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Asset Specificity and Network Control of Television Programs

Show simple item record Lin, Daniel
dc.creator Lin, Daniel 2007-12-19T20:54:55Z 2007-12-19T20:54:55Z 2007-12-19T20:54:55Z
dc.description.abstract This dissertation uses transaction-cost theories to explain the shift from advertiser control to network control of programs in the 1950s television industry. In the late 1940s, ratings data revealed that the audience for one program tended to flow into neighboring programs. This paper proposes that the threat of ex-post opportunism discouraged advertisers from making the necessary ex-ante investments to exploit audience flow. The networks were better positioned to constrain the opportunism by consolidating the control rights to production and scheduling, increasing the contract duration with key production personnel, and placing more contractual restrictions on producers.
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.subject Economics en_US
dc.subject Television en_US
dc.subject Advertising en_US
dc.subject Asset Specificity en_US
dc.subject Transaction Cost en_US
dc.subject Golden Age en_US
dc.title Asset Specificity and Network Control of Television Programs en
dc.type Dissertation en Doctor of Philosophy in Economics en Doctoral en Economics en George Mason University en

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