

NEW VOICES IN PUBLIC POLICY

Volume V
Spring 2011

Recommendations to Reduce Sexual Violence in Haitian Internally Displaced Persons' (IDP) Camps

Maggie Emery
Megan Shaw
Lisa Santosa
Olivia Bird

The authors are Masters of Public Policy students at the School of Public Policy, George Mason University, Arlington, VA. Corresponding Author: Olivia Bird, obird@masonlive.gmu.edu.



School of Public Policy

ISSN: 1947-2633

Acronyms

BAI	Bureau des Avocats Internationaux
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IJDH	Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
KOFAVIV	Commission of Women Victims for Victims
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
RAPP	Rape Accountability and Prevention Project
UN	United Nations

Executive Summary

In January 2010, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake tore through the area surrounding Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince, destroying much of the city's already fragile infrastructure. Over 222,570 people were killed and 300,572 injured.¹ An additional 2.3 million—almost a quarter of the population— were displaced and now live in roughly 1,300 internally displaced person (IDP) camps.² The camps are constructed mostly of tarpaulins, have limited public shower and toilet facilities, and lack adequate lighting and sanitation.³ These living conditions exacerbate the already high risks of sexual violence⁴ in Haiti.

As sexual violence is severely underreported, no official statistics exist for the levels of rape in IDP camps in Haiti. However, there is evidence that sexual violence is rampant.⁵ In fact, a University of Michigan study estimates that 3% of the female Haitian population in IDP camps has experienced sexual violence since the earthquake.⁶

Although \$5.5 billion have been pledged to rebuild Haiti in the months following the earthquake, aid absorption is low and disbursement is slow.⁷ In fact, the few Haitian groups that are working to address sexual violence have received little to no funding in the last ten months.⁸

This paper is a response to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti's (MINUSTAH) decision in September 2010 to launch a campaign to eliminate sexual violence in Haitian IDP camps. In order to successfully carry out a campaign to end sexual violence, MINUSTAH must involve local Haitian women and non-government organizations (NGOs) in all phases of planning and implementation. In doing so, MINUSTAH should provide practical training programs to women and men living in the

IDP camps and assist them to form autonomous security brigades⁹ in order to protect women and prevent sexual violence.

1. Introduction

In response to MINUSTAH's request for analysis and recommendations to combat sexual violence, this paper presents details concerning the history of sexual violence and the current situation in Haitian IDP camps. It identifies local grassroots organizations in Haiti that MINUSTAH should look to for guidance and partnership, while emphasizing the urgency in addressing the crisis through improved collaboration between MINUSTAH and local groups. Finally, this paper offers an analysis and recommendations to immediately reduce sexual violence in the camps, with evidence as to why these recommendations apply to Haiti's current context.

2. Overview

2.1. Stakeholders

Unable to travel to Haiti to investigate the situation firsthand, the evidence assembled throughout this paper stem from a number of reports¹⁰ which document the prevalence of sexual violence in IDP camps.¹¹ Based on these reports, the following stakeholders should be consulted in any MINUSTAH program aimed at reducing sexual violence in Haitian IDP camps. Key actors, and reasons for involving them in further projects, include:

- *Local Population:* Women, underage girls and families that have directly and/or indirectly been affected by sexual violence in the camps. Current and future MINUSTAH projects must engage local women and their families as they reformulate their strategy on combating sexual violence. MINUSTAH will benefit from collecting information and data in IDP communities to gain better awareness

of the precise dynamics of the problem. Local women are also crucial in the empowerment process.¹²

- *Domestic and International organizations:* The Commission of Women Victims for Victims (KOFIV) and MADRE's Haiti chapter are essential here. These organizations have formed a partnership and have acted effectively to improve security in several IDP camps. Together, they have launched campaigns to tackle sexual violence and have earned the respect of local residents. Moreover, they have coordinated successful operations with limited means, demonstrating that minimal funding is needed to provide Haitian women with security in the camps.¹³ Partnerships like these are key to strengthening transnational advocacy networks and these networks are instrumental in putting pressure on the local government to take action.¹⁴
- *Public Officials:* Haitian mayors of towns that enclose IDP camps, municipal staff, and local and national representatives must be included in talks that involve planning and coordinating national operations against sexual violence. Health officials are crucial mouthpieces to inform women of the necessary steps to take to reduce sexual violence. Moreover, in a society where dire socio-economic conditions have often bred sexual violence,¹⁵ education officials are necessary agents in teaching Haitian youth—both male and female—about alternative choices to violent sexual behavior.

2.2. Sexual Violence in Haiti

Sexual violence is not a new phenomenon in Haiti. Haitian politics have historically nurtured rape as a political tool, especially in times of upheaval.¹⁶ During the

two decades preceding the earthquake, sexual violence was widespread in Port-au-Prince, notably under the regime of General Raoul Cédras after he ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide in 1991.¹⁷ Sexual violence rates for all age groups were described as “shocking” at the time.¹⁸ Estimates reveal that between 2004 and 2006 almost one in 40 underage girls were sexually assaulted each year in the greater Port-au-Prince area.¹⁹

History has also demonstrated that women are disproportionately affected by disaster around the globe.²⁰ Violence against women manifests itself in new ways during different phases of a natural disaster.²¹ In Haiti, it is no surprise that the chaotic aftermath of the earthquake has increased the vulnerability of already at-risk women and girls to sexual violence.²²

In the IDP camps, this vulnerability has been exacerbated by the lack of formal security. In addition, insufficient lighting at night, open-air sanitary facilities, and poor shelter intensify this risk.²³ According to our research, the most pressing four areas, which increase the prevalence of sexual violence in the camps, are:

- *Lack of lighting:* Little to no electric lighting is provided in the camps, which makes women more susceptible to attacks at night—when the majority of sexual violence occurs.²⁴
- *Lack of privacy:* Camps lack private bathing areas for women, who are forced to wash themselves and use the toilets in public view of men.²⁵
- *Lack of security:* Women report a general lack of security in the camps, especially at night. UN guards are too few in number (see Table 1 in Annex) to conduct organized patrols within camps, tending to stay on the outskirts.²⁶

- *Loss of familial structure:* Many women and girls lost family members in the earthquake,

particularly male relatives who once served as their caretakers.²⁷

Without a support network, women and girls are more

vulnerable to violence, especially as many now live and sleep alone.²⁸

Figure 1
(Morrison 2007, 33)

Fatal outcomes	Physical injuries and chronic conditions	Nonfatal outcomes	Sexual and reproductive sequelae	Psychological and behavioral outcomes
Femicide	Fractures	Gynecological disorders		Depression and anxiety
Suicide	Abdominal/thoracic injuries	Pelvic Inflammatory disease		Eating and sleep disorders
AIDS-related mortality	Chronic pain syndromes	Sexually-transmitted infections, including HIV		Drug and alcohol abuse
Maternal mortality	Fibromyalgia	Unwanted pregnancy		Phobias and panic disorder
	Permanent disability	Pregnancy complications		Poor self-esteem
	Gastrointestinal disorders	Miscarriage / low birth weight		Post-traumatic stress disorder
	Irritable bowel syndrome	Sexual dysfunction		Psychosomatic disorders
	Lacerations and abrasions	Unsafe abortion		Self harm
	Ocular damage			Unsafe sexual behavior

Why is it important to address sexual violence in Haiti when the country faces other pressing issues, including socio-economic collapse and repair of severe infrastructural damage? The impact of sexual violence on women and girls has enormous implications for Haiti's rebuilding in the aftermath of the earthquake. Sexual violence greatly impacts women's mental and physical health; many of the women living in the IDP camps have reported injuries such as those listed in Figure 1.²⁹

While the exact costs of sexual violence are hard to measure, they greatly impact developing economies. Not only must we take into account the direct and indirect costs, shown in Figure 2, but also the economic multiplier effects which impact the society and country as a whole.³⁰ These include decreased worker productivity and incomes, and lower growth rates of human and social capital, both of which lead to violence as frustration and free time mount.³¹ For example, according to a 1997 study on Chile,


domestic violence cost the country \$1.56 billion—more than 2% of their 1996 GNP.³² Women are the pillars of Haitian society; in addition to caring for their families, they represent 75% of the informal workforce.³³ With Haiti’s economy in its current dire state, the country cannot rebuild the economy without addressing sexual violence and its impact on women.

2.3. Current Work on the Ground

As previously mentioned, local groups in Haiti have successfully implemented anti-sexual violence projects in the IDP camps, despite very limited funding. The cooperative efforts between local grassroots and well-funded international organizations are crucial to generating ways to reduce sexual violence in the IDP camps.³⁴ Particularly successful in addressing sexual violence are multinational partnerships formed between international organizations such as the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH); the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI); and MADRE; and local groups, such as the Commission of Women Victims for Victims (KOFIVIV).³⁵

The coordinator of KOFIVIV confirmed during a recent interview that public officials in Haiti are doing little to prevent rape in the IDP camps.³⁶ We believe that addressing the apathy of government officials would require large systematic changes in Haiti. Since the goal of this paper is to provide short-term solutions, we will focus on engaging with, and supporting grassroots organizations that can be mobilized quickly and effectively.

Figure 2: The Boomerang Pattern (Chen 2010, 2)



Partnerships between domestic and international organizations often succeed in putting pressure on unresponsive domestic governments. This “Boomerang Pattern,” shown in Figure 2, has successfully pushed for sexual violence to be addressed in the U.N. Agenda, and brought gender-based violence into the realm of human rights.³⁷ MINUSTAH must work closely with local Haitian organizations in order to prevent further sexual violence in IDP camps. Examples of the activities led by international and Haitian NGOs are described in the subsequent paragraphs.

2.3.1. Commission of Women Victims for Victims (KOFVIV)

KOFVIV is a Haitian, women-led organization based in Port-au-Prince. The local group has gained extensive credibility in IDP camps for its proactive stance in protecting vulnerable women. Members of KOFVIV provide the social services that the Haitian government has been unable to offer to its people. KOFVIV members accompany victims to the hospital and the police station, organize nighttime community watch groups and distribute cell phones, whistles and flashlights to women in the camps.³⁸ MADRE reports that “they have over 1,000 members in the camps, and women know that they can turn to KOFVIV if they’ve been raped”.³⁹ However, KOFVIV has mostly acted independently of public officials whom they described in a recent interview as unresponsive.⁴⁰ Additionally, the local grassroots organization has been unable to sustain many of its projects in IDP camps as gangs regularly threaten them when they operate in slum territory.⁴¹ To their own acknowledgment, without the help of international partnerships—MADRE and IJDH amongst others—KOFVIV would not have survived for very long.⁴²

2.3.2. MADRE

MADRE is a women-led human rights organization that has battled sexual violence globally since 1983. It specializes in partnering with community-based women's organizations to address issues such as reproductive rights and sexual violence. MADRE has been responsive to addressing women's needs in post-disaster situations around the world, including such challenging locations as Gaza and Burma.⁴³ In Haiti, MADRE has worked closely with KOFAVIV by delivering food and water, funding local activities, and offering substantial coverage of their projects via their website in the months since the earthquake.⁴⁴

2.3.3. The Haiti Rape Accountability and Prevention Project (RAPP)

RAPP is the result of a partnership between the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH), and an international legal group named Bureau des Avocats Internationaux (BAI). Their collaboration provides low-income victims of sexual assault with low-cost legal services in the aftermath of the earthquake.⁴⁵ BAI has also gained substantial credibility for initiating the "whistle project" which distributes whistles to women in IDP camps so they can signal if they or others are being attacked.⁴⁶ Haitian women in the camps have successfully implemented the project, as explained and demonstrated by the coordinator of KOFAVIV.⁴⁷

Undeniably, local groups possess the will and expertise needed by MINUSTAH staff to successfully carry out a campaign to combat sexual violence in Haiti. MINUSTAH would greatly benefit from their experience in implementing sexual violence prevention projects on a larger scale in Haiti's IDP camps.

3. Recommendations to improve security

Women in IDP camps face security concerns which make them vulnerable to sexual violence. Which mechanisms are available to best protect them from further sexual violence in the short-term? Four priority areas were identified to reduce the high incidence of sexual violence occurring in the camps in the short-term. These are: security brigades; solar-powered streetlights; women-only areas for bathing and safety; and training programs on preventing sexual violence.

In order to gain an accurate picture of the costs of potential means to improve security in the camps, a hypothetical IDP camp that is representative of the existing situation in Haiti was imagined. Camps vary greatly in size and number of residents; the size chosen for this report represents an average of the more than 1,300 camps that emerged following the 2010 earthquake. Assume that the camp:

- Is roughly two square kilometers and home to 20,000 residents;
- Has limited, unreliable electricity;
- Has no sexual violence prevention training programs, and;
- Has a few informal and irregular women-only brigades which patrol the camp at night.

3.1. Security Brigades

KOFAVIV recommends that informal security brigades should be supported with additional resources, such as flashlights, t-shirts, and whistles.⁴⁸ The minimum wage in Haiti for an eight-hour day of work is approximately \$5.⁴⁹ Working with KOFAVIV's agents and other local NGO staff, volunteers would sign up for four-hour shifts at night.

In addition to stipends, t-shirts (valued at \$2 each) and whistles (\$0.10 each) would be provided to each volunteer. Brigade coordinators would be paid an additional \$2 per day.

Even though this requires working during the night, due to high levels of unemployment, finding volunteers—both male and female, over the age of 18—should not be difficult. Those accepted into the program would receive cash payments at the end of each shift. MINUSTAH would work with local NGOs to hire trusted coordinators to ensure that the brigade program was properly implemented. As no construction is needed, the only time constraints are making sure that funding is in place, reliable volunteers can be found, and shirts and whistles are provided. Over the course of four hours, 20 people could cover an area of one square kilometer. For this camp, two patrol groups were recommended. They should consist of 20 people, or 40 people per night and circulate between the hours of 8 pm and 4 am, when most cases of sexual violence occur.⁵⁰ This amounts to \$200 a day, or \$6,000 a month. In addition to providing security, these funds will be injected into the Haitian economy. T-shirts and whistles would be a onetime cost of \$2.10 a person. If volunteers worked five times a week, a two square kilometer camp would need 120 volunteers to ensure that it was monitored every day. Therefore, the cost to run the program for three months would be approximately \$18,252 for this initiative. While statistics cannot show at this time the rate at which incidents of sexual violence would drop, it is predicted that the rate would be more than halved due to the presence of the brigade members and the knowledge that they operate.

3.2. Solar-powered Streetlights

Natural disasters provide windows of opportunity to make the infrastructure better than before it was destroyed; Haiti is no exception. For the purpose of sustainability,

Enersa solar powered lights should be installed.⁵¹ These streetlights can be provided at a cost of \$1,400, \$2,200, or \$2,500 per light, depending on the model purchased.⁵² Without having to rely on electricity, which is notoriously unreliable in the tent camps,⁵³ camp residents can be assured that these lights will work even if the electricity is not available elsewhere in the camp. If installed properly, Enersa streetlights can also be moved to another location at a later time.

To provide lighting in and around this camp, ideally one light would be installed every 15 to 25 meters, depending on the model of streetlight purchased.⁵⁴ If placed strategically, such as along pathways, and around the eight communal latrines, at least 120 lights should be installed (one at each of the latrines and one every 50 meters along the two diagonals of the camp, which are about 2800 meters in length). Installing a light with rocks and soil (as opposed to concrete) will ensure that it can be moved when and if the camp is closed down. One light takes approximately an hour to install with a team of four men. Therefore ideally over eight hours, eight lights could be installed, costing \$20 in labor; it would take 15 days of labor, or \$300 total to cover the camp. With 120 lights at an average of \$2,033 each, it would total \$244,260 to install these lights.

3.3. Women-only areas

Currently, international and local NGOs are providing safe spaces for women who have been victimized (by sexual and other forms of violence).⁵⁵ However, since this paper focuses on preventing sexual violence, women-only latrine and bathing areas in the camps should be considered. In addition to the necessary construction costs to create these new areas, additional security would be required to keep them women-only. Therefore, in this hypothetical camp, if a latrine costs \$300 to build (not including

labor),⁵⁶ women-only latrines should be made available at least every square half kilometer— totaling two latrines per square kilometer, or eight latrines, totaling \$2400. In addition, there would be labor costs, 20 persons x \$5 a day over two days, or \$200 per latrine, as well as security—a few women and or men taking turns outside the latrine to make sure that men do not enter. This would require at least nine people a day, in eight hour shifts, three at a time, for a total of \$45 a day. The likelihood of finding volunteers for this position is much more difficult because sitting by a latrine is less pleasant than walking through the camp. Over three months this would total \$4,050 for security, \$300 plus \$200 for each of eight latrines, or \$4,000, for a total of \$8,050.

3.4. Educational Trainings to Prevent Sexual Violence

Information is power. By educating camp members on simple but powerful ways to prevent sexual violence, many women and girls could ultimately be protected. These trainings would focus on: reasons for why sexual violence is common in Haiti, especially in the camps; how to recognize signs of sexual violence in both perpetrators and victims; why reporting cases of sexual violence is important; and where and how to report these crimes. Using local trainers will not only be crucial to making sure that information is understood among the local Haitian population but it is also cost-effective. Sixty percent of adult women in Haiti are illiterate.⁵⁷ Training provided in native Haitian Creole ensures that the information shared will be understood. Training would rely heavily on picture boards (“boîtes à images”). These would serve as a complement to the advocacy campaigns composed of posters using written language, which MINUSTAH and a range of NGOs have begun placing around Port-au-Prince.

The cost of the educational training program in this camp would break down as follows: an experienced local trainer on gender and sexual violence would cost at least \$250 a month.⁵⁸ The camp would need at least four trainers, so they could work in pairs. Haitian Health officials would be involved to secure government buy-in in the program. This ensures that training sessions do not have to be canceled should a trainer fall ill or be otherwise unavailable. Finding the space to hold these training programs would be free (these would be provided by MINUSTAH and/or partner NGOs). However, incentives, such as refreshments, should be provided to encourage attendance. The cost of refreshments, including clean water and some food, can be budgeted at \$0.50 per person. Each training session should include no more than 50 persons to ensure that everyone can hear and have the chance to ask questions. Microphones and speakers could also be purchased (even though their functioning would be dependent on reliable electricity, and they would need to be kept secure). Design and preparation costs must be taken into account, but MINUSTAH can rely on the excellent preparation already set up by KOFAVIV and its partners. However, it is assumed that design and preparation costs (labor) for this training series would account to \$500. The cost to produce 10 boîtes à images flipbooks would be \$300 and audio equipment would be an estimated \$1,000.⁵⁹ The cost of having four trainings per week, to impact 800 people a month, or 12% of the camp over three months, would be \$1,800 in start up; \$3,000 for trainer payments (\$250x4 trainers x 3 months); \$50 for refreshments for each training, 48 trainings over three months, for a total of \$2,400. Providing sexual violence prevention training for 2,400 adults would total \$7,200. However, the time involved in preparing this training, especially over the Christmas period, would prevent it from being implemented quickly.

Table 1. Overview of Potential Recommendations

Priority Areas for Security	Cost (over three months)	Primary Benefit
Security Brigades	\$18,252	Women and girls throughout the camp feel protected at night; likely attacks prevented; jobs provided for unemployed Haitians
Solar-powered Streetlights	\$244,260	Lighting is provided in key areas in the camp, helping to prevent sexual and other crimes that might otherwise take place under cover of darkness
Women-only Latrines	\$8,050	Women feel safer, have easier access to sanitation; some jobs provided
Educational Training	\$7,200	Camp residents are educated on crucial aspects of understanding and preventing sexual violence

3.5. Final Recommendations

MINUSTAH has made it clear that its priority lies in protecting the highest number of women possible. Thus, the outcome of our cost-benefit analysis should be used as the first step of a new strategy to combat sexual violence. However, this outcome—number of women protected by a proposed course of action—cannot be accurately predicted without more intensive research.

Looking at the result of the analysis above, trainings are the most cost-effective method to ensure that residents of this hypothetical camp are informed about ways to prevent and treat sexual violence. However, it will not likely keep most women protected from sexual violence in the short-term. Keeping in mind the high level of unemployment in Haiti, and especially in the IDP camps, we propose that the best immediate solution to reduce sexual violence in the camps lies in having local security brigades patrol them. The success that the brigades have had, as demonstrated by KOFAVIV, lends support to

this recommendation. Brigades require minimal resources and training, no additional infrastructure, and are a model that can be replicated easily and inexpensively throughout different kinds and sizes of camps. It is crucial that local Haitians be involved in the process of forming and executing these nightly brigades. Security brigades are also economically practical for MINUSTAH because of the low minimum wage in Haiti. Those living in the IDP camps are familiar with the geography of the areas they live in and are able to communicate successfully with fellow residents, unlike international UN Peacekeepers. The combination of cost-effectiveness and local knowledge of brigade members will lead to more effective security and will empower the local population, who will feel they are playing an active role in protecting their fellow residents. Paying salaries to Haitians also has the important benefit of injecting money into the local economy. The brigades will also likely receive support from public officials as they employ Haitians and will serve as a complement to the limited security that the Haitian National Police is able to provide. While there is the potential for Haitian authorities to oppose the injection of funds into informal (rather than official) security, it is unlikely that there would be major obstacles to implementing these security brigades. However, MINUSTAH must engage both the necessary municipal officials and local police forces overseeing the areas in question to ensure that local NGOs and those state employees implementing current security measures come to a mutual understanding regarding how these brigades are formed, led, and managed.

Before the earthquake struck, Port-au-Prince residents faced cycles of political and social upheaval, weak infrastructure, extreme overcrowding, and high rates of violence. Gross mismanagement meant the government was unable to provide even basic

services to its urban population, including adequate education, health care, transportation, and sanitation.⁶⁰ This governmental neglect has rendered the Haitian population unresponsive to political authority, as they are unable to hold their government accountable. The recent increase in sexual violence in Haiti is a direct result of the lack of strong governance following the earthquake. Traumatic stress caused by disaster can lead quickly to social violence⁶¹ and violence against women is no exception. Sexual violence in the IDP camps is clearly aggravated by the current post-disaster climate. Perpetrators in Haiti can act with impunity, knowing that their weak government does not have the structures in place to respond with justice. Those persons most affected by the earthquake will remain without adequate protection until fundamental changes occur in the way Haiti is governed.

While every possible course of action has great potential, security brigades will likely protect the most women in a given IDP camp in Haiti. Once established, the security brigades offer a feasible short-term solution to reducing sexual violence and improving the livelihoods of camp residents through reduced stress and access to employment. Whatever course of action that MINUSTAH chooses, proper evaluation of the project implemented must be carried out. Trusted Haitian monitoring and evaluation experts, working in tandem with UN representatives, should assess the program at the end of the three-month period to gauge its effectiveness and recommend changes to staffing and materials as necessary.

4. Conclusion

The January 2010 earthquake devastated Haiti, essentially destroying not only the infrastructure of the country's capital but also the local economy, leaving thousands of

people jobless, homeless and unable to provide for their own future. MINUSTAH has the mandate⁶² to coordinate efforts of local and international groups working to rebuild Haiti. Looking specifically at the problem of sexual violence in the IDP camps, this paper demonstrates that there are clear opportunities to leverage a locally-led solution that, when multiplied, could have the tangible impact of reducing sexual violence in Haiti's IDP camps.

5. Appendix: Client Profile (Minustah)

MINUSTAH is a UN Mission that has operated in Haiti since 2004, securing fair elections and democratic governance at the demand of the Haitian administration.⁶³ Its activities have included stabilizing violent outbreaks and providing humanitarian relief throughout the several natural disasters, widespread illnesses and violent coups that have recently weakened Haiti.⁶⁴

Upon its creation, the Mission's troops totaled 9,872 individuals. The January 2010 earthquake killed 159 staff members, destroyed MINUSTAH's headquarters in Port-au-Prince and damaged several other UN facilities.⁶⁵ Since the disaster, MINUSTAH has struggled to stabilize the subsequent violence. 2.3 million homeless Haitians—nearly a quarter of the Haitian population—have been temporarily placed in tent camps, both inside and on the outskirts of Haiti's cities.⁶⁶

Security issues include the collapse of Haiti's national penitentiary situated in Port-au-Prince; approximately 3,000 dangerous gang members have fled to return to the slums they once governed and constitute a daily menace to the security of IDP camp residents.⁶⁷ Moreover, the results of the postponed general elections have stirred riots across Haiti.⁶⁸

The resulting state of emergency has made it clear that MINUSTAH's activities must be diversified and decentralized. MINUSTAH's daily projects now include rebuilding Haitian infrastructure, assuring the good governance of an interim government—put in place until the election results—and providing aid to survivors of the earthquake including security, basic shelter, water, medicine and food.⁶⁹ Although it operates under frenzied conditions, MINUSTAH possesses a substantial social

platform,⁷⁰ reliable military forces⁷¹ and a budget (see Table 2) to carry out a successful anti-violence against women campaign.

Table 1. Approved resources for MINUSTAH peacekeeping operations during the period of 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011⁷² (United Nations General Assembly 2010, 2)

	Allocated Budget (US Dollars)	MINUSTAH PERSONNEL (Individuals)
Military and Police Personnel	\$191,108,500	11,848
International Civilian Staff *	\$77,010,800	481
Local Civilian Staff *		1,235
United Nations Volunteers		204
Total:	\$380,000,000	13,768

Statistics for international and local civilians are as of 30 June 2010. Separate total costs for staff and volunteers have not been published.

¹ United Nations, *Haiti: 6 Months After*, July 1, 2010: 2.
http://www.undp.org/haiti/doc/Haiti_6months_after.pdf

² United States Agency for International Development,
USAID's Approach to Shelter in Post-Earthquake Haiti: Providing Security, Dignity and Work (May 26, 2010): 1.
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP673.pdf.

³ MADRE et al., *Gender-Based Violence Against Haitian Women and Girls in Internal Displacement Camps*, 12th Session of the Working Group on the UPR (Human Rights Council, February 2011): 2.

⁴ For the purpose of this paper we are defining sexual violence as rape or attempted rape against women and girls.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷ US\$5.5 billion were pledged by United Nations member states on February 2011. As of February 2011, \$1.38 billion has been disbursed (Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti 2010).

⁸ KOFAVIV, *Camp Security Report* (Port-au-Prince, Haiti, July 18 2010)
<http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/.../KOFAVIV-Appendix.pdf>

⁹ See pages 15-17 for a definition of “brigade.”

¹⁰ In particular, “Our Bodies Are Still Trembling” (2010) and “Request by the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic at the City University...” (2010). They can be accessed in the reference section in this report.

¹¹ The abundance of the reports themselves suggests that MINUSTAH’s efforts to tackle the problem have been inadequate so far. Sadly, the government of Haiti has taken no evident measures to address sexual violence.

¹² We use empowerment to mean enabling women to take control over their future by providing them with means to defend themselves if they or those around them face the threat of sexual violence.

¹³ Ligon, Sara, *In Fight Against Femicide, Whistles Win* (October 26, 2010)
<http://madreblogs.typepad.com/mymadre/2010/10/in-fight-against-femicide-whistles-win.html>.

¹⁴ Margaret E. Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell University: Cornell University Press, 1998)

¹⁵ Sarah Meharg, Aleisha Arnush, *Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building*, Ed. Susan Merrill (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 78.

¹⁶ Erica Caple James, *Democratic Insecurities: violence, trauma, and intervention in Haiti*, California Series in Public Anthropology 22 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 68-74.

¹⁷ Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti et al., *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape* (2010), 15.
<http://ijdh.org/archives/13361/>

¹⁸ Athena Kolbe, Royce Hutson, *Human rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: a random survey of households* (*The Lancet* 368, no. 9538, 2010), 864-872.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 872

²⁰ Chew Lin, Kavita N. Ramdas, *Caught in the Storm: The Impact of Natural Disasters on Women* (The Global Fund for Women, 2005), 1.
www.globalfundforwomen.org/storage/images/stories/.../disaster-report.pdf

²¹ Felten-Biermann, *Gender and Natural Disaster: Sexualized violence and the tsunami* (*Development* 49, no. 3, 2006), 83.

²² *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape: 4.*

²³ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 12.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-6.

²⁶ *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape: 6.*

²⁷ *Democratic Insecurities: violence, trauma, and intervention in Haiti*, 61.

²⁸ *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape: 4-6.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ United Nations Development Fund for Women, *Not a Minute More* (2003), 68.

http://www.unifem.org/materials/item_detail.php?ProductID=7

³¹ Andrew Morrisson, Mary Ellsberg, Sarah Bott, *Gender-Based Violence in the Latin American and Caribbean Region: A Critical Review of Interventions* (World Bank, 2004), 11-12.

<http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241591609.pdf>

³² *Not a Minute More*, 68.

http://www.unifem.org/materials/item_detail.php?ProductID=7

³³ Alexis Gardella, *Gender Assessment for USAID/ Haiti Country Strategy Statement. Assessment* (USAID, 2006), 11.

pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH597.pdf

³⁴ *Gender-Based Violence Against Haitian Women and Girls in Internal Displacement Camps*

³⁵ Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell University: Cornell University Press.

³⁶ Democracy Now! *Rape in the Camps: Lacking Security, Women Organize to Protect Themselves*

http://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/14/rape_in_the_camps_lacking_security (July 14, 2007)

³⁷ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 165-198.

³⁸ *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape*

³⁹ MADRE, *Haiti Website*, <http://www.madre.org/index/meet-madre-1/our-partners-6/haiti-kofaviv--zanmi-lasante-36.html> (October 26, 2010)

⁴⁰ Democracy Now! *Rape in the Camps: Lacking Security, Women Organize to Protect Themselves*,

http://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/14/rape_in_the_camps_lacking_security (November 4, 2010)

⁴¹ Joseph Guyler Devla, Tom Brown, *Gangs return to Haiti slum after quake prison break*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60G0CO20100117> (November 19, 2010)

⁴² *Rape in the Camps: Lacking Security, Women Organize to Protect Themselves*

⁴³ MADRE *Haiti Website*

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape*

⁴⁶ *In Fight Against Femicide, Whistles Win*

⁴⁷ MADRE Haiti Website

⁴⁸ Oxfam Media Briefing, *Aid to Haiti, 6 months on: a long way to go*, <http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/aid-to-haiti-6-months-on-a-long-way-to-go> (November 10, 2010)

⁴⁹ Robert Naiman, *Is the UN Violating Haiti's Minimum Wage Law?* (Just Foreign Policy, 2010), <http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/496>, (November 14, 2010)

⁵⁰ *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape.*

⁵¹ Enersa is a Haitian-based company that designs and manufactures solar-powered technology. In addition to street lights, they produce chargers for cell phones and lamps. They do as much production as they can in Haiti and employ only locals in their Port-au-Prince based factory (Appropriate Infrastructure Development Group 2010).

⁵² Jean Ronel, *Questions about streetlights* (November 25, 2010)

⁵³ *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape*, 12. <http://ijdh.org/archives/13361/>

⁵⁴ Jean Ronel, *Questions about streetlights* (November 25, 2010)

⁵⁵ KOFAVIV, *KOFAVIV Camp Security Report* (Port-au-Prince, 2010) <http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/.../KOFAVIV-Appendix.pdf> (November 15, 2010)

⁵⁶ An estimate based on the amount paid to public health educators. Oxfam Media Briefing, *Aid to Haiti, 6 months on: a long way to go* (July 2010), 3. <http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/aid-to-haiti-6-months-on-a-long-way-to-go> (November 10, 2010)

⁵⁷ Anne-Christine D'Adesky, Jacob Kushner, *SPECIAL REPORT: Haiti, Women, and the Elections: Following Africa's Lead* (World Pulse, October 2010)

⁵⁸ Oxfam Media Briefing, *Aid to Haiti, 6 months on: a long way to go*, 1. <http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/aid-to-haiti-6-months-on-a-long-way-to-go> (October 10, 2010)

⁵⁹ Please note that these prices are based on the authors' understanding of such commodities from working in developing countries around the world.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Rosalind P. Petchesky, *Conflict and Crisis Settings: Promoting Sexual and Reproductive Rights* (Reproductive Health Matters 16, no. 31, 2008), 7. www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/110294.php (November 17, 2010)

⁶² See page 4 for the UN mandate.

⁶³ MINUSTAH, *Background - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti* <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml> (October 23, 2010)

⁶⁴ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1542 (2004)- Security Council establishes UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for initial six-month period* (Press Release, 2010) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8083.doc.htm>. (November 19, 2010)

⁵⁵ Jessica Desvarieux, *Haiti's Cholera Riots: Anger at the U.N. Over Outbreak* – (TIME, 2010) <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2032437,00.html> (November 30, 2010)

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁷ *Gangs return to Haiti slum after quake prison break.*

⁶⁸ Arnesen, Ingrid, *Observers Validate Haiti Election*, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703945904575645220323533144.html?KEYWORDS=haiti> (November 30, 2010)

⁶⁹ MINUSTAH Background - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

⁷⁰ As a United Nations mission.

⁷¹ Haitian police forces are not adequately trained to face the state's recurrent violent upheavals. Reports suggest that the United Nations will have to maintain troops in Haiti for "at least a decade" (Erikson 2009, 8-9).

⁷² United Nations General Assembly 2010, *Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, Sixty-fourth session, Fifth Committee, United Nations, July 13, Accessed November 19, 2010.* www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml

Bibliography

- Anastario, M. P, R. Larrance, and L. Lawry. 2008. Using Mental Health Indicators to Identify Post-disaster Gender-Based Violence among Women Displaced by Hurricane Katrina. *Journal of Women's Health* 17, no. 9: 1437–1444.
- Appropriate Infrastructure Development Group. 2010. AIDG Haiti: Enersa (Rapid Investment). Accessed November 21, 2010. <http://www.aidg.org/incubation/enersa.htm>.
- Arnesen, Ingrid. 2010. Observers Validate Haiti Election. November 30. Accessed November 30, 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703945904575645220323533144.html?KEYWORDS=haiti>.
- Bardach, Eugene. 2009. *A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving (Third Edition)*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Booth, William, and Mary Beth Sheridan. 2010. Funding delays, housing complexities slow Haiti rebuilding effort. *The Washington Post*, November 25. Accessed December 1, 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/24/AR2010112407194.html>.
- Brookings Institute. “New Orleans Index at Five.” Accessed November 30, 2010. Last modified August 4, 2010. <http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2007/08neworleansindex.aspx>

BRR & Partners. "Aceh and Nias: Two Years After the Tsunami." Indonesia: BRR, 2006.

Chen, Yu-Wen. 2010. "Who Made the Uighers Invisible in the International Arena." *George Mason University*. March 25. Accessed November 30, 2010.
Cgs.gmu.edu/publications/gmtpwp/gmtp_wp_12.pdf

D'Adesky, Anne-Christine, and Jacob Kushner. 2010. SPECIAL REPORT: Haiti, Women, and the Elections: Following Africa's Lead. *World Pulse*. October 15.

Delva, Joseph Guyler, and Brown, Tom. 2010. Gangs return to Haiti slum after quake prison break. *Reuters*. January 17. Accessed November 19, 2010.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60G0CO20100117>.

Desvarieux, Jessica. 2010. Haiti's Cholera Riots: Anger at the U.N. Over Outbreak - *TIME*. November 22. Accessed November 30, 2010.
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2032437,00.html>.

Democracy Now! Rape in the Camps: Lacking Security, Women Organize to Protect Themselves (Video). *Democracy Now! News*, July 14. Accessed November 4, 2010.
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/14/rape_in_the_camps_lacking_security.

Erikson, Daniel P. 2010. Haiti. *Country Report*. Freedom House: 8-9.

Felten-Biermann, C. 2006. Gender and Natural Disaster: Sexualized violence and the tsunami. *Development* 49, no. 3: 82–86.

FEMA Louisiana Recovery Office. "Katrina/ Rita: The 5th Commemoration." New Orleans, LA: Department of Homeland Security, 2009.

Gardella, Alexis. 2006. *Gender Assessment for USAID/ Haiti Country Strategy Statement*. Assessment. USAID, June. Accessed November 30, 2010.
pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH597.pdf

Government Accountability Office. "HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future." Washington D.C.: FEMA, 2006.

Guardian. "After the 2004 Tsunami: Rebuilding Lives, Salvaging Communities." Accessed November 30, 2009. Last modified December 23, 2009.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/23/2004-tsunami-five-years-on>

Guidi, Ruxandra. 2009. MINUSTAH Focuses on Security in Haiti's Cité Soleil Slum. July 20. Accessed November 21, 2010. <http://www.americasquarterly.org/haiti-cite-soleil>.

Haiti Grassroots Watch. 2010. Ayiti Kale Je - Haiti Grassroots Watch - Haïti Veedor - English. November 8. Accessed November 21, 2010.
<http://haitigrassrootswatch.squarespace.com/haiti-grassroots-watch-engli/>.

Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, MADRE, TransAfrica Forum, University of Minnesota Law School Human Rights and Advocacy Clinic, and University of Virginia School of Law International Human Rights Law Clinic and Human Rights Program. 2010. *Our Bodies Are Still Trembling: Haitian Women's Fight Against Rape*. July 1.

Accessed October 16, 2010. <http://ijdh.org/archives/13361/>

James, Erica Caple. 2010. *Democratic Insecurities: violence, trauma, and intervention in Haiti*. California Series in Public Anthropology 22. Berkeley: University of California Press, XX-74.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Cornell University: Cornell University Press.

KOFAVIV. 2010. *KOFAVIV Camp Security Report*. Port-au-Prince, Haiti, July 18. Accessed November 15, 2010. <http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/.../KOFAVIV-Appendix.pdf>

Kolbe, A. R, and R. A Hutson. 2006. Human rights abuse and other criminal violations in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: a random survey of households. *The Lancet* 368, no. 9538: 864–873.

Leavitt, Sarah. 2010. Interview with Outreach Manager Sarah Leavitt at LAMBI Fund of Haiti: Activities and Comments on the Plight of Haitian women in IDP camps. Interview via Skype. October 7.

Ligon, Sarah. 2010. In Fight Against Femicide, Whistles Win. MADRE blogs. October 26. Accessed November 3, 2010. <http://madreblogs.typepad.com/mymadre/2010/10/in-fight-against-femicide-whistles-win.html>.

Lin, Chew, and Kavita N. Ramdas. 2005. *Caught in the Storm: The Impact of Natural Disasters on Women*. The Global Fund for Women, December. Accessed November 3, 2010. www.globalfundforwomen.org/storage/images/stories/.../disaster-report.pdf

Lindblom, Charles E. 2002. *The Market System: What it is, how it works, and what to make of it*.
Yale University: Yale University Press.

MADRE. 2010. MADRE Haiti Website. Accessed October 26, 2010.

<http://www.madre.org/index/meet-madre-1/where-we-work-53/haiti-168.html>

MADRE, KOFAVIV, FAVILEK, KONAMAVID, Women's Link Worldwide, and The International Women's Human Rights (IWHR) Clinic at the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law. 2011. Gender-Based Violence Against Haitian Women and Girls in Internal Displacement Camps. 12th Session of the Working Group on the UPR Human Rights Council. Haiti: Republic of Haiti, February. <http://ijdh.org/archives/17997>.

Marulanda, Lilliana. "Building Houses, Rebuilding Communities: UN-HABITAT Post-Tsunami Reconstruction Efforts in Indonesia." Fukuoka, Japan: UN-HABITAT Regional Office for Asia & the Pacific, 2005.

Meharg, Sarah, and Aleisha Arnush. 2010. Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building. Ed. Susan Merrill. PKSOI Papers. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January.

MINUSTAH. 2010. MINUSTAH Background - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

MINUSTAH. Accessed October 23, 2010.

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml>.

Morrison, Andrew, Mary Ellsberg and Sarah Bott. 2007. "Addressing Gender-Based Violence: A Critical Review of Interventions." World Bank. Accessed November 19, 2010.

<http://wbpro.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/1/25.full.pdf+html>

Naiman, Robert. 2010. Is the UN Violating Haiti's Minimum Wage Law?. Just Foreign Policy. February 26. Accessed November 21, 2010. <http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/node/496>.

Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti. 2010. International Assistance to Haiti: Key Facts as of November 2010. November. Accessed May 6, 2011. http://s3.amazonaws.com/haiti_production/assets/22/1_Overall_financing_key_facts_Feb_original.pdf

Oxfam Media Briefing. 2010. *Aid to Haiti, 6 months on: a long way to go*. July 7. Accessed November 10, 2010. <http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/aid-to-haiti-6-months-on-a-long-way-to-go>

Petchesky, Rosalind P. 2008. Conflict and Crisis Settings: Promoting Sexual and Reproductive Rights. *Reproductive Health Matters* 16, no. 31: 4-9. Accessed November 17, 2010. www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/110294.php

Ronel, Jean. E-mail. 2010. Questions about streetlights. November 25. South End Press Collective, eds. 2007. "What Lies Beneath: Katrina, Race, and the State of the Nation." South End Press, February 1.

United Nations (UN). 2010. "Haiti: 6 Months After." July 1. Accessed October 16, 2010. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/6_months_after_commemoration.pdf

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). 2003. "Not a Minute More."

Accessed November 19, 2010.

http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/305_book_eng_07.pdf

United Nations General Assembly. 2010. Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011. Sixty-fourth session, Fifth Committee.

United Nations, July 13. Accessed November 19, 2010.

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/financing.shtml

United Nations Security Council. 2004. Resolution 1542 (2004)- Security Council establishes UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti for initial six-month period. Press Release. April 30.

Accessed November 19, 2010.

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8083.doc.htm>.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2010.

"USAID's Approach to Shelter in Post-Earthquake Haiti: Providing Security, Dignity and Work." May 26. Accessed November 19, 2010.

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACP673.pdf.