Show simple item record Adams, Mark
dc.creator Adams, Mark 2009-07-23 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z NO_RESTRICTION en_US 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z
dc.description.abstract Societies exist where individuals agree to live together and abide by a common set of rules. These rules seek to limit, but to not eliminate, predation. When a community is struck by a disaster the environment changes but rules frequently do not adapt; discouraging investment and repopulation and hindering recovery. The laws governing private contracts have evolved mechanism for avoiding harmful rigidity during times of crisis. This thesis proposes a means of applying a similar mechanism to the binding constraints in social interactions with the aim of increasing the likelihood of the community surviving and rebuilding.
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.subject public choice en_US
dc.subject Tiebout en_US
dc.subject disaster en_US
dc.subject constitution en_US
dc.subject law en_US
dc.subject crisis en_US
dc.title Rules In Crisis en_US
dc.type Thesis en Master of Arts in Economics en_US Master's en Economics en George Mason University en

Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search MARS


My Account