tendencies that evolve systems based on “accountability, responsibility, liability, and blame” that dictate communitarian construction regardless of external social actors. The nexus of the religio-economic conflict exists as a set of components for viewing society as constitutive building blocks, each defined through notions of material and structural determinism. This network for viewing the Other as solely economic actors must be deconstructed in order to understand the (forced) marginal aspects of historical and philosophical social constructions that authenticate normative anti-Chinese sentiment; and further, the violence that is ridden throughout Indonesian societal-exceptionalism. (Monolithically demonstrating actors as solely economic does not present the intersectional phenomenological outcome of the matrices previously discussed.)

---

187 Ibid. 1117.
Even as inter-faith organizations exist in the background of the socio-religious conflict between Islamic socio-structural entities and the ‘silent majority’-Gus Durian-fronted entities, devolving factors associated with the socio-economic aspects of the relationship is the most difficult aspects in transforming this deeply entrenched dispute. Even as communities tend to evolve, renegotiate, and co-construct depending upon individual needs, interests, capacities, and abilities, the cleavages that distinguish them from the greater Islamic society tends to disregard the ability for recognizing the socio-economic capacities through inter-faith dialogue—disregarding the fundamental systems responsible for institutionalizing conflict. These two social spheres cooperate and are more-often-than-not separated based on neo-colonial considerations of ethnically-focused religious systems (even Islam cannot exist in this mindset!). Devolution must be re-oriented to recognize these dispositions to witness and utilize differences in material and structural deterministic policy platforms.\textsuperscript{189}

Through inter-faith organizations, community-development, and relationship-building, stronger security apparatuses finally become feasible and incentivize community groups to re-consider status quo structures that are inhibitory and challenge community engagement. This process disassembles socio-normative considerations for substantiating \textit{masalah Cina}, suggesting for a possibility to repurpose prescriptions in alleviating social tension by redirecting these community-development initiatives towards the resolution of the ‘Chinese Question.’ Inter-faith organizations, such as FPUB and

Interfidei, can (and have) promoted these actions throughout numerous communities and have accomplished a significant reduction in the degrees of separation between Christian-Chinese and nearby Islamic institutions. Furthermore, Catholic parishes have expanded upon FPUB and Interfidei activism by holding discussions within the parish as a place to inspire, embolden, and empower marginalized groups to realize ‘cultural access’ through compromise.

Community dialogue sessions or events propose re-classifying entrenched notions of anti-Chinese sentiment, and even Indonesian societal-exceptionalism, through the promotion of dialogue aside from contentions topics of ethnicity, religion, and shared trauma. Yet, even as ethnicity and/or religion are never focal points for dialogue, these meetings are based on common religious principles that promote forgiveness, respect, and harmony. Upon shared values, the possibility to understand collective trauma, memory, and history become accessible avenues for translating negative social norms into tangible, practical efforts for engagement, development, and cooperation. Discussions epitomize the nexus of capitalizing on the socio-religious sphere to strengthen and expand the socio-economic sphere for the community.

These notions of community-building and -development through relationships is a pivotal concept in Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Daiseku Ikeda’s work The Wisdom of Tolerance. By bridging the numerous concepts that are part-and-parcel to communitarianism, ethno-religious establishments, and religious institutions; communities overcome monolithic perceptions of the social Other and combine capacity and ability to forward pluralism, multiculturalism, and tolerance through democratic
mechanisms. Gus Dur and Ikeda promote interactions between Islam and Buddhism as both systems lament over the suffering of others; whereas it is the principled (if not dogmatic) responsibility of these followers to collaborate in mutually beneficial means for resolving tensions, reconciling the past, and utilizing negativity towards transforming communities. Education among all social groups, especially through inter-faith-based relationships, captures the very essence of Javanese culture and education; a ‘support from behind’190—religion and culture are fundamental pillars for strengthening communal values. Intimate characteristics and re-identifying these anew can instill powerful messages.191 Recognizing the ability to access culture through compromise—initiating dialogue with the social Other—represents the most difficult hurdle to cross. These fragile paths weaken the status quo and threaten the stability and legitimacy of social institutions. It is the cause and concern for like-minded communities and groups to revisit Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and reconsider elements of Pancasila—efforts that inter-faith organizations essentialize in activism and advocacy.

The consideration of educating through indigenous means (indigenization or pribumisasi) can become a mode of social change (and therein, security) for marginalized communities. This curriculum directs institutional or socio-governmental foci from the majority policy platform and redesigns it to enable (and integrate) minority access to participate and function within that node. This curriculum promotes a sense of familiarity among distressed communities so that the socio-religious landscape can soften and

---

191 Ibid. 104.
become flexible. If the socio-religious sphere represents the vital ‘organ’ to communal considerations vis-à-vis l’air du temps, then the effectual means of substantiating community-development is a subsequent process. This is the method for constructing an evolutionary society that appreciates its indigenous ontological systems. Ikeda:

“Nothing inspires children, boys, and young people with a true feeling of strength, with the sure and vibrant feeling of an elevated spiritual life, more effectively than complete familiarity with their immediate environment and the region in which they were born and have lived, knowing in detail about their natural environment and its products, and having a complete understanding of them. Nothing has the function of reinforcing the true feeling of strength, of reinforcing and fostering the sure and vibrant feeling of an elevated spiritual life, as the awareness of this feeling.”192

While the concept of inter-faith dialogue maintains a lofty position in liberal, post-structural thinking, it is necessary to consider the ineffectiveness of inter-faith initiatives to grab a foot-hold throughout the socio-normative contentiousness that segregates Chinese populations from the remainder of society. There is no lack of skepticism among these marginalized communities from participating based on the very liberality and post-structuralist mindset of inter-faith operationalization. Both groups need each other to gain authority among the ‘silent majority’ and to promote Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and Pancasila doctrine throughout communities in the form of community-development. This is no easy task, especially as fundamentalist Islamic groups actively seek to dissolve these communal bridges through threats, violence, and publicly revisiting the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis.

192 Ibid.: 113-114.
However, if the concept of inter-faith dialogue can become a synonymous reference to the ‘umbrella of the Sultan’ as an overall security apparatus, then Yogyakarta society can address the threats that seek to dissolve dialogue and community-development through a religio-economic lens. Communities that operate through this lens have already speckled the socio-religious landscape; Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims; Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims. Within each of these intersectional relationships, the expansion of *Gus Durian* philosophy gradually becomes socio-normative (at least within the construct of the ‘silent majority’) and naturally changes perception through education, discussion, and familiarity. Regardless of socio-normative perceptions of the social Other (in traditional terms of capacity, ability, function and participation), the essence of highlighting group access to the socio-religious – socio-economic matrix reflects a liberal, post-structuralist line of progressive thinking that is impossible to quell. Inter-faith dialogue, then, begins a line of social change that can alleviate the residual tensions of traumatic histories.
CONCLUSION

Security is absolute. As numerous marginalized populations suffer at the dictation of fundamentalist groups beholden to power through residual Suharto politics, the possibility of accessing a hostile society is unlikely. Social institutions represent strict adherences to policy platforms within the social, political, economic, and religious spheres. Yet, even as these institutions maintain a considerable amount of social power to influence the ethnic dynamic of the Chinese population, the effect of accessing this dynamic is an impossible consideration. Collective trauma, distrust of social institutions, geographic segregation, obstacles to observe religious-cultural affinities, and the historical limitations towards recognizing the essentials of Chinese-Indonesian-ness obfuscate future possibilities of living comfortably, or legitimately, within the Indonesian societal complex.

Considerations for the Chinese minority is aggravated further by their existence as a ‘double minority’; ethnicity and religion work together to further marginalize minority groups. While these additional considerations to the ‘Chinese Question’ muddle the possibilities of realizing an integrationist-assimilation/assimilationist-integration, these characteristics have phenomenologically made head-way for alternative directions. Tridharma, Christianity, and Islam provide alternative identities Chinese populations; venues that allow the possibility to access other categories while adhering to culture,
customs, and history. These possibilities are essential in the plight of the ‘Chinese Question,’ especially as the perceptions towards capacity, ability, function and participation continuously adjust/adapt to *l’air du temps* and social dictation. Nonetheless, essentializing an alternative, distinctive identity to the majoritarian Indonesian ideal is a social capital that ultimately reflects in accessing mobility.

The Chinese population is fragile, loosely organized, and dependent upon other groups to legitimate its existence within society. Even as religious institutions and their respective communities construct security apparatuses to solidify as sense of direction, comfort, and mobility, socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment continues to be a mainstay in Indonesian society that significantly affects the likelihood of long-term survival. Yet, these communities are incredibly unique in their individual constructs—supplying basic human needs, physical protection, and mechanizing policy platforms to accordingly adjust/adapt to changing social tides. Religions and ethnicities reflect the exceptional variabilities of Indonesian society to adhere to *wawasan nusantara*, notwithstanding institutional perceptions of the social Other. The ability to access and engage in differential characteristics represent a culmination of Chinese survivability and protectionism as essential pillars to identity in the ‘Chinese Question.’

Further, religion and ethnicity combine into unusual but necessary effects for substantiating a sense of security and institutional protectionism for the ‘Chinese Question,’ establishing an overall identity of ‘emptiness.’ By removing the desire to identify as Chinese, these ‘empty’ populations can direct more effort into accessing attainable varieties of Indonesian-ness and can attribute individual contributions towards
improving societal-exceptionalism that is part-and-parcel to the social cleavages that created their ‘Question.’ However, even as these possibilities are possible to access, religious institutions and their respective communities reflect alternative nodes to possible social construct in the majority that ‘silently’ revolutionizes security apparatuses. Education, community-development, inter-faith dialogue, etc. promote the concrete values of the Pancasila—“the ‘hope of Indonesia’ to bring light to the ‘ambiguity in factuality’”\textsuperscript{193}—rather than instigating religiously-focused agendas. Religious exchange through a dialogue in difference reflects the possibility of change. Interactions between these communities brought together by community-development extends this curriculum to promote familiarity and the possibility to renegotiate socio-normative perceptions of the social Other.

Therein, the Chinese population stands as a juxtaposition. Tridharma-Chinese cannot justify a relegation of core Chinese characteristics in favor of accessing the society at-large; whereas collective memory, trauma, and history continue to propagate prominent pillars of Chinese identity that haunt the possibility of finding a possible alternative. These components to Chinese identity are substantial insomuch that culture, ethnicity, and religion derive aspects to policy platforms that effectively construct institutions; and shift processes of Chinese religious re-identification, re-categorization, and re-verification schemes. The negative aspect of identifying differently from the core Chinese population is to remove the few cultural symbols that remain in existence from the psyche and to replace them with Indonesian pillars. This is a violation of trust, an

\textsuperscript{193} Personal communication, 1 July 2017.
alienation of culture, and an ostracization from Chinese-ness. Yet, this is becoming a common practice.

Among younger Chinese generations, the trauma of the ‘1965 Affair’ and the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis are becoming faint memories in the maintenance of cultural institutions. Socio-normative anti-Chinese social institutions responsible for continued discrimination and violence in the social sphere are becoming obsolete within the wake of generational trends. Numerous groups are opting to relinquish these Chinese religious-cultural affinities in favor of mitigating all forms of violence. But in order to do this successfully, these groups must replace identity with alternative identities more in-line with Indonesian recognizable characteristics. Christianity and Islam both contain significant Chinese-based groups within their systems and experience a heightened sense of reduced violence. The consideration of identifying with an ethnically-based group in an alternative religious system is more appealing than entirely relinquishing the Chinese cultural Self. This fine line of ‘cultural access’ in compromise can effectively dissolve Chinese culture in respect for the community, and also promote a significant loss of memory, history, and identity in favor for something not yet proven to be beneficial for the ethnic community at-large.

While inter-faith organizations, cultural accommodation in religious institutions and communities, and the possibility of expressing cultural-exceptionalism are now methods for re-vitalizing Chinese-exceptionalism, the possibility of achieving a full integration or assimilation is a difficult outcome to realize. Socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment is strongly rooted in Indonesian society, and the fervor that represents a liberal,
post-structuralist age cannot effectively penetrate traditional, fundamentalist cultural and religious groups’ perspectives on societal-exceptionalism. Despite the rise of a ‘silent majority’ that aligns poles with the plight of the ‘Chinese Question,’ inter-faith organizations continue the trend of Chinese disenfranchisement vis-à-vis derivatives in the manner of entrenched views on material and structural determinism; and how these economic pillars necessitate wijkenstelsel and based on intrinsic economic value. In these cases, security apparatuses are only effective in communitarian constructs while also demanding that these communities insist on adhering to the dictates of the majority.

In essence, security apparatuses are plausible means for establishing a ‘cultural access’ through compromise, but also limit the possibility of accessing this same right in Indonesian culture and society. Considering the ‘Chinese Question’ ontologically, Chinese culture is not allowed to penetrate Indonesian society regardless of the historical and current cultural appreciation that has cemented Chinese-ness as part of Indonesian-ness. Recognizing essential aspects of the social construct to mitigate potential violence is indeterminable. The utility to maintain a ‘reign of (Suharto-esque) fear’ continues to capture the economic drive, and therefore mechanize violence in order to achieve lofty ends. Materialistic determinants mechanize social function while further instituting the need for Chinese groups to remain as they always have remained. Even if the rhetoric for Chinese groups to maintain the status quo by remaining within the wijkenstelsel and pecinan structures, the operationalization of the Chinese ethnic sphere is hardened and impossible to dissect based on these immovable pillars for economic success.
The position of Chinese groups must consider the advancements that have been made and re-visit the consternation of traditional, *Tridharma* values for establishing a semi-fluid concept that integrates all aspects of Chinese-exceptionalism with societal-exceptionalism. The ‘Chinese Question’ is not so much as a problem in itself, but rather that is continues to revolve around *masalah Cina* as a nodal function for how society views the Chinese and enforces social function to adhere to that viewpoint. Re-identifying *Tridharma* as a communitarian example for bridging ethnic and religious divides based on similarities can become a model for other ethnic/religious groups to develop communities together. Chinese characteristics established under one central, ethno-religious complex can contribute to the phenomenological modeling of the socio-economic – socio-religious matrix as a recognition of struggle; whereas “the social world is ‘the product and the state of cognitive and political symbolic struggles over knowledge and recognition.’”¹⁹⁴ Producing a ‘cultural meaning’ in reflection to this recognition invigorates communitarian values and perspectives, and questions the implications of socio-normative anti-Chinese sentiment. Moreover, the younger generational push towards re-identifying *Tridharma* boundaries suggests that the *masalah Cina* has become part of the ‘Chinese Question.’ Chinese must reevaluate the role of Chinese in Indonesian society to account for this cleavage in transforming livelihood and security at the expense of the community.

Therein, the ability of Chinese populations to view themselves as ‘empty’ is not a hopeless cause-for-concern but establishes the ‘double-minority’ as a pillar of identity. This is a means of securing ‘cultural access’ through compromise. The magnitude of alleviating discrimination, violence, and anti-Chinese sentiment becomes a mechanism for softening the trauma of the past with a new age of Indonesian socialization. If security apparatuses provide a sense of religious-institutional protectionism—as a center for community-development, relationship-building, and accessing culture (either Chinese or Indonesian)—then the end goal is to find tangible, practical ways of integrating into society through gradual, peaceful, cohabitational means. Perhaps the consideration of ‘emptiness’ represents the mechanics of achieving pribumisasi; whereas religious institutions serve as policy platforms for combating both the ‘Chinese Question’ and masalah Cina in one, already unified, structure for dismantling anti-Chinese socio-normative sentiment into an integrationist-assimilatory agenda.

Chinese religious-institutional protectionism in post-1998 society reflects the static and fluid natures of Indonesian societal-exceptionalism and Chinese cultural-exceptionalism. The two depend on each other, and these social constructs that derive the need to dictate policy platforms are directly related to communitarian constructs, development, and the need to institutionalize religious systems as centers for observance in ethnic solidarity. While history manages to substantiate much of the directive within policy-making, the order of softening cultural pride by replacing religious-cultural affinities with characteristics of the social Other dismantles notions that obfuscate social progression. It is imperative for religious institutions to continue working as community
centers for monitoring and adjusting to *l’air du temps* to ensure the likelihood of a possible integration/assimilation, and to look for meaningful ways to develop communities through ethnic and religious exchange. These opportunities for inter-faith dialogue, cultural exchange, and cooperative engagement represent a holistic security apparatus for communities and society and strive to improve upon historical notions of violence.

Throughout this discussion, I hope I have brought light to the status quo of the ‘Chinese Question’ and *masalah Cina*, and to provide an additional understanding for how these Chinese populations substantiate Chinese-ness in communities through religious-institutionalism as means for protecting identity and memory through solidarity. By considering alternative means for perceiving how the Self interacts with the Other, it is important to consider the historical and modern constructions of Chinese identity and how various communities have structured identity into communal policy platforms to mitigate normative pillars for anti-Chinese sentiment, discrimination, and violence. While these platforms vary, Chinese communities operate through unique mechanisms to mitigate this sentiment; and through generational, ethnic, religious, and economic means, the ‘Chinese Question’ seems to finally withstand the nature of Indonesian oppression. Though the ‘Chinese Question’ is riddled (and part-and-parcel to-) with *masalah Cina*, the effects of the past are still very recent, and are not to be stifled by progressive, liberal, and post-structuralist considerations for present-day bandages following *l’air du temps*. It is up to these differences and similarities of the Chinese to account for collective
memory, trauma and violence, and to shift these values into communitarian and institutional pillars that truly represent Chinese characteristics.

“If you can conquer your ego, then you will be [enlightened.] Positioning is an active [obstruction] to resolving conflict. [These] obstructions impede the conflict resolution techniques of ‘minimizing differences,’ ‘[asserting] basic human needs,’ and the ‘self-determination’ of conflict as a mutual process. By proceeding through [community-based conflict resolution], the [method] can determine the path to the [re-balancing] of conflict [in communities].”

195 Personal communication, 5 July 2017.


_____. “Buddhism and Confucianism in Contemporary Indonesia: Recent Developments.” In *Chinese Indonesians: Forgetting, Distorting, Remembering*. 150


Joshua M. Mahuna is a graduate student within the George Mason University - School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution where he focuses on Southeast Asian securitization, Chinese diasporic studies, and indigenous alternative dispute resolution methodologies. Mahuna’s research comprises of identity, positionality, human-security, and religious studies, in addition to original theoretical model research on indigenous mediation techniques and cross-cultural communication. After earning his baccalaureate of arts degree in International Studies from Hawai‘i Pacific University, his focus has gained a rich perspective from his Native Hawaiian heritage and international experience throughout marginalized communities across the Pacific and Southeast Asia.